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Abstract
This research theorises militant groups' meso-level evolution from their emergence to their potential
non-violent transformation. The central argument of this thesis is that the timing of militant groups'
adoption  of  violence  in  semi-authoritarian  regimes  is  crucial  in  accounting  for  their  subsequent
ideational and organisational evolution, according to a path-dependent model. When a militant group
predates its legitimisation of armed violence, the time period preceding the latter encourages low-risk
activism mobilising patterns, which are defined as safer modes of mobilisation that are not directly
opposed  by the  state  and  therefore  do  not  entail  high  individual  costs.  These  mobilizing  patterns
facilitate the creation of strong horizontal ties between the group's leaders and the development of
collective group identity shared by its leaders and members. These three factors collectively ease the
internal legitimisation of shared horizontal and vertical organisational norms, which respectively refer
to the norms uniting the leaders of the group and the norms uniting the leaders to their followers.
Theses norms include the normalisation of the prerogatives of the group's leadership, an internal culture
of  consensus  and shared decision  making processes.  These factors  subsequently shape  the  group's
evolution,  whose  possible  non-violent  transformation  becomes  contingent  on  the  ability  of  its
leadership to exploit external macro stimuli or internal learning processes, and to draw on the group's
collective identity to internally legitimise a new strategic direction. Conversely,  the second type of
militant  group  is  defined  by  its  members'  immediate  engagement  in  high-risk  activism  forms  of
mobilisation,  defined by their  high individual cost  caused by their  intrinsically violent nature (e.g.
staging  a  military  coup).  The  combination  of  early  ideational  justifications  of  violence  and  its
associated mobilising patterns fuel internal factionalism and hinder the legitimisation of internal norms
of decision making and the consolidation of a controlled collective group identity. This mobilising
pattern often sparks splits over any new tactical and strategic issues which may arise overtime, and
eventually impedes the successful consensual transformation of this type of group in changing macro
circumstances. This theorisation of militant groups' evolution is applied to the Egyptian Islamic and
Jihad Groups. This thesis is based on a social movement theory framework. It is a qualitative small-n
comparative  case-study  research  using  field  research  and  interviews  with  numerous  leaders  and
members of these two groups.
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CHAPTER 1
A MESO-LEVEL THEORISATION OF
MILITANT GROUPS' EVOLUTION
The diversity  of  the  [jihadi]  groups is  the  outcome of  many factors  [...]  pertaining to  the  different
temporal and spatial conditions in which they emerged, their different understandings of reality, and the
lack of confidence of some Muslim youths that older groups could confront secular governments from
the 1940s to this day.
Ayman al-Zawahiri (1993)
1.1. TOWARDS A MESO-CENTRED APPROACH TO MILITANT GROUPS' EVOLUTION
A comparative theorisation of Islamist militant groups' evolution across cases has long been neglected
in  the  scholarship  on  political  violence.  While  the  academic  literature  recognises  the  necessity  to
contextualise  these  groups  in  their  multi-level  environments,  a  comprehensive  theoretical
understanding stretching from their emergence to their potential non-violent transformation has never
been fully  developed.  Rationalised  by a  laudable  endeavour  to  dissect  these  groups'  diversity  and
undermine frequent unhelpful amalgams, the academic corpus on political violence has often endorsed
diverse  typologies  based  on  these  groups'  ideologies,  theologies  and  rationales.  Rationale-based
differentiations  have  notably  compartmentalised  Islamist  militant  groups  into  four  categories
demarcating the internationalists, the irredentists,  the socio-revolutionaries,  and the vigilant.1 These
typologies  have  been  designed  to  facilitate  militant  groups'  theoretical  understanding  in  delimited
contexts, even though they have often obstructed a broader understanding of these groups' changing
rationales over time2 and hindered the study of cross-group mechanisms. A replicable cross-category
theoretical framework reconciling militant groups' changing macro environments and organisational
dynamics with internal learning processes and ideational legitimisation has yet to be formulated.
1 e.g. Hegghammer, 2009, 2011: 4-8; see also: Wittes, 2008; Ashour, 2011; Dalacoura, 2011. Ideational differentiations
based on these groups' ideological or theological outlooks refer to other categories, including the ubiquitous  takfiri
denomination which includes militant groups which are said to excommunicate fellow Muslims.
2 Interchanging rationales between internationalists and local agendas have spread substantially in the 2000s, with the
development of local groups adopting al-Qaeda's agenda combined with the latter's increased focus on local regimes
(e.g. Hoffman, 2004).
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The comparative routes followed by the two main Egyptian militant groups, the Islamic Group (IG
thereafter)  and  the  Jihad  Group  (JG  thereafter),  illustrate  the  limits  inherent  with  rationale  and
ideational-based typologies, and demonstrate the necessity to develop cross-category theorisations. The
IG emerged in the mid-1970s as a university-based proselytising group which subsequently endorsed
armed violence against the semi-authoritarian Egyptian regime. A failed armed campaign in the 1990s
triggered the 1997 ceasefire initiative, later followed by theological renunciations of violence. After a
temporary opening of political opportunity in 2011, the IG created a political party and joined the
political process. A rationalist understanding of organisational survival could infer that this group has
historically responded to external macro stimuli, and adapted its ideational framework accordingly. It
would posit that the IG endorsed violence when the state obstructed any non-violent alternative, and
created a political party when the political environment became favourable to political participation.3
The IG's history would illustrate that ideational typological differentiations between violent and non-
violent Islamist groups merely reflect the diverging macro-level environments in which they operate.
This explanation would nonetheless not explain why, in similar environmental conditions, a prominent
JG-affiliated faction joined al-Qaeda in the late 1990s when violence failed to yield any result in Egypt,
and  why  only  a  minority  of  its  leaders  joined  the  political  process  when  the  Egyptian  political
environment became conducive to political participation after 2011. The JG, in contrast with the IG,
indeed adapted its rationale for violence when armed jihad failed in Egypt: rather than renouncing the
legitimacy of  violence,  the JG embraced an internationalist  agenda.  If  this  discrepancy was solely
explained by the personality of the JG leader, Ayman al-Zawahiri, and by this group's association with
al-Qaeda networks outside of Egypt,4 then why did the IG's external leadership not similarly join AQ,
despite  its  inclusion  in  analogous networks  and friendly  relations  with Osama bin  Laden? On the
ideological front, one could also question why a broadly similar salafi theologico-political outlook was
amenable to political participation in the IG, despite decades of theological opposition to party politics
and democracy, while the same does not collectively hold true in the JG. The comparison between
these two groups demonstrates that they have reacted differently to external stimuli over time.
3 This argument is aligned with Hafez's analysis (2003), which posits that violence was a response to political exclusion
combined with reactive and indiscriminatory repression. This argument has sparked many controversies over the precise
role of exclusion on Islamist movements. e.g. Dalacoura, 2011; Hamid, 2014. See also chapter 6.
4 This view is favoured by Gerges (2009).
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Applied  to  Islamist  and  non-Islamist  cases,  these  paradoxical  routes  suggest  that  organisational
dynamics have a preponderant role in mediating environmental changes, and in explaining militant
groups' internal learning processes. This thesis therefore aims to theorise militant groups' meso-level
evolution according to a path dependent model. This perspective considers that, although these groups'
evolution is not pre-determined, their past choices regulate the range of possibilities available in the
present and informs their future trajectories. This research endeavours to achieve this aim with the
completion of three complementary objectives. The first objective is to provide an understanding of
these groups' ideational constructions situated between essentialist and rationalist perspectives. This
research sets out to analyse militant groups' ideational developments as complementarily flexible and
circumscribed, whereby ideas are reinterpreted relationally, in continuity with previous interpretations
and  within  the  boundaries  set  by  the  organisational  settings  in  which  these  groups  operate.  This
research's second objective pertains to these groups' use of violence. This thesis undertakes a multi-
level disaggregated analysis of these groups’ resort to armed violence centred on their organisational
dynamics.  Finally,  this  research  investigates  militant  groups'  potential  non-violent  transformation,
including ideological renunciations to violence and the creation of political parties.
A meso-level conceptualisation of militant groups' evolution represents an important step towards their
cross-case  analytical  comparison.  This  theorisation  is  designed to  investigate  successive  phases  of
evolution comprehensively, from these groups' emergence, to their involvement in armed contention,
and potential non-violent transformation. These episodes are understood in continuity and change in
order to discover and investigate specific points of rupture. This meso-level perspective is designed to
explore  internal  dialogues  and  processes,  reconciling  evolving  patterns  of  decision  making  with
broader  ideational  developments,  and  to  investigate  their  mediation  with  material  (macro  and
organisational) changes. This focus is necessary to explain Islamist militant groups' evolutions beyond
idiosyncratic analyses, towards a replicable and empirically rich theorisation. 
The construction of a meso-level conceptualisation of militant groups has important ramifications on
the  study  of  Islamist  movements.  This  theoretical  endeavour  is  a  significant  contribution  to  the
academic literature, which has often been plagued by a counterproductive division between materialist
and ideational paradigms. Materialist leaning studies have generally granted pre-eminence to structural
and organisational factors, including political exclusion and repression (e.g. Martinez, 1998; Burgat,
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2002; Hafez, 2003), foreign occupation (Pape, 2006), the sociology of the radical communities which
support militancy (Berman, 2009) and diverse micro and meso processes informed by the necessity to
survive in competitive environments (e.g. Bloom, 2007; Kalyvas, 1999, 2006). Conversely, ideational-
leaning studies have often emphasised the nature of radical millenarist religious cults (Juergensmeyer,
2003; Stern, 2003) and of these groups' Islamist ideologies (Tibi, 2014).5 According to this perspective,
ideational  factors  are  central  to  the  study  of  militant  Islamist  groups,  while,  for  their  materialist
contenders, ideational developments are contingent on broader structural and organisational changes.
These two paradigmatic visions should nonetheless not simplify the complex reality of Islamist armed
groups, which reveal that material and ideational factors are, in congruence with constructivist views,
mutually constituted rather than mutually exclusive.
1.2. THE MAIN ARGUMENTS OF THIS RESEARCH
This research presents a general argument explaining militant groups'  ideational and organisational
evolution, and three subsidiary arguments covering specific themes. While this research focuses on two
Islamist groups, it is of relevance to armed militancy broadly speaking, whether in Islamist or non-
Islamist settings. The central argument of this thesis is that the timing of militant groups' adoption of
violence  in  semi-authoritarian  regimes  is  crucial  in  accounting  for  their  subsequent  ideational  and
organisational evolution,  according to  a path-dependent model.  When a militant group predates its
legitimisation of armed violence, the time period preceding the latter  encourages low-risk activism
mobilising patterns, which are defined as safer modes of mobilisation that are not directly opposed by
the state  and therefore do not  entail  high individual  costs.  These mobilizing patterns  facilitate  the
creation of strong horizontal ties between the group's leaders and the development of collective group
identity  shared  by  its  leaders  and  members.  These  three  factors  collectively  ease  the  internal
legitimisation of shared horizontal and vertical organisational norms, which respectively refer to the
norms uniting the leaders of the group and the norms uniting the leaders to their followers. Theses
norms include the normalisation of the prerogatives of the leadership of the group, an internal culture
of  consensus  and shared decision  making processes.  These factors  subsequently shape  the  group's
evolution,  whose  possible  non-violent  transformation  becomes  contingent  on  the  ability  of  its
leadership to exploit external macro stimuli or internal learning processes, and draw on the group's
5 Several criticisms of the role allegedly played by religion in violent contention have been recently elaborated by a few
scholars (e.g. Cavanaugh, 2009; Gunning & Jackson, 2011; Gunning, 2012; Armstrong, 2014).
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collective identity to internally legitimise a new strategic direction. Conversely,  the second type of
militant  group  is  defined  by  its  members'  immediate  engagement  in  high-risk  activism  forms  of
mobilisation,  defined by their  high individual cost  caused by their  intrinsically violent nature (e.g.
staging  a  military  coup).  The  combination  of  early  ideational  justifications  of  violence  and  its
associated mobilising patterns fuel internal factionalism and hinder the legitimisation of internal norms
of decision making and the consolidation of a controlled collective group identity. This mobilising
pattern often sparks splits over any new tactical and strategic issues which may arise overtime, and
eventually impedes the successful consensual transformation of this type of group in changing macro
circumstances.
This thesis  develops three supplementary arguments.  The first  contention is  that  a militant group's
ideational framework has to be understood relationally, within a group's organisational norms which
both empower  and constrain  the emergence  and development  of  new ideational  frames.  A group's
ideational framework therefore cannot be reified,  and only exists  and evolves through the learning
processes of its internally recognised sources of authorities, and within organisational constraints (for
instance internal norms of decision making). Ideational outlooks can be reinterpreted to justify both
violent  and  non-violent  tactics  and  strategies,  although  ideas  cannot  be  solely  considered
epiphenomena of broader material  conditions. A group's ideational reinterpretations are specifically
bounded by an ideational structure adopted in its early days (for salafi militants, this structure is formed
by the salafi discursive tradition) which defines its core commitments and provides a set of legitimate
tools and resources to reinterpret them over time. These ideational reinterpretations are facilitated by
the possibility to redefine the ramifications of a group's collective identity in light of external stimuli
and internal learning processes.
The second argument of this thesis is that violence and its practicalities have to be understood within a
cycle of contention with numerous forces, including these groups' allies, contenders and the state. In
addition to this widely accepted assertion in social movement studies, it is also crucial to differentiate
the organisational mediations of evolving state policies by distinctive actors within a militant group,
and their changing interpretations at the meso-level. A group's reaction to a cycle of contention cannot
be solely understood through the analysis of diverging patterns of repression (possibly contextualised
in  a  cycle  of  protest).  A group's  reaction  to  macro  policies  is  primarily  contingent  on its  internal
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structure and organisational norms, which mediate internal differences of preferences for the use of
violence. This perspective posits that a militant group does not necessarily react similarly to analogous
macro-level  policies,  and asserts  that  a  group might  react  differently overtime,  in  consideration of
internal learning processes and their organisational assimilation.
Finally, the third argument presented in this thesis is that a militant group can successfully renounce the
applicability  of  armed  violence  and  embrace  non-violent  approaches  to  political  action.  This
transformation  is  informed by internal  learning  processes  and by changing  external  environments.
These two factors are regulated by these groups' interactions with external groups and actors situated
within  or  outside  their  social  movement  family.  A  group's  transformation  should  therefore  be
understood organisationally, in consideration of a group's internal organisational norms and in light of
the ability of its leadership to reframe its collective identity and diffuse new ideational frames within
the boundaries set up by the group's ideational structure 
1.3.  THE  CHOICE  OF A SMALL-N  COMPARATIVE  CASE  STUDY AND  SCOPE  FOR
GENERALISATION
Finding an adequate balance between empirical abundance and theoretical value is the main difficulty
of  meso-centred  studies  on  armed militancy.  The  numerous  obstacles  facing  the  gathering  of  rich
primary  data  on  militant  groups  have  often  spurred  a  counter-productive  division  between  broad
comparisons  of  macro  or  meso-level  characteristics  across  cases,  and  empirically  rich  single-case
studies. The former emphasises its theoretical validity and generalisability, at the cost of a neglected
consideration of internal perceptions and interpretations at the meso-level (e.g. Pape, 2006; Bloom,
2007; Moghadam, 2008; Dalacoura, 2011). Conversely, the latter relies on first-hand primary access to
militant groups and rich analyses of their written and oral sources to explore their internal dynamics
and debunk existing simplifications. Their idiosyncratic nature, however, often leaves doubts over their
theoretical generalisability to broader understandings of armed militancy, although their empiricism
sometimes alludes to subsidiary theoretical ramifications (e.g.  Gunning, 2008; Hegghammer,  2010;
Lefèvre, 2013).
An alternative  approach  situated  between these  two contrasting  poles  emphasises  the  necessity  to
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conceptualise  the meso-level,  and comparatively investigate  militant  groups'  internal  dynamics and
organisational processes. This perspective is located beyond hardly replicable analyses of a single case
study,  towards  more  generalisable  conceptualisations  and  meso-level  theorising,  reconciling  these
groups' internal dialogues and organisational processes with changing macro policies. This choice has
increasingly been adopted in the literature on civil war (e.g. Wood, 2003; Weinstein, 2007; Metelits,
2009;  Christia,  2012;  Shapiro,  2013;  Staniland,  2014),  building  on  the  case  for  the  multi-level
disaggregation  of  the  use  of  violence  in  these  settings  (Chenoweth  et  al.,  2010).  Similar
conceptualisations  of  the  meso-level  have  also  been  replicated  in  studies  of  armed  militancy  in
alternative settings not marked by fully-fledged civil wars (della Porta, 2013), although this field of
inquiry has not hitherto been as widely pursued.6 This research endorses this alternative choice between
empirical and theoretical value, and adopts a small-n comparative case study research design. This
choice is the most appropriate to substantiate the main arguments of this research, and analyse militant
groups' internal dynamics comparatively in a limited number of cases.
A major historical contribution to comparative politics was introduced by Mill's comparative methods.
In  A System of  Logic (Mill,  1865),  Mill  explores  the “method of  agreement” and the “method of
difference”, which have often been subsequently referred to as the most different and most similar
cases. Mills posits that, in the method of agreement, “if two or more instances of the phenomenon
under investigation have only one circumstance in common, the circumstance in which alone all the
instances agree, is the cause (or effect) of the given phenomenon” (Mill,  1865: 454), while, in the
method of difference, he proposes that “if an instance in which the phenomenon under investigation
occurs, and an instance in which it does not occur, have every circumstance save one in common, that
one occurring only in the former; the circumstance in which alone the two instances differ, is the effect,
or cause, or a necessary part of the cause, of the phenomenon.” (Mill, 1865: 463). Mill's method of
agreement therefore endeavours to identify a single causal variable, whereas his method of difference
attempts to identify a distinctive variable explaining different outcomes, all other factors being similar.
Although the application of Mill's methods in the social sciences can be problematic, they provide an
important comparative logic of case selection. George and Bennett contend that Mill's methods rely on
three  challenging  prerequisites,  namely  that  only  one  necessary  or  sufficient  condition  should  be
6 A growing number of PhD theses have been recently completed with similar conceptualisations, although they remain
focused on civil war environments. e.g. Green, 2011; Krause, 2011; Woldemariam, 2011; Bateson, 2013.
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involved in the causal relations, that all “causally relevant variables” are recognised and that all causal
paths can be investigated (George & Bennett,  2005: 155).  Despite additional  risks associated with
Mill's  methods  to  assess  a  variable's  necessity  or  sufficiency,  its  ideal  types  are  beneficial  to  this
research for their distinction of the two main logics of case selection. The first choice would be the
selection of a determined number of militant groups sharing an organisational characteristic, followed
by their systematic comparison in different settings. This choice could draw on Goodwin's state centric
approach (2001: 35) by selecting a small-n number of cases of Islamist militant groups with a shared
organisational characteristic, which would be analysed and systematically compared in several types of
political  regimes in order to make theoretical sense of its  role and importance.  The second choice
would  be  the  selection  of  a  few  militant  groups  which  differ  on  one  prominent  organisational
characteristic, followed by their systematic comparison in very similar contexts. The analysis of this
comparison would then infer on this organisational factor.
The philosophy and objectives of this research are particularly appropriate to a case selection informed
by Mill's method of difference. The social movement approach to armed militancy developed in the
next chapters does not isolate militant groups from their broader environments, which notably include
their  violent  and  non-violent  competitors  and  allies,  as  well  as  religious  and  secular  groups  and
institutions. This research contextualises militant groups' political approaches in relation to changing
state  policies  towards them and towards  these additional  actors.  The complexity inherent  with the
inclusion of rich external factors hinders a cross case comparison between different countries, which
could increase the presence of unconsidered and uncontrolled external  variables.  This shortcoming
would  negatively  impact  the  validity  of  this  research's  findings  and limit  its  theoretical  relevance.
Building on Mill's method of difference, it is therefore more appropriate to select a single country and a
small-n  number  of  militant  groups  which  substantially  differ  on  one  prominent  organisational
characteristic.  This  analysis  can  then  focus  on  the  impact  of  this  discrepancy  on  these  groups'
respective evolution. In this research, the main difference between the two groups selected concerns the
time-frame separating their emergence and endorsement of armed violence.
The choice of country was guided by several additional considerations. This research design required a
country that was both accessible to field research and widely studied in the literature. The selected
Islamist  militant  groups  had  to  differ  organisationally,  and  somehow represent  typical  cases.  The
32 / 314
existing breadth of research on Egypt and the importance of its two main militant groups, the Islamic
Group (al-Jamaʿa al-Islamiyya,  IG thereafter)  and the Jihad Group (jamaʿa al-jihad,  JG thereafter)
made it particularly suitable for a comparative study.7 Egypt has long been central for armed Islamist
groups in Muslim countries, and both groups have proven very influential for decades. The former has
historically defended a mass-movement approach which has affected other Islamist armed groups, such
as its eponymous counterpart in Indonesia. The JG's elitist endeavour, on the other hand, has influenced
other groups such as the Libyan Islamic Fighting Group (LIFG), and has provided the ideational and
organisational  backbone  of  al-Qaeda  organisation.  The  similarity  of  these  two  Egyptian  groups'
theologico-political frameworks drawing on  salafi  Islam and their evolution in similar domestic and
international environments based on distinctive organisational structures and modes of mobilisation is
therefore appropriate to the research design of this comparative case study.
These groups' evolution in the same macro-level environment and their analogous theologico-political
ideologies means that  this  comparative case study can focus primarily  on the impact  of diverging
organisational  dynamics  on these groups'  evolutions.  This  choice enhances the replicability  of  this
research's  findings  to  other  militant  groups evolving in  semi-authoritarian  contexts.  As the second
theoretical chapter of this research argues, this generalisability is additionally strengthened by the use
of process tracing and by the constant reference to a broad literature on social movement, civil war and
political violence to substantiate the arguments advanced throughout this research.
1.4. THE ADOPTION OF A PLURALISTIC APPROACH
The intricacies of this study and the focus on political violence necessitate the use of complementary
sources  to  bolster  its  internal  validity.  This  qualitative  research  design  therefore  adopts  pluralistic
research  methods  for  data  acquisition  and  analysis,  triangulation  which  notably  facilitates  “sound
explanation,  enhanced  theory-building  capacity,  and  deeper  understanding”  (Ayoud,  Wallace  &
Zepeda-Millán,  2014:  68).  This  choice  is  supported  by  past  and  current  criticisms  elaborated  by
scholars of political violence, who have long lamented the absence of research-based analyses informed
by reflective methodologies, using direct access to militant groups rather than solely relying on the
secondary sources published by a small epistemic community8 (Schmid & Jongman, 1988; Silke, 2004;
7 This group is sometimes internally referred to as tandhim al-jihad (the Jihad Organisation) and, in the literature, as the 
Egyptian Islamic Jihad. 
8 On the epistemic community monopolising public discourse on terrorism, on can refer to Herman & O’Sullivan (1990)
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Gunning, 2007; Jackson, Smyth & Gunning, 2009). As argued recently by Marc Sageman, current
research on political violence is still often marked by an “explosion of speculations with little empirical
grounding” and by the absence of “comprehensive and reliable data” (Sageman, 2014b: 6). While this
field of study has certainly improved over the past decade (Boyle, 2012; Schmid, 2011: 470),  “too
many academics make unsubstantiated claims mimicking research and cite each other, generating an
echo effect of erroneous information” (Sageman, 2014a: 5). A pluralistic approach to political violence
is therefore necessary to the undertaking of this research.
This research followed two complementary deductive and inductive phases. First, a diverse literature
on  social  movements  and  political  violence,  complemented  by  empirical  studies  of  these  groups'
histories and published interviews of their leaders, was gathered and analysed. These sources presented
rich data on these groups and highlighted a few important themes in their respective histories. This
early  analysis  facilitated  the  formulation  of  preliminary  hypotheses  accounting  for  these  groups'
evolution  over  time,  including  their  ideological  constructions,  their  evolving  approaches  to  armed
violence and their  gradual  (partial  or  comprehensive)  renunciations to  violence in  the 2000s.  This
deductive phase was followed by eighteen months' field research in Egypt between 2011 and 2014
designed to gather primary data, following an inductive approach. This field research was composed of
two main methods of qualitative data acquisition: a political ethnography with members and leaders of
these two groups and an extensive number of semi-structured interviews. The combination of these
deductive and inductive phases facilitated the consideration of new hypotheses and ideas potentially
ignored by previous research (Lieberman, 2004: 2).
The 2011 uprising presented an unprecedented opportunity to participate in many public and private
activities organised by IG and JG members, and to intermingle with them. The opening of the public
space after 2011, the liberation of political prisoners (including numerous IG and JG members) and
these groups' eagerness to communicate to the public after decades of political closure was used, in this
research, to open dialogue and to facilitate a field immersion. After a clarification of this researcher's
objectives, senior leaders and members of these two groups facilitated the author's integration, and
crucially  organised  many  formal  and  informal  meetings  with  fellow  members  and  leaders.  This
participant observation included diverse private and public activities, such as group meetings, political
and Stampnitzky (2014).
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party internal negotiations, public gatherings and demonstrations. The IG, through the family of sheikh
ʿOmar ʿAbd al-Rahman, notably organised an eighteen months sit-in in favour of the liberation of this
scholar in the centre of Cairo, which was used as a public space where Egyptian former militants,
among others, would gather and engage one another. The researcher spent a considerable amount of
time throughout this period in these settings to become acquainted with these groups' members' and
followers' self-understandings in their own terms and within their own traditions (Asad, 1993: 200),
which helped this researcher to “develop a certain intimacy with [this] subject” (Loaeza, 2005: 9). This
field  research  shed  light  on  the  interactions  between  these  groups'  members  and  leaders,  on  the
evolution of  their  micro-level  perceptions  and generally  dissociated this  research from widespread
ideationalisation  (through  ideology  or  theology)  of  these  individual  experiences.  As  a  political
ethnography, this endeavour sustained the development of a specific “approach that cares […] to glean
the meanings that the people under study attribute to their social and political reality” (Schatz, 2013b:
5).
In  addition,  these  groups'  leaders  and  members  facilitated  the  organisation  of  semi-structured
interviews throughout this fieldwork. These interviews were organised relationally, through networks
of trust developed in the field. Initially, the author was introduced by a senior member of the IG to the
group's current leadership, which consented to being interviewed. Senior JG leaders later gave a similar
approval. Other lower-ranking IG and JG members encountered during this field research additionally
presented their views and internal insights, and invited the researcher to their houses and communities
to  introduce  new  contacts  and  provide  additional  information.  These  semi-structured  interviews
presented  thematic  probes  and  queries  on  pre-defined  themes,  following  the  theoretical  approach
developed in the preliminary research design.  These dialogues gave ample leeway to digression to
introduce potentially overlooked issues and themes raised by the interviewees. 
The accuracy of these interviews were facilitated by various factors. Between the 2011 uprising and the
July 2013 military coup, the Egyptian political environment was unprecedentedly open. The coercive
measures imposed hitherto by the political police, the infamous State Security Investigations Service
(mabahith amn al-dawla), ended after the 2011 uprising and former and current Islamist militants were
able,  for the first  time, to express themselves.  For instance,  many senior IG and JG members and
leaders were invited by Egyptian TV channels for long interviews to present their views to the public.
Academic  interviews  were  consequently  not  subjected  to  their  pre-2011  security  repercussions.
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Moreover, these two groups had long declared a ceasefire in Egypt (in 1995 for the JG and 1997 for the
IG) and had already served long sentences in jail for their past actions. They did not have to conceal
their responsibilities for what happened in previous decades, and were generally quite reflective about
the impact of their actions. During the researcher's early interactions with them, it became clear that
they saw an opportunity to set the record straight. They were aware that most publications written on
their histories do not include their perspectives, and realised that this was a necessary endeavour. Both
groups were engaged in self-critical appraisal about what had happened in the past, and were generally
eager to convey their retrospective insights. They wanted to use the 2011 uprising to assert that they
had, too, long been victims of state oppression under Mubarak.
Academic interviews cannot be considered uncritically,  however.  A researcher must reflect on “the
effects of weak or selective memory, lack or imprecision of concrete historical detail, ideologically-
driven  portrayal  of  past  events,  personal  self-promotion,  and  adaptation  or  outright  distortion  of
responses in accordance either with the perceived aims and prejudices of the interviewer or with the
current political agenda of the interviewee” (Sayigh, 2004: xvi-xvii).9 These biases are inherent with
any biographical retrospection, although they can be mitigated. 
Preliminary research and interviewee selection were particularly important to take fully advantage of
field  research.  In  order  to  preclude  hollow  discussions  whereby  interviewees  would  reproduce  a
stereotypical  discourse  to  an  external  audience,  this  researcher  had  to  demonstrate  an  acute
understanding of these groups' histories, and sometimes rely on the authority conferred by previous
interviews to  nurture  trust  with  these  groups'  members.  Some interviewees  were  occasionally  less
inclined to dwell on internal differences of opinion, especially in the Islamic Group where a consensual
culture prevails. It was often beneficial to quote other leaders internally perceived as more intransigent
to  demonstrate  that  this  researcher  was  already  trusted  by  important  figures.  In  addition,  these
references also helped to establish meaningful dialogues with lower ranking members, who were not
always confident to divulge internal dissensions to non-members. 
Interviewee  selection  was  based  on  a  combination  of  targeted  sampling  and snowball  effect.  The
temporarily  liberal  environment  after  2011  meant  that,  in  contrast  with  many  studies  of  political
9 See also Kalyvas, 2006: 42
36 / 314
violence, interviewee selection was not merely based on “opportunity sampling” (Silke, 2004: 64) with
whoever  could  be  interviewed.  This  researcher  had  the  opportunity  to  select  individuals  at  the
leadership  and  non-leadership  levels,  based  on the  variety  of  positions  they  held  in  the  past.  For
instance,  it  was  important  to  include  individuals  from  these  groups'  imprisoned  and  external
leaderships, who invariably had different understandings of and perspectives on their groups' histories,
and would be less likely to be subject to collective group reinterpretation. Occasionally, some members
would also discourage the author from interviewing specific actors, which was important for inferring
internal tensions.  A final significant issue concerned the fact that a few leaders were still  on trial,
having previously been sentenced to death in abstentia. Rifaʿi Taha and Mustafa Hamza were notably
re-trialled for their alleged involvement in the IG military apparatus. In addition, Muhammad Sawqi al-
Islambuli  is  still,  to  this  day  [19  February  2015],  on  the  United  Nations'  “List  established  and
maintained by the Al-Qaida Sanctions Committee with respect to individuals, groups, undertakings and
other entities associated with Al-Qaida” (United Nations Security Council, 2015).
A tremendous amount of internal and external sources were additionally gathered and analysed. They
include  these  groups'  official  literature  (books,  communiqués  and  magazines)  as  well  as  diverse
primary documents published by their current and former members, including memories and online
retrospective interviews. Many sources were provided by these groups' members, while the remaining
were obtained online.  This  research  also  retrieved a  variety  of  documents  from Islamist  and non-
Islamist websites and forums, media interviews and documentaries, and international and national non-
governmental reports. The latter notably includes Egyptian and American court reports, declassified
sources  and  Wikileaks  documents.  Governmental  and  non-governmental  reports  were  particularly
important to study the severe policing of protest  of the Egyptian security forces in the 1990s, that
interviewees would not necessarily describe in details considering the social taboos associated with
many practices utilised by the political police.
The nature of this research project highlights significant ethical issues. The University of Durham's
ethical regulations were discussed with this research's supervisor, and this fieldwork was then approved
by  the  university's  ethics  committee.  A few  academic  publications  and  guidelines  produced  by
European  and  American  associations  were  consulted,  including  the  American  Anthropological
Association Code of Ethics, the Code of Practice for the European Commission, MRS Guidelines for
Qualitative  Research  and  Code  of  Conduct,  the  SRA's  Code  of  Practice  for  the  safety  of  social
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researchers and the Statement of Ethical Practice for the British Sociological Association. In the field,
all participants were told the aims and purposes of this research. They explicitly gave their consent to
the use of the data obtained and, in the majority of cases, to use their names. At the same time, the
precarious security environment meant that their consent could not be simply granted, and ought to be
considered as a continuous process of renegotiation in changing circumstances (Clark, 2006; Wood,
2006; Miller et al, 2012). It was particularly clear that the political environment in Egypt was volatile
and  that  information  disclosed  in  a  relatively  free  environment  could  become  a  concern,  even  a
liability, in the future. Unfortunately, these early fears materialised after the July 2013 military coup,
when more than dozens of IG and JG leaders and members interviewed in this research were arrested
by the new authoritarian regime. After the completion of this research, it was therefore decided that,
when an interviewee gave similar information via the media (written or televised), his quote and name
could be preserved. In addition, names could also be preserved if the information was not sensitive and
threatening to the security of the interviewee. On the other hand, when IG or JG members revealed
information which could be potentially used against them, their names were altered and all information
which could help to identify them was carefully removed, including from this researcher's electronic
copy.
This  research  does  not  intend  to  speak  on  these  groups'  behalf,  nor  does  it  seek  to  uncritically
reproduce their narratives. This research rather endeavours, as Sara Roy aptly mentioned in her study of
the Islamist social sector in the Gaza Strip, to speak “from them by incorporating into […] analysis
personal  studies  and  accounts”  and  to  “walk  in  their  shoes”  (Roy,  2011:  17).  In  light  of  current
criticisms of political violence research, this is the least a researcher can aspire towards.
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CHAPTER 2
DEVELOPING A METHODOLOGICAL MESO-CENTRED
SOCIAL MOVEMENT APPROACH
2.1. INTRODUCTION
The previous chapter has introduced the objectives of this research and set out the case for a multi-level
analysis  of  Islamist  militancy  in  Egypt.  This  theoretical  chapter  additionally  promotes  dialogue
between  political  violence,  civil  war  and  social  movement  studies  to  contextualise  and  de-
exceptionalise  the  study  of  the  use  of  violence  by  Islamist  actors.  This  theoretical  framework
accordingly contends that violence and non-violence should be studied as repertoires of social protests
constructed  in  interaction  with  evolving  and  interrelated  macro,  meso  and  ideational  factors.  The
following discussion presents this research's social movement theory analytical framework, and draws
on past and current debates on armed violence and contentious studies to develop this thesis' theoretical
outlook.
This theoretical chapter explores the academic study of social movements. It is designed to present the
construction of a diverse understanding of collective action in the literature, to evaluate its strength in
the study of the use of violence by Islamist militant groups and to present the meso-centred theoretical
approach adopted throughout this research.
The  academic  conceptualisation  of  social  movements  broadly  emphasises  similar  variables,  even
though they diverge on their respective importance. In this research, social movements are defined as
“a distinct social process, consisting of the mechanisms through which actors engaged in collective
action,  are  involved in  conflictual  relations  with clearly identified  opponents;  are  linked by dense
informal networks; share a distinct collective identity” (della Porta & Diani, 2006: 20). The adoption of
this definition is justified by its clear and all-encompassing conceptualisation of social movements.
Other  definitions  posit  that  social  movements  operate  “outside  of  institutional  or  organizational
channels”  (Snow,  Soule,  & Kriesi,  2004:  11)  or  that  they  “actively  pursue  change  by  employing
protest” (Edwards, 2014: 5). These conceptualisations are not suited to this research given that the two
militant groups under examination have adopted other repertoires rather than protests before 2011, and
institutional channels thereafter. 
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The following theoretical discussion explores the two main analytical perspectives developed in the
literature. The first perspective has historically focused on the meso-level, and was initially introduced
by  resource  mobilisation  theory  (RMT)  to  analyse  the  rational  mobilisation  of  diverse  types  of
resources by social movement organisations (SMOs). The second approach, the political process model
(PPM), has conversely investigated the macro-level environment which facilitates or hinders social
movement  mobilisation.  After  discussing  these  models'  respective  analytical  strengths  and  internal
revisions,  this  chapter  contends  that  social  movement  approaches  are  particularly  adapted  to  this
research's study of Islamist armed militancy. The corpus on social movement studies is notably aligned
with this research's objectives, and with its ontological and epistemological premises. Moreover, social
movement approaches to political violence are particularly relevant for their multi-level, dynamic and
relational understanding of militant groups' evolutions.
This chapter nonetheless argues that the social movement literature on Islamist militant groups is less
adequate on two fronts. First, the current academic focus on the discovery of replicable mechanisms
across cases has often overlooked militant groups' internal learning processes. The literature tends to
assume  that  militant  groups  evolving  in  similar  settings  are  subject  to  similar  mechanisms,  and
therefore  excludes  the  possibility  that  their  actions  might  be  additionally  informed  by  their  past
experience or by the experience of other groups. Second, the academic corpus on Islamist groups is still
overtly marked by rationalist ideational considerations, wherein ideas are merely a resource to be used
and manipulated by Islamist groups, without giving consideration to their potentially constraining role
as well.
Finally,  this  chapter  concludes  with the methodological  undertaking of this  research.  As a  small-n
comparative case study research, this thesis draws on complementary SMT traditions. This research
postulates that militant groups' meso-level modes of organisation should be analysed as network-based,
rather than maintaining an artificial division between organisational and networking conceptualisations.
This  perspective adds that  a  specific  analytical  emphasis  should be stressed on the study of  these
groups'  internal  regulations  and norms.  This  section  finally  contends  that  the  choice  of  a  small-n
comparative  research  design  has  a  few  implications  on  this  research's  approach  to  causation  and
potential for generalisation. It consequently justifies the adoption of process tracing within and across
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case study comparison, which, this research argues, is particularly suited to this thesis' endeavour to
theorise militant groups' evolutions in diverse settings.
2.2.  SOCIAL MOVEMENTS  STUDIES  TOWARDS  THE  POLITICAL PROCESS  MODEL
CONSENSUS
Social movement studies investigate individual mobilisation in various forms of social protest. From
early collective behaviour models to the current political process consensus, the development of this
academic corpus has been marked by an array of questions reflecting broader sociological debates,
including  the  ubiquitous  structure  versus  agency  debate.  The  following  discussion  explores  the
maturation  of  this  field  of  study  and  reflects  on  its  dialectical  nature  (Edwards,  2014:  2).  This
discussion notably investigates the “conceptual dualism” of this field, between agency and structure,
rational  and  relational  approaches,  and  emotion  and  rationality  (Edwards,  2014:  3).  This  section
contextualises the emergence of the political process consensus, which has dominated social movement
studies for the past few decades.
Modern  social  movement  studies  were  preceded  by  early  twentieth  century's  collective  behaviour
studies.  This  approach  historically  drew  on  the  study  of  crowds,  mobs  and  fascist  militias,
conceptualised  as  the  irrational  outcome of  shared  grievances  and allegedly  characterised  by  their
irrational behaviour (e.g. le Bon, 1897). This approach to collective action is relatively diverse, and can
be differentiated into symbolic interactionism and structural functionalism (Edwards, 2014: 10-41). The
root causes of social problems and “abnormal” collective behaviour are therein located in macro-level
societal  disruptions  and  structural  strains.  These  factors  include,  for  instance,  industrialisation,
modernisation, rural flight and fast economic and social changes. An influential theory, the relative
deprivation theory,  specifically  traces individual  frustration back to  changing social,  economic and
political conditions (Gurr, 1970; Marx & Wood, 1975; Smelser, 2011). Collective behaviour studies
contend that an array of macro factors generate two key individual grievances, deprivation and social
marginalisation (Edwards, 2014: 41), which, in turn, fuel micro psychological grievances and irrational
emotions, and eventually catalyse micro-mobilisation.
Collective behaviour studies are marked by their focus on the causal roots of supposedly irrational
contention.  This  approach  is  rooted  in  social  psychology,  which  explains  its  investigation  of  the
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negative and destabilising role of anger, emotions and frustration on aggrieved individuals. This early
academic corpus has nonetheless long been rebutted in the literature. While the role of emotion has
been reasserted in subsequent studies, collective behaviour studies have been contested for their limited
explanatory relevance which fails to account for the non-participation of other aggrieved individuals
(Snyder  &  Tilly,  1972;  McAdam,  1982).  Moreover,  they  have  been  crucially  invalidated  by  the
ubiquitous finding that mobilised individuals are generally more socially connected than the broader
populace (e.g. Tilly, 1978).
The prominence of irrationality in early contentious protest studies combined with the emergence of
new social  movements considered favourably by social  movement scholars,  including the African-
American Civil Right Movement and streets protests against U.S. wars in the 1960s, has subsequently
initiated  a  new  emphasis  on  social  movements'  rationality.  This  consideration  has  sparked  the
development  of  two successive rationalist  traditions,  resource mobilisation theory and the political
process model. These new frameworks have instituted a new conceptualisation of social movements,
understood as rational, purposeful, and organised, which has persisted in the literature (Zald & Ash,
1966; Oberschall, 1973, 1980; McCarthy & Zald, 1977, 1987; Tilly, 1978).
The first  rationalist  approach to  social  movements,  resource mobilisation theory (RMT thereafter),
emphasises the meso-level and the understanding of “how”, rather than “why”, contention occurs. Its
proponents postulate that most individuals do not act upon their  shared grievances, and assert  that
grievances  alone  cannot  explain  diverging  modes  of  contention.  Resource  mobilisation  scholars
advocate  the  need  to  investigate  the  mobilisation  of  resources  in  contention.  They  contend  that
resources can be material (including financial and organisational) and intangible (including audience
and  public  support),  and  vary  quantitatively  across  social  movements.  They  add  that  diverging
mobilising structures, from centralised (McCarthy & Zald, 1973, 1977; Gamson, 1975) to decentralised
structures  (Gerach  &  Hine,  1970),  are  characterised  by  various  levels  of  efficiency.  Diverging
structures arguably impact micro mobilisation,  as well  as social  movement organisations'  ability to
adapt and survive in changing circumstances. This approach to contention focuses on the rationality of
mobilisation and on the strategic mobilisation of resources, based on a cost-benefit individual calculus.
The  micro-rationality  endorsed  by  RMT has  raised  the  so-called  collective  action  problem.  This
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conundrum,  initially  developed  by  Olsen  (1965),  pertains  to  the  free  riding  problem  affecting
presumably  rational  actors.  It  contends  that  micro  mobilisation  is  not  necessarily  congruent  with
individuals'  self-interests,  considering  the  risks  involved.  While  everyone  benefits  from  societal
mobilisation, risks are only taken by the minority actively engaged in contention. Economists explain
this  contradiction  with  the  collective  good  problem.  Fighting  for  the  collective  good  benefits
everybody, but mostly entails costs for the mobilised minority. Resource mobilisation scholars have
attempted to  explain micro-mobilisation by its  micro-rationalisation through coercion or  incentives
(material or immaterial, including rewards and solidarity incentives) (Zald & Ash, 1966). They have
also  emphasised  the  role  of  mobilising  entrepreneurs,  ideational  commitments  and  professional
organisations (McCarty & Zald, 1977) which can successfully rationalise micro-mobilisation for active
individuals.
The second theoretical development based on a rationalist conceptualisation of social movements is the
political  process  model  (PPM).  In  contrast  with  RMT,  the  PPM  has  reintroduced  a  thorough
consideration of the broader macro environment in which social movement organisations evolve. This
model focuses on the environment in which social movements emerge and operate, and investigates its
constraining and enabling role on their development. Political process scholars generally argue that,
notwithstanding the existence of shared grievances and resources, social movements need favourable
macro-level conditions for contention to be possible and successful.
The central concept introduced by the political process model concerns the political characteristics of
SMO's external environment. This concept was originally named “political opportunity structures”, and
referred  specifically  to  the  opportunities  inherent  within  different  types  of  regimes.  Political
opportunity structures are based on several conceptualisations by Eisinger (1973) and Tilly (1978), and
include  these  regimes'  degree  of  openness  in  comparative  perspective  across  cases  (e.g.  Kitschelt,
1986). A typical definition describes them as “features of regimes and institutions that facilitate or
inhibit a political actor's collective action and [...] changes in those features” (Tarrow & Tilly, 2009:
440).  The  next  section  elaborates  on  internal  debates  and contentions  over  the  nature  of  political
opportunities. It is worth mentioning that they generally include (1) the  level of formal and informal
access  to  political  institutions  and  to  the  decision-making  process,  (2)  changing  state  repression
capability and use, (3) the general configuration of the political system (especially with regards to its
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structure and to elite alignment and division), and (4) the position of other social movements evolving
in the same milieu (Tilly, 1978; Kitschelt, 1986; Tarrow, 1994; Gamson & Meyer, 1996; McAdam et
al., 1996).
PPM scholars have long argued that political opportunities cannot be objectified, and should rather be
considered  as  interpreted  and  constructed  by  SMOs.  McAdam  (1982)  adopted,  from  a  Marxist
perspective, the concept of cognitive liberation to explain the interpretation of political opportunities by
social movement actors and their mediation by social movements' mobilising structures. According to
McAdam, cognitive liberation explains that “people must collectively define their situations as unjust
and subject to change through group action” (1982: 51) to mobilise successfully.
The development of new types of conflicts in Western countries from the 1970s onwards sparked the
parallel study of “new social movements” among European scholars. These movements illustrate the
development of new types of contention in  post-industrial societies (Melucci, 1980, 1995; Touraine,
1981;  Cohen,  1985;  Kriesi  et  al.  1995).  Their  mobilisation  is  arguably no longer  based  on socio-
economic  class-based  grievances  but  on  ideas,  identities,  values  and  beliefs  such  as  gender,
international solidarity and environmental protection. New social  movements recruit across classes,
often among the middle class, women and minorities, and are characterised by less hierarchical, and
more egalitarian and decentralised networks which significantly contrasts with their predecessors. New
social movement scholars have surfaced in dialogue with hitherto prevailing Marxist understandings of
contention; they mostly diverge with the latter vis-à-vis their focus on cultural struggle rather than on
class-based economic contention, although their focus on structural changes as determining this shift to
culture is informed by a neo-Marxist outlook.
This “ideational turn” has later influenced the political process model as well, and motivated a renewed
interest  in  meaning-making and interpretative processes.  The main contribution  to  the  PPM is  the
inclusion of framing, in combination with the (already included) political opportunity and mobilising
structures. The concept of frame was initially introduced by Gamson, and later popularised in social
movement studies by a few scholars, notably Benford and Snow (Gamson et al. 1982 ; Snow et al.
1986; Snow & Benford 1988; Snow & Benford 1992; Benford & Snow 2000; Williams & Benford
2000). Frames are defined as “an interpretive schema that simplifies and condenses the ‘world out
44 / 314
there’ by selectively punctuating and encoding objects, situations, events, experiences, and sequences
of actions within one’s present or past environment” (Snow & Benford, 1992: 137). The inclusion of
framing in social movement studies has reignited a focus on the interactive relations between social
movement  entrepreneurs  and  their  audience,  rather  than  on  individual  transformation  processes
triggering  collective  action,  which  was  initially  proposed  by  Gamson.  Framing  studies  uncover
ideational  micro-mobilisation  through  the  creation  of  collective  action  frames,  and  investigate  the
success or failure of different types of frames in achieving this objective. The inclusion of framing in
social movement studies has attempted to revive the social psychology dimension of collective action.
Although framing is  generally  considered  an  outgrowth  of  the  RMT,  its  inclusion  in  the  political
process model has provided an array of analytical tools and concepts to explore ideational processes,
including frame alignment, resonance and master frames. Frames have the same functions as collective
action frames, and mostly differ in their broader scope, inclusivity, flexibility and cultural resonance.
They are characterised by their  generic and structuring nature,  and by their  provision of a general
narrative,  guidance  and  orientation.  Frames  have  three  main  objectives,  defined  as  diagnostic,
prognostic  and  motivational.  These  three  objectives  are  designed  to  inspire  micro-mobilisation  by
presenting social movement audiences with (1) what is wrong, (2) what should be done, and (3) why
they should mobilise. Social movement entrepreneurs can manipulate existing frames to mobilise their
followers  through frame  bridging,  frame  amplification,  frame  extension  and  frame  transformation
(Snow et al. 1986). Their success can then be assessed with the study of their resonance, which is
contingent  on  their  constituency,  empirical  credibility,  experiential  commensurability,  centrality,
narrative fidelity and the credibility of their promoters (e.g. Wickham, 2002),
The combination of political opportunities, mobilising structures and framing has shaped the formation
of the consensual  political  process model  (McAdam et  al.,  1996).  The PPM has  dominated social
movement studies, despite the revisions discussed in the next section. This approach to the study of
contention defends the need to explore the interactions between three level variables, macro, meso and
micro, to explain social movements' emergence and development. According to the political process
model, changing political opportunities are interpreted by social movement entrepreneurs who forge
diagnosis, prognosis and motivational frames to mobilise their followers in specific structures. This
prevailing model has, however, been subject to growing criticisms since its postulation, including by its
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most prominent architects.
The development of RMT and of the PPM lay out the parameters which serve as a guide for this study
of  Islamist  armed  militancy.  In  agreement  with  most  of  the  current  academic  corpus  on  political
violence, these two models expose the limits of early structural strains studies on allegedly irrational
contentious mobilisation. These two theoretical frameworks demonstrate the analytical relevance of the
study of social movement organisations are rational groups whose actions are informed, constrained
and made possible by the internal and external conditions in which they operate.
2.3. REVISITING THE POLITICAL PROCESS MODEL
The predominance of the political process model in contentious politics and social movement studies
has instigated many debates over its main premises. These criticisms have been elaborated internally
and externally, by this model's main founders as well as by new contributors. They suggest diverse
degrees of revisions over the concept of political opportunity structures, and over the PPM's rationalist
and  strategic  foundations.  These  revisions  have  notably  triggered  the  emergence  of  new  research
agendas discussed at the end of this section.
The first criticism of the political process model concerns the formulation of “political opportunity
structures”. The narrow political characteristics originally included in this concept have exponentially
been enriched  by the  inclusion  of  new non-political  opportunities  of  a  cultural,  discursive,  socio-
economic,  organisational  and  transnational  nature  (Jasper,  2011b).  The  proliferation  of  new
opportunities has raised a word of caution among social movements scholars demanding a conceptual
clarification and a quantitative delimitation (e.g McAdam, 1996: 27; Tilly, 2008: 91). The growing
number of potential opportunities has prompted the discontinued use of the word “structures”, replaced
by these opportunities' contextual examination on a case-to-case basis (Tarrow, 1998; Kurzman, 2004).
A broad consideration of political opportunities arguably limits their individual explanatory strength.
The inclusion of a considerable number of new opportunities signifies that any favourable factor can
potentially  be  examined.  Analytically,  this  broad  inclusion  limits  the  possibility  to  systematically
compare their influence across cases and hinders the analysis of their scientific falsifiability (Jasper,
2011b). Social movements scholars have notably lamented that any variable retrospectively considered
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favourable to contention has been considered an opportunity, even if its cross-case impact is in reality
more ambiguous (such as state  repression)  (Goodwin & Jasper,  2004).  Political  opportunities have
therefore  been  criticised  for  the  difficulty  to  measure  their  explanatory  strength  and  their  post-
contention interpretations (Jasper, 2011b). Some scholars have specifically denounced the truism to
name them “opportunities”, and questioned the appropriate denomination of an opportunity missed by
social actors (Jasper, 2011b). These criticisms have stimulated a redeeming quest designed to delimit
political opportunities more clearly (Gamson & Meyer, 1996; Meyer & Minkoff, 2004), an endeavour
rejected by a few constructivist scholars (Goodwin & Jasper, 1999, 2004).
Another leading criticism informed by the cultural  turn in social  movement studies pertains to the
PPM's objectification of political opportunities. These contributions argue that political opportunities
should not be considered objectively. In agreement with constructivist perspectives, they posit that,
while some of them might be described as objective and structural, others are subjective and prone to
interpretation  by  social  movement  actors  (Koopmans,  2004;  McAdam,  2004).  More  radical
perspectives  further  renounce  any  objectification  of  political  opportunities,  and  assert  that  social
movement actors are agents of change who can create their own opportunities through interpretative
processes  (Kurzman,  1996;  Goodwin & Jasper,  2004).  Regardless  of  the  degree  of  constructivism
endorsed by these criticisms, they generally agree that culture should, at least, be considered embodied
in political opportunities, in recognition that cultural dimensions shape prevailing norms and practices
(Polletta, 2004).
The investigation of political opportunities' construction by social movement actors has motivated an
additional critique on the PPM, namely its structural bias. The rationalist and macro-centred approach
endorsed by this model indicates that, despite an advocacy of a dynamic understanding of contention,
structural changes are presumably prevalent in the initial phase of collective action (McAdam et al.,
1996: 17; Tarrow, 1998: 7). This perspective thus suggests that macro-level changes pave the way for
contentious  mobilisation.  At  the  same  time,  if,  in  accordance  with  cultural  criticisms,  political
opportunities  do  not  exist  objectively,  then  rationalist  understandings  of  structural  change  are
unsubstantiated. McAdam recognised this structural bias as early as 1994, and the inclusion of cultural
perspectives and framing in the PPM is a response to these criticisms. Goodwin and Jasper nonetheless
maintain that  social  movement actors  construct  their  own opportunities  (Jasper,  1999;  Goodwin &
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Jasper,  2004)  and  are  not  simply  waiting  for  favourable  macro  changes.  Social  movement  actors
therefore actively construct and interpret their world to make action possible.
The last prominent criticism of the PPM concerns its rationalist understanding of contention, illustrated
by its treatment of ideas and meaning making processes. The PPM adopts a rationalist understanding of
meaning making whereby culture and ideas are used as a “tool kit” (as coined by Swidler (1986)) by
social movement entrepreneurs. The latter are considered rational actors who rationalise their choices
to their followers by drawing on a shared ideational corpus, through the creation of complementary
frames. This perspective follows a top-down approach, which considers ideas as one resource among
others. This understanding has nonetheless been increasingly questioned for its inadequate explanation
of the interactions between culture, ideology and framing. A few scholars have notably called for a
clarification of the relation between culture and social movements (Williams, 1995; Kane, 1997), as
well as between frames and ideology (Zald, 1996; Fisher, 1997; Johnston & Oliver, 2000). Johnston
and  Oliver  (2000)  have  recommended  a  more  restricted  use  of  the  concept  of  framing,  and  the
reintroduction of the concept of ideology in social movement studies. They argue that many social
movement theorists have used frame and ideology in a synonymous fashion, while framing should be
considered a cognitive process and ideology should be reintroduced as a general belief system. Critics
of the PPM's' rationalist foundations have also argued that the production of meaning is relational, and
not solely strategic and rational (Steinberg,  1999). This relational understanding endorses a greater
inclusion of the social networks in which social actors are embedded. A final critique of the use of
framing in contentious politics has been elaborated by one of its foremost theorist, Benford, who has
critiqued  the  neglect  of  “systematic  empirical  studies,  [its]  descriptive  bias,  static  tendencies,
reification, reductionism, elite bias, and monolithic tendencies.” (Benford, 1997: 423).
In agreement with the reconsideration of social movements' rationality, the role of emotions has been
re-emphasised in the study of social movements (Aminzade & McAdam, 2002; Goodwin & Jasper
2007; Gould 2009).  Emotions had historically been ignored in reaction to the collective behaviour
model presented earlier, and replaced by a cost-benefit rational calculus by social actors in RMT and
the PPM. This new corpus nonetheless posits that, despite valid criticism of the collective behaviour
model, emotions should be scrutinised and analysed as any other variable in social movement studies.
Emotions are an essential part of social interactions, and often contribute to meaning making beyond
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rational calculus.
The  most  creative  development  informed  by  these  criticisms  was  introduced  by  PPM  founders
themselves, with the “contentious politics” (CP thereafter) agenda (Aminzade et al. 2001; McAdam et
al. 2001; Tilly & Tarrow 2006; Tarrow & Tilly 2009). This development unfolded in parallel to the
growing emphasis on processes and causal mechanisms in the social sciences (Mahoney 2001, 2008;
Hedström & Ylikoski,  2010).  Its  founders  argued,  ten years  after  designing this  agenda,  that  they
initially  launched  this  research  programme  in  response  to  the  narrow  focus  of  social  movement
research, which was isolated from broader studies of revolutions and large-N case study comparisons,
biased towards Western movements, and characterised by structuralist foundations rather than by a
focus on processes and outcomes (McAdam & Tarrow, 2011: 2). CP scholars recognised the validity of
many criticisms of the PPM, which has generally been described as too static, narrow and rationalist.
This acknowledgement has encouraged a move towards relational, dynamic and interactive studies of
processes and mechanisms. CP promotes the study of broader and replicable mechanisms to explain
diverse phenomena beyond social movements per se, stretching from revolution, civil wars, protests
and  democratisation  and  generally  investigates  the  relations  between  different  players  in  broader
episodes of contention. This agenda suggests that mechanisms of contention can be environmental,
relational and cognitive, and include, for instance, brokerage, diffusion, polarisation, repression and
radicalisation.  CP  emphasises  the  relational  dimension  of  contention,  which  contrast  with  the
structuralist and rational PPM foundations.
The CP agenda has, despite its emphasis on relational contention, processes and mechanisms across
cases, often been criticised for a plurality of reasons. A prominent criticism has maintained that CP
undermines its relevance and applicability by trying to explain too many phenomena simultaneously, a
critique its founders recognise (McAdam & Tarrow, 2011: 5). The latter's attempts to broaden their
scope beyond social movements has arguably led to the inclusion of too many forms of contention, and
has weakened this agenda's theoretical strength. CP contenders also argue that this agenda still favours
a state-centred understanding of contention, which might lose its relevance in cultural fights unrelated
to state authorities, as well as in non-Western contexts where the distinction between state and civil
societies is different. This agenda's founders additionally recognise that too many mechanisms initially
studied were  not  well-scrutinised,  and that  important  issues  of  measurements  remained unclarified
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(McAdam & Tarrow, 2011).
Finally,  most  recent  studies  have  built  on  the  investigation  of  the  relational  and  contextualised
interactions between social movement actors. This relational emphasis expands on Bourdieusian fields
to analyse  the relations  and interactions  between various  social  movement  players,  including their
opponents, allies and the state. This approach argues that these relations are regulated by specific rules,
which collectively form structured fields of contention. This perspective contributes to the prevailing
structure and agency sociological debate to explore collective strategic action (Fligstein & McAdam,
2011) and analyse social changes within these fields (Fligstein & McAdam, 2012). It posits that society
is  composed  of  a  plurality  of  “strategic  action  fields”  containing  their  own  social  orders,  where
incumbents and challengers compete for material and status reward. This corpus explores the micro-
foundations of field dynamics, from their emergence to their subsequent evolutions.
These criticisms of the PPM are beneficial to the study of armed militancy. Their two main strengths
are the reintroduction of the relational dimension of contention,  and the emphasis on interpretative
processes and social movements' agency. In contrast with the PPM, these criticisms emphasise that
SMOs actively  construct  their  opportunities,  which  are  simultaneously  informed  by  these  groups'
interactions  with  other  players  in  multi-level  environments.  SMOs  therefore  cannot  merely  be
considered passive actors waiting for change to become possible. In addition, these new perspectives
on  social  movements  raise  a  word  of  caution  against  exaggerated  strategic  and  rationalist
understandings, and instead revive the importance of ideational and emotional factors in contentious
processes. These criticisms have informed an emphasis on militant groups' leaders' and lower-ranking
members'  perceptions  of  changing macro-level  policies  throughout  the  interviews,  and promoted a
relational understanding of contention.
2.4. THE STUDY OF VIOLENT CONTENTIOUS POLITICS AND ISLAMIST MOVEMENTS
The discussion  on the  development  of  social  movement  and contentious  politics  studies  reveals  a
striking attribute. Most of the scholarship has focused on “good” social movements,  understood as
Western-based  social  movements  fighting  for  economic,  societal  and  political  advancement.  This
academic corpus has historically only marginally contributed to the study of social movements in other
cultural contexts, or in violent environments where armed violence prevails (with some exceptions, e.g.
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della  Porta,  1995).  Social  movement  approaches  have  been increasingly  adopted  to  study political
violence10 and Islamist groups,11 with diverging theoretical contributions to social movement theory.
This  section  examines  their  strength  in  political  violence  and  Islamist  movement  studies,  before
identifying two remaining gaps pertaining to their weaker treatment of organisational learning and to
their overtly rationalist ideational considerations.
The main contribution of a social movement theory approach to the study of political violence concerns
this research's ontological and epistemological premises. A social movement understanding of political
violence de-exceptionalises this phenomenon and investigates its  emergence and development as it
would with any other social occurrence (Gunning, 2009). This theoretical understanding facilitates a
sophisticated analysis  of political  violence,  which contextualises  violent  groups within the broader
movements  from which  they  emerge,  stresses  the  importance  of  their  interaction  with  competing
groups, allies and state authorities, and uncovers the evolution of their repertoires of contention beyond
ideological  and  strategic  considerations.  These  theoretical  foundations  promote  a  multilevel
understanding of political violence, which cannot be reduced to the sheer outcome of psychological,
ideological or structural factors.  In this  theoretical framework, the role of ideational and structural
factors  is  recognised  and  studied  in  interaction  with  militant  groups'  organisational  dialogues  and
internal dynamics, as well as in changing time and space.
A social  movement  theoretical  framework contextualises  militant  groups within  the  broader  social
movement from which they emerge, and where they potentially operate. Violent groups do not surface
in a vacuum, and often stem from broader social movements characterised by specific ideological and
organisational legacies (Gunning, 2009: 160).12 These groups and their affiliated social movements are
separated by fluid boundaries, and are often competing for legitimacy over a partially shared audience.
For instance, the combination of shifting internal boundaries and internal contests over an overlapping
constituency often explains the evolution of these actors' framing processes (Wiktorowicz, 2004). In
addition, these contests illustrate the potential embeddedness of radical groups in shared networks with
10 e.g. della Porta, 1992, 1995, 2013; Goodwin, 2001, 2009; Hafez, 2003; Tilly, 2003, 2005; Wood 2003; Alimi 2006,
2011;  Gunning,  2008,  2009;  Hegghammer,  2010;  Malthaner,  2011;  Bosi,  Demetriou  & Malthener,  2014;  Bosi,  Ó
Dochartaigh & Pisoiu, 2015.
11 e.g.  Munson, 2001; Wiktorowicz,  2001, 2003, 2004, 2005; Wickham 2002; Hafez 2003, 2006, 2007; Clark,  2004;
Bayat, 2005, 2007; Karagiannis, 2005, 2009; Meijer, 2005; Sutton & Vertigans, 2005, 2006; Snow & Bird, 2007; Azani,
2008; Gunning 2008; Wagemakers, 2008, 2010, 2012; Tuğal, 2009; Eligür, 2010;  Hegghammer 2010; Lacroix, 2011;
Beinin & Vairel, 2013.
12 See also della Porta (1995).
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broader  social  movements,  which  can  both  empower  and  constrain  them  (Malthaner,  2014).
Overlapping  networks  and  ties  can  also  explain  recruitment  and  support  patterns,  notably  in
consideration of the radical milieu, which provides moral and logistical support to militant activists
(Waldmann, 2010; Malthaner, 2014).
Militant groups additionally interact with other groups, which are not situated in their social movement
family. These groups, which can pursue violent or non-violent goals and objectives, are set apart by
varying levels of antagonism or sympathy towards armed militants. Competition and cooperation can
influence  and  shape  armed  groups'  ideational,  organisational  and  behavioural  developments.  For
instance, competition can explain militant groups' rationale for violence (Zirakzadeh, 2002; Pearlman,
2011; Prince & Warner, 2013), as well as the use of certain armed repertoires such as suicide bombings
(Bloom, 2004,  2007;  Pedahzur  & Perliger,  2006).  These  patterns  are  relational  in  nature,  and can
explain these groups' radicalisation and moderation over time (Alimi, Bosi & Demetriou, 2012). Group
cooperation can also have a moderating influence, and widen the articulation of these groups' ideational
commitments (Jamal, 2013).
At a macro-level, militant groups are faced with evolving patterns of policing of protest which crucially
affect their evolution (della Porta & Fillieule, 2004; Earl,  2011; Davenport & Inman, 2012). These
policies change over time and place, and vary in degree, modes and selectivity. 13 State authorities can
include or exclude an array of actors, including militant groups, their opponents, allies and supporters.14
State repression can be designed to dismantle armed groups' infrastructures and isolate them from their
constituencies. Its peculiarities, if perceived unjustly by the populace, can also backfire and reinforce
popular sympathy and support for the opposition (Hess & Martin, 2006). These policies are differently
mediated by militant groups' organisational dynamics and internal dialogues, affect the perceptions of
their leaders and members, and potentially change these groups' internal make-up. Evolving policing of
protests are shaped by the state's institutional making and culture, and can fuel or mitigate cycles of
protests with the opposition (della Porta, 1995; della Porta & Fillieule, 2004).
The multilevel conceptualisation of violence means that the latter cannot be considered militant groups'
essential characteristic. Violence is rather investigated by social movement theorists as an evolving
13 See also della Porta & Fillieule (2004: 218).
14 Chapter 6 expands on this theme. In the meantime, one can refer to Hafez (2003) and Dalacoura (2011).
52 / 314
repertoire adopted among an array of other choices, and marked by its changing traits. The resort to
violence is informed by changing state policies towards militant groups, and by the use of an array of
repertoires  by  these  groups'  allies  and  opponents.  Internally,  violence  and  its  modalities  are
continuously debated amongst militant groups' leaders and followers, and reconsidered over time and
space.  Evolving  patterns  of  violence  should  therefore  be  studied  through  these  groups'  internal
dynamics since militant groups' internal fabric can fuel or restrain internal competition over resources
and authority, and influence their evolving resort to armed violence.
Social movement approaches to violent contention have grown at a fast pace recently.15 New research
agendas  have  built  upon  the  social  movement  and  contentious  politics  literature  to  contextualise
violence within episodes of contention. They have explored processes and mechanisms of contention,
including  radicalisation,  escalation,  transformation  and  diffusion.  Violence  is  accordingly  located
within various repertoires of actions  and in  relational  fields with other  actors  (Bosi,  Demetriou &
Malthener, 2014: 2). Violence is contextualised in time, space and milieu (Bosi, Dochartaigh & Pisoiu,
2015), which helps to illustrate the temporal, spatial and organisational contexts which precedes the use
of violence and unfolds in parallel to its use.
These  social  movement  approaches  to  violent  contention  promote  a  dynamic  and  multilevel
conceptualisation of violence,  understood as an emergent,  constructed and relational process (della
Porta,  2013) contextualised in a multilevel environment (della Porta,  2009; Gunning, 2009). These
perspectives favour a reconsideration of the temporality of violence, of the dynamic and interactive
relations  between societal  structures  and militant  groups'  behaviours  and ideologies,  and generally
eases the scrutinisation of the impact of state policies on these groups' internal dynamics (Gunning,
2009).  These  visions  challenge  ahistorical  and  uncontextualised  research  agendas,  and  de-
exceptionalise the use of violence (Gunning, 2009). Violence is not merely considered an ideological
imperative or a tactical choice, but rather “the product of intense debates within the wider movement
and  of  factional  power  struggles  fuelled  by  differential  access  to  resources  and  competing
interpretations of members' interests and identities” (Gunning, 2009: 162). 
Social  movement approaches  are  particularly relevant  to  this  research on militant  groups for  their
15 e.g. della Porta, 2013; Bosi, Demetriou & Malthener, 2014; Bosi, Dochartaigh & Pisoiu, 2015.
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investigation of armed groups' internal dynamics. This specific perspective had long been neglected in
studies of armed violence, which have too often investigated militant groups as strategic black boxes
and failed to uncover internal dialogues and processes accounting for their ideational and behavioural
developments. Social movement scholars have increasingly studied militant groups' internal dynamics.
Building on her previous scholarship, della Porta has notably theorised differentiated organisational
processes,  including  militant  networks'  activation,  organisational  compartmentalisation,  action
militarisation, ideological encapsulation and militant enclosure (della Porta, 2013).
In addition to this  wide corpus on armed violence,  social  movement approaches have increasingly
covered Islamist movements as well. While most studies do not engage critically with social movement
studies' theoretical development, they have undeniably demonstrated its analytical relevance in non-
Western contexts. Social  movement scholars contend that this theoretical corpus helps to take “the
Islamist  movement  seriously”  (Meijer,  2005)  and to  resist  widespread analyses  investigating  these
groups through a simplistic religious angle. By focusing on the interconnections between “ideas, events
and actions”  (Snow & Byrd,  2007),  SMT scholars  have,  for  instance,  explored  these  movements'
constituencies (Clark, 2004), analysed al-Qaeda as a New Social Movement (Sutton & Vertigans, 2005,
2006)  and  reincorporated  the  study  of  ideas'  embeddedness  within  social  movement organisations
(Munson,  2001).  Social  movement  studies  have  explored  middle-class  networking  modes  of
mobilisation (Clark, 2004), as well as Islamist opposition movements' organisational and networking
developments  in  semi-authoritarian  regimes  (Wiktorowicz,  2001).  In  Turkey,  a  SMT  analytical
framework  has,  for  instance,  demonstrated  that  political  Islam  reached  prominence  thanks  to  the
successful framing of new opportunities by social movement entrepreneurs (Eligur, 2010). Most recent
studies have primarily utilised the concept of framing to interpret Islamist groups' internal competition,
ideational legitimisation and mobilising processes (Wiktorowicz, 2004; Wagemakers, 2008a, 2008b,
2010, 2012; Karagiannis, 2009). A notable contribution specifically argues that framing can reconcile
the incorporation  of  material  interests  and ideas  to  explain Islamist  mobilisation  (Wickham, 2002,
2004).  These  contributions  have,  however,  often  been  inclined  to  rationalist  understandings  of
ideational  developments,  whereby ideas  are  merely  considered  a  resource  which  can  be  used  and
manipulated  by  social  movement  activists.  In  addition  to  this  overtly  functionalist  ideational
understanding, Roel Meijer (2005) asserts that these analyses often overlook the independent role of
ideology, do not attempt to explain “why” people revolt, and neglect the study of patronage systems
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ubiquitous in the Middle East.
The literature on political violence and Islam consequently still suffers from two main shortcomings
that this research strives to address. The first main omission is informed by its focus on replicable
mechanisms across cases. Most of the recent scholarship explores specific episodes and time-framed
mechanisms in differentiated settings,  and overlooks militant  groups'  long-term learning processes.
While  militant  groups  can  be  subjected  to  similar  mechanisms  and  processes  when  faced  with
analogous macro-level changes, they also arguably learn from experience and from the experience of
other groups in similar settings. For instance, one could question whether a militant group would react
similarly to two comparable patterns of repression in different temporalities. Current research mostly
focuses on the timing of repression (possibly within an episode of contention) and on the development
of  different  type  of  resources  across  different  movements.  It  is  additionally  crucial  to  revive  the
importance of meanings, and to investigate whether past lessons have been assimilated by militant
groups and how. An acute exploration of organisational  learning processes is  therefore required to
answer this question.
Organisational learning is partially suggested by the notion that militant groups evolve in continuity
with their past, and that the latter informs their present choices. Following a path-dependent model,
Kathleen Blee notably argues that “activist groups quickly develop routine ways of operating that shape
what  they  will  do,  and  will  consider  doing  far  into  the  future”  and  that  “sequencing  shapes  the
possibilities  of  action  and  interpretation”  (Blee,  2012:  29-30).  This  approach  is  congruent  with
historical institutionalism, which examines sequences of evolution and recognises the constraints and
opportunities  inherent  in  the past.  Historical  institutionalism specifically  contends that  “institutions
continue  to  evolve  in  response  to  changing  environmental  conditions  and  ongoing  political
manoeuvring but in ways that are constrained by past trajectories” (Thelen, 1999: 387). While these
analyses do not specifically focus on organisational learning, their perspectives are beneficial to the
investigation of militant groups' changing responses over time.
Finally, the academic treatment of militant groups' ideological outlooks is not entirely satisfactory in
current social movement studies. The consensual acknowledgement that ideational factors should be
carefully  assessed  and  contextualised  is  usually  followed  by  their  predominantly  rationalist
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understanding based on strategic considerations. In this prevailing conceptualisation, militant groups
draw on a flexible ideological corpus and theological texts to respond to structural - and essentially
material - changes, and to sustain their strategic objectives. Ideas are considered rationally while their
relational dimension, which is arguably more congruent with recent theoretical developments in social
movement studies,  is  mostly investigated in  relation to  other  actors (in  terms of collaboration and
competition) rather than internally as well. Ideational frameworks should nonetheless not be considered
independently from their organisational context and internal interpretations (Gunning, 2012). Social
network analysis insights would be a welcome contribution to this corpus, with the postulate that ideas
are  embedded and  mediated  by  specific  networking structures.  The  networking  and organisational
ideational contextualisation presented henceforth is specifically designed to facilitate their relational
exploration within the organisational structures in which they operate. Finally, the study of ideational
developments should not necessarily consider ideational commitments from a rationalist angle only,
and should additionally investigate non-rational ideational commitments. The perspective promoted in
the research therefore insists on the exploration of the opportunities and constraints posed by ideational
factors.
2.5. BUILDING A RELATIONAL MESO-CENTRED APPROACH
The  discussion  of  the  study  of  violent  contentious  politics  with  a  social  movement  theoretical
framework has  underlined the importance  of  militant  groups'  organisational  dynamics  and internal
processes. This section therefore explores the conceptualisation of the meso-level in social movement
studies,  and  defends  a  unified  approach  drawing  on  organisational  and  networking  studies  (as
increasingly  suggested  by  social  movement  scholars).16 While  social  movement  studies  have  long
investigated organisational and networking modes of mobilisation separately, this section contends that
their  dichotomisation  misrepresents  their  common roots,  and artificially  divides  them.  Drawing on
social  network analysis  theoretical premises,  this  research endorses a unified networking approach,
which defines organisations as specific types of networks rather than differentiated entities.
Organisational conceptualisations of social movements have their roots in RMT. Zald and Ash argued
that  social  movements  rely  on  social  movement  organisations,  which  they  characterised  by  their
endeavour to change society and by the existence of internal incentive structures (Zald & Ash, 1966).
16 e.g. Diani & McAdam, 2003; Clemens & Minkoff, 2004; Caniglia & Carmin, 2005; Davis, 2005; Minkoff & McCarthy,
2005; Soule, 2013; Krinsky & Crossley, 2014.
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Early  definitions  of  social  movement  organisations  have  later  been  enriched  by  additional
contributions; an inclusive definition identifies their “goals with the preferences of a social movement
or counter-movement and attempts to implement those goals” (McCarthy & Zald, 1977: 1218) and
stresses  the  additional  existence  of  internal  structure  and  boundary  (Amstrong  &  Bartley,  2013).
Resource  mobilisation  theorists  have  investigated  evolving  organisational  structures  and  analysed
SMOs' changing goals and objectives. They contend that the evolution of SMOs' internal incentives
and mobilisation of resources illustrate their bureaucratisation, professionalisation and formalisation,
designed to assure organisational survival in changing environments (McCarthy & Zald, 1977). These
organisational processes notably explain the evolution of these organisations' membership, hierarchies,
decision  making  processes  and  resource  management  (Armstrong  &  Bartley,  2013).  Other  social
movement  traditions,  including  the  PPM and  cultural  analyses,  have  also  examined  SMOs.  PPM
scholars have considered social movement organisations from a macro perspective, and investigated the
structuring  of  the  organisational  field  as  well  as  the  interactions  between  SMOs.  This  model  has
nonetheless not referred specifically to organisational studies despite their analytical prospects. Cultural
analyses have, on the other hand, investigated ideational and meaning makings in SMOs.17
Organisational  and  social  movement  studies  share  overlapping  concerns  which  reinforce  bilateral
dialogue  (Davis,  2005:  1-2).  In  the  past,  social  movement  studies  drew  more  extensively  from
organisational studies (McAdam & Scott, 2005: 8), although this pattern has seemingly been recently
reversed (Soule, 2013). Organisational studies are particularly relevant in SMT for the investigation of
informal and formal modes of organisation, and for the analysis of organisational decision making and
diffusion processes. The inclusion of institutional practices, governance and organisational changes,
while not as dynamic as SMT endeavours, is especially suited to current RMT studies.
Organisational studies contribute to this  research on militant groups in three complementary areas:
organisational change and decision making (Minkoff & McCarthy, 2005), organisations and identity
(Diani,  2013),  and  organisational  identity  and learning processes  (Soule,  2013).  The  choice  of  an
organisational conceptualisation premises that a militant group is more than the sum of its components.
Members  of  a  single  organisation  share  and legitimise a  set  of  informal  and formal  norms which
regulate their interactions, and inform the ideational and behavioural evolution of their collective entity.
17 For a brief review of these three schools, one can refer to Caniglia & Carmin (2005).
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These norms are socially constructed by historical processes to be investigated. They are informed by
the past, through the construction of a shared identity, and mediated by a group's internal decision
making processes. Organisational evolution is contextualised within these sets of parameters to explain
broader processes of changes and continuity.
The continuity with the past concerns two neglected factors in violent contentious studies previously
mentioned, namely the treatment of militant groups' ideational construction and organisational learning.
As with any other structured organisation, militant groups should be understood in continuity with their
ideational and material past developments (della Porta & Diani, 2006: 154; Blee, 2012), even though an
inflexible  and  uncontextualised  path  dependency,  rightly  criticised  by  early  resource  mobilisation
theorists (Zald & Ash, 1966), should not be presumed. A social movement perspective drawing on
organisational  analysis  is  designed  to  investigate  organisational  norms'  construction,  and  uncover
possible points of rupture with the past to preclude deterministic analyses.
The second meso-level field of inquiry are networking studies. This corpus has been included in social
movement  research  in  diverging  ways,  starting  with  Tilly's  (1978)  exploration  of  network
embeddedness in micro mobilisation.18 Social networks studies have followed two main perspectives
(Diani 2013). The first approach investigates social networks as assortments of nodes and ties which
connect individuals and facilitate mobilisation by sharing material and non-material resources, while
the  second  perspective  focuses  on  the  networks  which  connect  a  plurality  of  social  movement
organisations and facilitate their collaboration (Diani, 2013). 
The first perspective on social networks is specifically relevant in this research for its relational and
structural contribution to the study of armed militancy. Social network studies extend beyond official
narratives  of  violence,  towards  a  dynamic  and  relational  inclusion  of  the  impact  of  diverging
networking properties on militant groups (Krinsky & Crossley, 2014). From a social network analysis
perspective, individual actors and militants are embedded in social networks characterised by structural
proprieties whose study explains diverse phenomena relevant to militant groups, such as diffusion,
18 See also: Snow, Jr, & Ekland-Olson, 1980; McAdam, 1986; Kitts, 2000; Passy & Giugni, 2001; McAdam, 2003.
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brokerage and leadership. This networking conceptualisation explores the ties between militant groups'
members and their repercussions on individual behaviour and ideas, through the inclusion of diverse
notions such as group solidarity and group social conformity (Everton, 2013: 15). This networking
conceptualisation illuminates the sharing of resources,  the diffusion of influence (Diani,  2004) and
decision making processes (Passy, 2003: 24). A social network analysis enhances current understanding
of the creation of coalitions, meanings, identities, culture and shared perceptions (Passy, 2003: 22).
Within the general theoretical framework of this research, networking studies re-integrate structural and
rationalist understanding of militancy in perspective. 
Networking studies  of  armed militancy have  expanded at  a  fast  pace  in  the  literature.  They have
generally focused on militant group's internal networking topographies (Mishal & Rosenthal, 2005;
Marsden, 2014) and on the networks in which violent groups and insurgents are embedded (Staniland,
2014).  A prominent  approach notably  uncovers  networking  structures  and  their  role  in  the  use  of
violence (Asal & Rethemeyer, 2008; Eilstrup-Sangiovanni & Jones, 2008; Enders & Jindapon, 2009;
Piazza, 2009; Heger et al. 2012). 
This  thesis  draws on organisational  and networking studies  and postulates  that,  following a social
network  analysis  conceptualisation,  all  meso-level  structures  can  be  considered  network-based
regardless of their degree of internal centralisation, formalisation and bureaucracy (Everton, 2013: 6). A
strict dichotomy between militant organisations and networks obscures their meso-level reality, which
usually  combine  some  degree  of  formal  organisation  with  looser  networking  structures.  The
heterogeneous organisational patterns considered in this research, referred to as “hybrid models” in
social  movement studies (della Porta & Diani 2006: 159),  encompass all  possible combinations of
organisational formality, internal hierarchy and organisational discipline. 
2.6. A METHODOLOGICAL MESO-LEVEL COMPARATIVE CASE STUDY
The  introductory  chapter  has  defined  this  thesis'  aims  and  objectives,  and  defended  the  need  to
theoretically conceptualise militant groups' evolution. This section concludes with the presentation of
this research's methodological approach in light of the preceding theoretical discussion. The following
discussion  locates  this  research  within  the  broader  social  movement  scholarship,  and  presents  the
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small-n case study research design endorsed in this thesis.
This  research's  meso-centred  approach  is  pluralistic  and  draws  complementarily  on  several  SMT
traditions.  At  a  general  level,  this  thesis  conceptualises  militant  groups  as  network-based  entities
characterised by diverse degrees of institutionalisation and formalisation. This research contends that
militant groups' internal construction determines their ability to successfully mobilise ideational and
material  resources  in  changing  circumstances,  and  utilises  the  RMT  tradition  to  study  resource
mobilisation  by rational  actors.  In  contrast  with the limited RMT's  analytical  focus,  however,  this
analysis also explores why contention occurs rather than solely how contention takes place. This causal
investigation  situates  militant  groups  in  the  broader  environment  in  which  they  operate,  with  the
inclusion of PPM analytical perspectives. Drawing on this model and on its subsequent revisions, this
research  emphasises  militant  groups'  interpretations  and  constructions  of  changing  political
opportunities  on  their  ideational  and  behavioural  evolution.  This  analysis  postulates  that  militant
groups interpret the environment in which they operate, and adds that their interpretations are mediated
by their  internal  organisational  make-up as well  as  by internal  organisational  norms including,  for
instance,  their  decision  making  and  learning  processes  which  specifically  influence  these  groups'
responses  to  changing  environments.  While  acknowledging  the  negative  fallouts  of  broad
considerations  of  macro-level  opportunities  on  the  study  of  their  cross-cases  causal  impact,  this
research's  focus  on  their  meso-level  interpretations  and  constructions  alleviate  this  potential
shortcoming. This analysis therefore adopts an encompassing macro-level consideration. Finally, this
research's networking conceptualisation of the meso-level emphasises the importance of internal and
external relational developments. The study contends that militant groups' ideational and behavioural
construction cannot be isolated from the study of the internal interactions between their leaders and
members,  as  well  as  from the  analysis  of  their  interactions  with  external  violent,  non-violent  and
governmental actors.
The small-n comparative case study research design presented in the previous chapter and this thesis'
endeavour  to  theorise  militant  groups'  evolution  beyond  Egypt  have  notable  implications  on  this
research's  methodological  approach.  This  choice  is  related  to  broader  debates  in  social  sciences
between case-oriented versus variable-oriented research (della Porta, 2008), which have already been
60 / 314
extensively discussed in the literature.19 Small-n case study research does not share the premise that
qualitative and quantitative approaches entail the same logic of explanation based on a statistical logic
of  scientific  inference  between variables  (King,  Keohane,  & Verba,  1994:  4).  This  research rather
endorses the promotion of the “specificity of diverse tools” in social sciences (della Porta, 2008: 203),
formulated in response to King, Keohane and Verba.20
This  research  contends that  qualitative  and quantitative methodologies  endorse distinctive  research
designs  informing  their  approaches  to  explanation,  causation,  scope  and  causal  generalisation
(Mahoney, 2006; Creswell, 2008). They are two different cultures with their “own values, beliefs, and
norms” (Goertz & Mahoney 2012: 1). Qualitative and quantitative methodologies notably differ in their
case  selection  and  logic  of  inference (George  & Bennett,  2005:  6).  Their  respective  assumptions
influence their approaches to explanation and causation (Mahoney, 2006; Creswell 2008; Goertz &
Mahoney, 2012), and explains the determinist (rather than probabilist) definition of causation endorsed
by qualitative research designs (Mahoney et al. 2009; Beach & Pedersen 2013: 28). While variable-
oriented  studies  attempt  to  generalise  their  findings  based  on  a  logic  of  inference  between  pre-
determined variables,  case study research provides rich investigations  of  specific  phenomenon and
intricate understanding of complex units (della Porta, 2008: 198). Qualitative and case-study research
provide  numerous  tools  to  improve  their  generalisability  and  are  therefore  more  suited  to theory
discovery and theory building (George & Bennett, 2005: 13).
This thesis adopts a case study research design, which is defined as “an intensive study of a single unit
for the purpose of understanding a larger class of (similar)  units” (Gerring,  2007: 37).  Case study
research is particularly suited to examining causal mechanisms in complex cases (George & Bennett,
2005: 19), by helping “to go beyond descriptive statistical measures, towards an in-depth understanding
of historical processes and individual motivations” (della Porta, 2008: 203). This approach is hindered
in large sample selections, which are more suited to the systematic test of specific hypotheses (Gerring,
2007:  41).  Case  study  comparison  can  achieve  higher  conceptual  validity  thanks  to  strong
methodological procedures which ease the development and close examination of new hypotheses and
19 e.g. King, Keohane, & Verba, 1994; Collier & Brady, 2004; della Porta & Keating, 2008.
20 Ibid
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complex causal mechanisms (George & Bennett, 2005: 19).
While acknowledging the strength of case-study research designs, this research is reflective about their
“trade-offs,  limitations  and  potential  pitfalls”  (George  & Bennett,  2005:  22).  George  and  Bennett
notably mention that their  recurrent trade-offs pertains to case selection,  empirical breadth and the
compromise between internal validity and generalisability. They add that inherent limitations concern
the representativeness  of the cases,  while  potential  limitations refer  to  “indeterminacy and lack of
independence of cases” (George & Bennett, 2005: 22).
This research's main concern refers to its potential selection bias (Geddes, 1990; King et al. 1994: 116;
Collier  & Mahoney,  1996;  George & Bennett,  2005).  This bias has been repeatedly mentioned by
quantitative methodologists opposed to any selection on the dependent variable (e.g. King, Keohane, &
Verba,  1994),  which  arguably  undermines  the  validity  of  causal  inference.  Qualitative  scholars
recognise these limits,  and argue that  selection on the dependent  variable  can help identity  causal
variables or causal mechanisms, even though it does not allow for the assessment of their  validity
across cases (Geddes, 1990). This warning is not particularly problematic in this case study of Egypt,
however, considering that the choice of the two militant groups was based on their distinctive early
organisational dynamics in a similar macro-level environment.
In  addition,  qualitative  research  designs  offer  two  tools  to  strengthen  their  internal  validity  and
generalisability,  diachronic  within  case  study  and  process  tracing  (George  &  Bennett,  2005).
Diachronic within case study entails a cross-time comparison within a single unit in order to reduce the
influence of unconsidered intervening variables and background noise (Van Evera, 1997: 52). In this
research, the choice of two militant groups evolving in the same country and their simultaneous within
and cross-case analysis contributes to the exclusion of external (unconsidered) variables. In addition,
the validity of qualitative research designs can be improved with a thorough use of process tracing,
defined as “the analysis of evidence on processes, sequences, and conjunctures of events within a case
for  the  purposes  of  either  developing  or  testing  hypotheses  about  causal  mechanisms  that  might
causally explain the case” (Bennett & Checkel, 2015: 7). Process tracing “provides a way to learn and
to evaluate  empirically  the  preferences  and perceptions  of  actors,  their  purposes,  their  goals,  their
values and their specification of the situations that face them” (Venesson, 2008: 233), by “describing
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political and social phenomena and [..] evaluating causal claims” (Coller 2011: 1). This research's use
of process tracing eases the study of these groups' evolution in a systematic and dynamic way, and
enhances the discovery of causal mechanisms which can be generalised to other cases.
This research utilises process tracing cross cases and within group comparison of two Egyptian groups
to theorise militant groups' evolutions. Following the guidelines of Derek Beach and Rasmus Pedersen
(2013),  this  research  uses  process  tracing  for  theory  building  purposes.  It  postulates  the  possible
existence of causal mechanisms explaining these groups' diverging evolutions in similar environmental
conditions. It goes on to offer a rich analysis of the empirical data acquired in the field and a thorough
study of  a  diverse academic corpus on social  movements  and political  violence contributes  to  the
hypothesising  of  these  groups'  evolutions  and  to  the  discovery  of  causal  mechanisms  (Beach  &
Pedersen, 2013: 60).
The endorsement of a dynamic and contextualised approach to these groups' evolution and the focus on
causal mechanisms based on a path-dependent model sustain a specific focus on points of ruptures
marking these groups' histories.21 Rather than presenting a fastidious narrative of these groups' decade-
long evolution,  the following chapters are  internally  structured around specific  themes designed to
discover and analyse important points of rupture, located at the macro, organisational and ideational
levels. These chapters' objectives are to theorise change and continuity before and after these temporal
junctions. An array of themes are therefore investigated, including these groups' mobilising patterns,
internal  interactions  between  their  members  and  leaders,  external  interactions  with  other  groups
situated  inside  and  outside  their  social  movement  family,  their  leaders  and  members'  evolving
perceptions and thinking processes, internal norms of decision making, the meanings attributed to their
leaders  and  members'  belonging  to  these  groups  and  these  groups'  changing  relations  with  state
authorities.
The following chapters are structured around four themes informed by this thesis' objectives. Chapter
three  examines  theses  groups'  emergence  in  the  1970s.  Chapter  four  investigates  their  ideological
construction over time. Chapter five analyses these groups' use of violence in the 1990s. Chapter six
explores the construction of their political approach, including their joining of the political process after
21 On the focus on specific points of rupture in path-dependent studies of social movements, see also Blee (2012: 37-38).
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the 2011 Egyptian uprising.
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CHAPTER 3
THE EMERGENCE AND EARLY DEVELOPMENTS OF
ARMED MILITANCY
The Islamic movement was preoccupied with the big ideas, such as the Caliphate and the restoration of
the Islamic state. We did not answer the modalities and just focused on the general principles. We had a
dream, a vision and endless hopes. We drew on Sayyid Qutb and Ibn Taymiyya because they represented
exceptional sources in Islamic history. A unique era necessitated unique sources. We were drawing a new
framework.
A leader of a jihadi cell in the late 1970s
At the beginning of  our  movement  in  the  1970s,  there  was no clearly defined idea.  We were only
committed to  religion.  The  salafi creed and the  minhaj (method)  of  the  Muslim Brotherhood were
adopted later on. Then, we legitimised armed jihad and decided to change the reality through the use of
force, which resulted in the killing of Anwar Sadat in 1981.
A religious thinker of the Islamic Group
3.1. INTRODUCTION
This chapter investigates the emergence and early developments of the Islamic Group (IG thereafter),
and  of  the  cells  which  later  formed  the  Jihad  Group  (JG  thereafter).  This  analysis  sets  up  the
foundations of the remaining chapters of this  thesis,  which notably argue that  these groups'  initial
organisational dynamics crucially shaped their subsequent ideational and organisational constructions.
This chapter therefore explores these groups' early mobilisation patterns, as well as the formal and
informal organisational norms established in these groups' early days.
This chapter's comparative emphasis on these groups' organisational dynamics based on rich empirical
contributions from their members differs from current studies of armed Islamist militancy in Egypt in
the 1970s. Early sociological studies explored militants' backgrounds, ideational frames of reference
and organisational structures (Ibrahim, 1980; Ansari, 1984), contextualised in their broader contexts
(Fandy, 1994) and in consideration of the expansion of the Islamic sphere in Egypt (Ayubi, 1980;
Kepel, 1993). As theoretical overviews, these sociological analyses of Islamist militancy do not cover
their  members'  experiences  and  micro-mobilisation  processes,  which  were  only  subsequently
elaborated  by  additional  contributions  from these  groups'  members,  close  observers,  and  scholars
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(Hammuda,  1985;  Ahmad,  1988;  Khalid,  1988;  Muru,  1990;  Mubarak,  1995;  al-Sibaʿi,  2002;  al-
Zayyat, 2002; Sageman, 2004; al-Ansari, 2006; Munib, 2009, 2010a, 2010b; al-Zawahiri, 2010). These
two main corpuses provide exhaustive empirical insights and sociological analyses of the 1970s, even
though they do not thoroughly compare these groups' early organisational dynamics and mobilising
processes. A few comparative attempts have proved less convincing because of their reliance on scarce
empirical  material  (Zeidan,  1999;  Nedoroscik,  2002),  while  the  current  focus  on  these  groups'
ideological publications has regrettably neglected these groups' meso-level dynamics (Jansen & Faraj,
1986; Kenney, 2006; Orbach, 2012). A comparative analysis of these groups' early developments is
therefore still required and very much needed.
This  chapter  endeavours  to  de-construct  two prevailing  paradigms which  obscure a  more rigorous
understanding of these groups' early histories. The most frequent myth claims that the IG and jihad
groups cells sprang from the mainstream Muslim Brotherhood (MB thereafter) in reaction to Nasserist
state repression.22 It is widely reported, for instance, that Ayman al-Zawahiri would have been a MB
member before his  endorsement of armed violence.23 Field interviews nonetheless reveal that most
jihad  groups  members  followed  the  mainstream  salafi institution  jamʿiyya  ansar  al-sunna  al-
muhammadiyya  (association of the partisans of Muhammad's tradition), rather than the Brotherhood.
They  were  not  organisationally  connected  to  the  MB  and  were  only  indirectly  affected  by  the
repression of its members and leaders. This claim is also inadequate with regards to the IG, which
emerged independently from the MB and specifically adopted armed violence in  opposition to  the
reformist path promoted by the latter in the 1970s. 
The second paradigm of the literature focuses on the ideas endorsed by prominent individuals, rather on
their  reinterpretation by these  groups'  members  and mediation by these  groups'  internal  dynamics.
Many studies investigate the thoughts of a few religious scholars and intellectuals. They include Sayyid
Qutb,  sheikh ʿOmar  ʿAbd al-Rahman,  sheikh ʿAbd al-Hamid Kishk and the  medieval  scholar  Ibn
Taymiyya, as well as jihadi leaders such as Muhammad ʿAbd al-Salam Faraj and his opus on jihad (al-
farida  al-gha'iba,  The Neglected  Duty).24 These  analyses  tend to  reify  these  publications  with  the
underlying assumption that they would explain the causes of violence, its evolving use and generally
22 e.g Vidino, 2010: Cesari, 2014: 169.
23 e.g Esposito, 2002: 18; Springer et al. 2009: 271; Masoud, 2013: 482.
24 e.g Jansen & Faraj, 1986; Kepel, 1993; Brooke, 2008.
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epitomise  the  ideological  views  held  by  these  groups.25 While  ideological  sources  should  be
investigated,  their  construction  and  evolving  interpretation  should  be  contextualised  as  well.  For
instance, Muhammad ʿAbd al-Salam Faraj was, according to extensive interviews conducted in this
research, not as pivotal as often claimed; his post-mortem fame was primarily informed by his role in
Sadat's assassination in 1981 and by the existence of a written legacy. His pamphlet on jihad merely
compiled familiar ideas of the 1970s, and his emphasis on the so-called close enemy should not be
considered quintessential in the rationale of fellow jihadis at the time.26 The ideological framework of
the latter  was broader  than usually assumed, and generally  constituted of general  principles which
prominently included the need to liberate Palestine and Jerusalem as well.27 One should therefore exert
caution in understanding militant groups through the analysis of an Islamic equivalent of Lenin's What
is to be done? (Lenin, 1966) which could explain these groups' actions, as inadequately as an analysis
of Lenin's text would explain the actions of the Bolsheviks.
This opening chapter on armed militancy in Egypt demonstrates the existence of two distinctive jihadi
trends  characterised  by  diverging  mobilising  patterns,  organisational  dynamics  and  approaches  to
violence. The first jihadi cells were predominantly constituted by religious minded youths dismayed by
an array of domestic and international issues. They resented the 1967 Arab defeat, the loss of Jerusalem
and  the  repression  of  the  MB and  of  its  chief  ideologue  Sayyid  Qutb.  They  mobilised  in  covert
networks of acquaintances and friends to topple the regime and replace it with their utopian vision of
an  Islamic  state.  Their  early  mobilisation  patterns,  however,  reinforced  internal  competition  and
prevented the emergence of a cohesive group. In the South of Egypt, the second jihadi group answered
a different dynamic. The Islamic Group emerged as a group of proselytising friends active on university
campuses, who later adopted armed militancy in response to a closing of political opportunities at the
macro-level. Eventually, they formed a loose coalition with other like-minded jihadis to topple their
common enemy, the Egyptian regime and his president Anwar Sadat.
25 More intricate analyses of the adoption of Qutb's ideas in specific political contexts were elaborated by Burgat (2002,
2005).
26 As argued by Gerges (2009: 10-12).
27 This chapter illustrates the role played by many Palestinians in the jihad groups, including Saleh Sirriyya and Salim al-
Rihal. Their role in early Egyptian jihadism and in salafi jihadism has been specifically studied by al-Amin (2010) and
in a special issue of Welt des Islams (Hegghammer & Wagemakers, 2013).
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3.2. THE SEEDS OF VIOLENCE UNDER NASSER
The contextualisation of the Muslim Brotherhood before and during the reign of Gamal Abdel Nasser is
important to understand the development of armed militancy under Nasser's successor, Anwar Sadat.
The first jihadi cell emerged in the Nasserist regime in the late 1960s and, while members of diverse
jihadi  cells did not suffer directly from Nasser's policies, the repression of the MB had a profound
impact on their micro-mobilisation in the 1970s. The 1960s also witnessed the pivotal role played by
the prominent  MB ideologue,  Sayyid  Qutb,  and his  articulation of  the concepts  of  hakimiyya  and
jahiliyya in  the  Egyptian  context.28 Finally,  Nasser's  endeavour  to  monopolize  Egyptian  religious
institutions through the reform of al-Azhar University’s educational curriculum catalysed the religious
revival and the legitimisation of Islamic Law in Egyptian societal debates in the 1970s.
The MB emerged three decades before the 1952 military coup, and rapidly became a prominent mass
movement  in  Egypt.  Created  in  1928 by a  schoolteacher,  Hassan  al-Bana,  the  MB exploited  new
political  opportunities  after  the  abrogation  of  the  Caliphate  to  develop  as  a  revivalist  religious
movement in the city of Ismaïlia. Al-Bana was influenced by Egyptian reformist intellectuals, notably
Muhammad ʿAbdo and Rashid Rida; he resented the diminishing role of Islam in Egyptian society, and
was eager to restore the prominence of Islam as a way of life (Mitchell, 1993: 5). Under his leadership,
the MB emerged as an influential organisation which gradually politicised its message and methods
(Lia, 2006). Despite the MB's initial non-violent approach, the deterioration of the political atmosphere
in Egypt in the 1940s became more conducive to the use of violence between Egyptian groups and
against British forces (Mitchell, 1993: 59). In this violent regional and national environment, the MB
created the “special apparatus” (al-tandhim al-khas), which was initially justified by the MB failure to
militarily  support  the  1936  Palestinian  uprising  (Ashour,  2009:  38).  This  military  infrastructure
subsequently pursued complementary internal and external objectives. In Egypt, its members targeted
public figures deemed opposed to the Muslim Brotherhood or allied to the British forces in Egypt.
Outside Egypt,  the MB participated in the 1948 Palestine war.  Observers and scholars nonetheless
doubt that the apparatus was under the full command and control of the MB leadership, and stress the
importance of internal organisational divisions (Ashour, 2009: 40). By the beginning of the 1950s, the
military wing was dismantled, and a new leadership led by Hassan al-Hudaybi was selected.
28 Cf. note 29 page 70 on these concepts.
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In the beginning of the 1950s, a clandestine group composed of young officers successfully planned to
overthrow the Egyptian monarchy. They named themselves the Free Officers, and included Muhammad
Naguib, Gamal Abdel Nasser and Anwar Sadat. The Free Officers were a direct response to the failure
of the Egyptian regime to help the Palestinians in the 1948 war. Its members considered the prevailing
political environment destructive to the country, and believed that internal divisions and the absence of
a strong leadership precipitated the loss of Palestine (Cook, 2011: 39). Their ideas were initially rather
unsophisticated, lacking a central guiding ideology and a political framework. Their programme was
mainly focused on the necessity to end British rule in Egypt and improve socio-economic conditions
(Cook, 2011: 40). Shortly after seizing power in a military coup, they gradually closed most political
opportunities for their contenders. They confined their opponents, dissolved their political parties and
created a new revolutionary command council to rule the country. The coup abolished the monarchy
and created a republic on its ashes (Cook, 2011: 49-51). 
The relations between the Free Officers and the MB were crucially affected by the 1952 military coup.
Some of the Free Officers, such as ʿAbd al-Munʿim ʿAbd al-Raʾwf, were MB members who took part
in the special apparatus (Ashour, 2009: 42). Al-Banna and Nasser even discussed the possibility that the
Free Officers became a MB unit in the Egyptian army (Ashour, 2009: 42). This close proximity led to
an expected,  yet  not  unconditional  nor  uncontested,  MB support  for  the 1952 military coup.  This
mutual entente was nonetheless short lived, and only lasted for a single year (Cook, 2011: 53), when
the Free Officers retreated from their commitments. The Officers feared the MB influence and its large
constituency. By the end of 1953, the military regime subjugated the political opposition, consolidated
its rule and became increasingly suspicious of the perceived MB hostility. An assassination attempt on
Nasser - which some considered staged (Cook, 2011: 60) - was a pretext to jail the MB leadership and
thousands of the group’s followers. The MB disappeared as a political force between 1954 and 1957
(Cook, 2011: 83). 
This  historical  context  explains  partially  the rise  of the most  prominent  Islamist  ideologue of  this
decade,  Sayyid  Qutb,  whose  influence  has  been  unparalleled  on  Islamist  movements  worldwide.
Sayyid Qutb was born in 1906 in the province of Asyiut in Southern Egypt (Calvert, 2010: 25-52).
From his childhood to his execution in 1965, he had been the incarnation of Egyptian vacillations
between Islam, tradition and modernity. After the beginning of his career as a school teacher and a poet
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influenced by nationalist liberal thoughts and Sufism, he evolved quickly into a prominent writer and
literary critic (Musallam, 2005: 35-39; Calvert, 2010: 62-72). By the 1930s, the general malaise caused
by cultural Westernisation and by a harsh economic crisis cultivated Qutb's renewed interest in Islam
and  in  the  Qur'an,  initially  informed  by  the  holy  book's  aesthetic  and  philosophical  dimensions
(Musallam,  2005:  58;  Calvert,  2010:  111).  Qutb  became  more  critical  of  Western  countries,
admonished for colonialism, support of the Zionist  movement,  materialism and lack of spirituality
(Musallam, 2005: 73-90; Calvert, 2010: 116-121, 172). His return from a study trip in the U.S. was
followed by the completion of his work on social justice in Islam.29 By 1952, he became politically
closer to the Free Officers, who admired him and considered him the father of the 1952 revolution
(Musallam, 2005: 139; Calvert,  2010: 182). Eventually, Qutb joined the MB and led their political
propaganda and cultural  affairs  (Calvert,  2010: 187).  When the regime crushed the organisation in
1954, Sayyid Qutb was arrested and imprisoned until 1964. Prison was a pivotal moment in his life; the
harsh conditions he experienced with his inmates motivated his repentance from his past as a non-
Islamic  intellectual  (Calvert,  2010:  200)  and his  rejection  of  the  inauthentic  Islamic  nature  of  the
regime (Musallam, 2005: 151). Prison gave him ten years to complete his commentary of the Qur'an,
from  which  he  extracted  Milestones  (Qutb,  1987),  which  has  been  widely  considered  the  most
influential text for Islamist movements worldwide.
Sayyid  Qutb  has  mostly  been  remembered  for  the  extensive  scholarship  he  authored  in  prison,
especially between 1958 and 1964 (Calvert, 2010: 204). Prison granted him the time to develop the
concepts  of  hakimiyat-Allah  (God's  sovereignty)  and  jahiliyya.30 Influenced  by  Abu  al-ʿAla  al-
Mawdudi from Pakistan, Qutb framed the roots of Nasser's authoritarianism in its  jahili  foundations.
He  contended  that  all  modern  societies  were  un-Islamic,  and  that  only  God's  sovereignty  could
establish a superior moral order and a just Islamic society (Musallam, 2005: 153; Calvert, 2010: 217-
218).31 In  Milestones, he denounced man's sovereignty as oppressive, and framed the restoration of
Islamic Law as the only possible remedy to free humanity from man's despotism (Qutb, 1987).
Qutb's ideas and the MB organisational limbo sparked the last contested attempt of this organisation to
29 See The America I have seen (Qutb, 2000) and the different editions of Social Justice in Islam (Qutb, 1975)
30 Jahiliya  means  ignorance  in  Arabic.  In  Islamic  terminology,  this  concept  refers  to  pre-Islamic  Arabian  peninsula
societies. Hakimiyat-Allah refers to God's sovereignty on earth. Qutb's political use of these concepts has been studied
by Khatab (2006a, 2006b).
31 For studies on Qutb, refer  to:  Moussalli,  1992; Euben,  1999; Carré,  2000, 2004; Musallam, 2005; Khatab, 2006a,
2006b; Bergesen, 2008; Calvert, 2010; Toth, 2013.
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use violence against the regime in the 1960s. At the initiatives of ʿAbd al-Fatah Ismaʿil and Zainab al-
Ghazali, a secret organisation loosely inspired by the 1940's covert apparatus was formed to revive the
MB, though scholars disagree about the organisation's aims (Calvert, 2010: 230; Musallam, 2005: 168).
Some analyses allude to a thirteen year plan to preach and advocate for the creation of an Islamic state,
culminating in the establishment of this utopian state when 75% of the population agreed (Musallam,
2005: 168), while others contend the organisation had plans to use violence against the regime (Calvert,
2010: 230-234). It is generally agreed that Qutb became this organisation's advisor after his liberation
in 1964, though he arguably warned this organisation against any hasty actions, and advocated for the
preliminary Islamisation of society before the application of Islamic Law in the country (Calvert, 2010:
241).  Qutb  believed  that  this  group  needed  years  of  spiritual  preparation  to  develop  a  true
understanding of Islam, and thought that violence could only be a last resort in self-defence (Calvert,
2010: 232, 242). The group discussed some possibilities to attack the regime, before they eventually
caught its attention. Its members were subsequently rounded up, the organisation dismantled and Qutb
executed in 1966 (Calvert, 2010: 243).
This influence of Qutb's  ideological  radicalism on the MB receded in the 1970s.  Shortly after  his
execution,  his  revolutionary  thoughts  sparked  heated  discussions  on  his  legacy,  especially  on  the
justification of violence against the state and on the excommunication of Muslims (Zollner, 2008: 45;
Ashour, 2009: 81). The general MB guide, Hassan al-Hudaybi, imposed a theological clarification on
members of the 1965 organisation on these two contentious issues (Zollner, 2008: 45). This initiative
triggered a process of ideological revisions, based on the shared premise that violence devastated the
MB. The central contention pertained to the group's strategy, rather than its objectives. It endeavoured
to clarify whether an Islamic state should be created through revolutionary means or through preaching
(daʿwa) and education (Zollner, 2008: 46). These revisions materialised with the publication of a book,
Preachers not Judges (duʿat la qudat), consensually agreed upon by the MB leadership (Zollner, 2008:
66). This book was not solely a response to Qutb's scholarship but generally represented an attempt to
impose a reorientation on diverse subjects including belief, disbelief, sins and Islamic Law (Zollner,
2008: 149).
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3.3. EARLY JIHADI MOBILISATION UNDER SADAT
Anwar Sadat's presidency and the decade leading to his assassination in 1981 witnessed a proliferation
of small militant cells whose central raison d'être was to replace the regime with an Islamic state, the
so-called  “jihad  groups”.32 This  section  contextualises  their  emergence  in  a  political  and  societal
context  marked  by  a  religious  revival,  and  analyses  the  early  micro-mobilisation  of  these  cells'
members. The following suggests that the jihad groups were an epiphenomenon of the mainstream
salafi institutions which became influential in the 1970s and subsequently gave them a specific legacy.
This section argues that young jihadis were influenced by a plurality of issues, including moral shock
in response to stories of torture suffered by MB members, the execution of Sayyid Qutb, the loss of
Jerusalem in 1967 and the desire to create a utopian Islamic state which would restore the golden age of
the Muslim world. At the same time, it demonstrates that the early adoption of violence by the jihad
groups  hindered  their  efforts  to  unite  and  fuelled  repeated  internal  divisions.  Finally,  this  section
concludes with the investigation of the role played by Saleh Sirriyya, who managed to unite a few
groups despite his eventual failure to achieve his objectives.
Anwar Sadat reached Egypt's presidency after the death of Abdel Nasser in September 1970. Sadat's
political  débuts  were  characterised  by  his  renunciations  of  Nasser's  policies  and  by  the  so-called
“corrective revolution” which distanced Egypt from the Soviet Union and from the socialist camp.
Sadat opened up the Egyptian economy and changed his country's regional alliances (Thompson, 2008:
317; Kandil, 2013: 99). He envisioned a strategic partnership with the United States, and a resolution of
the Israeli Egyptian conflict that would result in the recovery of the Sinai Peninsula from Israel. Sadat
portrayed himself as the “believer president” (al-raʾis al-muʾmin) and used the new popularity of Islam
and the looming importance of the Gulf States against his nationalist and socialist political opponents
(Esposito,  1998:  236-237;  Zaman,  2010:  146).  He  eased  pressure  on  Islamist  opponents,  mostly
represented by the Muslim Brotherhood, ended their detention in prison and allowed their reappearance
in the public sphere (Zollner, 2008: 48). This religious revival was similar to parallel developments
witnessed in other Arab and non-Arab countries.33
32 These groups were called  jamaʿat al-jihad  in Arabic media, even though their members did not self-designate their
groups. Similarly, Saleh Sirriyya's group has often been called the “military academy” group (al-faniyya al-ʿaskariyya),
although  this  name  was  never  used  by  its  members.  Others  also  wrongly  name  this  group  shabab  Muhammad
(Muhammad's youths) or hizb ul-tahrir (the Liberation Party).
33 On the religious revival in Arab and non-Arab countries, one can refer to an extensive older bibliography (Haddad &
Esposito, 1991).
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Sadat's presidency was accompanied by the reconstruction of the religious field and by flourishing
demands for a greater role for Islam in society. The nationalisation of the most prominent religious
institution in Egypt, al-Azhar University, and its monopolistic instrumentalisation by Nasser to justify
his  socialist  leanings  gave  al-Azhar  scholars  “the  instruments  for  their  political  emergence  in  the
1970s” (Zeghal, 1999: 272).34 The educational reforms of al-Azhar University and the inclusion of non-
religious subjects in its curriculum paved the way for its graduates' entry into new professional bodies,
which expanded the influence of al-Azhar outside of the religious sphere. Moreover, the monopoly
granted to al-Azhar and its scholars on religious discourses under Nasser gave them administrative
resources and a strong political platform in society. The demise of previous political constraints under
Sadat therefore gave Azhari ʿulamaʾ free reins to expand their political  influence and to call  for a
greater role for Islam. Al-Azhar scholars were calling for the application of Islamic Law in Egypt and
several  committees  created  to  codify  Islamic  Law  later  demanded  the  elaboration  of  an  Islamic
constitution that would include the application of the hudud35 (Esposito, 1998: 236-237; Zeghal, 1999).
The diversification of the religious field was accompanied by the appearance of what have been termed
“peripheral”  ʿulamaʾ,  who  used  this  phase  of  political  liberalisation  to  issue  similar  calls  for  the
application of Islamic Law in Egypt.36
Political liberalisation and the growing importance of religion similarly facilitated the expansion of
salafi leaning associations,  which had emerged a few decades earlier  in the reformist  environment
mentioned in the previous section. The first influential association, al-jamʿiyya al-sharʿiyya lil-taʿwun
al-ʿamilin  bil-kitab  wal-sunna  al-Muhammadiyya  (the  shariʿa association  for  those  who  behave
according to the Book and Muhammad's tradition), was created by sheikh Mahmud Khattab al-Sobki in
1912. This association is not strictly  salafi  (Gauvain,  2012: 38), even though it  has long favoured
religious  views  congruent  with  modern  salafism,  notably  its  emphasis  on  purging  religion  from
innovations  (Munib,  2009).37 This  association  has  pursued social  work  in  the  fields  of  preaching,
education and health since its inception (Faid, 2014: 52). The other influential association is jamʿiyya
ansar al-sunna al-muhammadiyya (association of the partisans of Muhammad's tradition), which was
created by sheikh Muhammad Hamed al-Fiqi as a  salafi split from al-jamʿiyya al-sharʿiyya  in 1926
34 See also Zeghal's extensive study on the evolution of al-Azhar and its scholars during this period (Zeghal, 1996).
35 In Islamic Law, the hudud refer to the legal punishments ascribed to certain crimes.
36 On these themes, see also Eickelman & Piscatori (1996).
37 The next chapter expands on salafism.
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(Faid,  2014: 54).  In the 1970s,  ansar al-sunna  was led by sheikh Muhammad Khalil  Hiras,38 who
graduated from al-Azhar University in 1940 and later studied in Saudi Arabia under sheikh ʿAbd al-
ʿAziz Ibn Baz.39 These associations developed important social networks in Egypt, even though their
influence had remained relatively limited until the 1960s. They subsequently benefited from the new
competitive religious environment and from Sadat's new accommodating policies.
This  contextualisation  indicates  that  discussing  the  application  of  Islamic  Law was  commonplace
among substantial components of Egyptian society in the 1970s. It was a discursive opportunity, which
defines  those  “ideas  in  the  broader  political  culture  believed  to  be  “sensible,”  “realistic,”  and
“legitimate”” (McCammon, 2013: 1). Militant groups demanding the application of Islamic Law in
Egypt therefore cannot simply be dismissed as khawarij groups to denounce their alleged heterodoxy.40
An  ontological  refusal  to  essentialise  Islam  cannot  negate  that  the  Islamic  legal  tradition  has
historically  legitimised  certain  forms  of  political  organisation  (polity)  and elaborated  rich  political
prescriptions  (Cook,  2014).41 Despite  a  plurality  of  de  facto forms  of  Islamic  states,  this  unitary
conception has never been out-rightly abandoned by Muslim scholars.42 Demanding the application of
Islamic Law enjoys a certain resonance in Muslim societies; this contextualisation generally means
that, in the 1970s, the main distinction between the  jihadi  cells discussed thereafter and mainstream
religious actors pertained to the legitimacy of violence to achieve a shared objective.
This fundamental feature - that  jihadi cells shared much of their ideological framework with broader
sections of society - is inherent with the study of violent groups in social movement studies discussed
in the previous chapter.  The latter  asserted that  violent  groups often originate  from broader  social
38 Muhammad Khalil Hiras was an Egyptian religious scholar born in the city of Tanta in 1916. He graduated from al-
Azhar University where he received a doctorate in Islamic sciences. He was initially a self-proclaimed opponent of Ibn
Taymiyya and of  the latter's  rejection of  philosophy and  kalam  (Islamic theology).  Eventually,  Hiras's  attempts  to
scholarly refute Ibn Taymiyya's creed failed, and catalysed his adoption of this creed as his own.
39 Sheikh ʿAbd al-ʿAziz Ibn Baz was a leading Saudi scholar and the country's Grand Mufti from 1993 to 1999. He is
widely considered as one of the most influential scholar of 20th century salafism.
40 Khawarij (khariji in singular) refers to an early Islamic sect denounced by Islamic orthodoxy as heretic. This name
means that this sect literally "left" religion because of its antagonist position on the succession of prophet Muhammad.
The next chapter expands on this theme. In the meantime, it should be mentioned that it has historically been common
to denounce one's opponent as a khariji to deny his Islamic legitimacy. One can refer to Kenney (2006) for the evolving
use of this concept in Egypt.
41 One of the earliest Islamic theological conceptualisation of the Caliphate was written by Abu al-Hasan al-Mawardi in
Al-ahkam al-sultaniyya, The Ordinances of the Government (al-Mawardi, 2000).
42 This understanding of the role of the tradition should not preclude the consideration of its reinterpretation over time.
The next chapter develops this argument, and investigates the reinterpretation of the salafi tradition by the IG and the
JG.
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movements  which  give  them a  certain  organisational  and  ideational  legacies,  and  added  that  the
boundaries between them are often fluid and changing.43 In this case, salafi associations such as ansar
al-sunna  provided  the  theological  salafi backbone  and  legacy  to  the  jihad  groups  which  were
established by some of its members and followers. The shared objectives between mainstream salafi
associations and jihadi entrepreneurs also informed the framing used by the latter, which mostly had to
convince a salafi minded audience that only violence could lead to the creation of an Islamic state in
Egypt.
The emergence of the first noticeable armed Islamist group in the 1970s was not directly related to
these  developments,  however.  The  first  violent  group  was  formed  by  former  MB  members  who
suffered from Nasser's repression and strived to apply their reading of Sayyid Qutb's revolutionary
path. This group, jamaʿa al-muslimun (the group of the Muslims, JM thereafter),44 was led by Shukri
Mustafa,  a  member  of  the  1965 MB special  apparatus  who briefly  recruited  a  few followers  and
pursued an isolationist approach after his discharge from prison. During its short-lived existence, the
JM was characterised by peculiar sectarian and authoritarian internal dynamics which isolated it from
society and hindered the development of a supportive environment. This group was mostly based on
prison ties, and its rejection of other Muslims on theological grounds later obstructed its expansion.
Micro mobilisation was therefore limited, and the JM remained a cult organised around an authoritarian
leader throughout its short-lived existence.45 Its members eventually confronted the state before the
group's dissolution by 1978.
The Islamist cells which later morphed to create the Jihad Group were called the jihad groups. These
groups were loosely structured in fuzzy networks, which agglomerated high school students and friends
of religious background, often active in mainstream  salafi  institutions as well. Their members were
often  convinced  by  their  acquaintances  that  violence  was  Islamically  justified  in  Egypt. The
legitimisation of violence was rationalised by many complementary issues whose sole remedy was
believed to be the creation of an Islamic state in Egypt. It included, for instance,  the liberation of
Jerusalem and Palestine and the creation of an Islamic utopia in Egypt. These groups did not follow an
intricate ideological corpus, and mostly referred to a set of general principles. One of their leaders in
43 Chapter 2 pages 51-52.
44 This group has also widely been referred to as  takfir wal-hijra  (excommunication and exile), even though the group
never used this name (Hegghammer, 2009: 246).
45 A few studies have covered this group's early developments (Ibrahim, 1982, 1988; Ansari, 1984; Kepel, 1993).
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the late 1970s, a JG leader argues that:
The Islamic movement was preoccupied with the big ideas, such as the Caliphate and the restoration of
the Islamic state. We did not answer the modalities and just focused on the general principles. We had a
dream, a vision and endless hopes. We drew on Sayyid Qutb and Ibn Taymiyya because they represented
exceptional sources in Islamic history. A unique era necessitated unique sources. We were drawing a new
framework. 
The jihad groups were religiously influenced by the  salafi  teachings of  ansar al-sunna,  and by this
institution's leader sheikh Khalil Hiras. This influence shaped these cells' focus on tawhid (unicity of
God) and on the rejection of unlawful religious innovations denounced as  bidaʿ (Muru, 1990: 31).
Many members politically argued that the Egyptian regime was un-Islamic,46 and drew on diverse
writings of Sayyid Qutb and Ibn Taymiyya47 to justify that Muslim leaders who do not apply Islamic
Law have to be violently opposed.
The successful  relational  framing undertaken by  jihadi entrepreneurs  was rendered  possible  by its
strong resonance, as argued by social movement theorists, and by its pro-active nature. The successful
recruitment of jihadi fellows was facilitated by the theological corpus shared with mainstream salafism,
which eased the transition to violence, and by the construction of a utopian project in these frames'
diagnosis,  prognostic and motivational components. New jihad groups' members were not uniquely
convinced on the basis of shared grievances, but were also integrated into an ambitious project, the
creation of  an Islamic state,  which would restore the golden age of the Muslim world,  revive the
Islamic Caliphate and liberate the Muslim world from domestic oppressors and foreign occupation.
This  pro-active  and  positive  endeavour  is  described  by  Elisabeth  Wood  as  “pleasure  in  agency”,
defined  as  “the  pleasure  in  together  changing  unjust  social  structures  through  intentional  action”
(Wood, 2003: 235). The plurality of concerns addressed by the creation of the Islamic state meant that
all new members could find something worth fighting for. It also indicates that the broader project
defended by the jihad groups, in contrast with the IG investigated later, was not merely a reaction to
repressive domestic policies, thus accounting for the use of violence prior to the closure of political
opportunities.
46 This position drew as well from mainstream salafi scholars. Cf. chapter 4 pages 109-112.
47 The next chapter develops these theological arguments. It notably asserts that these groups' reference to Ibn Taymiyya
does not mean that the latter legitimised the use of violence in Islamic countries, which he actually opposed. Cf. chapter
4 pages 107-108.
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Relational micro-mobilisation through acquaintances and pre-existing ties was not the only mobilising
pattern. In addition, many leaders and members of these early cells mention that they adopted armed
jihad independently. They argue that, while they had never been MB members, the repression of the
latter and the execution of Sayyid Qutb triggered their micro-mobilisation. They describe their moral
shock at the stories of torture and executions of Islamist prisoners in Egyptian prisons, and often add
that their outrage was further reinforced by the loss of Palestine in the 1967 war against Israel. This
moral shock is defined in the social movement literature as a cognitive and emotional process which
encourages micro-mobilisation in the absence of pre-existing ties with active social networks (Jasper &
Poulsen 1995; Jasper, 1999: 106). This emotional outrage can trigger an individual's self-recruitment
into activism, such as this decision to join or create  jihadi  cells. Stories of torture and execution of
Islamist prisoners played a similar role in the wars launched by the United States in the 2000s on the
radicalisation  of  Muslims  in  Western  countries  (Wiktorowicz,  2005),  sometimes  described  as
“humiliation  by  proxy”  (Khosrokhavar,  2005:  157).48 Ayman  al-Zawahiri  (2010:  11)  argues  in  his
memoirs that state repression sparked:
[A] growing anger and a desire to take revenge against those who persecuted Islam and Muslims […].
These feeling made many Egyptians - and the majority of them were religious - sympathise with the
MB, especially when they learnt the crimes committed by the regime against their wives and what was
sacred in their houses.
A leading member of a jihadi cell in the 1970s, similarly explains that:
I never belonged to any organisation but when I heard about the Muslim Brotherhood being tortured in
prison,  I  wanted  to  know more  about  them.  Why  did  it  happen?  What  were  their  ideas?  Then,  I
sympathised with them and realised that the regime had to be changed with the use of force. The regime
committed a fatal mistake. They repressed them and paved the way for our emergence, the emergence of
a more radical generation.
Another prominent member of the Jihad Group who briefly joined jamaʿa al-muslimun before joining a
JG cell, Osama Qassem (2012), adds that:
I joined this group [jamaʿa al-muslimun] to express my solidarity with them against state oppression.
My solidarity was to its members and was not ideologically inspired. At the time, there was nobody else
48 On the role of Western states' foreign policies on the radicalisation of individuals in Western societies, see also Githens-
Mazer (2008).
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involved in militancy so I had no other alternative.
The moral  shock expressed in  these testimonies  relates to the theoretical  discussion of the second
chapter on the role of grievances and networks in micro-mobilisation. It notably suggests that micro-
mobilisation is not necessarily generated by a direct encounter with the security services, but can also
be triggered by the suffering of others. Moreover, it confirms that, while pre-existing ties played an
important role  in the socialisation of many jihadis,49 it  was not always a pre-requisite  to high-risk
activism mobilisation.50 Emotions,  empathetic  grievances  and  individual  solidarity  hence  played  a
critical role in the mobilisation of a new jihadi generation in the 1970s. This cognitive trigger and these
framing processes are nonetheless not sufficient to give a comprehensive picture of the mobilisation
processes  of  the  jihad  groups in  the  1970s,  which  still  relied  on organised  networks  which  could
aggregate material and non-material resources to confront the Egyptian state.
The  first  jihad  group  emerged  between  the  late  1950s  and  the  beginning  of  the  1960s  in  the
authoritarian Nasserist regime. Its initial leadership was formed by Nabil Bariʿ, Ismaʿil Tantawi, and
ʿUlaywah Mustafa (Muru, 1990, 1998: 77; al-Sibaʿi, 2002; Munib, 2009; al-Zawahiri, 2010). This cell
was then reinforced by the joining of some of their acquaintances from schools and local mosques,
including Ayman al-Zawahiri and Sayyid Imam, who became prominent JG leaders subsequently (al-
Sibaʿi,  2002;  al-Zawahiri,  2010).51 This  group was led  by Tantawi in  Cairo,  who was the group's
ideologue and Hassan Halawi in the Giza area (Muru, 1990: 31). This small grouping of mostly high
school students was primarily a group of friends and acquaintances who were preparing themselves for
jihad, rather than a structured armed group.
This group's first significant development occurred much later, during the 1973 Arab-Israeli war. The
war with Israel challenged this group on the most suited tactical and strategic approach to confront and
replace  the  Egyptian  regime.  The  largest  faction  legitimised  the  joining  of  the  Egyptian  army to
confront Israel, and asserted that it would be an opportunity to spread the groups' ideas and recruit
army officers. ʿIsam al-Qamari, an army colonel who subsequently reached prominence within the JG,
49 The role of pre-existing ties is well-documented by social movement scholars. See chapter 2.
50 High-risk activism is defined by the “anticipated dangers” entailed by this form of activism compared to safer forms of
mobilisation  by  McAdam (1986),  who  further  argues  that  high-risk  activism  is  generally  associated  with  higher
integration in activist networks.
51 Sayyid Imam became the leader of the Jihad Group from 1988 to 1993, before his succession by Ayman al-Zawahiri.
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was henceforth recruited by ʿUlaywa Muhammad (Muru, 1990: 34). Another faction opposed this idea,
and further  argued that  group members  who joined  the  army and  died  in  the  battlefield,  such as
ʿUlaywa Mustafa's  brother,  could  not  be considered martyrs  in  Islam (Munib,  2009:  48).  The last
faction, led by Yahiya Hashim, believed that only guerilla warfare could lead to the creation of an
Islamic state.
These ideational divisions epitomise the story of the jihad groups and of the JG which succeeded them.
These cells and their successor repeatedly divided over tactical and strategic matters.52 Interviews with
their  members  and with  IG members  and leaders  who enjoyed close  links  with  them nonetheless
question the ideational nature of these divisions. They maintain that, in most cases, ideological and
tactical divisions were an alibi to cover personal conflicts between group members (e.g. Taha, 2013). 
The origin of these repeated divisions lies in these groups' early micro-mobilisations. These cells' early
legitimisation and adoption of violence signifies that being a member entailed personal pitfalls akin to
high-risk activism.53 These cells were marked from their inception by the secret and violent nature of
their endeavour to replace the Egyptian regime. This characteristic hindered the organisation of low-
risk activities (such as non-violent proselytisation and the provision of local social support),  which
could have helped to forge close ties between group members and leaders, strengthen internal trust, and
shape  formal  and  informal  organisational  norms,  decision  making  processes  and  ideological
production.  While  high-risk  activities  can,  in  insulated  cells  or  in  military  organisations,  trigger  a
similar result, these processes are usually preceded in these structures by low-risk activism facilitating
the integration and socialisation of new activists, as argued by social movement theorists (McAdam,
1986: 69),  or by paramilitary collective training activities.  In this  case, however,  these  jihadi  cells
leaders were rather defined by Staniland as “revolutionary plotters” whose “fragmented organisations”
were shaped by these early organisational patterns, which prove paradoxically inadequate to violent
collective action (Staniland, 2014). The absence of internally legitimised norms explains these groups'
tendencies to split over any new rising issue.
The endeavour to infiltrate the army and topple the regime with a military coup remained unexploited
until  the  arrival  in  Egypt  of  a  Palestinian  called  Saleh  Sirriyya.  Sirriyya  was  a  former  PLO
52 The next chapter expands on the extent of these divisions over time.
53 Cf note 49 page 78.
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representative in Iraq,  and an Islamist  intellectual close to the ideas of  hizb ut-tahrir  (though it  is
unclear  whether  he  ever  belonged  to  this  group).54 According  to  a close  associate,  Sirriyya  was
primarily motivated in the liberation of Palestine and Jerusalem. He believed that Palestine could only
be freed after the creation of an Islamic state in Egypt, which he justified in a pamphlet entitled risala
al-iman (Message of Faith) (Sirriya, 1974). Sirriyya envisioned a military coup as the least bloody way
to create an Islamic state in Egypt, and the only workable possibility considering the military structure
of the Egyptian regime.
Sirriyya tried to associate the Islamic current to his military coup. He notably proposed his plan to the
Muslim Brotherhood, who refused to lend him support, and to Ismaʿil Tantawi, the leader of the main
remaining jihad group. The subsequent rivalry between Sirriyya and Tantawi is quite symptomatic of
the  disputes  opposing  diverse  jihadi  groups  allegedly  for  ideological  reasons.  Muhammad  Muru
mentions that many prominent members of Tantawi's group, including Hassan Halawi from Giza, were
disappointed by Tantawi's passive posture and joined Sirriyya because of their eagerness to take action
against the regime (Muru, 1990). Many new members of Tantawi's group therefore answered Sirriyya's
call for unity, including Karam al-Anaduli, Mustafa Yasiri and Talal al-Ansari (Munib, 2009: 49).  A
member of the group argues that:
Saleh [Sirriyya] proposed his plan to Tantawi, who refused. Tantawi was scared of Saleh, whom he saw
as a competitor.  He thought that Saleh would eventually take the group's leadership and impose his
conditions. Tantawi therefore asked everybody to agree to follow the teachings of Ibn Taymiyya. Saleh
refused, and thought that this demand was a mere excuse. Later, many people left Tantawi and joined our
group because they wanted to do something, not for ideological reasons. They wanted to launch jihad
and were very zealous.
This episode confirms that ideological or theological arguments can often act as a cover for less noble
rationales. The theological debate between a religious favouritism for Sayyid Qutb or Ibn Taymiyya
was a pretext for deeper organisational conflicts. Defectors from Tantawi's jihad group did not join
Saleh Sirriyya for religious reasons but for his ideational and human resources: Sirriyya had a plan and
followers who were willing to take action. Following Sayyid Qutb or Ibn Taymiyya did not entail
specific  tactical  differences  over  the  most  suitable  approach  to  political  action.  This  competition
between two jihadi cells is rather generally congruent with broader debates in civil war studies, which
54 On Saleh Sirriyya, one can refer to al-Amin (2010).
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emphasise  material  reasons as  for  why individuals  join  specific  groups with stronger  resources  or
military potentials,55 and stress the importance of varying resources in the creation of alliances between
armed groups (Christia 2012). Sirriyya was ready and had a military plan to topple the regime. This
simple fact explains why new members joined in, not because of Sirriyya's theology.
Sirriyya created many cells in Egypt to execute his plan (Muru, 1990: 37). His recruitment tactics were
primarily aimed at young Muslims already socialised in a religious environment, with a preference for
those  who  frequented  mainstream  salafi associations.  Members  of  Sirriyya's  group  would  meet
individuals  in  mainstream  salafi mosques,  with  an emphasis  on  individuals  who prayed the  dawn
prayer  (fajr).  They would  give  them appropriate  books and literature  drawing on shared  religious
scholars, such as Ibn Taymiyya's fatwas on the Mongols. In a later phase, new members would be
encouraged  to  recruit  their  friends,  neighbours  and  family  members.  On  the  eve  of  the  military
academy operation, Sirriyya's organisation was composed of three main groups, young members of the
military academy under the leadership of Karam al-Anaduli, a cell in Alexandria under the leadership
of Talal al-Ansari and a cell in Giza under the leadership of Hassan al-Halawi (Muru, 1990: 45). In
addition to these three main units, smaller cells also existed in local neighbourhoods in Shubra and in
the military aerial academy.
The  evolving  composition  of  Sirriyya's  group  and  the  joining  of  many  motivated  individuals
dramatically changed this organisation's destiny. In sharp contrast with jamaʿa al-muslimun, Sirriyya's
group  was  not  a  pyramidal  authoritarian  organisation  but  was  rather  “fairly  democratic  in  its
deliberations and decision-making” (Ibrahim, 1980: 436). As a result, new members stimulated by the
group's human and material resources pressured Sirriyya to act quickly against the regime (Ibrahim,
1980:  437).  A member  of  the  group  confirms  that  Sirriyya  supported  the  principle  of  an  armed
operation against the military academy, but considered the chances of success quite low, which explains
his initial reticence. Intense pressure from his new followers nonetheless forced him to approve this
operation, which eventually failed. Members of the group were subsequently arrested and imprisoned,
while Sirriyya was executed.56
This operation was the main armed activity of the jihad groups in the 1970s. Sirriyya's followers did
55 See chapter 5 page 156.
56 On the military academy operation, one can also refer to the autobiography of Talal al-Ansari (Surur, 2006).
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not recover from their failure to take over the military academy. They scattered, and no cell managed to
reach operational capability in the next few years. Some of its members tried to reconstitute the group
under the leadership of Amir al-Jaysh and another Palestinian, Salim al-Rihal. Amir al-Jaysh was a
close Egyptian associate of Sirriyya, while al-Rihal was a Palestinian who followed Sirriyya's rationale
that Palestine could only be liberated after the creation of an Islamic state in Egypt. They coordinated
their efforts to reconstitute this group with Sirriyya's vision, aware of the risks posed by excessive
enthusiasm and by the absence of preparation. They remained a small  jihadi cell, however, and were
marginalised after 1979 by the rising influence of Muhammad ʿAbd al-Salam Faraj. Meanwhile, other
followers of Sirriyya similarly tried to revive the organisation in Alexandria and got involved in small
failed armed operations in 1977 and 1979.
3.4. SPREADING DAʿWA IN THE SOUTH OF EGYPT
The  evolution  of  the  Islamic  Group  (al-Jamaʿa  al-Islamiyya)  in  the  South  of  Egypt  diverges
substantially from this analysis of the jihad groups. The following section therefore focuses on the
emergence and early developments of the IG from the mid-1970s to 1979. It argues that the IG emerged
as  a  proselytising  group  of  students  who  socialised  and  learned  religion  collectively.  Then,  it
demonstrates that the group's inclusive and non-violent activities eased its development as an integrated
organisation  characterised  by  internal  cohesion  and  societal  integration.  Eventually,  this  section
establishes  that  the  combination  of  local  clashes  against  IG  opponents  in  Southern  universities
combined with a gradual closing of political opportunities in Egypt informed the group's subsequent
adoption of an antagonistic stand on the Egyptian regime, and a distinctive salafi jihadi outlook.
The emergence of the Islamic Group should be contextualised in consideration of the expansion of
higher  education  in  Egypt.  The growing importance  of  Egyptian  universities  and their  role  in  the
political opposition can be traced back to the Nasserist regime. The promotion of higher education was
congruent with Nasser's redistributive policies, and with his socialist inclinations. After consolidating
power in 1954, Nasser endorsed educational reforms designed to facilitate wider access to Egyptian
universities. The budget of the Ministry of Education effectively doubled, tuition fees were lowered
and  the  number  of  students  consequently  increased  substantially  (Wickham,  2002:  24-25).  While
Nasser  initially  policed  university  students  and  forbade  student  unions,  the  political  frustrations
stemming from the Egyptian defeat in 1967 combined with general economic stagnation sparked the
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first political demonstration in 1968 (Wickham, 2002: 32). Nasser was forced to ease state control over
university  campuses,  and  to  authorise  the  expression  of  previously  banned  political  opinions
(Wickham, 2002: 33). The student movement was still under the overwhelming influence of nationalist
and leftist forces, however, and the Islamic trend was virtually absent.
The  succession  of  Nasser  by  Anwar  Sadat  and  the  expanding  role  of  Islam in  the  public  sphere
modified the university landscape. The previous contextualisation of the growing importance of Islam
under Sadat illustrated the expansion and diversification of the religious sphere in Egypt, and revealed
the rise of Islam as a credible alternative to older ideologies. Arab nationalism specifically suffered
from the 1967 defeat against Israel, and from the short-lived pan-Arab union with Syria. The expansion
of its Islamic alternative was logically reflected in university campuses. New state policies eased the
development of Islamic groups, which gradually agglomerated an increasing number of students, and
competed with leftist and nationalist force to form an Islamist alternative.
The first Islamic student groups appeared in the beginning of the 1970s in most Egyptian universities.
The first of these groups, the “youths of Islam” (shabab al-Islam), rose as an Islamist vanguard in the
student unions (al-Arian, 2014: 52), even though its influence rapidly waned in favour of its emerging
Islamist  competitors.  The  latter  were  initially  named  the  “religious  group”  (al-jamaʿa  al-diniyya),
before adopting the name “Islamic group” (al-jamaʿa al-islamiyya) by 1972-1973 (al-ʿAwwa, 2006: 68;
Hashim, n.d.). A leading IG member in the Southern university of Asyut and one of its first members,
Salah Hashim, recalls that he was already religiously committed before joining university, and familiar
with the activities of al-jamʿiyya al-sharʿiyya, ansar al-sunna, and tabligh al-daʿwa.57 He explains that
his group adopted the name Islamic Group in 1975, following the acronym Pakistani group created by
the influential Islamic thinker Abu al-ʿAla al-Mawdudi.58 He adds that most current IG leaders joined
the group at that time, including Karam Zuhdi, Osama Hafez, ʿAli Sharif, Rifaʿi Taha, Muhammad al-
Islambuli  (Hashim,  n.d.).  Based  on  numerous  testimonies  quoted  subsequently,  two  main  patterns
account  for the adhesion of early members.  Some were religiously committed,  like Hashim, while
others adopting religion in parallel to their engagement with the IG.
57 This movement is a revivalist  religious movement which originated in the Indian subcontinent and later expanded
worldwide.
58 On al-Mawdudi see also: Hartung, 2014; Jackson, 2010.
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In  the  following  analysis,  the  name  “Islamic  groups”  refers  to  Islamist  student  groups  active  in
Egyptian  universities  in  general,  while  “Islamic  Group”  (IG)  applies  to  the  student  group created
initially in the city of Asyut. While the IG was initially part of the Islamic groups, it  subsequently
evolved independently after its adoption of armed violence, and eventually monopolised the use of the
terminology “Islamic group”.
In sharp contrast with the jihad groups, the IG did not initially endorse a specific political programme.
As in similar cases of grass-root activism (Blee, 2012: 16-17), the IG emerged as a group of friends
who interacted locally before developing a shared political understanding. Its members were religious
youths who endeavoured to preach Islam and spread religion through daʿwa. The nature of this initial
endeavour,  peaceful  proselytisation,  was  interrelated  with  the  group's  early  activities.  As  noted  by
Kathleen Blee, grass-root movements indeed “do not first develop collective political understandings
and then formulate actions that reflect these beliefs. Rather, they build shared beliefs as they consider
what it is possible for them to do” (Blee, 2012: 85). IG members therefore organised diverse activities
such as student camps, conferences and lectures, which helped its members to become acquainted with
religious precepts and concepts, and to internalise the group's fundamental mission. One of its earliest
founders, who subsequently headed the IG abroad in the 1990s, Rifaʿi Taha (2013), explains that:
Our movement did not begin as an idea in 1975, but as a group of individuals. We were a group of
youths committed to religion in Asyut  University.  We created the Islamic Group to find the proper
understanding of Islam. We were calling for fasting during Ramadan, for prayer and for wearing hijab.
We did not have a comprehensive political understanding. We only called people to Islam and to their
religious commitments. The idea was only taking shape.
The IG's religious endeavour was initially very heterogeneous and inclusive. The group was at an early
stage of its  religious maturation and had not yet adopted the  salafi  approach (minhaj) to Islam. In
comparison with the jihad groups influenced by the legacy of mainstream salafi associations, the IG did
not inherit a specific religious tradition during its initial development since it did not emerge from
established organisations or networks. Moreover, coming from the rural South, early IG members were
not initially marked by the activist politicisation of jihad groups members in Cairo and in the Egyptian
Delta. A religious preacher of the IG argues that: 
We initially  followed many religious  sources.  We did not  have  a  defined ideology,  contrary to  the
Muslim Brotherhood which followed a  clear  method from the beginning.  We began as  a  group of
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students who loved religion. We initially drew from many sources, such as Ibn Taymiyya, Ibn Kathir,
[Imam] al-Nawawi, [Abu al-ʿAla] al-Mawdudi, Sayyid Qutb.59 We also participated in many lectures, by
[Mohammed] al-Ghazali,  [ʿAbd al-Hamid]  Kishk,  ʿIsa  ʿAbdo,  Muhammad Najib al-Muti  and many
others.60
And Taha (2013) adds that:
Our learning process was gradual. We did not learn everything at once but rather gradually learnt from
many  sheikh,  ʿulamaʾ,  preachers,  from  al-jamʿiyya  al-sharʿiyya,  ansar  al-sunna,  the  Muslim
Brotherhood, etc.
In the 1970s, the Islamic groups spread throughout Egypt and became the dominant force in Egyptian
universities, including in the South. They benefited from a favourable political environment and from
the resonance of their Islamic message in Egyptian society to participate in students elections and gain
control of eight out of twelve unions in universities nationwide (Abdo, 2002: 124). Their activities
were diverse and progressively included the provision of social services to the students (Kepel, 2005:
135). The Islamic groups responded to increased student needs for social support that neither the state
nor  universities  were  able  to  provide  due  to  the  fast  development  of  higher  education  and  the
exponential growth of the student body. The Islamic groups provided efficient and easy solutions to
daily student issues, which made them a credible alternative to their opponents. They provided buses to
female students, organised book fairs with cheaper material, and offered direct student support (Abdo,
2002: 124-125). Furthermore, their influence was reinforced by the growing religiosity of Egyptian
society and by the booming prominence of religious discourse. Both factors explain the joining of a
growing number of students throughout the 1970s. A current IG local leader explains that: 
I became religiously committed before joining university. I was initially close to  tabligh al-daʿwa.  I
liked the way they dressed and their religious commitments. When I joined university, the Islamic Group
looked like them so I enquired about this group and sat with its members. I did not initially know the
group's ideology, and only discovered its positions when I spoke to its members. The group's central
objective was the commitment  to the  Prophetic tradition.  It  was just  a religious revival.  There was
nothing political.
 
The  time-frame  before  the  group's  legitimisation  of  armed  violence  had  a  crucial  organisational
59 The first three religious scholars are from the early Islamic period, while the last two are contemporary.
60 Many of those included in the “peripheral ulama” mentioned previously.
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importance on the subsequent IG evolution. The low-risk nature of early IG activities helped the group
to benefit from an advantageous religious societal environment to recruit and mobilise new followers.
The ostensibly non-political nature of these activities additionally distracted the regime and did not
obstruct  the  group's  expansion,  which  could  therefore  build  strong  organisational  vertical  norms
between its leaders and members, including shared ideational goals, collective group identity,61  and
obedience to the group's centralised decision making processes. Even though the IG engaged, by the
end of the 1970s, in local acts of violence, these actions were preceded by low-risk activism during the
group's early history. This time-frame therefore witnessed the consolidation of the IG's leadership based
on the group's nuclear foundations, and eased the development of an horizontal culture of consensus
between IG leaders, whose importance is a recurring undercurrent in the following chapters. The strong
horizontal and vertical ties rendered the group similar to an “integrated organisation” (Staniland, 2014:
26).
Despite  a  non-political  early focus,  the group's  expansion in  Southern university  campuses  incited
repeated local confrontations with its leftist and nationalists opponents. While the IG initially focused
on non-violent, low-risk activities, its members started to resent their opponents' position on Islam and
hostility to the group's expansion; conversely, non-Islamic forces opposed the IG's gradual imposition
of stricter religious regulations regarding gender separation, dress codes and moral values (Abdo, 2002:
125). These confrontations were local occurrences, unrelated to specific theological arguments. An IG
leader argues that:
The clashes started with the leftists on university campuses. They criticised us, criticised Islam, and
claimed  that  we  were  backwards.  These  arguments  fuelled  local  fights  between  our  respective
supporters. We did not justify it religiously at the time, and only drew from religious sources later on.
Eventually, we utilised the concept of hisba to justify the imposition of our ideas with the use of force.
Taha (2013) also substantiates that: 
Our movement became stronger. We became aware of our strength and consequently wanted to apply
Islam and prevent violations of  shariʿa in our universities. We wanted to impose prayer for example.
When it was time for salah [prayer], we would stop university lectures to allow the students to pray. We
also wanted women to wear  hijab, and wanted to separate men and women in university campuses in
order to protect female students from harassment. The communists resisted, insulted us and insulted
61 The chapter 6 of this thesis expands on this theme.
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religion. We opposed them religiously, not politically. It only became political later. We refused their
control.
The use of violence was therefore driven by local dynamics of violence rather than by a premeditated
political  or religious rationale.  The IG did not resort  to violence based on its  interpretation of the
Islamic concept of  hisba,  but  only developed this  theological conception afterwards. This  concept,
usually translated in English as “commanding what is right and forbidding what is wrong”, has often
been used to Islamically describe the societal imposition of Islamic norms,62 and has been repeatedly
mentioned  in  the  subsequent  IG  literature.  According  to  the  Islamic  conception  of  hisba,  the
implementation of Islamic societal norms can be undertaken by hand (yadd), tongue (lisan) and heart
(qalb). In this case, however, this Islamic concept subsequently legitimised local clashes between IG
members and their opponents, and did not precede them.
These  violent  developments  were  not  isolated  in  Egypt.  By  the  end  of  the  1970s,  the  political
atmosphere had seriously deteriorated, and the relatively politically liberal environment had come to an
end. These political  developments were partially caused by Sadat's  rapprochement with the United
States and Israel; Sadat's new international choices and his fear of a popular backlash prompted new
coercive domestic policies. The end of the 1970s witnessed a gradual closing of political opportunities,
notably illustrated by increased restrictions on students' political activities (Abdo, 2002: 127-132) and
by the interdiction  of  student  elections,  hitherto  dominated by the  Islamic current.  Eventually,  the
president's  visit  to  Jerusalem in November  1977 caused a  strong outrage  in  many components  of
Egyptian society, as well as in the ranks and files of the Islamic groups active in Egyptian universities.
According to Taha (2013), these new political choices merely confirmed the group's evolving position
on the regime:
Our perception of the regime evolved progressively. We realised that the regime was corrupted by 1976-
1977, even before the Camp David peace treaty. We knew that Sadat was preparing for this outcome
since his victory in 1973. We opposed it from the beginning.
The MB simultaneously attempted to capitalise on the student Islamic groups and to integrate them into
its organisational framework. The MB successfully managed to integrate most groups from the Delta
62 For example the Saudi religious police referred to as the “Committee for the Promotion of Virtue and the Prevention of
Vice” arguably uses this concept to justify its prerogatives.
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and from Cairo, and to recruit prominent student leaders, including Essam al-Arian, Abdel Moneim
Aboul Fotouh and Abu al-ʿAla al-Mahdi.63 According to many testimonies of Islamic groups' members
integrated in the MB, joining this movement nuanced their religious views and helped them to develop
a more complex political  understanding of Islam (Al-Arian,  2014: 159).64 This rapprochement was
nonetheless opposed by the IG, which reinforced its salafi creed and refused MB reformism. By 1978:
The salafi creed and the minhaj (method) of the Muslim Brotherhood were adopted later on, by the end
of the 1978. Then, we legitimised armed jihad and decided to change the reality through the use of force,
which resulted in the killing of Anwar Sadat in 1981.
3.5. TOWARDS AN ARMED CONFRONTATION: THE KILLING OF PHARAOH
The journeys of the jihad and Islamic groups reached their climax in October 1981, when individuals
associated with their leadership assassinated Egyptian president Anwar Sadat. This group was later
labelled tandhim al-jihad (the Jihad Organisation), even though its members never used this name to
describe themselves, claiming that they constituted a loose network of individuals rather than a well-
defined organisation (Ibrahim, 2012; Hafez, 2013; Taha, 2013).65 The following analysis explores the
succession  of  events  preceding  Sadat's  assassination,  and  focuses  specifically  on  the  interactions
between jihad group members and the IG. It notably demonstrates that state pressure triggered their
rapprochement and their agreement on the orchestration of a military coup combined with a popular
revolution, although this plan never materialised. This section rather argues that the modalities and
timing of Sadat's assassination in October 1981 were primarily informed by a wave of arrests launched
by the Egyptian president a month before.
The jihad groups were in organisational disarray by 1979.  Jihadi cells had not recovered from the
failure of  the military academy operation,  and had not  managed to create  a unified organisational
structure. The lack of trust between their members and leaders combined with the fear of an infiltration
from the security services hindered the group's recovery. Its leaders still endorsed the same strategic
vision, that the Egyptian state had to be replaced by an Islamic state, but remained extremely divided. A
central leadership had not materialised and only small groups of individuals remained at large. These
cells' leaders and members notably included Amir al-Jaysh, Salim al-Rihal and Kamal Habib. In the
63 Incidentally these three leaders played crucial role in the subsequent MB reformist trend's trajectories, especially since
they arguably did not emerge from the MB but from a different background (Wikcham, 2014).
64 See also the testimony of Aboul Fotouh (Abul Futuh, 2010).
65 See also Rushdi, 2002.
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Cairo upper class neighbourhood of Maʿadi, ʿIsam al-Qamari, Sayyed Imam and Ayman al-Zawahiri
were leading their own cell; they were contemplating the possibility of organising military training in
Afghanistan as early as 1980, when al-Zawahiri travelled to the Afghan war front (al-Zawahiri, 2010:
61; Naʿim, 2014). This plan subsequently inspired their post-Sadat's assassination exile to this region,
as detailed in the following chapters.
Meanwhile, a member of an Alexandria-based jihadi cell, Muhammad ʿAbd al-Salam Faraj, arrived in
Cairo to reorganise the jihad groups. Faraj endorsed the jihad groups' strategic vision, and defended the
Islamic legitimacy of the fight against Muslim leaders who do not apply Islamic Law in a small opus.
This book's title,  The Neglected Duty (al-farida al-gha'iba), refers to the obligation of jihad against
Muslim leaders (ʿImarah, 1983). Building on the Islamic tradition, notably on Ibn Taymiyya's fatwas
on the Mongols,66 Faraj justified the necessity to use violence to replace the regime with an Islamic
state. Faraj was initially opposed by former members of Sirriyya's group, notably al-Rihal and Amir al-
Jaysh,  who refused his leadership and considered themselves Sirriyya's  real  heir. Sirriyya's  former
companions did not accept Faraj's attempt to lead them, and refused to join him. Faraj persisted and
therefore contacted other groups, including the Southern based IG.
By 1979, the IG was a structured organisation which gradually began to antagonise the regime. While
this group emerged as a conglomeration of individuals solely committed to religious preaching, the
previous analysis demonstrated that the IG later endorsed a confrontational stance on Sadat for an array
of domestic and international reasons. As a revolutionary group, IG leaders requested the religious
guidance of a previously mentioned peripheral ʿulamaʾ, sheikh ʿOmar ʿAbd al-Rahman, who became
the group's religious mentor and emblematic  amir.67 In addition, IG members became embroiled in
local  skirmishes  with  Coptic  Christians,  reminiscent  of  the  logic  of  vendetta  which  prevailed
throughout  the  1990s.68 By  the  end  of  the  1970s,  the  deteriorating  political  environment  and  the
pressure exerted on IG members explain the context in which this group's leader, Karam Zuhdi, met
66 Faraj refers to several prominent scholars, not solely Ibn Taymiyya. It should also be noted that this reference to the
Islamic tradition should not be understood as an endorsement of the latter to the violent removal of Muslim leaders. See
also chapter 4 pages 107-108.
67 Sheikh ʿOmar ʿAbd al-Rahman was born in 1938. He studied in al-Azhar University where he obtained a doctorate on
“the position of the Qur'an on its enemies as conceptualised in the Repentance Surat” (al-Rahman, 1985). He was
arrested after the death of Gamal Abdel Nasser, when he argued that Muslims should not pray over him. He later
reached prominence under Sadat's regime. His publications and audio recordings are available on the following page:
www.tawhed.ws/a?a=t44x7zzc.
68 See also chapter 5.
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Faraj. Zuhdi was pursued by the security services for on-going confrontations between IG members
and Coptic Christians in the South, and was looking for a way out of the political impasse. The IG
second-in-command at the time, Najih Ibrahim (2012), retrospectively laments this rapprochement with
Faraj:
The Islamic Group initially wanted to preach the masses (daʿwa) and did not  believe in the use of
violence against the state. Joining Faraj's group was one of our biggest mistakes. Faraj believed in a
military coup and was not convinced of preaching alone. He was already involved in a jihad group
before, and was acting in haste. His people were not ideologically united through. For instance, they did
not believe in al-ʿudhr bil-jahl,69 while it was crucial for us. We were initially hesitant, and only accepted
this idea subsequently. A split occurred shortly after, nonetheless, before October 1981. Our practices
were fundamentally different from theirs; we believed in educating the masses and in social work, while
they focused on establishing a secret organisation.
Taha (2013) adds that:
We all  wanted an Islamic state  by the time we met  Faraj.  We were merely,  like  other movements,
discussing the practicalities.  What  programme will  help to  create  this  state?  Some thought  it  could
materialise through preaching, while others believed that a military organisation was needed. The first
faction opposed this idea and claimed that  such a group would be caught.  So when ʿAbd al-Salam
[Faraj] discussed his ideas with us, we were already thinking about the Islamic state
These discussions reveal that the IG was already considering the creation of an Islamic state in Egypt
before meeting Faraj. The practicalities were still being discussed, however, and the Islamic state was
admittedly not a central group tenet before this meeting. This ideational development was informed,
according  to  IG  leaders,  by  two  complementary  factors.  First,  the  IG  religious  construction  was
becoming more coherent,  and a distinctive  salafi  approach to Islam materialised by the end of the
1970s. Second, state pressure on IG members and leaders, combined with the hostility to the regime's
new foreign policies, reinforced the group's hostility towards the state and fuelled the quest for an
alternative.
The discussions between Faraj and the IG did not immediately generate an agreement in principle.
After meeting with Faraj, Zuhdi returned to the South to propose an alliance to the IG's leadership.
According to the latter, the IG initially refused to join Faraj for several reasons. A central contention
69 See the following page.
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was Faraj's refusal to adopt the Islamic concept of  al-ʿudhr bil-jahl  (the excuse of ignorance) as a
central ʿaqai'di tenet rather than a mere fiqhi question (Ibrahim, 2012; Taha, 2013).70 In Islamic Law,
this concept refers to the limitations imposed on the practice of excommunication (takfir) if a Muslim is
ignorant of his sin. The Islamic Group considered it  ʿaqa'idi,  in the foundation of the Islamic creed,
while  members  of  Faraj's  groups  usually  considered  it  fiqhi,  jurisprudential  only.  This  does  not
necessarily means,  however,  that jihad group members used excommunication indiscriminately;  JG
commanders stress  that  most  jihad  group  members  practised  al-ʿudhr  bil-jahl, and  refused
indiscriminate takfir. This contention over a theological principle should be comprehended in line with
the previous discussion,  which asserted that  theological issues were often a cover  to  justify  group
divisions.
In the meantime, Faraj recruited new members who soon reach prominence in his group, including a
Lieutenant Colonel from the military intelligence, ʿAbud al-Zumur, and his cousin Tariq who recruited
him. In other cells, al-Rihal was in contact with Palestinian fellow countrymen, including Fathi al-
Shiqaqi who later created the Movement of the Islamic Jihad in Palestine.71 Al-Rihal was later expelled
from Egypt and replaced by Habib. Other cells, such as the group of ʿIsam al-Qamari, Sayyid Imam
and Ayman al-Zawahiri, or Rifaʿi Surur, were acting in isolation and did not coordinate with other jihad
groups or with Faraj and the IG.72
Under pressure from the security services, Faraj and the IG finally compromised on a common plan to
topple Anwar Sadat. This plan was a compromise between the IG's mass-movement approach and the
elitist vision of Faraj's group. This agreement occurred through a relational diffusion of ideas73 which
triggered these groups' acceptance of the necessity to share their resources to fight a common enemy.
The  long-term  strategy  was  the  organisation  of  a  military  coup  in  combination  with  a  popular
70 In Islamic Law,  ʿaqai'di  refers to  ʿaqida, which is the central creed of Islam, while  fiqhi  refers to  fiqh which is the
interpretative process by which religious scholars interpret Islamic law. A concept which is embedded in the ʿaqida is
considered a required belief in Islam, while a fiqhi concept can be interpreted at the discretion of religious scholars, 
71 Despite  similar  names,  the  movement  of  the  Islamic  Jihad  in  Palestine  (haraka  al-jihad  al-islami  fi  filastin,  PIJ
thereafter) is not related to the Egyptian jamaʿa al-jihad. In the late 1970s, there were some interactions between early
PIJ  members  and some Egyptian jihad groups members in the city of  Zaqaziq.  Ramadan Shallah,  the current  PIJ
secretary  general,  recognised  these  early  organisational  interactions  in  an  interview  (Shallah  &  Sharbal,  2003).
Additional interviews with JG members in Zaqaziq confirm this claim. They all assert, however, that these groups did
not share the same ideological outlook. On the PIJ, see also Higazi, 2010: 226-260; Alhaj, Dot-Pouillard & Rebillard,
2014.
72 According to court reports, al-Zawahiri's memories (2010) and interviews (Naʿim, 2014).
73 See also chapter 4 pages 134-135.
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revolution. According to Taha (2013):
The main idea was to create an armed organisation to protect a popular revolution. Our idea was to call
for a popular revolution, and to expect the state to react violently. If the state used violence, then we
would need armed men to protect the revolution. These men would be drawn from inside the army. So
when  ʿAbd  al-Salam  [Faraj]  came  with  the  idea  of  a  coup,  we  introduced  the  idea  of  a  popular
revolution.
This  plan  never  materialised.  The  assassination  of  Anwar  Sadat  on  6  October  1981 was  not  pre-
organised,  and was rather a spontaneous reaction to an unprecedented wave of arrests  launched in
September 1981 by Sadat, widely known as tahafudh (the restraining measures). This assassination was
an opportunistic move facilitated by the incidental participation of Khalid al-Islambuli, the brother of a
prominent IG member, to the military parade organised in commemoration of the 1973 war. IG leaders
argue that they did plan to take over the regime in 1981, but generally thought that they needed another
three years to prepare the military coup and the popular revolution. They thought that they were not yet
prepared to face the state, and needed to recruit more followers inside the army to organise a popular
revolution  (Hafez,  2013;  Taha,  2013).  By  1981,  jihad  group  cells  and  the  IG  were  only  loosely
connected. According a member of al-Rihal's cell:
Between 1979 and 1981, there were just meetings between different groups. We were still thinking about
a long term strategy but nothing was really prepared before September 1981.
The seeds  of  Sadat's  assassination were sown on September 3,  1981,  when he ordered a  massive
crackdown on his domestic opposition. The wave of arrests covered the entire Egyptian political and
sectarian  spectrum.  Sadat  ordered  the  arrest  of  more  than  one  thousand  five  hundred  political
opponents  from  the  leftists  to  the  nationalists,  including  liberals,  students,  journalists,  prominent
Christians and Islamists.74 Sadat subdued the political opposition in a mere few hours. Many of those
who managed to escape the initial arrests were subsequently pursued by the security services. These
arrests scared Islamist militants who had not been caught by the state. Paradoxically, only a few jihadis
were arrested, including two IG members, Muhammad Shawqi al-Islambuli and Talʿat Fu'ad Qassem
(Taha, 2013). Faraj's and individuals from the IG leadership managed to meet at different times in
Cairo to prepare a response to Sadat's latest move. IG members felt pressured in the South, and thought
that the organisation had been compromised. They wanted to take immediate action and react quickly.
74 See also Heikal (1983).
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According to a member of Faraj's cell:
There was no consensus between us. Our side, with sheikh ʿAbud [al-Zumur], sheikh Tariq [al-Zumur],
sheikh Abu al-Hadid and others wanted to abstain until the organisation was ready. The brothers from the
South, on the other hand, wanted to act quickly. They said that the organisation had been compromised.
Finally, Taha (2013) explains the events preceding Sadat's assassination in October: 
After the arrests, we thought that a reaction was needed. Incidentally Khalid al-Islambuli, whose brother
Muhammad was  arrested  at  the  beginning  of  September,  happened to  be  in  the  army.  He  was  not
supposed  to  participate  in  the  military  parade  on  the  6th of  October,  and  we  did  not  expect  it.
Surprisingly, he learned that he would participate. Then, everything happened really quickly. He told us
that he would participate, and said that he could do something. Some of the brothers met and decided
that we could try to kill Sadat, and then take over the radio and the national TV. We could move the
people after killing the leader.  Khalid took three other brothers with him. He did not  think that  the
operation would succeed, but he wanted to give it a chance. We were about to be caught so we had to do
something. We couldn't just be arrested and executed by the regime without reacting. The decision was
only taken by a few people. There was no consensus.
Osama Hafez (2013), the current IG second-in-command adds that:
We were escaping from arrests and thought that if the regime caught us, we would not be able to do
anything. It was a battle for survival. We nonetheless tried to stop the operation at the last minute. ʿIsam
Dirbala, sheikh ʿAbud [al-Zumur] and I opposed the operation. I went to Cairo after we agreed we would
stop the operation. There was no fatwa and only limited possibilities remained available. I went to Cairo
but could not contact the brothers. You know, we had no mobile at that time to call them! It was too
late.75
The eldest son of sheikh ʿOmar ʿAbd al-Rahman, Muhammad, confirmed that his father never issued a
fatwa  condoning  Sadat's  assassination.  The  president  of  the  Court  constituted  after  Sadat's
assassination,  ʿAbd  al-Ghafar  Muhammad,  confirmed  that  sheikh  ʿOmar  was  declared  innocent
because he had no knowledge of the assassination plans (al-Khatib,  2009). As his son Muhammad
(2012) reveals:
At the time, some people were looking for my father to ask for a fatwa. But he disappeared that famous
month to escape the security services. He was hiding with our family and nobody could meet him. He
75 One could legitimately wondered if Hafez is reinterpreting what happened under a favourable light. His version is
nonetheless confirmed by court documents and by numerous testimonies.
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supported the opposition to Sadat and the preparation for a revolution, but there was no plan to kill him.
 
Eventually,  the operation led by Khalid al-Islambuli  on the 6 October,  1981 succeeded and former
president Sadat was killed. The next phase of the plan - the taking over of the Southern city of Asyut -
nonetheless failed; most members of the jihad groups, including those who had virtually no connection
to the assassination, along with the IG leaders and members, were arrested. The IG and the jihad groups
entered the next phase of their history, in prison.
3.6. CONCLUSION
This chapter presented a new perspective on the development of armed militancy in the 1970s. This
analysis has refuted the claim that Islamist armed groups emerged from the mainstream MB in reaction
to state repression, and has contended that this view misrepresents their initial developments and their
implications on these groups' futures. 
In contrast with the current academic corpus on radicalisation and violence in social movement studies,
this  chapter  has  uncovered two differentiated  patterns  explaining  the  legitimisation of  violence  by
Islamist groups. The first pattern has been widely covered in social movement studies and concerns the
radicalisation of a group of individuals in reaction to  changing state policies,  usually a closing of
political  opportunities  combined  with  repressive  policing  of  protest.  Changing  macro  policies  can
antagonise opposition groups and account for the gradual legitimisation of violence when non-violent
alternatives to political change disappear, and when these groups are faced with external existential
threats. This radicalising pattern specifically explains the IG’s adoption of armed jihad by the end of
the 1970s.
This pattern nonetheless fails to explain the early adoption of violence by the jihad groups, which
illustrates an additional trend often ignored in social  movement studies.  In 1970s'  Egypt,  the jihad
groups legitimised the use of violence when the macro environment was relatively inclusive, which
apparently seems to negate the previous argument on the role of repressive policing of protest and
exclusion. In this case, however, ideational factors, including emotions, empathic solidarity and a sense
of pro-active agency to pursue radical political change prevailed over the consideration of macro-level
closing of political opportunities. While jihad groups' members had not directly suffer from repression,
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they were motivated by their sympathy with MB victims of torture, and by the possibility to create a
utopian state in Egypt which would bring about justice and liberate the Muslim world. Their rationale
for violence was broader than a mere reaction to changing state policies.
Most Islamist militant groups, aside from the sectarian JM, were not, contrary to common conceptions,
isolated  from their  societies.  These  groups'  emphasis  on  Islamic  law cannot  be  isolated  from the
broader  Egyptian  society,  where  analogous  demands  similarly  flourished.  These  groups'  long-term
objectives were not essentially antithetical with the positions endorsed by mainstream preachers and
religious institutions. It would consequently be analytically counterproductive to study these groups as
khawarij  (Islamic heretics) to denounce their alleged heterodoxy. These groups merely differed from
their competitors on the most suitable modus operandi to achieve shared objectives.
This  chapter  has  further  explored  these  groups'  early  organisational  dynamics.  The study of  these
groups' emergence has notably uncovered the existence of two main mobilising patterns. This chapter
has argued that the early legitimisation of violence by the jihad groups hindered the development of
shared norms of decision making and prevented the development of strong ties between their leaders.
Throughout the 1970s, the jihad groups were characterised by internal competition over (ideational and
material)  resources,  and  never  managed  to  create  a  common  organisational  structure.  These
organisational dynamics substantially contrast with the internal legitimisation of widely shared norms
inside the IG, which developed a clear internal hierarchy and unified decision making processes since
the group's emergence
Finally, this analysis suggests that, while ideational factors shaped these groups' tactical and strategic
views, theological intricacies were often used in internal and external competition. These groups have
referred to theological arguments to assert their Islamic orthodoxy and defend less laudable rationales.
Even though these debates do not negate these groups' genuine belief in a certain ideational framework,
as  demonstrated  in  the  next  chapter,  these ideational  contests  nonetheless  indicate  that  ideological
arguments should be carefully examined and not taken at face value. 
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CHAPTER 4
MILITANT GROUPS' IDEOLOGICAL CONSTRUCTION
The Jihad Group and the Islamic Group tried to unite twice, in Afghanistan, and then in the Sudan. The
Jihad Group had two conditions however: they did not want to be headed by sheikh ʿOmar, and they
opposed the leadership of the brothers in prison. These were of central importance for the Islamic Group.
We supported  our  leaders  in  prison  and the  unification  never  happened.  The  Jihad  Group was  not
important nonetheless. They were just a few individuals.
Muhammad ʿOmar ʿAbd al-Rahman (2012), son of sheikh ʿOmar ʿAbd al-Rahman
There was no agreement between them and us [speaking about the unification attempts]. We refused to
unite with them because we already had a project, the creation of an Islamic state in Egypt. We were
better  organised,  had more members,  and our  ideas  were more developed.  There  was only a  small
number of them and they had no real possibility to act. They wanted to carry out common work, but
expected to discuss on the basis that they were as strong as we were. They claimed that their leaders and
members were better than ours, and that we could convene a common  majliss al-shura. We refused.
They  had  no  presence  on  the  ground.  So  the  differences  were  not  merely  in  terms  of  ideas.  All
ideological differences could have been solved. It was about people.
 Rifaʿi Taha (2013), external IG leader in the 1990s
My experience with the Islamic Group was bitter. Our attempts to unite with them failed because of their
insistence on their prison leadership and their excessive veneration of the so-called big brothers. […]
They gave them the right to take all the existential decisions. Those abroad could only apply the general
guidelines sent by the big brothers. Even though many of their leaders abroad were convinced by our
logic, they declared that only the group could decide, that the group was built on this basis, that they did
not want to disturb it, and that we had to deal with it as a fait accompli.
 Ayman al-Zawahiri (2010: 191-192, leader of al-Qaeda organisation
4.1. INTRODUCTION
The previous chapter on the emergence of armed militancy concluded with the assassination of former
president Sadat in October 1981. It argued that two main jihadi groups proliferated in Egypt before the
detention of most of their members and leaders between 1981 and 1982. The first cells were the loosely
structured jamaʿat al-jihad (jihad groups), which were characterised by their fragmented nature and by
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the  absence  of  a  centralised organisational  structure.  The other  group,  al-Jamaʿa  al-Islamiyya (the
Islamic  Group,  IG  thereafter),  emerged  in  the  South  of  the  country  as  a  non-violent  integrated
organisation76 which later adopted an antagonistic position towards Sadat's regime. The detention of
hundreds of their members after October 1981 and their subsequent trial opened a new phase in their
histories. This chapter explores these groups' ideological constructions after 1981, and draws upon a
central question to investigate their respective evolution: considering that these groups started with the
same socio-revolutionary rationale77 based on a shared salafi theologico-political outlook, why did the
IG eventually renounce violence consensually while an important Jihad Group (JG thereafter)78 faction
adopted a violent pan-Islamist rationale in alliance with al-Qaeda?
The literature  on  the  comparative  study of  the  renunciation  of  violence  and the  joining  of  AQ is
relatively narrow. The two main studies acknowledge that these two groups were in decline by the mid-
1990s, and had tremendously suffered from state repression. Then, the IG's theological renunciation of
violence is explained by a rational cost-benefits calculus of the excessive cost of violence (Gerges,
2009,  2011),  which  was  arguably  eased  by  a  cognitive  process  informed  by  internal  dialogue,
interactions with outsiders and selective state inducements (Ashour, 2009).79 As for “why jihad went
global”,  the choice of JG leader Ayman al-Zawahiri  to join Osama bin Laden is explained by this
group's financial difficulties, the close ties developed with AQ networks and al-Zawahiri's personality
(Gerges, 2009, 2011).80 The globalisation of jihad by a JG faction would be better understood as a
desperate effort to reinvigorate a lost battle against Arab regimes by targeting another enemy, in light of
a changing regional and international environment. These two choices, renouncing violence or adopting
a pan-Islamist agenda, would be the outcome of an internal civil war within the jihadi movement itself
(Gerges, 2009).
This corpus only partially explains these two complementary issues, however. The first study suffers
from a rationalist consideration of ideational developments similar to the tool box denounced in this
thesis' theoretical chapter (Gerges, 2009), whereby ideas are an epiphenomenon wholly susceptible to
76 The definitions of fragmented and integrated organisation are based on Staniland (2014).
77 This socio-revolutionary rationale is  defined as the fight against  Muslim endogenous authorities to replace current
regimes with Islamic states. A useful typology differentiates four main rationales between: socio-revolutionary, violent
irredentist,  violent  pan-islamist,  vigilantist,  violent  sectarian  (with  possible  overlaps  between them) (Hegghammer
2009, 2010: 5-8).
78 The JG is the organisational structure which agglomerated the jihad groups after 1981.
79 The last chapter expands on this theme.
80 See also al-Zayyat (2004: 64-70).
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material changes. In the other analysis, cognitive processes are acknowledged through the inclusion of
internal dialogues and retrospections, while internal differences of opinions and the predominance of
specific ideas are overlooked (Ashour, 2009). Finally, these studies do not consider the constraining
impact of ideational developments on their holders, whereby the ideational framework chosen by a
jihadi group constrains the possible range of ideational reinterpretations overtime.
These studies' second shortcoming concerns their failure to explain the position of IG leaders abroad,
who eventually accepted the cessation of violence in Egypt. These leaders were isolated from the IG
prison leadership, had friendly interactions with AQ leaders in Afghanistan (and sometimes ideological
affinity)  and  suffered  from  a  predicament  akin  to  the  JG's.  These  studies'  analytical  frameworks
therefore cannot explain why none of them joined AQ networks.81 This illustrative issue underlines
these studies' inadequate consideration of organisational dynamics, which are only partially covered in
one case (Ashour, 2009) and rejected all-together in Gerges' study (2009). The latter rather generalises
that  jihadi movements  are  wholly  based  on  “founding  charismatic  emirs”  and  marked  by  their
“inability or unwillingness to construct formal institutions and organizations” (Gerges, 2009: 41). This
AQ characteristic should not be considered an essential characteristic of jihadi movements as a whole,
however,82 and should rather be studied as the outcome of certain organisational processes peculiar to
this organisation and informed by the JG's organisational legacy.
This  chapter  investigates  the  construction  and  articulation  of  these  groups'  theologico-political
frameworks from Sadat's assassination in 1981 to the present day. It provides a multi-level explanation
of these groups' dynamic and interactive ideological constructions, rather than a mere review of their
textual productions.83 This chapter theoretically builds on a relational consideration of ideas, which
considers them embedded in relational interactions between individuals (usually at a leadership level),
and shaped by specific organisational norms. This chapter does not reify militant groups' ideological
frameworks, which cannot be considered independently from the organisational context in which they
81 Only a negligible  number  of  IG members  reportedly joined AQ,  including a minor figure  named Muhammad al-
Hakayma (2006) (see also chapter 6 page 194). It should also be stressed that, despite intermittent contacts between IG
members and AQ, it would be inaccurate to consider them allies (Ashour, 2011: 90) or to assert that many IG members
hold dual membership in AQ (Sageman, 2004: 63), as this chapter later demonstrates.
82 The assertion that all jihadi movements have failed to construct formal institutions is inadequate with regards to the IG,
as  argued throughout this  chapter,  as well  as  in  many other  prominent cases  such as  Hamas or  Hizbullah, whose
institutions have survived their leaders. e.g Gunning, 2008; Daher, 2014.
83 Extensive discourse analyses of these groups' positions are available in Arabic (Munib 2010a, 2010b; al-Mesbar, 2011a,
2011b, 2012; Abu ʿAtiyya al-Sandbissi, 2012).
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are embedded and operate, and from the ideas held by individuals internally recognised as sources of
authority. In other words, militant groups' ideational frameworks are tied to organisational norms and
decision making processes which, in turn, shape them. Ideas cannot be considered an exogenous and
pre-existing factor determining militant groups' actions. In addition, they cannot be merely considered a
tool kit for internal and external consumption, nor can they be essentialised and considered immutable
over time.
This chapter is  structured in four sections. It  opens with a theoretical discussion on organisational
studies of militant groups' ideational developments. Then, the two following sections demonstrate the
existence of ideational and organisational constraints on militant groups' ideological constructions. The
first part argues that the salafi discursive tradition adopted in these groups' early histories has set up the
boundaries within which these groups have reinterpreted their theologico-political outlooks overtime.
The following section demonstrates the additional existence of organisational constraints inherent with
these groups' internal norms of decision making. In the concluding analysis, this chapter investigates
the  emergence  of  new interpretative  frames  and the  conditions  that  determine  their  organisational
diffusion. It demonstrates that the macro environment in which these groups' leaders evolve, notably
defined by changing political opportunities and by the evolution of their social movement industry, can
trigger  the  emergence  of  new interpretative  frames  and  ideational  debates.  Then,  this  concluding
section argues that  their  organisational  diffusions are  constrained by their  compatibility  with these
groups' discursive tradition and by internal norms of decision making previously analysed.
4.2.  THE  ORGANISATIONAL  STUDY  OF  MILITANT  GROUPS'  IDEOLOGICAL
CONSTRUCTION
The following analysis  contributes to militant groups'  organisational studies.  This  academic corpus
investigates these groups' internal dynamics contextualised in a multi-level environment. It emerged at
an early stage in the literature on political violence, and has been recently revived in academic research.
This section analyses its contribution to the understanding of militant groups' ideational construction; it
specifically  substantiates  the  necessity  to  contextualise  armed  groups'  ideological  evolution  in
consideration of their evolving organisational structures and internal dialogues.
The study of militant groups' organisational dynamics has materialised to uncover the rationale behind
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their use of violence. This approach was initially introduced by Martha Crenshaw, who defended the
existence of two alternative explanations to political violence (Crenshaw, 1987). Crenshaw suggests
that  instrumental  explanations  consider  violence  an  intentional  choice  to  achieve  predetermined
objectives,  while  organisational  explanations  deem violence  an  outcome of  internal  organisational
processes and of the fight for organisational survival in a competitive environment. The latter, she
argues,  explains  the  development  of  various  incentives  for  violence  which  often  contradict  armed
groups'  stated objectives.  This  claim has  been upheld in  subsequent  studies  asserting  that  militant
groups'  political  objectives  cannot  explain  comprehensively  their  rationale  for  violence  (e.g.  della
Porta,  1995;  Hafez,  2003;  Bloom,  2007;  Gunning,  2008).  While  acknowledging  these  groups'
rationality,84 these studies determine that it is crucial to analyse the ideational and material incentives
developed during an armed campaign to assure these groups' organisational survival. They add that
these incentives can paradoxically contradict and replace initial justifications for violence (Crenshaw,
1987: 13; della Porta, 1995: 83-135; McCormick, 2003: 486-490). As stated by Wendy Pearlman, “the
factors responsible for an initial turn to violence differ from those that sustain it” (Pearlman, 2010:
202).
 
This  organisational  perspective  posits  that  ideological  incentives  for  violence  evolve  during  a
contentious conflict and cannot be considered entirely exogenous and anterior to contention. The main
hypothesis  postulates  that  militant  groups  are  clandestine  organisations  subjected  to  a  process  of
“ideological encapsulation” which takes place to assure their survival in the underground. Donatella
della  Porta  defines  this  process  as  a  “mechanism of  adaptation  of  frames  to  changing  contextual
challenges” (della Porta, 2013: 232), usually associated with “organisational compartmentalisation and
action militarisation” (della Porta, 2013: 25).85 This process is substantiated by an ideational closure
producing new frames for internal consumption, designed to prevent dissent and preserve a group's
unity. This process can trigger the development of a Manichean vision of the world, where militants
perceive themselves as soldiers in an existential war against external groups (della Porta, 1995: 133,
2013: 207; Crenshaw, 2011: 124-134). This vision is often organisationally reinforced by insular group
thinking, and by the removal of dissident voices (Crenshaw, 1985; Shapiro, 2013: 47-49). Applied to
militant Islamist groups, this model has been utilised to explain the increasing use of excommunication
84 Militant groups' rationality has been stressed in many recent studies which do not necessarily follow an organisational
approach. e.g. Figueiredo & Weingast, 2000; Doran, 2002; Kydd & Walter, 2002, 2006; Pape, 2003, 2006; Abrahms,
2004; Mishal & Sela, 2006; Wiktorowicz & Kaltenthaler, 2006; Bloom, 2007; Sandler, 2013; Shapiro, 2013.
85 See also Crenshaw (2011: 88-110).
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(takfir) against opponents of some Islamist armed groups in Algeria and Egypt (Hafez, 2003: 155-198).
The study of ideational encapsulation has, despite its theoretical strength, often been monolithic. Most
studies have overlooked the impact of distinctive organisational dynamics on its materialisation. Della
Porta accurately maintains that ideational encapsulation is tied to various organisational processes, such
as  organisational  fragmentation  and  internal  competition  over  leadership  and  resources.  She  also
suggests the need to study the tensions inherent with militant groups' internal dynamics, and unfold
their  sources  in  these  groups'  organisational  structures  and  in  their  vertical  and  functional
differentiations (della Porta, 2013: 146-147). In spite of these theoretical ramifications, case studies of
ideational encapsulation have not differentiated distinct types of encapsulation caused by diverging
group structures and evolution. Mohammed Hafez, for instance, amalgamates ideational encapsulations
in several Algerian and Egyptian groups without considering cross-group differences (Hafez,  2003:
155-198).
It would therefore be beneficial to refer to the expanding literature on the origins and evolutions of
militant groups' internal structures to investigate their influence on ideational encapsulation. Scholars
of  political  violence  notably  suggest  that  militant  groups  follow diverging  organisational  patterns,
ranging from any combination of pyramidal and networking structures (della Porta, 2013: 30). The
impact of these organisational structures on spirals of encapsulation should be explored. In reference to
two extreme cases, one could suggest that foot-soldiers of a structured and highly hierarchical militant
groups are not be subjected to the same frame development as members of independent and secluded
cells (Gunning, 2012: 227).
The study of militant groups' internal dynamics and organisational structures has mushroomed in the
literature  on insurgency,  civil  war  and political  violence.  This  corpus remains  a  minority  concern,
however, which often fails to re-integrate macro and micro factors in the study of ideological changes.
The literature primarily focuses on the impact of external (Stedman, 1997; Figueiredo & Weingast,
2001; Kydd & Walter, 2002; Bloom, 2004, 2007; de Mesquita, 2005; Berrebi & Klor, 2006; Jaeger &
Paserman, 2006; Gunning, 2008; Christia, 2012) and internal competition (Zirakzadeh, 2002; Bueno de
Mesquita, 2008; Pearlman, 2010; Shapiro, 2013) on the use of violence. The investigation of internal
competition specifically demonstrates that violence is often the subject of heated internal discussions. It
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further  suggests  that  the  use  of  violence  fluctuates  in  consideration  of  these  groups'  evolving
memberships,86 changing macro environments and individual cognitive processes. 
Militant groups'  internal structures  consequently play a  prominent  role in  these groups'  ideological
developments.87 The  study  of  the  interlinkages  between  Islamist  militant  groups'  structures  and
ideologies has hitherto been undertaken on two levels. The main debate has focused on al-Qaeda's
transformation after 9/11 from an allegedly pyramidal organisation to a network-based group. The two
central questions have dwelt on the influence of this transformation on this group's use of violence and
efficiency (Mishal & Rosenthal, 2005; Eilstrup-Sangiovanni & Jones, 2008; Braniff, 2011; Mobley,
2012), as well as on AQ's ideological evolution. As for the latter, primary sources from AQ's central
leadership88 have notably revealed their dismay at their followers in several countries (Rassler et al.,
2012; Lahoud, 2012). AQ leaders expose their opposition to the Pakistan Taliban's “ideology, methods
and behaviour” (Rassler et al.,  2012: 37), while the memoirs of an AQ commander, Fadil Harun,89
expose his castigation of new AQ followers “who are inflexible in their interpretation of religion and
rush to declare fellow Muslims to be unbelievers, [and are a] liability to al-Qa`ida and to jihadism”
(Lahoud, 2012: 6). This configuration suggests a correlation between militant groups' organisational
structure and ideational construction, positing that the transformation of a structured to a network-based
group degrades the ability of its leadership to impose a clear ideological framework.
Finally,  studies  of  militant  groups'  internal  structures  have  covered  these  groups'  decision-making
processes.  In  Palestine,  the  study  of  Hamas'  decision  making  process  is  explained  through  the
investigation  of  its  internal  structure and of  the role  played by its  informal  and formal  figures  of
authority (Gunning, 2008). As for the use of violence, a study of the Syrian MB demonstrates that the
latter's decision to use violence in the 1970s resulted from a combination of leadership crisis, internal
divisions and the parallel development of a jihadi faction which influenced MB members when the
political environment was deteriorating (Lefèvre, 2013). Similar internal dynamics are also studied in
non-violent movements, for instance in the Egyptian MB where the emergence of new generations
86 For instance with the adhesion of less-disciplined members, who are more prone to violence, and the departure of older
moderating leaders. Cf. chapter 5.
87 The next chapter will further covers the impact of militant groups' structures on their use of violence.
88 Most of these sources were produced by the Harmony Program, launched by the Combating Terrorism Center at West
Point.  AQ's  primary  sources  were  released  on  the  following  website:
https://www.ctc.usma.edu/programs-resources/harmony-program
89 Also known as Fazul Abdullah Mohammed.
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arguably explain the group's changing reactions to new political opportunities (Wickham, 2013). While
these studies do not necessarily explore these groups' ideational construction, their understanding of
their internal dynamics and figures of authority contextualised in a multi-level environment underline
their importance in these groups' evolution.
In conclusion, this discussion establishes that militant groups' ideological constructions are the outcome
of interactive dialogues informed by evolving organisational structures and changing macro factors.
The  following  analysis  is,  accordingly,  based  on  a  relational  conceptualisation  of  militant  groups'
ideational  construction,  which  contextualises  ideational  developments  in  mediation  with  militant
groups' organisational dynamics and decision making norms and processes.
4.3. TAKING IDEAS SERIOUSLY: A FIGHT FOR ORTHODOXY
This section demonstrates the existence of a (paradoxically) constraining and flexible framework which
has defined the evolving boundaries within which these two Islamist groups have reinterpreted their
theologico-political outlook. This framework is the salafi discursive tradition adopted in these groups'
early histories, and characterised by its internal rationality and environmental conditions of production.
The following analysis dwells on this religious tradition and explores its foundations. It exposes these
groups' framing contest with their opponents, and argues that this contest demonstrates these groups'
commitment to the validation of their political prescriptions and rebuttal of their contenders'. Finally,
this  section  asserts  that  the  narrow  internal  religious  diversity  of  the  salafi discursive  tradition
combined with its broad political diversity have provided rich resources to reinterpret these groups'
political  prescriptions  when  environmental  conditions  changed.  At  the  same  time,  this  analysis
demonstrates that these groups' reinterpretations have been confined within the boundaries internally
generated within this tradition.
This approach is situated between rationalist  and essentialist  conceptualisations of Islamist  militant
groups' ideological constructions. This perspective recognises that ideological discourses can lead to
violent and non-violent interpretations (Kalyvas, 1999), and rebuts monolithic ideological analyses of
Islamist groups that disregard the flexibility of these groups'  interpretations and discursive works.90
This  approach  substantiates  that,  while  armed  Islamist  groups  can  reinterpret  their  ideational
90 As denounced by Snow and Byrd (2007) and Gunning (2009).
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commitments and beliefs quite substantially, there is a constraining framework which limits the range
of new possible reinterpretations. As Jeroen Gunning posits, “political entrepreneurs can re-interpret
[their political theory or ideology] […] but once formulated, it constrains what [they] can do with it”
(Gunning, 2008: 56). This research argues that this constraining framework is shaped by the religious
tradition adopted by these groups at an early stage.
4.3.1. A Salafi Discursive Tradition
The consideration of Islam as a discursive tradition developed by Talal Asad (Asad, 1983, 1996) is
particularly suited to comprehend the internal construction of the salafi tradition. This concept is Asad's
answer to anthropological debates on the disputed existence of multiple forms of Islam between ʿAbdul
Hamid  el-Zein,  Michael  Gilsenan,  Ernest  Gellner  and  Clifford  Geertz  (Asad,  1983,  1996).  Asad
opposed el-Zein's argument that diverse and equal forms of Islam coexisted, Gilsenan's assertion that
there is no true Islam, Gellner's reversed image of Islam and Christianity and Geertz's neglect of power.
Asad rejects a typological separation of a rural and an urban Islam, and defends the reintroduction of a
historicised social context. He posits that Islam is better studied as a tradition, defined as a “Muslim
discourse  that  addresses  itself  to  conceptions  of  the  Islamic  past  and  future,  with  reference  to  a
particular  Islamic  practice  in  the  present”  (Asad,  1996:  398).  This  discourse  “seeks  to  instruct
practitioners regarding the correct form and purpose of a given practice that, precisely because it is
established, has a history” (Asad, 1996: 18). According to Asad and his followers, the articulation of
Islamic discourses has to be studied within their traditions, using their internal instruments of reasoning
and texts, and their embodiment in a set of practices and institutions (Anjum, 2007: 662). It is essential
to recognise that the preservation of this discursive tradition requires its reinterpretation with its own
criteria (Anjum, 2007: 662), since this religious tradition defines its engagement with sacred sources
and the conditions for its reproduction (Mahmood, 2005: 115). According to this view, “orthodoxy is
not a mere body of opinion but a distinctive relationship - a relationship of power' (Asad, 1986: 15).
Anthropological studies of Islam can facilitate the exploration of the social,  political and economic
conditions which enable or restrain the production and maintenance of specific discursive traditions.
This environment includes forces of change and resistance, which are necessary to the comprehension
of the regulation, maintenance and adaptation of correct practices and their legitimisation by Islamic
discursive traditions.
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This  anthropological  concept  is  useful  to  the  on-going  debate  on  the  relation  between  Islam and
Islamist armed groups. These studies have long opposed two antagonist positions, one claiming that
these actors merely follow Islam,91 and their contenders dismissing these claims and alleging that these
groups are  khawarij  (Kenney, 2006; Lahoud, 2010), tribal movements (Ahmed, 2013) or extremists
whose  ideational  commitments  have  nothing  to  do  with  Islam.92 Asad's  conception  of  Islamic
orthodoxy  rather  justifies  that  debating  the  Islamic  nature  of  these  groups  and  rebuking  them as
khawarij is an anthropological question in itself. This research therefore abstains from judging these
groups' Islamic legitimacy, and rather endeavours to analyse their ideological construction inside their
discursive tradition.
This analysis defines the salafi  religious tradition as a specific discursive tradition within Islam. This
approach to Islam is based on internally legitimised practices and textual analyses of the religious text
(the Qur'an) and of the religious tradition (the Sunna). This approach is congruent with current studies
of Islamic Law which explore internal structures of authority and textual norms of interpretation. This
corpus specifically contextualises Islamic Law in its historical conditions of production in order to
provide a rich understanding of the evolution of an Islamically rationalised revealed Law (Zaman,
2002: 38; Hallaq, 2005).93
The previous chapter argued that the IG and the JG adopted the salafi approach (al-minhaj al-salafi) by
the end of the 1970s. Salafism is defined as a modern revivalist movement originating in ahl al-hadith94
in the Abbasid caliphate (Haykel, 2009). The salafi approach to Islam mostly diverges with non-salafi
Islam on the method of interpretation of Islamic sources.  Salafi  Muslims  reject what they consider a
blind adherence (defined as imitation in Arabic,  taqlid) to the four canonical Islamic schools of Law
(al-madhha'ib al-arbaʿ) (Meijer, 2009c: 4), and insist on the need to return to the two fundamentals
sources in Islam, the Qur'an and the Sunna (the practice of the Prophet) (Haykel, 2009: 38-39). Their
name, salafi, refers to the first three generations of Muslims whom they intend to emulate in their daily
practices and religious understanding. Salafis promote a specific creed (ʿaqida) which is not shared by
the majority of Muslims, and are often described by their relatively literalistic approach to the religious
91 This position is paradoxically often shared by these groups and some of their non-Muslim contenders.
92 These discussions have been elaborated by Hellmich (2005, 2008, 2014).
93 On this topic, see also Walbridge, 2011.
94 Cf. note 102 page 108.
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text.95 They insist on the necessity to purify Islam from any innovation deemed un-islamic (bidaʿ) and
from  remnants  of  polytheist  beliefs  or  practices  (denounced  as  shirk  in  Arabic).  This  emphasis
motivates their continued reference to the prominence of tawheed (oneness), differentiated in tawheed
al-uluhiyya (oneness of divinity), al-rububiyya (oneness of worship) and al-asmat wal-safat (oneness
of names and attributes).  Prominent religious scholars of salafism include Taqi al-Din Ibn Taymiyya
and Ibn Qayyim al-Jawziyya in the 13th and 14th century and Muhammad Ibn ʿAbd al-Wahhab in 19th
century Saudi Arabia.
These characteristics of the salafi discursive tradition have facilitated its development and expansion in
the  Middle  East  in  the  second part  of  the  20 th century.  The critical  salafi posture  on  the  Islamic
scholastic heritage has incidentally coincided with state-sponsored modernisation and monopolisation
of formerly independent religious authorities, which marginalised their influence for colluding with
authoritarian  regimes.  It  was  additionally  accompanied  by  the  growing  importance  of  modern
universities' graduates (Eickelman & Piscatori, 1996) who were not immersed in traditional Islamic
teachings. These young professionals could more easily contribute to salafism, considering that this
approach to Islam follows a relatively horizontal structure (Heykel, 2009: 35-36). These characteristics
have rendered salafism more attractive to a new generation striving to re-appropriate religious texts
from discredited religious authorities, such as al-Azhar University after Nasserist reforms.
The role  of  the  prominent  scholar  Ibn  Taymiyya for  modern  salafis  should  be  understood  in  this
context. Ibn Taymiyya is often misrepresented as a backward and sectarian anti modernist figure, even
though this representation is inaccurate and factually misleading. Ibn Taymiyya's positions are far more
nuanced than prevailing perceptions,96 considering his reconciling position between rationalism and
revelation (Holtzman, 2010; Anjum, 2012: 196-227) and his factual opposition to the use of violence in
Muslim countries, which he only sanctioned against foreign occupation (Michot, 2004a, 2012a).97 Ibn
Taymiyya's  contemporary  resonance  should  rather  be  understood  for  his  intellectual  independence
95 See note 96 page 108.
96 An edited book has recently investigated Ibn Taymiyya's theology, hermeneutics and legacy (Rapoport & Ahmed 2010).
97 Yahiya Michot denounces current misunderstandings of Ibn Taymiyya's fatwas by Islamists proponents of violence. He
argues  that  their  political  and  ideological  approaches  contradict  Ibn  Taymiyya's  central  argument  (Michot  2004a).
According to the medieval scholar, a country populated by a Muslim population cannot be considered a domain of war
(dar al-harb),  even if  its  institutions or  prevailing Law are un-Islamic.  Michot  denounces the “Mongolisation” of
Muslim governments and the betrayal of Ibn Taymiyya's position to justify armed rebellion against Muslim leaders. He
adds that Ibn Taymiyya only commanded patience and did not condone sedition. On Ibn Taymiyya's opposition to
rebellion, see also Abou El Fadl (2001: 271-279).
106 / 314
against oppressive state authorities, and symbolic role in waging war against foreign forces occupying
Muslim lands. In addition, his independent theology and mastering of his opponents' arguments provide
abundant theological arguments to refute religious institutions allied to the modern state on religious
ground, such as al-Azhar University.98
Salafism is a tradition which is religiously homogeneous and politically diverse. Modern salafi scholars
and  movements  consensually  endorse  the  athari Islamic  creed  (ʿaqida),  as  described  by  Ibn
Taymiyya,99 and often (even if not necessarily) draw from the Hanbali100 school of jurisprudence (al-
madhhab al-hanbali), which represent the most orthodox approach the pious predecessors (al-salaf al-
salih) would have agreed upon according to Ibn Tamiyya (Al-Matroudi, 2006). They share the same
religious understanding of the creed (ʿaqida) and principles of jurisprudence (usul al-fiqh), which are
historically  rooted  in  the  legacy  of  ahl  al-hadith.101 This  religious  harmony  should  not  conceal,
however, that salafi scholars and movements have adopted remarkably antagonistic political positions,
ranging from political apathy to the support of the violent overthrown of most Muslim regimes. These
discrepancies in political assessments of a shared creed have commonly informed the distinction of
salafis  between so-called  purists,  politicos  and  jihadis,  based  on their  approach to  political  action
(Wiktorowicz,  2006).102 This  distinction  has  nonetheless  been  considered too  schematic  by  some
98 al-Azhar University endorses  the  ashʿari/maturidi  Islamic creed,  whose refutation by Ibn Taymiyya  gives modern
salafis strong arguments to oppose this institution for religious reasons. Al-Azhar has not remained idle to this line of
argument, however, and azhari scholars have strived to refute salafi theology and precepts, for instance in a publication
called al-Radd (the response) (see: http://www.fixyourdeen.com).
99 Ibn Taymiyya dwells on the athari creed in his book entitled al-ʿaqida al-wasatiyya (Ibn Taymiyya & Harras, 1996).
The athari creed is distinctive from the ashʿari and the maturidi creed, which were historical responses to the influence
of Greek philosophy on Islamic theology. The ashʿari creed was defined by Abu al-Hasan al-Ashʿari in response to the
(widely considered) heretical  muʿtazila  rationalist theology. It is similar to the  matirudi  creed, and diverges from the
athari creed over the definition of God's attributes. The ashʿari and maturidi creeds are the prevailing theology of the
Muslim world.  Ibn Taymiyya's  defence  of  the  athari creed justified his  trial  in  Damascus for  defending  heretical
positions (Jackson, 1994). Ibn Taymiyya's creed is an alternative between the denial of God's attributes (al-asma' wal-
sifat in Arabic) as defined in the Qur'an, and anthropomorphism.
100 The Hanbali madhhab is one of the four orthodox schools of jurisprudence recognised in Islam, the three others being
the Hanafi, Shafiʿi and Maliki schools. It originated with Ahmad Ibn Hanbal and was later developed by his students.
This school of jurisprudence is considered more restrictive on the interpretation of the Qur'an and of the prophetic
tradition. One can refer to al-Matroudi (2006) for a discussion of Ibn Taymiyya's contributions to the Hanbali madhhab.
This emphasis on the Hanbali madhhab is specifically noticeable in the wahhabi tradition, defined as a subcomponent
of the broader salafi discursive tradition, shaped by Muhammad Ibn ʿAbd al-Wahhab and his followers in Saudi Arabia.
All salafis do not necessarily follow the  hanbali  fiqh strictly, however. For instance, Nasiruddin al-Albani, arguably
referred  to  the  marginal  madhhab  zahiri,  and  was  critical  of  Muhammad  Ibn  ʿAbd  al-Wahhab  positions  on  fiqh
(Lacroix, 2011: 84). Other leading scholars of salafism, such as Muhammad Ibn al-ʿUthaymeen, referred widely to the
four classical madhhab without favouring one specific school.
101 In the Iraqi city of Kufa, ahl al-hadith (the people of hadith) favoured continued references to the tradition while ahl al-
ray (the people of opinion) promoted individual reasoning.
102 According to this definition, the politicos endorse political participation, the purists (also called scientific salafis,  al-
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scholars who argue that  it  overlooks internal  salafi divergences over creed, and add that prominent
salafi scholars transcend these strict boundaries (Wagemakers, 2012: 9. See also Meijer, 2007: 427-
428).  Others  have  additionally  argued  that  diverging  political  prescriptions  can  be  traced  back  to
creedal divergences and older theological debates over the nature of faith (Lav, 2012).
4.3.2. Asserting Orthodoxy and Challenging their Opponents' Credibility
The sharp discrepancies between the political prescriptions endorsed by diverse  salafi  currents have
catalysed a discursive confrontation between jihadi groups and their contenders. This research argues
that the IG and the JG have focused on the defence of the political understandings derived from their
approach to Islam, rather than on their religious creed (ʿaqida). Theological arguments over  ʿaqida,
which appeared subsequently in the  salafi jihadi  literature, were initially absent from these groups'
written  productions.103 The  defence  of  their  legitimate  political  prescriptions  has  framed  their
discourses and their consistent rebuttal of their opponents' positions and credibility. IG and JG leaders
have consistently strived to embed their arguments in the salafi discursive tradition to demonstrate that
their  political  positions  are  derived from the correct  understanding of  Islam,  and that  they  do not
deviate from Islamic orthodoxy.104 
The trial organised after Sadat's assassination in October 1981 substantiates this assertion and further
provides an incomparable access to these groups' use of the Islamic tradition. The most emblematic
debate involved sheikh Jad al-Haq, sheikh Saleh Abu Ismaʿil and sheikh ʿOmar ʿAbd al-Rahman, three
al-Azhar graduates who endorsed diverging positions on Sadat's assassination. Sheikh Jad al-Haq was
the  Egyptian  mufti,  before  becoming  sheikh  al-Azhar  in  1982  (the  country's  highest  religious
authority).  Sheikh Salah Abu Ismaʿil  was a prominent  MB member and a strong supporter  of the
application of Islamic Law in Egypt. Sheikh ʿOmar ʿAbd al-Rahman represented the jihadi current in
prison and was their  main religious  figure.  This  debate concerned three core  issues  for  the  jihadi
current and its opponents: the application of Islamic Law by the state, the status of the Muslim ruler
salafiya al-ʿilmiyya) focus on the creed and the jihadis support the violent  removal of regimes which fail  to fully
implement Islamic Law.
103 Sayyid Imam only contributed to this debate in a later phase, as argued in the concluding section of this chapter. This
chapter's argument, in contrast with Roel Meijer's contention that “[Salafi current] are always engaged in persuading
others of the truth of their ʿaqīda” (Meijer, 2007: 428), posits that salafi jihadis only subsequently focused on ʿaqida,
after the creation of a competitive social movement industry abroad. Cf pages 137-142.
104 On salafi  proponents of violence developing “their conception of themselves as the true defenders of orthodox Sunni
doctrine”, see also Lav (2012: 120).
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and obedience to the Muslim head of state. 
The eagerness of the state and its jihadi opponents to debate theologically is characteristic of their fight
for Islamic orthodoxy. The religious clergy instigated this debate through the voice of the Egyptian
mufti, sheikh Jad al-Haq. Al-Haq issued a legal opinion (fatwa) to rebut Muhammad ʿAbd al-Salam
Faraj's Neglected Duty (al-Haq, 1993). He dwells on the book's most contentious issues, referring to
the criteria  to  be considered a  Muslim,  the meaning of jihad,  the status  of Muslim rulers  and the
application of Islamic Law in Muslim countries. Al-Haq's reinterpretation of some hadith used by Faraj
substantiated his denunciation of the jihadis as modern khawarij, and his claim that Egypt is a Muslim
State where rebellion is not Islamically acceptable as long as the ruler prays. Al-Haq does not, however,
oppose some fundamental arguments developed by Faraj, for instance on the obligation of jihad upon
Muslims when a Muslim country is invaded and on the important status of Islamic Law in Muslim
countries.105
Sheikh Salah Abu Ismaʿil had an antagonistic approach to al-Haq's line of argument. He was called by
the jihadi defence to debate the Islamic nature of Sadat's regime. Abu Ismaʿil insisted on the necessity
to fully implement Islamic Law and clarified the circumstances in which Muslims can rebel against
their rulers. He asserted that it is Islamically lawful to oppose a leader who disbelieves, and related
Sadat's assassination to the ridda (apostasy) wars launched by the first Caliph Abu Bakr.106 Abu Ismaʿil
argued that Sadat's domestic and international policies, from his failure to implement Islamic Law to
the Camp David peace treaty with Israel, were religious sins which could justify his excommunication
if he considered them Islamically lawful.107
These arguments were later discussed by sheikh ʿOmar ʿAbd al-Rahman, who used this opportunity to
defend the concept of hakimiyya (God's sovereignty on earth) to rebut the accusations that the jihadis
were khawarij, and to discuss the status of the Muslim leader and the Islamic injunction to obey him. 108
In contrast with common allegations that the  jihadi  trend merely follows Sayyid Qutb to legitimise
their views, sheikh ʿOmar does not mention the latter's scholarship in his defence of the jihadis. Sheikh
105 See also Scott (2003).
106 These wars, also named the Wars of apostasy, refer to a few military battles led by the first Caliph after the death of
prophet Muhammad against rebellious tribes which refused to obey the new Muslim authorities.
107 His testimony has been published in Arabic (Ismaʿil, 1984).
108 ʿAbd al-Rahman's intervention in the court was published in a single opus called The Word of Truth (Kalima al-Haq)
(ʿAbd al-Rahman, 1985).
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ʿOmar's arguments were rather based on the four canonical School of Law109 and on the positions of
prominent Islamic judges. In his testimonies to the Court, sheikh ʿOmar argued that God's sovereignty
(al-hakimiyya) is absolute, eternal, and derived from God's unchanging laws. He insisted that the right
to legislation belongs only to God, and that Muslims are solely required to respect the Muslim leader
(wali al-amr) if he applies Islamic Law and does not sin. Sheikh ʿOmar opposed the  khawarij label
used against the jihadi trend and contended that Islamic sources justify jihad against Muslim rulers who
do not rule with Islamic Law. He added that the IG has repeatedly attempted to correct the Islamic
understanding of real khawarij, and could therefore not be associated with them. 
The written corpus published by IG and JG leaders in the following decades is based on an analogous
use of the Islamic tradition to ground their positions; their authors continuously strived to refer to the
four  classic  schools  of  jurisprudence  to  substantiate  their  political  arguments.  This  corpus  covers
written magazines, books and leaflets published by their individual leaders or by their leaderships.110 In
the  IG,  it  includes  the  texts  written  in  prison  by  its  historical  leadership,  the  communiqués  and
magazines published in Egypt and abroad, the texts written by sheikh ʿOmar ʿAbd al-Rahman, by the
IG leader abroad Rifaʿi Taha, by Talʿat Fu'ad Qassem and by the IG mufti sheikh ʿAbd al-Akhr Hamad.
In  the  JG,  it  primarily  includes  the  texts  written  consensually  by  its  external  leadership,  JG's
communiqués and magazines, and the books published by its main leaders in the 1990s, Sayyid Imam
al-Sharif and Ayman al-Zawahiri.
Collectively,  these  texts  demonstrate  that  these  groups  shared  a  common  political  and  religious
understanding, despite diverging mobilising patterns. As asserted by al-Zawahiri, “there  here are no
essential  or  creedal  differences  between  jihadi  groups.  The  differences  are  […]  operational,  with
regards to our understanding of reality” (al-Zawahiri, 1993). The IG believed in the mobilisation of a
broad social movement, whereas the JG believed in the training of a small well-equipped elite. Despite
this  difference,  however,  these  groups  shared  similar  politico-religious  views.  They  opposed  the
application of Positive Law in Muslim societies (al-qanun al-wadʿi) and demanded a comprehensive
application of Islamic Law. They asserted that Muslim heads of state who do not rule by Islamic Law
109 Sheikh ʿOmar mentions many prominent medieval scholars who wrote important theological treatises, including ʿAbd
Allah Ibn  ʿAbbas,  Imam Abu ʿAbdullah Al-Qurtubi,  Imam Shafiʿi,  Ibn Hajar  al-ʿAsqalani,  Imam al-Nawawi,  Ibn
Abidin, Ibn Hazm, Muhammad al-Shanqiti and Ibn Kathir.
110 Most  of  these  texts  and  publications  were  retrieved  online,  notably  on  Abu  Muhammad  al-Maqdissi's  website
tawhed.ws. They are fully referenced in the bibliography.
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are disbelievers who should be Islamically opposed, including by force.111 They acknowledged that
jihad includes both military and non-military components, and contended that it is legitimate in the
defence of Muslim lands attacked by non-Muslim occupation forces. These texts nonetheless did not
elaborate on secondary issues, which were only alluded to. For instance, although the IG used violence
in Egypt against foreign tourists in the 1990s, its leaders did not develop an Islamic line of argument to
justify these actions. These attacks were rather defended by lower-ranking members in independent
communiqués, which argued that tourists were a religious threat to Egypt's Islamic identity and that
attacking them indirectly weakened the state. The JG, conversely, did not condone these attacks (al-
Zawahiri, 1993).
This  written corpus demonstrates  that  conforming to the  salafi discursive tradition is  important  to
persuade a religious audience that these groups' religious understanding inferred on the right policy
prescriptions. These groups never addressed a liberal or modernist Muslim audience, but rather focused
on the fight for orthodoxy inside salafism, and vis-à-vis MB supporters and al-Azhar University. They
premised that their audience shares the same discursive tradition, and that the main barrier between
them was the acceptance of these groups' political prescriptions. Mainstream salafi scholars and jihadi
groups indeed share important political assumptions. They consensually agree that Islamic Law should
be applied comprehensively in Islamic societies, that Muslim leaders who fail to do so are infidels,112
and that jihad also has a military component which is Islamically justified in many contexts, especially
under non-Muslim occupation.113 The main difference between these groups and mainstream salafis
concerned the strategical political vision developed to reach these shared objectives, in other words the
legitimacy of violence against Muslim leaders.114
111 Some JG factions nonetheless claim that they oppose these regimes without excommunicating their leaders.
112 This position is supported by prominent salafi scholars such as Salih bin Fawzan, Muhammad Ibn al-ʿUthaymeen and
former Saudi mufti Muhammad bin Ibrahim Al Shaykh (Al-Rasheed, 2007: 31; Lav, 2012: 164; Wagemakers, 2012:
65). Others scholars, such as Ibn Baz and al-Albani, do not disagree but additionally request an impractical procedure to
convey the same position (Wagemakers, 2012: 64-65; Rabil, 2014: 103).
113 The theoretical legitimacy of jihad does not mean that its application cannot be conditioned. It should be noted that
Muslim scholars have historically separated jihad in two types of obligation: fard kifayya and fard ʿayn. Fard kifayya
refers to the duty of the community and is only performed by one subgroup of the Muslim community. Conversely, fard
ʿayn is an individual duty.  Salafi scholars consider jihad a  fard ʿayn for Muslims under non-Muslim occupation of
Muslim lands. Ibn Baz used this argument to endorse ʿAbdullah ʿAzzam's,  the Defence of Muslims lands, during the
war in Afghanistan in 1984 (ʿAzzam, 1990. On the position on jihad amongst non-jihadi salafi  scholars,  see also
Wagemakers (2012: 56-58). On jihad in Islamic Law, see Abou el-Fadl (2001).
114 Wagemakers  (2012) similarly argues that  the main difference between quietist  salafis  and the  jihadi  trend is their
position on Muslim rulers.  Others differences pertaining to their  excommunication of  other  Muslims (non-head of
state), which appear more thoroughly in the subsequent salafi jihadi literature, were not covered by these two groups.
111 / 314
This proximity between many non-jihadi  and  jihadi  positions has long shaped their framing contest.
Considering that these two currents primarily diverged vis-à-vis their political prescriptions rather than
vis-à-vis their long-term objectives, the IG and the JG have not necessarily felt the need to bridge,
amplify, extend or transform existing frames - as elaborated in framing studies - to assert their correct
political  understanding  of  Islamic  orthodoxy.  Instead  of  dwelling  on  intricate  arguments  over  the
Islamic creed (ʿaqida) with their non-jihadi  competitors,115 these groups have rather focused on the
latter's figures of authority and targeted the “credibility of the frame articulators” (Benford & Snow,
2000: 619). A common theme charactering their framing is indeed the denunciation of their opponents'
political  credibility  and  complacency  with  oppressive  regimes  (see  also  Wiktorowicz  2004;
Wagemakers,  2014), designed to weaken their  frame resonance (Benford & Snow, 2000: 620) and
discredit  their  political  prescriptions.  These  actors  are  the  most  prominent  Islamic  figures  and
institutions, namely al-Azhar University and its leaders, influential salafi scholars and the MB.
The dispute with al-Azhar resumes the debate between sheikh ʿOmar and sheikh al-Haq mentioned
earlier. Considering al-Azhar's historical prestige in the Muslim world and in Egypt, these groups could
not easily defame this institution even though this position would be theoretically congruent with the
salafi non-hierarchical approach to Islam. IG and JG leaders have rather denounced the collusion of al-
Azhar leaders with the state, while simultaneously praising some of its virtuous scholars (e.g. Taha,
1998;  al-Zawahiri,  2008).  They  describe  al-Azhar  as  the  strongest  historical  defender  of  Egypt's
Muslim identity, and blame foreign countries and post-1950s political regimes for marginalising its role
as the protector of Islamic Law; they assert that al-Azhar will only re-establish its prominence when its
financial and political independence are restored (e.g. Taha, 1998; al-Zawahiri,  2008). The  ashʿari-
maturidi Islamic creed endorsed by al-Azhar, which contradict these groups' religious creed, is never
questioned. Al-Zawahiri mentions, for instance, that he never debated the Taliban's endorsement of this
creed,116 hence stressing the political  nature of his  opposition to  al-Azhar,  informed by the latter's
deference to illegitimate leaders (e.g. al-Zawahiri, 1989).
The IG and the JG have also targeted prominent salafi scholars who enjoy a leading influence among
115 The main reference by Ayman al-Zawahiri to issues of ʿaqida concerns the group's position on Iran and, indirectly, on
shiʿa Muslims, which he denounced from a theological and political perspective (al-Zawahiri, 1995).
116 The Taliban movement traces its roots to sub-Indian continent deobandism, which is a revivalist Hanafi current distinct
from salafism. This religious difference has caused many controversies in  jihadi  circles in Afghanistan in the 1990s,
when some of its components denounced the Taliban for not endorsing a correct ʿaqida (Lav, 2012: 176).
112 / 314
salafis. Among these are sheikh ʿAbd al-ʿAziz Ibn Baz and sheikh Muhammad Nasiruddin al-Albani.117
Ibn Baz was Saudi Arabia's grand mufti between 1993 to 1999, and al-Albani was a salafi scholar of
hadith dwelling in Saudi Arabia. While their respective scholarship on theology and hadith has not
been  contested,  these  scholars'  political  positions  were  firmly  opposed.  Ibn  Baz  has  mostly  been
blamed for his legitimisation of the presence of American troops on Saudi soil during and after the first
Gulf war, as well as for his positions on the elections in Algeria in 1991 and on Israel during the peace
process (e.g. al-Zawahiri, 1994; jamaʿa al-jihad, n.d.d). Al-Albani has similarly been denounced for his
accommodating position towards Gulf regimes (e.g. jamaʿa al-jihad, 1991) and for his opposition to the
implementation  of  jihad  (e.g.  Hamad,  1996)118 (even  for  occupied  Palestinians).119 These  charges
substantiate that, as argued by Wiktorowicz on AQ's comparable denunciation of the same scholars
(Wiktorowicz,  2004:  170),  jihadi groups  can  hardly  discredit  the  religious  authority  enjoyed  by
prominent  salafi  figures, and have to focus on their collusion with Arab regimes and allegedly naïve
political prescriptions.
Finally,  these groups'  last  important  target  is  the MB. The MB has been repeatedly castigated for
engaging in party politics and participating in democratic processes (e.g. al-Zawahiri, 1988; al-Jamaʿa
al-Islamiyya,  n.d.d).  In line with mainstream  salafi  arguments,  the IG and the JG have denounced
democracy as un-Islamic for contradicting God's ultimate sovereignty and the supremacy of Islamic
Law. Then, they adopted an essentially political viewpoint, arguing that the MB's participation in the
political process legitimises autocratic regimes, such as Mubarak's presidency, and has never led to the
application of Islamic law in Egypt. In a similar vein to previous arguments on al-Azhar and  salafi
scholars, the MB's relatively inclusive religious approach and ashʿari creeds has not been questioned,
and a  focus  has  rather  been devoted  to  the  political  consequences  of  the  group's  positions.120 Al-
Zawahiri additionally substantiated this primordial political focus in 1995, when the MB was faced
with  repression  and military  trials,  that  time was appropriate  for  the  group to  review its  political
position on the regime, reconsider its reformist path and endorse armed jihad (al-Zawahiri, 1995).
117 Other scholars are also criticised, such as the Saudi  salafi scholar  Safar Al-Hawali, who gained prominence for his
opposition to the Saudi regime after the first Gulf war, who was criticised for supporting democracy in Algeria.
118 In a recorded tape between al-Albani and a jihadi proponent (al-Albani, n.d.), al-Albani does not negate that jihad is a
duty, fard ʿayn, upon Muslims. He rather argues that, according to his reading, jihad cannot be undertaken before the
creation of a single Islamic state which would rule the Muslim world.
119 Al-Albani, in a famous fatwa produced in 1994, advocated for the departure of the Palestinians following the example 
of Prophet Muhammad leaving Mecca when Muslims were oppressed.
120 On al-Zawahiri's book on the MB, see also Lav (2012: 170).
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4.3.3. A Constraining Ideational Framework
After  demonstrating  that  the  IG  and  the  JG  have  thoroughly  strived  to  substantiate  their  Islamic
orthodoxy, this section examines whether these groups' endorsement of a salafi discursive tradition has
constrained  the  reinterpretation  of  their  theologico-political  outlook  over  time.  The  ideological
revisions undertaken by the IG and of some JG factions are an unprecedented opportunity to undertake
this analysis. The processes which accompanied these revisions are analysed in the last section of this
chapter and, for the purposes of this  section,  it  must be noted that these revisions consisted of an
extensive retrospection and review of these groups' ideologies
The following analysis  draws on two theoretical contributions to the dissociation of ideational and
material causal factors in decision making processes (Tannenwald 2005; Jacobs, 2014).121 While these
studies primarily explore the causal role of ideas and cognitive processes, this analysis refers to their
guidelines to demonstrate the constraining role of militant groups' ideational commitments on their
subsequent  ideological  reinterpretations.  This  investigation  is  designed  to  substantiate  that,  while
ideational  commitments  can  be  reinterpreted,  the  latter  are  ideationally  bounded  by  these  groups'
discursive tradition. This concluding section therefore demonstrates that ideational commitments are
not solely shaped by objective material features and strategic imperatives (Jacobs, 2014: 43-49).
The first  theoretical  guideline  contends  that  the  separation  between ideational  and material  causal
factors  requires  (1) to  determine whether  ideational  changes  are  correlated with changing material
interest, (2) to compare the timing of material and ideational changes and (3) to corroborate whether
material or ideational factors explain which ideas prevailed (Tannenwald, 2005: 26-28). 
The comparison between the timing of material and ideational changes is relatively straightforward in
the ideological revisions. These revisions were initiated by the imprisoned IG leadership in 2001. They
started with internal discussions on the group's theological positions, and were followed by a similar
process  by some JG leaders  in  2007.  In both  cases,  the ideological  revisions  followed substantial
objective material changes and did not precede them. By the beginning of the 2000s, the IG and the JG
were in serious jeopardy. Most of their leaders were either imprisoned in Egypt or scattered in several
121 See also Bennett (2008).
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countries. Thousands of their members remained behind bars, with bleak prospects for liberation. The
armed conflict  with the Egyptian State failed to yield any results,  and Mubarak's regime appeared
stable and resilient in the 2000s. Intuitively, it can be asserted that the only alternative to jail was to
convince state authorities that it won the ideological battle and that no additional rationale justified the
continuous  imprisonment  of  these  groups'  leaders  and  members.  Ideationally,  this  would  find  a
translation into the renunciation of the use of violence in Egypt, and into the acceptance of the Islamic
legitimacy of Mubarak's regime - which underpinned the rationale of these groups' armed jihad.
The correlation between ideational changes and material interests could signify that these ideological
revisions were not  genuine considering their  timing and conceivable rationale.  In the 2000s,  these
groups  were  faced  with  strong strategic  incentives  and  an  environment  conducive  to  a  pragmatic
reconsideration of former ideational commitments (Jacobs, 2014). The last section explores the causal
mechanisms explaining the emergence and diffusion of new ideas and, in  the meantime, the main
concern pertains to the content of the ideological revisions. Considering that objective material factors
at the macro and meso levels encouraged a revision of these groups' main ideological tenets, two main
hypotheses  can  be  formulated  based  on  the  previous  guidelines  to  assess  whether  these  groups'
“cognitive structure is [...] wholly endogenous to objective, material features of the choice situation”
(Jacobs, 2014: 43). If these groups revised their entire ideological corpus, it can be inferred that these
revisions  were  a  deceiving  tactical  move  or  that  these  groups'  ideological  corpus  was  entirely
contingent  on  external  stimuli.  Conversely,  if  only  a  few  ideological  tenets  were  revised  while
substantial tenets incompatible with their new material interests were preserved, then the former can be
regarded as flexibly re-interpretable, while the latter can be analysed as uncorrelated to them.122 In other
words, the latter would be exogenous to changing environmental and material factors (Jacobs, 2014:
45-48) and, in this case, be embedded in the salafi discursive tradition endorsed by these two groups.
This analysis should therefore demonstrate the persistence of ideational tenets incompatible with these
groups'  objective  material  interests.  This  counter  factual  analysis  would  prove  that  these  groups'
theologico-political  outlook  is  not  solely  shaped  by  changing  material  factors.  This  approach  is
considered Bayesian in causal process analysis, with the postulate that some pieces of evidence are
more  discriminating  than  others  (Bennett  2008;  Beach  & Pedersen  2013).  The  researcher  should
122 The accuracy of this analysis is reinforced by its timing. Interviews were undertaken between 2011 and 2013, when
these groups were not under pressure from state authorities, and had no incentives to conceal their real positions.
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therefore  give  “greater  weight  to  evidence  that  is  expected  a  priori  to  be  less  probably  based on
previous knowledge of the phenomenon” (Beach & Pedersen, 2013: 83). A greater weight should be
given to the persistence of ideological tenets which contradict these groups' objective material interests.
The IG ideological revisions generated the authoring of four main books in consensus, in addition to a
dozen supplementary books and articles reflecting the non-consensual views of individual leaders.123
The  four  consensual  IG  publications  cover  central  issues  for  jihadi groups,  notably  jihad,  its
practicalities and legitimacy in Islamic and non-Islamic countries, the excommunication of Muslims
and the application of hisba (which refers to an Islamic doctrine usually translated as the propagation of
virtue and the prevention of vice). IG's arguments are grounded in Islamic jurisprudence, in congruence
with their historical use of the Islamic discursive tradition. IG leaders use widely acknowledged Islamic
tools and concepts to revise some of their positions. For instance, these new texts do not reject the
military component of jihad, but rather argue that jihad is conditional on maslaha and mafsada (their
positive and negative utility),  and can only be considered a means rather than an end purpose.  In
addition, they add that military jihad is unlawful against civilians, tourists and non-combatants.
Some JG members also endorsed a book authored predominantly by a former JG leader, Sayyid Imam
al-Sharif (bin ʿAbd al-ʿAziz, 2007). Imam, in a similar manner, endorses new Islamic restrictions on
jihad,  hisba  and  takfir.  He has primarily  addressed jihad and attempted to regulate  and eventually
impede its application. He mentions that a Muslim cannot select his targets based on their nationalities,
and adds that  Islam forbids the killing of tourists  and foreigners who hold a visa to  visit  Muslim
countries, assimilating visas to a binding security covenant. At a personal level, he asserts that only
religiously trained Muslims who are allowed by their parents can potentially participate in jihad. He
nonetheless insists that jihad is subordinated to military strength and to the presence of a favourable
environment, and reiterates that mujahideen (Muslim fighters) are constrained by maslaha and mafsada
(their positive and negative utility). In all cases, he rebuts the possibility to wage military jihad in the
contemporary era, and claims that the only current solutions are societal isolation or immigration to
safer places where preaching is permitted.
123 The four main books are the following:  mubadara waqf al-ʿunf ruya waqiʿiyya wa nathara sharʿiyya [The Ceasefire
Initiative, Realistic and Islamic Law Perspectives] (Hafez et al., 2002), nahr al-dhikrayyat al-murajaʿat al-fiqhiyya al-
jamaʿa al-islamiyya [The Rivers of Memories The Jurisprudential Revisions of the Islamic Group] (Zuhdi et al., 2003),
taslit  al-adwa ʿala ma waqaʿa fil-jihad min al-akhta  [Clarifications on the Wrongdoings which Occurred in Jihad]
(ʿAbd al-Rahman et al., 2002) and al-nasah wa al-tabayyin fi tashih mafahim al-muhtasibin [Advices and Clarifications
in the Correction of Hisba Concepts] (al-Sharif et al., 2002)
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These books demonstrate that the ideological revisions are mostly a new interpretation of formerly
endorsed policy prescriptions. The IG and JG members which supported this process do not reject their
normative commitment to Islamic Law, or their endorsement of the military dimension of jihad; rather,
they justify that the translation of these beliefs into their political approaches needs to be Islamically
correct and in accordance with the Islamic discursive tradition. This approach reinforces the cultural
resonance and narrative fidelity (Benford & Snow, 2000: 622) of the revisions, in order to preempt
expected accusations that they betrayed the cause. As asserted in an eponymous publication of ʿAbud
and Tareq  al-Zumur,  these  are  “Revisions,  not  Retreats”  (murajaʿat  la  tarajuʿat)  (al-Zumur  & al-
Zumur, 2005). These groups have altered their former policy prescriptions (Tannewald, 2005: 16) by
conditioning  their  practical  application.  IG  and  JG  members  have  thenceforth  become  closer  to
mainstream salafi  preachers and groups that they previously opposed, and adopted the same Islamic
tools and concepts to justify similar political views.124 In the salafi discursive tradition, this discrepancy
between the preservation of the purity of the Law and the endorsement of a pragmatic application in
practice noticeably follows Ibn Taymiyya's religious pragmatism.125
Finally,  as  justified  in  the  previously  mentioned  guidelines  (Jacobs,  2014:  49-56),  private
communications with these groups' leaders and members reveal that these revisions voluntarily omitted
a central theme from these groups' former literature. These revisions do not claim that a Muslim head
of state who does not rule by Islamic Law can be considered Muslim,126 an ideological tenet which has
long been a central  feature of these groups'  literature.  While these groups'  leaders have proscribed
military jihad in Muslim countries, they have not consensually recognised that their leaders should not
be excommunicated. Interviews with IG leaders and members detailed at the end of this chapter reveal
that the two main proponents of the revisions, Karam Zuhdi and Najih Ibrahim, revised the apostasy of
the Muslim head of state who does not apply Islamic Law. These discussions indicate that these two
prominent IG figures could nonetheless not reach a consensus with remaining IG leaders. Similarly,
after the election of President Mohamed Morsi from the MB, Sayyid Imam affirmed in a televised
124 Chapter 6 expands on this theme. These groups have become particularly closer to activist (haraki) salafis.
125 Michot expands on this issue in his study of the position of Ibn Taymiyya on the rafida. He notes that Ibn Taymiyya's
fatwas generally “present the Islamic norm with more or less details and then conclude with an emphasis on the danger
resulting from an inconsiderate application of the norm. Rather, [his fatwas] favour teaching over excommunication”
(Michot, 2014: 2).
126 This point is not included in the four books published consensually. Individual leaders expressed non-consensual views
in additional publications and in interviews which did not necessarily reflect the group's consensus.
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interview that he considered him a disbeliever, akin to his predecessors from Muhammad Ali to Hosni
Mubarak, for not applying Islamic Law (bin ʿAbd al-ʿAziz, 2013c). 
This omission is crucial to the hypotheses elaborated previously. It means that this central ideological
tenet  persisted  despite  favourable  objective  material  features  and  strategic  incentives  to  a
comprehensive ideological revision. It substantiates the argument that the discursive tradition adopted
by the IG and the JG at an early stage has ideationally facilitated and constrained their subsequent
ideological  construction,  by  providing  the  tools,  texts  and  concepts  which  only  allow  for  a
circumscribed rearticulation. It can also be argued that this reformulation is further facilitated by the
existence of a large spectrum of policy prescriptions inside the salafi social movement family, despite a
narrow religious understanding. A detailed analysis of the individual positions adopted inside these
groups127 finally  reveals  that  some individuals  can  overcome the  barriers  shaped by this  tradition,
including at a leadership level. At the same time, their rupture with the salafi  discursive tradition has
prevented them from diffusing their ideas organisationally. 
4.4. DECISION MAKING AND ORGANISATIONAL EVOLUTION
This chapter's theoretical discussion posited that the study of militant groups' ideological construction
has to be contextualised within their organisational structures. This section therefore explores these
groups'  evolutions with a specific focus on their internal norms of decision making. The following
analysis  argues  that  these  groups'  initial  organisational  patterns  triggered  the  development  of
constraining horizontal norms of decision making only in the IG. This analysis adds that this crucial
difference  explains  the  survival  of  a  centralised  IG  leadership  which  contrast  substantially  with
repeated JG factionalisation. This argument is tested on three occasions, when these groups' leaders
reconsidered  their  future  and  discussed  the  possibility  to  unite  their  groups.  These  negotiations
occurred in time of relative or absolute uncertainty; they are points of rupture which facilitate the
consideration of alternative explanations to the argument advanced in this section.
This section is primarily concerned with these groups' internal cohesion and with the emergence of
factionalism at a leadership level. This section demonstrates that militant groups' initial organisational
patterns  and  the  temporality  of  their  adoption  of  violence  are  crucial  to  explain  the  subsequent
127 The last section expands on this issue.
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evolution of their organisational structures and decision making processes. This argument thoroughly
builds on the demonstration that pre-war networks and the social bases in which violent group leaders
are embedded define the nature of the violent organisation subsequently created (Staniland, 2014). 
When the adoption of violence does not immediately follow a group's formation, the time interval in
between facilitates low-risk activism mobilising patterns and the strengthening of strong horizontal ties
between this group's leaders. These strong ties facilitate the provision of “information, trust and shared
political meanings” (Staniland, 2014: 9), and subsequently generate militant groups characterised by
“central  processes  of  decision making,  command and control,  strategic  assessment  and ideological
production” (Staniland, 2014: 27). The joining of new members does not subsequently contest these
pre-established hierarchies and organisational norms. Eventually, changing macro policies can spark
internal disputes, which are nevertheless more amenable to consensual resolution.
Conversely,  when a  group  adopts  violence  from the  onset,  initial  security  dilemmas  and tensions
inherent with its clandestine nature hinder the reinforcement of trust between its leaders, as well as the
establishment  of  consensual  horizontal  norms  of  decision  making.  Security  risks  reinforce  mutual
suspicion against one another and against new comers, for fear of external infiltration. These groups are
set apart by the absence of central organisational control, distrust, and fragile loyalty between their
leaders (Staniland, 2014: 53).  Worsening macro conditions often deepen organisational divides and
splits over personal or ideological issues.
This  analysis  is  also  informed  by  the  expanding  institutional  and  organisational  literature  on  the
evolution of violent groups over time. The validity of this approach is confirmed by an additional study
which argues that external factors such as state repression amplifies existing “trends in cooperation or
conflict existent in a movement”, depending on “the level of satisfaction with preexisting institutional
arrangements” (McLauchlin & Pearlman, 2012). It is also substantiated by a quantitative study which
demonstrates that “organisations with a factional or competing leadership structure and those that use
violence  as  a  tactic  are  at  a  greater  risk  to  split”  (Asal  et  al.,  2012).  The  combination  of  these
complementary arguments is congruent with this analysis, and stresses that strong pre-existing ties
between  militant  group  leaders  legitimise  institutional  arrangements  which  are  less  likely  to  be
contested when the group is faced with an external crisis, in contrast with groups characterised by
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weaker horizontal links which are more likely to split.
4.4.1. Exploring Early Organisational Differentiations
The timing of these groups' adoption of violence shaped their respective organisational construction.
According to the previous chapter, the JG was neither a unified nor a centralised structure before 1981.
The group merely agglomerated many individuals around the idea that the Egyptian state had to be
replaced  with  an  Islamic  state.  New  members  were  usually  recruited  in  larger  salafi mainstream
institutions and through networks of acquaintances. They had relatively vague political positions and
mostly agreed that  a  military coup would  be the most  suitable  option in  Egypt.  These  cells  were
competing  against  each  other  and,  by  1981,  included  the  council  headed  in  Cairo  by  Faraj  in
coordination with the IG, the cell headed by al-Rihal and Amir al-Jaysh, the cell headed by al-Zawahiri,
Imam  and  al-Qamari  and  hundreds  of  loosely  affiliated  individuals.  According  to  interviews,
recruitment required some level of secrecy and security constraints which hindered the creation of
strong  organisational  institutions  and  horizontal  ties  between  these  cells'  early  leaders.  Moreover,
security  compartmentalisation  obscured  their  members'  understanding  of  these  networks'  overall
topography, which they often discovered in jail.  The jihad groups were characterised by a divided
leadership  competing  for  influence,  the  prevalence  of  security  dilemmas  and  a  fear  of  external
infiltration and internal collaboration with the state. As a group, it conforms with Staniland's account of
a fragmented group whose leaders are tied through weak ties (Staniland, 2014: 8).
In the South of Egypt, the IG emerged as a non-political group of university students. Its members
socialised collectively and adopted the  salafi approach to Islam by the late 1970s. Initially,  the IG
provided social services to the students and enjoyed a broad public presence on university campuses.
This pre-contention socialisation eased the development and legitimisation of a clear internal structure
and division of prerogatives between its leaders, and encouraged shared horizontal norms. It reinforced
trust between early IG leaders, and nurtured a culture of consensual decision making. As elaborated by
Blee on grass-root movements in the United States, the IG's early days helped to “produce a unified
voice, standards of leadership and authority, rules and procedures, political agendas and strategies”
(Blee, 2012: 53). The IG was therefore characterised, before the contentious conflict, by a centralised
horizontal  decision  making  process,  and  vertical  norms  uniting  the  group's  leaders  and  members,
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including respect of the group's internal hierarchy and discipline, collective group identity, and a shared
political understanding of the group's short and long term objectives. The IG resembled Staniland's
description of a group led by a cohesive leadership united with strong ties (Staniland, 2014: 6).
Sadat's assassination in October 1981 was quickly followed by massive arrests of Islamist militants.
Their subsequent trials were unrivalled in Egyptian recent history and lasted until September 1984.128
Eventually, 3002 Islamist militants were judged in three successive phases. These trials started with
Sadat's executioners and co-conspirators. Then, it carried on with these groups' leaders and concluded
with their followers. In prison, all the militants temporarily united behind the leadership of a religious
scholar, sheikh ʿOmar ʿAbd al-Rahman, until 1984. These groups' leaders argue that they expected to
be executed and could not initially envision a future for their groups. They assert that they merely
intended to present their defence to the public while waiting for their executions (e.g. Ibrahim, 2012).
By  1984,  they  realised  that  the  authorities  were  relatively  clement  and  had  only  executed  five
militants.129 It  was  therefore  an  appropriate  time to  discuss  these  groups'  future  after  forthcoming
prisoners' release.
These  groups  held  multilateral  negotiations  on  a  possible  union  under  the  same  organisational
umbrella. These negotiations, which eventually collapsed, constitute the first test of this section. In
theory, several alternative hypotheses at the macro, ideational and organisational levels can explain
their  failure.  Drawing  on  a  social  movement  approach,  macro-level  explanations  include  the
consideration of different types of political opportunities and state policies towards Islamist militants.
For instance,  differentiated (selective or collective)  concessions to militant groups arguably impact
their  political  choices  (Goerzig,  2012),130 notably  when  the  state  “divides  and  concedes”  them
(Cunningham, 2011).131 In this case, however, the state did not differentiate between the Islamic and
jihad groups and did not promote one group or approach with selected incentives or punishments.
Moreover,  most  militants  were  imprisoned  or  living  clandestinely,  and  were  not  presented  with
alternative choices at the macro-level. While macro factors and the general characteristics of Mubarak's
new  regime,  such  as  its  initially  liberal  position  on  Islamist  movements,  could  have  influenced
128 An exhaustive publication of court reports, which include the testimonies of the militants, can be found in Sharqawi
(1985).
129 The five militants executed by the authorities were Muhammad ʿAbd al-Salam Faraj, Khaled al-Islambuli, ʿAbd al-
Hamid ʿAbd al-Salam, Hussein ʿAbbas, ʿAtta Tail.
130 On selective inducements and the renunciation to violence, see also Ashour (2009). 
131 See also de Mesquita (2005).
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militants' perceptions and internal debates, they did not directly disrupt these negotiations.
The main alternative hypotheses are located at the organisational and ideational levels. Officially, the
Islamic and jihad groups did not manage to unite for a few reasons mentioned by the IG second-in-
command at that time, Najih Ibrahim (2012):
Jihad groups' members supported jihad for the sake of it, while for us jihad was a means and not an end.
We understood the need to balance it with the concept of  maslaha [positive utility]. In addition, the
essence of our work was public preaching (daʿwa) to change people's values, while the jihad groups only
believed in the military coup (al-inqilab al-ʿaskari). We asked them to join us for God, not for us. They
preferred to stick to secrecy whereas we understood that military actions did not benefit us. We also
differed on the group's leadership. They opposed sheikh ʿOmar from the beginning and rebuked the
possibility to be led by a blind preacher. They wanted a military leader. So we split. We already had our
majliss al-shura and stayed united while their majliss al-shura quickly dissipated. Their majliss al-shura
initially had eleven members and every month one of them would leave.
Ibrahim's reference to the designation of a common leadership underlies a crucial issue, namely that
personal  and  organisational  differences  between  these  groups  played  a  decisive  role  in  these
negotiations. This assertion is confirmed on the other side by Nabil Naʿim (2014), who was a member
of al-Zawahiri's cell. He explains that:
The IG accused us of being takfiriyyin132 because of al-ʿudhr bil-jahl.133 I am a doctor in shariʿa and I
know that they were wrong. This was solely an excuse to split, not the real reason. In the JG, we practice
al-ʿudhr bil-jahl as well. We are salafis and follow proper Islamic rulings. The application of this concept
was not a reason to split. We thought that we were a jihadi organisation which could not be led by a blind
sheikh. Our leader must be in good physical conditions and, in this case, this leadership was inconsistent
with our jihadi nature.
The militants'  failure to  unite  in  prison was primarily  informed by diverging initial  organisational
patterns,  which  explain  pre-1981  ideological  and  organisational  developments.  These  testimonies,
which are confirmed by many other interviews (e.g. Hafez, 2013) confirm that the IG and the jihad
groups were crucially influenced by their initial strategic rationale, preaching versus the military coup,
132 This description refers to those who arguably excommunicate (takfir in Arabic) other Muslims outside of established
Islamic boundaries. 
133 “The excuse of ignorance” refers to the possibility to “excuse”, and not excommunicate, a Muslim who is ignorant of
his sin. Cf pages 90-91.
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and were vying to impose their pre-1981 leadership on any organisational structure created henceforth.
Their  distinctive  emergences  shaped their  approach to  political  action,  and were  decisive  in  these
debates.  Moreover,  other  alternative  hypotheses  fail  to  explain  this  outcome.  As  prisoners,  their
resources were limited and they were not competing for any sort of alternative resources, including
material, ideational or public support.134 In addition, these factions' weak positions in prison did not
position  any  group  more  favourably  to  attract  other  members  through  the  bandwagoning  concept
mentioned later in this research. They were isolated, in jail, and their social ties with their followers
were severed for security reasons. These groups primarily wanted to preserve their pre-existing nature
and leadership.  The  IG wanted  to  maintain  its  cohesive  unity  and leadership,  while  jihad  group's
members were reluctant to be included as secondary actors in a bigger entity.
4.4.2. Organisational Division of Labour in Egypt and Abroad
Prison discussions triggered the emergence of two distinct groups. The first group was the IG, which
proceeded on its pre-1981 foundations. It was a cohesive group of friends who socialised collectively
and consensually agreed to be guided by sheikh ʿOmar ʿAbd al-Rahman on theological issues. They
had a few years to bond, establish and legitimise horizontal and vertical norms and hierarchy, contrary
to the jihad groups, and refused to unite with them for that reason. Eventually, the group consolidated a
consensual leadership in prison. The IG named four leaders to define the group's general orientation
and lead its ideological construction, as expected in integrated groups (Staniland, 2014). Blee notably
argues  that  “the  most  common  way  that  new  activist  groups  phase  out  collective  learning  is  by
designating, often implicitly, the task of learning and knowing to one or a few members” (Blee, 2012:
53). An IG leader explains that:
Four main leaders were designated to lead the group's ideological construction: Karam Zuhdi, Najih
Ibrahim, ʿIsam Dirbala and Osama Hafez. Others, including ʿAsim ʿAbd al-Majid and I, also contributed.
When IG members started leaving prison after 1984, Muhammad al-Islambuli was the main IG leader
outside of prison. He was supplemented by Khaled Fikri and I. Sheikh Salah Hashim joined them in
1985. The South was our main focus.
The second group aggregated jihad groups' members and leaders. It adopted the name Jihad Group
(JG), and was initially led by its imprisoned majliss al-shura. This group included many differentiated
134 The corpus on the competition for resources between violent groups and its impact on these groups' mobilisation and
use of violence is relatively broad. The next chapter reviews these contributions. 
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social networks whose members often barely knew one another because of pre-1981 security dilemmas.
They  mostly  met  in  prison  and  were  frequently  embroiled  in  diverse  disputes  for  personal  or
ideological reasons. These contentions confirm the previous claims that internal conflicts intensify in
militant  groups  characterised  by  the  absence  of  pre-existing  institutional  arrangements  and  by
competing leaderships (Asal et al., 2012; McLauchlin & Pearlman 2012). For instance, the JG's majliss
al-shura divided in 1985 when a personal conflict arose between the group's two main leaders, ʿAbud
al-Zumur and ʿIsam al-Qamari. According to Nabil Naʿim (2014), these conflicts were motivated by
suspicions  of  collusion  with prison authorities,  hence  confirming the  lack  of  trust  and the  mutual
suspicion characterising fragmented organisations (Staniland, 2014). This comparison between the IG
and the JG does not necessarily imply that the IG was not affected by personal disputes;  it  rather
indicates  that  the  latter  managed  to  solve  them consensually  thanks  to  pre-existing  organisational
norms and stronger trust between its leaders.
In 1984, the first wave of prisoners was freed from detention after three years of incarceration. These
groups' organisational patterns then crucially impacted subsequent developments outside of prison. The
IG preserved its unity and reorganised its ranks in the South of Egypt. The prison leadership decided
that time was not ripe for a violent confrontation with the state, and instead decided to focus on the
group's social institutions. Sawfat ʿAbd al-Ghani (n.d.) confirms this plan, and reveals that the IG was
gradually reorganised by Rifaʿi Taha in 1986. The vertical authority of the group's prison leadership
was legitimised and accepted by all IG members, despite these geographic divisions. These leaders
became thenceforth referred to as the “historical leadership”. The IG leader outside of prison, Rifaʿi
Taha (2013), affirms that:
Until  1986  the  amir (leader)  was  sheikh  ʿOmar.  He  was  with  us  outside  of  prison,  along  with
Muhammad al-Islambuli, Saleh Hashim, ʿAbd al-Akhr Hamad and Khaled Fikri. The local leaders were
leading the IG in the group while those in prison, Karam Zuhdi, ʿIsam Dirbala, ʿAsim ʿAbd al-Majid and
Najih Ibrahim were giving their views. The real leadership was the historical leadership in prison.
This organisational division of labour and its associated legitimisation of internal hierarchy did not
occur in the JG. In this case, post-1984 liberations of prisoners only worsened internal divides and
marginalised the group's majliss al-shura in prison. The absence of consensual horizontal mechanisms
of decision making facilitated the emancipation of newly freed members, who were let free to pursue
their own endeavours. Liberated prisoners were mostly associated with the network led by al-Zawahiri,
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Imam and al-Qamari, which was not directly involved in Sadat's assassination. According to Naʿim
(2014), only some of their original members were arrested in 1981, and many remained at large. Their
strength outside of prison was reinforced by these liberations, which inexorably marginalised  jihadi
cells most closely associated with the killing of Sadat, around ʿAbud al-Zumur. When they left prison,
they resumed their  pre-Sadat assassination project, which consisted in pursuing military training in
Afghanistan. Two JG members, Mohammed ʿAtef (also known as Abu Hafs al-Misri) and ʿAli Amin al-
Rashidi (also known as Abu ʿObaida al-Banshiri), were already in Afghanistan. They were soon joined
by Imam and al-Zawahiri after his liberation in 1985 (al-Zawahiri, 1993). Naʿim (2014) explains that:
We needed a base and training camps. It was easy to do so in Afghanistan. So when Ayman left, he met
ʿAsim Musa, an Egyptian Colonel. He recreated the organisation [the JG] there, in 1986-87. I joined him
shortly after, when I was released from jail. 
The war in Afghanistan played a fundamental role in these groups' histories in the following decade.
According to many interviews (e.g. Amr, 2012; Mohammad ʿOmar, 2012; Qassem, 2012; Saʿid, 2012)
three main rationales explain the unprecedented exile of these groups'  leaders and members to the
border  region  between  Afghanistan  and  Pakistan.135 The  first  wave  of  departure  was  unrelated  to
Egyptian domestic developments. From the mid-1980s onwards, Egyptians of all political affiliation
individually accepted the legitimacy of armed jihad in Afghanistan and independently travelled there to
fight  or  assist  Afghan  refugees.136 This  mobilisation  of  foreign  fighters  was  very  similar  to  what
happened in many other countries, considering the broad legitimacy enjoyed by jihad in Afghanistan in
Arab and Islamic nations. The second wave of departure, which unfolded by the end of the 1980s,
differed  from the  first  emigration  pattern  and was  generally  informed  by the  deterioration  of  the
security situation in Egypt, and by the necessity to escape the Egyptian security services. Finally, some
of these groups' leaders and members were eventually sent to Afghanistan by their group, arguably to
assure their protection despite some allegations that they were sent to undertake military training to
fight back in Egypt.137
135 On foreign fighters, see also Malet (2013).
136 One can refer to the numerous testimonies of so-called Arab Afghans who travelled to Afghanistan in the 1980s (e.g.
Anas, 2002; al-Misri, 2002, 2006; ʿAbd al-Ghani, 2010).
137 This issue has often been mentioned in the literature on the IG and the JG. For instance, an IG leader reportedly
mentions that the IG leadership decided to send their members to Afghanistan to undertake military training in the late
1980s (al-ʿAwwa, 2006: 119). IG leaders in Afghanistan nonetheless contest this interpretation (Taha, 2013). The next
chapter contends that only a small number of returnees played a role in Egypt.
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The exile of many prominent leaders was a major challenge to these groups' leaderships, which was
differently mediated by these groups' organisational norms. According to IG leaders who relocated to
Afghanistan by the end of the 1980s, contacts with the prison leadership were maintained through
intermediaries. They assert that the legitimacy of their group's prison leadership was generally accepted
despite intermittent disputes.  Some mentions that there was no competition between the external and
the  prison leadership,  even  though the  subsequent  IG leader  abroad,  Taha  (2013),  mentions  some
tensions:
We thought that the leaders should be those abroad, including sheikh Hamad, Mustafa [Hamza], sheikh
Shawqi [Muhammad al-Islambuli] and those on the ground in Egypt, notably Osama Hafez and Saleh
Hashim. The leaders could not be those remaining behind bars. How could people in jail lead us? They
said that they were the leaders, even though they could not really lead in reality. We did not want to
claim openly that they were not the leaders, however, even though we took our own decisions. We did
not say anything, and generally told other IG members that the leaders were those in prison.
Taha's position substantiates that, despite internal differences of opinion, the group's external leadership
did not oppose the legitimacy of the prison leadership, and still strived to preserve the group's unity.
This setting contrasted significantly with the JG, whose new leaders in the Afghan-Pakistani border
area,  al-Zawahiri  and Imam,  did  not  feel  compel  to  maintain  the  JG's  organisational  unity and to
coordinate with prison leaders. These two leaders rather decided to revive their group's activities under
the name tandhim al-jihad (the Jihad Organisation), later renamed jamaʿa al-jihad (JG), and to create
their own training camps in the Afghan-Pakistani border area. Their objectives were to mobilise and
train  Egyptian  fighters  under  their  organisational  umbrella  in  order  to  prepare  for  an  armed
confrontation in Egypt.138 According to a member of the JG prison leadership:
All the contacts were severed even before Afghanistan. We were in prison and could be tortured at any
time to reveal what we knew. We could not maintain any contact with them. We were not even in touch
with others imprisoned members of our group, contrary to the IG who controlled the prisons from Liman
Tora [one Egyptian prison].
Another imprisoned JG leader, Osama Qassem (2012), also adds that:
We have  not  been in  contact  with the  external  leadership  since 1981.  We did  not  even manage  to
preserve the contacts between us, in prison. Everybody was on his own, following a daily programme.
138 Chapter 5 expands on this theme pages 189-192.
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Some obtained a PhD in shariʿa and in Law for instance. We were isolated until 2005, and only some
limited contacts were established thereafter. 
In Afghanistan and Pakistan, Imam became the de jure JG leader until his resignation in 1993-1994. He
had the most advanced religious credentials and was chosen for his religious authority (Naʿim, 2014).
According  to  his  testimony  (Imam,  2008),  he  was  primarily  a  religious  guide  absorbed  with  his
religious scholarship. He was isolated from fellow group members and gave al-Zawahiri free rein to
manage the group's operational and organisational leadership.139
The  new  opportunities  and  resources  (ideational  as  much  as  material)  available  to  the  JG  in
Afghanistan  and  the  popularity  enjoyed  by the  Afghan  jihad  helped  al-Zawahiri  to  reunite  a  few
factions formerly affiliated with his group. According to one of these factions' leaders, al-Zawahiri
managed to unite them on the fight against the Soviet Union, despite previous ideological contentions.
While JG-affiliated factions were not competing with one another in a civil war environment, their
coalition is congruent with studies of alliance formation in civil  wars which emphasise the role of
power  distribution  in  the  incorporation  or  bandwagoning  of  weaker  groups  with  stronger  entities
(Christia, 2012; Horowitz & Potter, 2013). The JG became stronger in its new external stronghold, and
manages to attract new Egyptians who became henceforth affiliated to this group. Some of them later
played a leading role in the emergence of the salafi jihadi trend in Egypt, such as Murjan Salem and
Ahmad ʿAshush. 
4.4.3. Discussing a Merger in Peshawar and the Sudan
The environment in Afghanistan and Pakistan was unique in the history of  jihadi  groups worldwide,
and Peshawar rapidly became their nerve centre. Militants from many Muslim countries settled in this
region, exchanged ideas and participated in this unprecedented jihad. Jihadi groups from Egypt, Libya
and Syria, non-profit Muslim organisations and individuals from diverse affiliations conglomerated in
the same region for the first time.140 When the Afghan war ended, the presence of many Egyptian
139 See also: al-Sibaʿi, 2002; al-Zayyat, 2007; Abu Shama, 2008.
140 For primary sources on this period, one can refer to the memories of ʿAbdullah ʿAzzam's son-in-law (Anas, 2002), to
the  lengthy memories  of  a  high-ranking  member  of  al-Qaeda,  Fazul  ʿAbdullah  Mohammed (aka  as  Fadil  Harun)
(ʿAbdullah, 2012), to the books authored by Mustafa Hamid (aka Abu al-Walid al-Misri), one of the first Arab to join
the Afghan jihad (e.g. al-Misri, 2006; Hamid & Farral, 2014) and to numerous other works (e.g. Tawil, 2007; ʿAbd al-
Ghani, 2010).
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fighters therefore spurred a  debate on a possible unification of their  groups,  which were officially
pursuing the same objective. Their dissociation was no longer justified in the eyes of some of their
leaders who favoured a bilateral rapprochement. These discussions in Afghanistan and in the Sudan
constitute the second test of this analysis.
The IG and the JG faced similar challenges in the beginning of the 1990s. In Egypt, their members
were under heavy pressure from the security services which imposed a tight grip on their activities.
Thousands had been arrested since the cycle of contention started in 1987, and the armed confrontation
with  the  state  was  not  heading  in  a  favourable  direction.  The  cycle  of  violence  became counter-
productive to these groups'  objectives,  and the prospects of achieving substantial  political  gains in
Egypt were marginal. Outside of Egypt, their members were increasingly scattered. Their departure
from Afghanistan after the beginning of the civil war in 1992141 hindered the maintenance of a strong
coordination between these groups' new regional poles. Finally, the IG and the JG suffered from acute
financial  difficulties.  They notably failed to  gather  substantial  sources of revenues to finance their
activities, and were dependent on meagre resources and, sometimes, external assistance. For instance,
Naʿim (2014) mentions that most of the funding he used to send JG members abroad came from bin
Laden. 
The literature on militant groups'  alliances argues that the difficulty to guarantee the credibility of
bilateral commitments results in relatively rare coalitions (Bapat & Bond, 2012; Bacon 2013, 2014).
These studies stress that the sustainability of state sponsorship render the latter more likely, and that
group alliances are more viable for militant groups less exposed to state repression (Bapat & Bond,
2012), or bandwagoning a stronger group (Horowitz & Potter, 2013). Regarding the IG and the JG,
however, the failure to unite against their stronger opponent (the Egyptian state) did not result from the
(lack of) credibility of their mutual commitments, but mostly pertained to their leaderships and to these
groups' institutionalised organisational norms. According to Muhammad ʿOmar (2012):
The Jihad Group and the Islamic Group tried to unite twice, in Afghanistan, and then in the Sudan. The
Jihad Group had two conditions however: they did not want to be headed by sheikh ʿOmar, and they
opposed the leadership of the brothers in prison. These were of central importance for the Islamic Group.
141 Cf. chapter 5 pages 192-194.
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We supported our leaders in prison and the unification never happened.
The IG leader abroad, Taha (2013), relays a similar position:
There was no agreement between them and us. We refused to unite with them because we already had a
project, the creation of an Islamic state in Egypt. We were better organised, had more members, and our
ideas were more developed. There was only a small number of them and they had no real possibility to
act. They wanted to carry out common work, but expected to discuss on the basis that they were as
strong as we were. They claimed that their leaders and members were better than ours, and that we could
convene  a  common  majliss  al-shura.  We  refused.  They  had  no  presence  on  the  ground.  So  the
differences were not merely in terms of ideas. All ideological differences could have been solved. It was
about people.
This point of view is also supported on the other side by al-Zawahiri (2010: 191), who mentions in his
memories that:
My experience with the Islamic Group was bitter. Our attempts to unite with them failed because of their
insistence on their prison leadership and their excessive veneration of the so-called big brothers. […]
They gave them the right to take all the existential decisions. Those abroad could only apply the general
guidelines sent by the big brothers. Even though many of their leaders abroad were convinced by our
logic, they declared that only the group could decide, that the group was built on this basis, that they did
not want to disturb it, and that we had to deal with it as a fait accompli.
These  evidences  demonstrate  that  the  failure  to  unite  was  directly  informed  by  these  groups'
organisational construction and organisational norms. The deference of IG leaders to their imprisoned
historical leadership is confirmed by many other witnesses, including by Abu Musʿab al-Suri142 in his
memories (al-Suri, 2004: 747). This pattern contrasts sharply with the JG, whose leader al-Zawahiri did
not feel compelled to consult  his peers before taking an important decision.  More than ideological
tenets or tactical factors, the IG and the JG therefore failed to unite because IG leaders felt part of an
institutionalised entity which constrained their possibility to take existential decisions on behalf of their
group.
4.4.4. Joining al-Qaeda?
142 Al-Suri, whose real name is Mustafa Setmariam Nasar is an AQ-related theoretician. See also: Lia, 2008.
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In the following years, these groups' predicaments worsened. By the mid-1990s, most IG members in
Egypt were incarcerated, while the group's presence in the Sudan did not survive president ʿOmar al-
Bashir's  decision  to  expel  formerly-welcomed  Islamist  groups.  IG  leaders  and  members  only
maintained a sporadic presence in different places in Europe, Middle Eastern countries and Central
Asia.143 The leaders of its external majliss al-shura were Taha, Mustafa Hamza, Hamad, Muhammad al-
Islambuli  and Osama Rushdi.  The coordination was extremely difficult  because of this  geographic
setting:
It  was very difficult  to  communicate.  Rifaʿi  was  in  Iran,  Muhammad Shawqi  [al-Islambuli]  was  in
Albania, Mustafa was in Afghanistan, etc. It was extremely difficult to take any decision. We had no
internet and no real contacts. We were also apprehensive to communicate on the phone, because of the
possibility to be intercepted by the secret services.
The JG faced a similar quandary. By 1995, most of the group's followers in Egypt had been arrested in
the case referred to as  talaiʿ  al-fath  (vanguards of conquest).144 In prison, they were maintained in
isolation and could not communicate. Outside of Egypt, the group's majliss al-shura was dispersed and
many members were arrested in diverse places such as  Albania, Azerbaijan, and Bulgaria. The JG
barely survived successive splits between 1993 and 1994. Tactical and strategic differences of opinion
between its leaders sparked internal conflicts and organisational divisions, as in other groups marked
by factionalised leaderships (Asal et al., 2012; Staniland, 2014). The JG was marginalised and many of
its members and leaders formally joined al-Qaeda when both groups were in the Sudan, according to
Abu Musʿab al-Suri (2004: 712) and Fadil Harun (ʿAbdullah, 2012: 147).145 Muhammad ʿOmar (2013)
adds that Osama bin Laden imposed a choice on JG members in the Sudan, to stay with their group or
to join AQ, rather than play on two fronts. Al-Zawahiri  attempted to find new ventures in several
central  Asian countries,  including Azerbaijan and Russia,  where he was briefly arrested.146 The JG
suffered from intense organisational and financial difficulties, highlighted in the testimony of one of its
member in a trial in Egypt.147
By the end of the 1990s, IG and JG members and leaders were disseminated in different places and
143 The next chapter expands on their role in these countries.
144 Cf. chapter 5 pages 176-179.
145 On JG members actively involved in al-Qaeda, see also: Salah (2001), Gerges (2009), Harun (ʿAbdullah, 2012). 
Chapter 5 expands on this theme pages 195-197.
146 Al-Zawahiri expands on these travels and on these countries in his memories (al-Zawahiri, 2010: 118-172).
147 See the court reports in: al-qadiyya al-jana'iyya li-ahmad al-najjar (1997).
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looked like a lost cause. These groups' approaches to political action in Egypt undeniably failed, and
they were left  with very dim military and financial  prospects.  The literature on the end of armed
militancy argues that militant groups cease to exist when their leaderships are apprehended or killed,
transition towards a political process or achieve their objectives (Cronin, 2009).148 In this case, none of
these  alternatives  materialised  and  these  groups  were  marginalised.  The  social  ties  between  their
leaderships  and  followers  crumbled,  and  the  failure  of  their  armed  campaigns  imposed  unilateral
declarations of ceasefire by the JG in 1995, and by the IG in 1997. Eventually, prominent leaders and
members gathered in Afghanistan after the Taliban takeover of the country. While the proximity of JG
leaders to al-Qaeda organisation has already been mentioned earlier, the IG also entertained cordial
relations with Osama bin Laden and AQ. Muhammad ʿOmar (2012) argues that:
We entertained strong relations with al-Qaeda, based on respectful exchanges and interests. We moved
together from the Sudan to Afghanistan, in the same plane. We were only a small group. Muhammad
ʿAtef [AQ military commander] wanted us to be together in Afghanistan because we did not really know
the place. Our interactions occurred at a personal, rather than organisational, level: we coordinated with
them on administrative issues, on food, training, etc. We liked one another even though we disagreed
with their political positions.
Militant groups failing to achieve their strategic objectives and to transition towards a political process
often attempt to reorientate their strategic objectives to survive (Cronin, 2009: 146-166). The last test
of this analysis therefore concerns the possibility offered to both the IG and the JG in the late 1990s to
join bin Laden and AQ. Bin Laden formally declared war in 1996 against the “Americans occupying
the land of the two holy places”, and discussed with other groups the possibility of manifesting this
declaration into action by consolidating a unified Islamic front against American forces in the world in
1998.149 This new alliance was inspired by bin Laden, who saw an opportunity to unite militant groups
in Afghanistan to support his ambitions to oppose the United States and its allies in the greater Middle
East.150 
The similarity of these groups' quandaries and their opposite responses to bin Laden's call for unity
favour a cross-case comparison. Many scholars recount that the IG leader abroad, Taha, would have
148 See also Jones 2008; Cronin 2006.
149 These two declarations are available on the following page: http://www.heritage.org/research/projects/enemy-detention/
al-qaeda-declarations.
150 On this alliance and on the consolidation of al-Qaeda, one can refer to: Bergen, 2001, 2006; Burke, 2004, 2012; Coll,
2004; Atwan, 2006, 2013; Wright, 2006; Scheuer, 2011; Soufan, 2011; Tawil, 2011.
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joined the “World Islamic Front for Jihad Against Jews and Crusaders” on behalf of his group, before
withdrawing under pressure of his peers (Ashour, 2007: 617; Gerges, 2009: 39, 155). Many witnesses
who spoke to him subsequently and Muhammad ʿOmar (2012) who was in Afghanistan disclose a
different version. They mention that Taha only agreed to sign a declaration against American policies
on Iraq. Then, Taha argues that another IG member told Abu Hafs al-Misri (AQ second-in-command)
that Taha would agree to join the Front, even though he was not consulted. While Taha confirmed in an
interview and in  a  book published subsequently  (Taha,  2000)  that  he  supported  the  legitimacy of
targeting American forces in the region, he stresses that it was an individual, rather than a collective,
endorsement.151 He also adds (Taha, 2013), about the Islamic Front, that:
I could not join this Front without referring to the brothers in the leadership. So I did not withdraw from
the Front since I never joined it. We had brotherly relations with AQ and I loved sheikh Osama bin laden.
I see him as the symbol of the Islamic movement and a courageous man. But, he had his project and I
had mine.
On the other hand, the financial and organisational predicaments suffered by the JG and the absence of
alternatives arguably persuaded al-Zawahiri to join this Front despite previous ideological differences
with bin Laden.152 Testimonies from al-Zawahiri's associates (al-Zayyat et al., 2004; bin ʿAbd al-ʿAziz,
2008),  primary  sources  (al-Shafiʿi,  2002;  Cullison,  2004)  and  academic  analyses  (Gerges,  2011)
consensually assert  that  the group's  strategic  deadlock combined with the possibility  to  access bin
Laden's  financial  resources informed al-Zawahiri's  decision.  Despite  the relevance of the academic
debate on the mutual influence of bin Laden and al-Zawahiri, it is thenceforth considered more relevant
to investigate this alliance from an organisational approach. In this case, the striking difference between
the  IG and the  JG is  not  ideational,  on  the  legitimacy  of  bin  Laden's  project,  but  organisational,
pertaining to these groups' decision making processes and organisational norms. According to broad
evidences,  al-Zawahiri  did  not  negotiate  this  decision  with  his  majliss  al-shura,  and  did  not  feel
constrained by the opinions of his peers, who often learned that he joined bin Laden through the media
(al-Sibaʿi,  2002: 37-39; Gerges, 2009: 163; Amr, 2012). In Afghanistan,  this controversial decision
catalysed intense opposition to al-Zawahiri from his close associates, who temporarily replaced him
with Salah Shahata, an opponent to this alliance (al-Sibaʿi, 2002: 37-39; Muhammad ʿOmar, 2012).
Other JG members additionally expressed their disagreements with al-Zawahiri, such as Murjan Salem
151 Other leaders confirm this version (e.g. al-Ghamari, n.d.).
152 In 1995, al-Zawahiri still maintained that the liberation of Jerusalem “ran through Cairo” (al-Zawahiri, 1995). Sayyid
Imam also adds that al-Zawahiri was very suspicious of bin Laden (bin ʿAbd al-ʿAziz, 2008).
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who arguably wanted him to include the JG under the Taliban's authority according to al-Sibaʿi (Tawil,
2003). Eventually, al-Zawahiri was reinstated as the JG leader and his JG faction allied formally with
bin Laden in 2001. Al-Qaeda became Qaʿida al-Jihad (the base of jihad). Qassem, from the imprisoned
JG leadership, affirms (2012) that:
Many people left Ayman even before his decision to join the Islamic Front. After joining bin Laden,
Ayman obtained more resources and became stronger. Some members therefore came back to him. I
think it's fair to say that Ayman joined bin Laden because he had what they needed.
The comparison between the IG and the JG reveals that strategic decisions were more susceptible to
changing resources and personal conflicts in the latter. While the alliance between bin Laden and al-
Zawahiri  can legitimately be interpreted “a desperate effort to alter the [jihadi] movement’s route”
(Gerges 2009: 24) driven by “powerful personalities” (Gerges, 2009: 37), it is crucial to note that it was
rendered possible precisely by the absence of shared organisational norms inside the JG,153 which had
characterised  the  group  for  decades.  In  contrast,  IG  leaders  and  members  have  continuously  felt
organisationally constrained to consult  their  peers and to abide by the consensual decision making
process established in the group's early days. These norms were absent in the JG, where the unilateral
decision to join bin Laden was reminiscent of past uncoordinated moves taken by al-Zawahiri as early
as  in  the  1980s,  when he re-organised  his  group in Afghanistan.  The JG's  strategic  deadlock and
financial  difficulties  contextualise  al-Zawahiri's  incentives,  but  only  a  consideration  of  the  JG's
organisational structure and norms can explain why al-Zawahiri was able to take this decision in the
name of his group without consulting his peers.
4.5. THE ORIGINS AND DIFFUSION OF NEW IDEAS
This concluding section investigates the IG and JG's ideological evolution through the study of the
emergence  and  diffusion  of  new  ideational  frames.  This  approach  premises  that  the  ideational
commitments of these groups' leaders can evolve for an array of reasons, including individual learning,
intra and inter-group interactions and these groups' failures and successes on the ground. This section
then demonstrates that the organisational diffusion of new interpretative frames is both contingent on
internal decision making norms and subordinated to their compatibility with these groups' discursive
153 This relates to a central point of this chapter's introduction. Gerges (2009) is right to state that the JG and al-Qaeda were
driven by personalities and not by organisational norms. His claim that this characteristic is widely shared by Islamist
movements is inaccurate,  however,  and this case study demonstrates that the IG had enjoyed strong organisational
norms.
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traditions. In other words, militant group leaders can revise their ideational positions for many reasons,
including these groups' operational failures, religious retrospections, and the influence of these groups'
social  movement  industries.  At  the  same time,  being  in  a  leadership  position  does  not  suffice  to
organisationally  diffuse  these  new  ideational  frames  if  one's  leadership  does  not  operate  within
legitimised decision making norms, or if these frames are incompatible with these groups' discursive
traditions.
This  analysis  draws  on the  literature  on  frame diffusion.  This  corpus  differentiates  ideational  and
behavioural diffusion (Givan et al., 2010), and adds that diffusion can unfold horizontally or vertically
(Roggeband,  2010:  20),  in relational,  non-relational  or  mediated patterns (Tarrow, 2005;  Sageman,
2004, 2008; Bakke, 2010; Givan et al., 2010). Relational diffusion occurs through trusted networks,
non-relational diffusion relies on the media and on the internet and mediated diffusion is established by
social movement brokers. While this literature focuses on ideational and behavioural diffusion between
social movement organisations, this section investigates the reception and diffusion of new ideational
frames inside militant groups.
This analysis contributes to intra-movement ideational diffusion with a comparative focus on militant
groups' organisational characteristics. This analysis investigates organisational recipients of ideational
diffusion in  consideration  of  these  groups'  internal  characteristics,  including their  decision  making
processes and internally recognised figures of authority (referring respectively to a group's horizontal
and  vertical  organisational  norms).  Ideational  diffusion  is  indeed  contingent  on  these  groups'
organisational norms, which situate  and shape the prerogatives of their  leaders  and their  ability to
influence their groups' ideological construction. Diverging group structures, from highly hierarchical to
loose network, inexorably impact diffusion processes;  the consideration of a leader's credentials or
social capital154 are therefore not sufficient in accounting for his ability to shape his group's ideational
framework alone, without contextualising them within a group's internal regulations.
4.5.1. Early Ideational Developments in Prison
154 Chapter 6 expands on this theme.
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The IG's ideological construction began in prison, when a central leadership was designated. The IG
had not authored any written literature beforehand, and prison presented an opportunity to convey the
group's ideational frame of reference. According to the group's second-in-command in prison Najih
Ibrahim (2012),  the IG's first  text,  mithaq al-ʿamal al-islami (The Charter for Islamic Action)  (al-
Jamaʿa al-Islamiyya,  1984),  was written during the post-1981 trial  to defend the group's positions.
Ibrahim insists that IG leaders feared they would be executed, and intended to defend their actions
rather than to elaborate on what has since been considered the group's literature. This text was followed
by a few studies in fiqh (Islamic jurisprudence) undertaken by the group's historical leadership (Hafez,
2013). These texts expand on the necessity of fighting leaders who do not apply Islamic Law in  al-
ta'ifa al-muntaniʿ ʿan shariaʿ min sharia'iʿ al-Islam (The Sect Abstaining from the Law of Islam) (al-
Jamaʿa al-Islamiyya, n.d.b.) define the group's theological positions on the excommunication of other
Muslims in al-ʿudhr bil-jahl (The Excuse of Ignorance) (al-Jamaʿa al-Islamiyya, n.d.e.) and in al-rad
ʿala fikr al-takfir (The Answer to Takfiri Thinking) (al-Jamaʿa al-Islamiyya, n.d.a.), and expands on the
group's core principles in man nahnu wa madha nurid (Who are We and What we Want) (al-Jamaʿa al-
Islamiyya, n.d.c.) and nahnu wal-ikhwan  (The MB and Us) (al-Jamaʿa al-Islamiyya, n.d.d.). The last
important  publication,  hatmiyya  al-muwajaha (The  Inevitability  of  Confrontation)  (al-Jamaʿa  al-
Islamiyya, 1987) was published at the end of the 1980s and openly called for a violent confrontation
with state authorities. This text was published when state repression worsened and:
These texts  all  supported the idea that  the  state  had to  be confronted.  The last  text,  hatmiyya,  was
different and more violent because of the centrality of the fight back then. This is because the Charter
was written for the courts, to defend ourselves. We could not openly support these violent ideas even
though, at the same time, we did not want to retreat from our [pre-prison] positions.
The JG similarly did not possess a noticeable written corpus before 1981. Despite frequent academic
mentions  of  Muhammad  ʿAbd  al-Salam Faraj's  opus,  al-farida  al-gha'iba  (The  Absent  Duty),  the
previous chapter demonstrated that this book did not present a comprehensive ideational framework but
rather compiled a limited set of shared ideas. The previous chapter also asserted that, in contrast with
Faraj's argument, foreign policy played a significant role for many jihad groups' members. In prison,
this group's failure to create a cohesive and legitimate leadership hindered the creation of consensual
ideological  foundations.  Only  a  few texts  were  published by individual  members,  such as  minhaj
jamaʿa al-jihad al-islami (The Method of the Islamic Jihad Group) by ʿAbud al-Zumur (1986), Amrika,
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Masr wal-haraka al-islamiyya (America, Egypt and the Islamic Movement) by the faction affiliated to
Salim al-Rihal (jamaʿa al-jihad, n.d.a.). These opuses do not cover the theological intricacies of the IG
collective corpus, and are rather vague. Organisationally, they represent individual views rather than a
consensual vision shared by JG members. It should be mentioned that many JG members could not
recall the existence of these texts, which contrast with the firm grasp of the IG corpus usually noticed
among IG members. This discrepancy already suggests that organisational differences played a critical
role in these groups' early internal diffusion.
4.5.2. The Influence of a Competitive Ideational Market in Exile
By the end of the 1980s, the IG and JG ideological developments were challenged by an unprecedented
exile of their cadres in Afghanistan and Pakistan. In the border region between these two countries,
they settled alongside an array of militant groups from other Arab and Islamic nations, and collectively
formed a competitive social movement industry. The latter is defined in social movement studies as an
agglomeration of “social movement organisations [SMO] with relatively similar goals” (Zald, 1979: 2),
marked by intense internal competition over resources, legitimacy and support (Zald, 1979). The broad
coalition assembled in support of the Afghan resistance was, as in other cases, “particularly conducive
to frame disputes because they are comprised of activists from a variety of SMOs, each having its own
reality,  agenda  and  views”  (Benford,  1992:  680-681).  Interviews  and  independent  testimonies155
mention ubiquitous theological and political framing contests between Islamist groups dwelling in this
region. The nature of these contests were diagnostic and prognostic (Snow & Benford, 1988), and
concerned the future of jihadi movements worldwide, their strategic objectives and priorities, the status
of Muslim leaders and states, and the use of excommunication against other Muslims. The salafi jihadi
trend and AQ trace their roots to this peculiar environment, and, according to many observers, to the
influence of the Egyptian groups under investigation. It is therefore important to study the influence of
this social movement industry on the development and diffusion of new interpretative frames inside the
IG and the JG.
In exile, these groups' decision making processes and organisational norms differently mediated the
influence of this competitive Islamist social movement industry on their ideological frameworks. The
155 One can refer to: Salah, 2001; al-Suri, 2004; al-Misri, 2006; ʿAbd al-Ghani, 2010; ʿAbdullah, 2012.
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IG remained under the nominal control of its prison leadership, which had been previously granted the
prerogative  to  define  the  group's  ideological  tenets.  Prominent  IG  commanders confirm  that  the
external leadership in Peshawar was only leading the media campaign, with the publication of a few
magazines (notably  al-murabitun) and communiqué pertaining to international and domestic issues.
Strategic  decisions  and  ideological  developments  were  still  in  the  hands  of  the  group's  historical
leadership, as had been mutually agreed upon in prison. Internal dissensions between prison and exiled
leaders concerned practical decisions rather than the group's general policies. The IG's internal division
of  labour  and  the  associated  monopoly  of  a  legitimised  leadership  hindered  the  organisational
absorption and diffusion of new ideas, though this analysis later argues that some exiled leaders were
individually influenced by this new environment.
In sharp contrast with the IG, the JG truly developed its ideological corpus in Afghanistan and Pakistan
under the guidance of al-Zawahiri and Imam. Impediments to group discussions in prison, the absence
of  a  culture  of  consensus  and  the  group's  poorly  developed  ideological  framework  gave  them
considerable leeway to develop their own theologico-political perspectives. JG leaders benefited from
the Afghan jihad to elaborate their ideas and develop a new textual corpus which reflected prevailing
debates in Peshawar. On-going contentions notably opposed al-Zawahiri and sheikh ʿAbdullah ʿAzzam
on several important issues, including their positions on Arab regimes, on the participation in jihad
alongside Afghan factions and on the Muslim Brotherhood. ʿAzzam hailed from the MB and only
supported armed jihad against non-Muslims occupiers of Muslim lands.156 He had an encompassing
approach to other Islamist movements, and argued that Arab and Muslim fighters should only fight
under  the umbrella  of  the Afghan resistance,  although they disagreed with some of their  religious
practices. Al-Zawahiri wrote a few publications to repudiate some of these claims. For instance, he
denounced  the  MB  political  participation  in  the  democratic  process  in  al-hasad  al-murr (Bitter
Harvests)  (al-Zawahiri,  1988)  and  chastised  their  accommodating  positions  on  Arab  states  and
governments.  Then,  he  used  the  concepts  of  al-wala'  wal-bara' (loyalty  and dissociation)  and  al-
istiʿana bil-kuffar (appeal to the non-Muslims) during the first Gulf war157 to blame the Saudi regime
for  collaborating  with  a  non-Muslim  military  power  (the  United  States).  Al-Zawahiri  became
ideologically closer to the theologians of the emerging salafi jihadi trend, including Abu Muhammad
156 On al-Zawahiri and ʿAzzam, one can refer to various primary testimonies in Bergen (2006: 69-70, 94-97).
157 On these concepts, one can refer to Wagemakers (2008; 2012: 147-164).
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al-Maqdissi.158 These developments reveal that internal JG divisions and the absence of legitimised
organisational norms rendered the JG more susceptible to new ideational influences.
The JG amir, Sayyid Imam, also contributed to the group's ideological construction. Imam expressed
his  frustration  at  the  deficient  religious  knowledge  of  many  young  fighters,  which  informed  his
intention to clarify fiqhi (jurisprudential) issues to remedy this situation (bin ʿAbd al-ʿAziz, 2008). His
first book, al-ʿumda fi ʿidad al-ʿida (the Pillar in the (Military) Preparation) (bin ʿAbd al-ʿAziz, 1988),
mostly focuses on the religious duties of a jihadi group's leaders and soldiers. The most controversial
elements  appear  in  the book's  last  sections,  where Imam asserts  that  it  is  more important  to  fight
apostate (nominally Muslims) rulers than the far enemy, represented by the Jews and the Crusaders (bin
ʿAbd al-ʿAziz, 1988: 295-6). He also insists that Muslim rulers who do not apply Islamic Law are not
the  only  priority  enemy.  In contrasts  with  former  JG positions,  Imam declares  that  “the  one  who
supports the infidel with words or action is a disbeliever like him” and that “jihad against these apostate
leaders and their supporters (al-ʿawan) is an individual duty for all Muslims” (bin ʿAbd al-ʿAziz, 1988:
297-300). This inclusion of the regime's supporters,  al-ʿawan, marks a theological rupture with the
positions  formerly  endorsed  by  the  JG,  which  only  opposed  Muslim  head  of  states  without
excommunicating  the  army.159 These  positions  became  close  to  the  positions  defended  by  Abu
Muhammad al-Maqdissi, and reflected Peshawar's ongoing debates.
Imam's next opus intensified the internal ideological and organisational upheaval caused by these new
ideas. By 1994, he authored a book which further fractured the JG leadership and degraded its relations
with other Islamist movements. In al-jamiʿ fi talab al-ʿilm al-sharif (the Collection in the Acquisition
of Sacred Knowledge) (bin ʿAbd al-ʿAziz, 1993), Imam dwell on Islamic theology on more than a
thousand pages and attacked many Islamist groups, including IG leaders.160 Eventually, al-Zawahiri
purged this book from controversial elements and published it under a new name, al-hadi ila sabil al-
rishad fi maʿalim al-jihad wal-ʿitiqad (The Guide to the Path of Righteousness in the Milestones of
Jihad and Belief) (jamaʿa al-jihad, 1994). Al-Zawahiri was religiously more inclusive, and limited the
158 On al-Maqdissi, see Wagemakers (2008a, 2008b, 2009, 2012, 2013).
159 For more than two decades the JG has precisely attempted to infiltrate the army to orchestrate a military coup.
160 Imam specifically denounces an IG leader, Talʿat Fu'ad Qassem for not excommunicating the supporters of the regimes
(ansar al-hakim) and sheikh ʿOmar ʿAbd al-Rahman for claiming that Muslim leaders who do apply Islamic Law are
not necessarily infidels. He claims that the IG is an extreme murji' (postponer of the application of Islamic Law) group.
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use of  takfir  (excommunication).161 In addition,  he wanted to preserve friendly relations with other
jihadi  groups, including the IG. Imam branded al-Zawahiri a thief for altering his book, to which al-
Zawahiri replied that the latter was a designed as a collective publication which legitimately had to be
reviewed. Imam published a communiqué to denounce the JG as an “astray group” (al-jamaʿa al-dala)
from which he resigned (bin ʿAbd al-ʿAziz, 1994).
The comparative ideational evolution of the IG and the JG in exile is important for many reasons.
Organisationally,  this  analysis  establishes  the  importance  of  diverging  decision  making  norms  on
ideational  diffusion.  The  legitimised  authority  of  IG  leaders  in  prison  and  the  group's  culture  of
consensus prevented the inclusion of external debates into the IG's ideological corpus. Even though
prominent IG external leaders were influenced by the crystallisation of the salafi jihadi trend in exile,162
organisational norms prevented the inclusion of these new ideational frames into the group's corpus.
The IG's external leadership recognised their organisational position and did not contest the group's
established norms of decision making. Conversely, the JG's ideological evolution and the inclusion of
these external debates into the group's corpus were facilitated by the comparative absence of centralised
decision making norms, which did not impede ideational diffusion. 
In addition, this episode substantiates that the radicalisation of Imam's theological positions (and to
some extent al-Zawahiri's) mirrored the controversies affecting Islamist militants dwelling in Peshawar.
His new positions preceded the JG's use of violence in Egypt in the 1990s and the related waves of
arrest;  they cannot be directly considered the outcome of an ideological encapsulation designed to
assure the group's organisational survival in the Egyptian underground. In social movement studies, the
radicalisation of these positions is rather congruent with the concept of the “radical fringe”, which
determines that social movement organisations competing for a shared audience “become further apart
in their conception of the amount of change and the tactic required” (Zald, 1979: 11). In other words,
intergroup rivalry in a competitive social movement industry radicalised many Islamist groups, out of
necessity to differentiate themselves and establish their orthodoxy and non-compromising creeds. As
mentioned by an IG leader Osama Rushdi, these radical positions “grew inside the isolated atmosphere
161 For instance, al-Zawahiri does not excommunicate shiʿa Muslims as a collective group (Haykel, 2010: 210).
162 Taha adopts this label for himself (Taha, 2013) and legitimised the theological and political legitimacy of targeting US
forces in the Middle East (Taha, 2000)
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in Peshawar.  In these conditions, if  you have any moderate opinion you would be [marginalised]”
(Bergen,  2006:  68).  Intergroup competition  resulted  in  “ideological  and organisational  chaos”  (al-
Walid,  2006:  37)  whereby,  according  to  Abu  al-Walid  al-Misri,  “in  this  intellectual  environment,
salafism was the best creedal trench and sword of religious retaliation against everyone else, Muslim,
non-Muslim, all of those who were outside of the group or organisation … or of the religious creed
(ʿaqida)!” (al-Walid, 2006: 38).
The development of an exiled radical fringe contextualises the crystallisation of the salafi jihadi trend,
and its new emphasis on the religious creed (ʿaqida) and on the reformulation of Qutbian theologico-
political outlooks with classic Islamic jurisprudence (Lav, 2012: 169-171). As argued by Lav (2012:
171), this trend initiated a “more sober and classically rooted formulation of the principle of hakimiyya,
namely jurisprudential  takfir of the rulers”. This reformulation appears clearly in Imam's new books,
which partially shaped the theological foundations of salafi jihadism thenceforth. It also contextualises
al-Zawahiri's  previously  mentioned  use  of  salafi  concepts  such as  al-wala'  wal-bara'  (loyalty  and
dissociation) and al-istiʿana bil-kuffar (appeal to the non-Muslims). Lav is nonetheless too categorical
in distinguishing “the salafi jihadi school (qua school) and the al-Qāʿida-led global jihadist movement”
(Lav, 2012: 170). Even though Lav rightly points out that AQ, al-Zawahiri  and bin Laden did not
consistently refer to salafi jihadi theological arguments163, their diverging use of theological resources
merely reflects this trend's internal diversity. 
This theological development of the  salafi jihadi trend (and the evolution of Imam and al-Zawahiri)
was additionally facilitated, in its early days, by the dearth of established authorities in this competitive
social movement industry. The house arrest of bin Laden in Saudi Arabia, the exile of sheikh ʿOmar in
the U.S. and the assassination of ʿAzzam meant that, according to Abu Musʿab al-Souri, “the  jihadi
scene was lacking ʿulamaʾ and students of knowledge” (al-Souri, 2004: 29). Al-Souri adds that new
salafi jihadi scholars such as Abu Qatada gradually filled this vacuum at a time (al-Souri, 2004: 29),
when a new takfiri generation appeared and prospered (Harun, 2002).
163 An often endeavoured to portray a more inclusive religious tradition, as  continuously mentioned in AQ secretary's
memories (Harun, 2006) (see also Lahoud, 2012).
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While  the  competitive  social  movement  industry  of  Peshawar  provides  the  broader  environmental
context of Imam's radicalisation, this episode is also important organisationally. Imam had the most
advanced religious credentials and was the nominal JG leader. At the same time, the absence of shared
vertical  or  horizontal  organisational  norms inside the  JG and Imam's  poor  organisational  dexterity
hindered the incorporation of these new frames inside the group's ideological corpus. It further divided
the JG, which was already faced with internal contentions over the appropriate use of violence. Imam's
writing  had  paradoxically  a  more  prominent  influence  on  jihadi movements  which  appeared
subsequently, through an non-relational diffusion of his thoughts.164 Imprisoned JG leaders claim that
they did not read his writings before their liberation in the 2000s (Qassem, 2012). In addition, many
factions which previously joined the JG during the war in Afghanistan henceforth distanced themselves
from the JG external leadership for ideological and personal reasons.165 One of their leader claims that:
Sayyid Imam is the one who destroyed the JG with his takfiri ideas. We were strong in Afghanistan but
then, when he excommunicated the parliament and military officers in the army, he divided us. He issued
the idea that both the Muslim leader who does not apply Islamic Law is an infidel and the one who helps
him. You know, even when we define one camp as muʿaskar al-kufr (the camp of disbelief), it does not
mean that all of them are infidels who need to be fought. There are limits in the use of  takfir. Sayyid
Imam destroyed our group with this new idea. We were an extension of the thoughts of al-Halawi and
Salim al-Rihal, who fought for the freedom of the umma (the Muslim community), based on the wrong
political positions of the Muslim leader.
4.5.3. Revising Jihad in Prison
These developments outside of Egypt were unrelated to the third phase of ideological construction
which  unfolded  in  Egyptian  penitentiaries.  In  prison,  several  mediation  attempts  were  organised
between independent  religious  scholars  and these  groups'  leaderships,  later  followed by additional
negotiations with state representatives. These discussions started in the late 1980s, when prominent
religious scholars tried to convince these groups' leaders that violence was Islamically wrong. These
mediation  attempts  repeatedly  failed  over  the  years  for  diverse  reasons,  however,  including  the
evolution of the security situation on the ground, the lack of trust between the parties, media leaks and
164 In Algeria for instance, the GIA resorted to Sayyid Imam's book to justify its use of violence (which is paradoxical
considering Imam's opposition to the practical resort to violence in Egypt) (e.g. Rushdi, 2002).
165 JG leaders interviewed in this research often denounce Imam's radicalism before dwelling on his personal shortcomings
as well (e.g. Qassem, 2012).
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popular pressure on the Egyptian regime not to negotiate (al-ʿAwwa, 2006; Ashour, 2011). 
In  parallel  to  these  short-lived  negotiations,  IG leaders  independently  reflected  on the  contentious
conflict with the state in the early 1990s. The aggravation of the use of violence on the ground and the
expansion of the range of acceptable targets by IG members motivated the quest for an alternative to
the emerging strategic deadlock. Two main positions were internally debated. One side was prepared to
present extensive and unilateral concessions to the state, whatever the costs, while their contenders
demanded to be acknowledged as a political partner which would formulate its own demands to the
authorities.166 The most prominent role was played by the leading representatives of the first position,
the head of the IG's majliss al-shura in prison Karam Zuhdi, later seconded by Najih Ibrahim, the IG's
second-in-command. According to most testimonies,167 Zuhdi played a critical role in convincing his
peers that violence should cease at any cost. An IG leader argues that:
Our members in prison received many books from al-Azhar scholars which failed to convince them to
renounce violence. The IG solved the conflict unilaterally, thanks to sheikh Karam [Zuhdi] and sheikh
Najih [Ibrahim].  They used their  personal  conviction,  nothing else,  to convince all  our followers to
support their position. IG members in prison did not consensually accept this decision in the beginning.
They thought: how can we stop fighting after what we've been through? So the two sheikhs visited the
fifteen prisons to convince our members that violence should cease immediately and unconditionally in
Egypt.
Eventually,  internal  IG  discussions  and  changing  environmental  conditions  at  the  macro-level
facilitated the proclamation of a unilateral ceasefire in 1997, which was only accepted by the group's
external leadership in 1999. The two years delay before the acceptance of the ceasefire by the IG's
external majliss al-shura is particularly relevant to this chapter's general argument. An analysis of the
written corpus published by two of its foremost leaders, Taha and Hamad, could infer that their initial
reluctance  was  ideological.  Taha  and  Hamad  published  extensively  against  the  regime  and
uncompromisingly in theoretical support of armed jihad (e.g. Taha, 2000; Hamad, n.d.c., n.d.d., n.d.e.),
which could infer that they were not willing to negotiate a ceasefire with the regime. It can reasonably
be  assessed  that  an  ideological  opposition  to  the  ceasefire  informed  their  initial  reticence  to  the
166 This was notably the position defended by ʿAbud and Tareq al-Zumur.
167 See also: Ibrahim, 2011a, 2011b; ʿAbd al-Ghani, n.d.
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ceasefire initiative.  Interviews with imprisoned IG leaders (e.g.  Hafez,  2013) and with the group's
external leadership nonetheless substantiate that organisational reasons caused this dissension.  Some
mentions that it  took two years to reach an agreement “because of the opposition of sheikh Rifaʿi
[Taha] and sheikh Shawqi [al-Islambuli] and because of the conflict with Osama Rushdi. We wanted to
reach a  consensus  but  it  was  difficult  to  communicate  and to  make a  common decision”.168 Najih
Ibrahim confirms that Taha's practical exclusion from the ceasefire initiative, caused by the difficulty to
reach the group's external leadership, explain his initial reluctance (Ibrahim, 2011a, 2011b). According
to Taha (2013):
We refused the ceasefire announced from inside prison because we thought that the state imposed it. We
only accepted the ceasefire initiative subsequently, since we could not know initially if the initiative was
good for our group. I thought that our brothers in jail were weak and could not decide. I believed that the
ceasefire would weaken the IG. If the state wanted to negotiate, it could negotiate with us, outside of
Egypt. We were not subject to any pressure, and were consequently in better position to negotiate. In
prison,  they could only negotiate  on small  issues,  such as  allowing visitors.  We wanted a  real  and
comprehensive solution, not merely solving penitential issues.
This consensual end of violence significantly diverged from the end of violence declared in Egypt by
the JG in 1995. By 1995, the JG had no meaningful organisational presence in Egypt, and most of its
members  were  incarcerated.  Outside  of  Egypt,  the  group  was  in  jeopardy  and  suffered  from  a
leadership  crisis.  Many  prominent  members  and  leaders  left  the  group  in  the  Sudan.  and  a  few
subsequently joined Osama bin Laden's network. Leadership breakdown combined with the group's
failure  to  achieve  any  result  in  Egypt  fuelled  its  development  as  a  loose  network  of  factions
disseminated in many countries, with poor operational capabilities.169 The absence of a consensual and
legitimate authority hindered the possibility to consensually resolve the conflict with the state on the
IG's model.
In prison, JG members and leaders were isolated and evolved independently. Most older prisoners were
not  acquainted with the new generation,  and were detached from the group's  external  reality  (e.g.
Qassem, 2012). For instance, they did not immediately learn that al-Zawahiri declared a ceasefire in
168 The contention between Taha and Rushdi was caused by the Luxor attack in 1997. While the external leadership had no
direct responsibility, as demonstrated in chapter 5 page 188, Taha claimed responsibility for this action. Other leaders,
especially Rushdi, were strongly opposed to this claim and denounced Taha.
169 The next chapter expands on the JG armed campaign in Egypt.
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1995 or that he joined bin Laden in 1998. Their isolation combined with the group's organisational
predicament  obstructed  internal  dialogue,  and  hindered  consensual  negotiations.  While  many  JG
leaders reconsidered the strategic value of violence in Egypt during their imprisonment (e.g. Naʿim,
2014), the absence of shared organisational decision making norms isolated them.
Eventually, the ceasefires declared by the IG and the JG triggered a process of ideological revisions. In
2001, collective discussions among IG leaders encouraged the authoring and publication of four main
books in consensus, in addition to dozen additional articles reflecting individual views. Karam Zuhdi
and Najih Ibrahim, the two most prominent IG leaders, had a leading role in these discussions. In the
aftermath of 9/11, these discussions endeavoured to distance the IG from the group's formerly endorsed
theology  of  violence.  As  previously  mentioned,  the  theological  revisions  were  nonetheless
circumscribed by the IG's  salafi  discursive tradition. These texts specifically did not re-evaluate the
group's position on Muslim leaders who do not apply Islamic law comprehensively. Although Zuhdi
and Ibrahim revised their position on the excommunication of Muslim leaders, they did not manage to
convince other IG leaders to follow suit. Zuhdi and Ibrahim's favourable organisational position in the
IG and their strong individual credentials did not allow them to overcome this ideational barrier. The
ideological revisions were a consensual retrospection sufficiently broad to encompass different views
and interpretations, as illustrated by Taha (2013) who argues that:
The revisions did not say that fighting was wrong Islamically. In reality, we only defended ourselves
against the regime. Then, we reflected on the positive and negative utility (maslaha  and  mafsada) of
armed jihad, and decided that we could renounce its application when jihad yields more negative than
positive outcomes. We stopped armed struggle against the regime, and I do not have a problem with that.
What was essentially wrong was that we used violence when we did not have the strength to do so. That
is  what  was  agreed  upon in  the  four  books.  In  subsequent  meetings  and interviews  with  Egyptian
newspapers,  the  two sheikhs [Zuhdi  and Ibrahim] said that  fighting was  wrong without  elaborating
further. This is the real reason: the absence of military strength on our side.
Another IG religious figure who opposed the revisions on theological grounds further asserts that:
They [Zuhdi and Ibrahim] said that the leader is Muslim if he says the shahada. My personal position
has not changed, however. We opposed the leader because he was not committed and did not apply
Islamic Law. My position on Mubarak had therefore not changed after the revisions. When I returned
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from exile, the Egyptian security services interrogated me. I told them that I opposed violence, which I ,
in reality, opposed from the beginning of the conflict with the regime. But I also told them that I still
opposed Mubarak, and thought that he should be removed from power. I therefore disagreed with sheikh
Karam and sheikh Najih on the regime. They did not oppose this regime, and claimed that its policies
were reasonable, aside from a few mistakes.
As  for  the  JG,  interviews  with  various  leaders  reveal  that  the  consensual  IG  approach  was  not
reiterated. While many JG members independently revised the applicability of jihad in Egypt, they
never  managed  to  overcome  organisational  barriers  which  impeded  collective  discussions.  The
extradition of Sayyid Imam to Egypt in 2006 facilitated the publication of his official renunciations to
the applicability of violence (bin ʿAbd al-ʿAziz, 2007), process which was thoroughly guided by the
security services as Imam admitted in an interview after his release from prison (bin ʿAbd al-ʿAziz,
2013c).
4.6. CONCLUSION
This chapter has investigated the construction of the IG and JG' theologico-political frameworks from
1981 onwards. This research has analysed these groups' ideational developments from an organisational
angle, and argued that this perspective is the most suited alternative between essentialist and rationalist
considerations.  This  meso-centred  approach  considers  militant  groups'  ideological  construction
relationally, in consideration of internal and external developments. Internal interactions refer mostly to
militant groups' organisational norms, especially their potentially binding decision making processes.
External interactions include these groups'  engagements with other actors, as well  as their  framing
contests with widely recognised sources of authority situated in their social movement family.
This chapter has demonstrated that militant groups' ideational construction is constrained by two main
factors. The first factor is the salafi  discursive tradition endorsed by the IG and the JG in their early
days. The salafi discursive tradition is defined by internally legitimised practices and textual analyses
of the Islamic corpus, and by specific analytical concepts enabling the reinterpretation of this tradition
over time. These groups' engagement with this tradition has notably shaped their framing contests with
their opponents, and informed their decision to target their opponents' political credibility rather than
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their  theological  legitimacy.  In  addition,  while  these  group's  have  (partially  or  comprehensively)
revised some of their political positions over time, these reinterpretations have been constrained by the
parameters  defined  internally  by  the  salafi  discursive  tradition  regarding,  in  particular,  the
excommunication of Muslim leaders who do not apply Islamic law comprehensively.
The  second  constraining  factor  is  organisational.  Militant  groups'  ideological  developments  are
bounded by these groups' internal dynamics, and by the legitimisation (or absence of) of an internal
hierarchy and organisational norms of decision making, which are included in these groups' vertical
and horizontal  norms. These groups'  evolving positions therefore cannot be understood in isolation
from the evolution of their internal sources of authority. This chapter contends that individual leaders
can evolve for an array of reasons, including individual or group learning processes, changing macro
policies towards Islamic groups and external interactions inside a competitive social movement family.
At the same time this chapter has demonstrated that the organisational inclusion of these new frames is
bounded by these groups' regulatory norms. For instance, a group's leader can individually radicalise
his positions, and be simultaneously incapable of diffusing new ideational frames if he feels bounded
by internal norms of decision making which do not grant him this prerogative.
In  line  with  the  general  argument  presented  in  this  thesis  and  with  the  previous  chapter,  the
organisational norms created in the IG's early days legitimised an horizontal culture of consensus and
shared norms of decision making between its leaders, which have not been subsequently opposed in
contrast with the organisational predicaments that have repeatedly affected the JG. As a result, the IG
has  maintained  its  organisational  cohesion  and  preserved  the  centralisation  of  its  ideological
construction despite challenging geographic divisions. Conversely, the JG has suffered from repeated
fragmentation  over  similar  issues,  and  has  frequently  split  over  ideological  arguments.  From  a
comparative perspective, the IG and the JG have reacted very differently to similar external constraints.
In this chapter, ideological developments have been studied in isolation from violent and non-violent
practices. The following two chapters therefore draw on this analysis, specifically on the study of these
groups' organisational evolutions, to investigate these groups' use of violence in the 1990s as well as
their non-violent transformation after the 2011 Egyptian uprising.
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CHAPTER 5
THE ORGANISATIONAL MEDIATIONS OF ARMED VIOLENCE
We were our own leaders because the security setting isolated us from our leadership. We were pressured
by the state  and did not  want  to  be incarcerated.  The state  was carrying out  mass  arrests  and was
pressuring and torturing our families to get to us. We needed to act in secret and had two objectives.
First, we wanted to survive and needed resources. Second, we wanted to weaken the state. This explains
why some of us attacked the tourism industry and the banks. It was the only way. As for the Christians, I
don't think we had any connections with that. Those were mostly local family conflicts.
Saʿid (2012), from the Islamic Group
People from our group [the JG] pressured doctor Ayman [al-Zawahiri] to do something for the prisoners.
You know, thousands of us had been caught before we fired a single bullet. Ayman was under heavy
pressure and that's when we began to use our weapons against targets that supported the state. It was
contrary to our doctrine and to the strategy of the military coup which defined us from the beginning,
however.
Amr (2012) from the Jihad Group
5.1. INTRODUCTION
This research has hitherto investigated the Islamic and Jihad groups' differentiated trajectories, and has
argued that their early mobilising patterns critically shaped their subsequent organisational evolution as
well as the development of their ideological commitments. This chapter follows the same approach,
and similarly adopts a contextualised multi-level focus on the meso-level to study the use of violence
by the IG and the JG. Considering that the significant developments in the study of violence preclude a
thorough  treatment  of  its  numerous  intricacies  in  one  chapter  only,  this  chapter  focuses  on  the
organisational  mediation  of  armed  violence,  through  the  investigation  of  internal  dialogues  and
processes contextualised with evolving state security policies.
This chapter is based on an ontologically inclusive consideration of violent incidents. This analysis
includes acts of violence perpetrated by Islamist militant groups, as well as violent acts which were
more loosely related to this conflict, such as private skirmishes. This choice is informed by civil war
and violent contention studies, which demonstrate that civil conflicts are marked by their ambiguity
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and by the “interaction between political and private identities and actions” (Kalyvas, 2003: 475). This
corpus notably substantiates that violence is often caused by private issues settled locally in the shadow
of a broader master cleavage (Kalyvas, 2003, 2006). It is therefore crucial to question the artificial split
between private and political violence and to adopt a broader definition of violent incidents. In Egypt,
for instance, local vendettas between Muslim and Coptic families in the South typically epitomised this
ambiguity between private and political rationales, as this chapter illustrates.
This research consequently does not utilise the shadowy and sketchy expression “military wing” to
describe the perpetrators of violence. This term has rapidly gained prevalence in studies of Islamist
armed groups, even though it has often impeded a rigorous understanding of violent contention. This
expression presumes a political nature to violent incidents, and is often used by militant groups or by
their  opponents to exaggerate their  strength and looming power.  Moreover,  this  term obstructs the
understanding of the organisational construction of these armed networks over time, and encompasses
an  array  of  armed  organisations  and  networks  that  are  often  barely  comparable,  ranging  from  a
negligible  group of friends  to  a fully-fledged para-military organisation such as  Hizbullah's  armed
networks in Lebanon.
The historical period included in this chapter ranges from 1981 to 2011. It begins with the incarceration
of most of these groups' members and leaders after the assassination of former president Sadat, and
ends with the post-2011 uprising. This period witnessed many acts of violence resulting in a number of
casualties  among  security  forces,  IG and  JG militants,  civilians,  Coptic  Christians  and foreigners,
reported in the following graph:
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5.1  Evolution
of the number of fatal casualties between 1986 and 1999170
Several  analyses have investigated the use of violence by Islamist  groups in Egypt  with mitigated
success. One influential explanation claims that these groups' hostility to the state and to the Coptic
minority, magnified by the return of many militants from the Afghan military front, best account for
armed contention in the 1990s (Kepel, 2003: 420-453). This study nonetheless examines the IG and the
JG  as  monolithic  entities  whose  actions  can  comprehensively  be  deduced  from  their  political
ideologies, and fails to recognise that violence in Egypt was primarily driven by local dynamics. A
predominant ideational focus fails to explain the geographic peculiarity of violence and its evolution
over  time.  Moreover,  this  chapter  demonstrates  that  the allegation that  returnees  from Afghanistan
played a crucial role is contested.171
A sophisticated rectification argues that violence in Egypt was primarily a reaction to indiscriminate
170 This introduction presents the data used in this chapter page 153. The quantitative data utilised in this graph are notably 
drawn from Fahrer (2011: 108).
171 This perspective is relatively common to explain the use violence in Egypt in the 1990s (e.g. Murphy, 2002), even
though returnees were only marginally involved in violent contention in Egypt. This position additionally disregards the
factual opposition of the external leadership to the practicalities of violence on the ground, which they believed was
detrimental to their groups' objectives.
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and reactive state repression combined with political exclusion (Hafez, 2003; Hafez & Wiktorowicz,
2004). These two factors would explain the existential threat experienced by Islamist militants, their
rational decision to use violence and the development of anti-system ideational frames.  Despite an
accurate focus on organisational processes contextualised in a multi-level environment and a laudable
endeavour to debunk superficial ideational and psychological interpretations, these studies suffer from
several shortcomings.  They gloss over diverging IG and JG organisational dynamics, including the
evolution of  their  respective command and control  over their  followers,  and therefore ignore their
origins. They deem violence a “rational calculus about tactical efficacy” (Hafez & Wiktorowicz, 2004:
62), yet overlook the evolution of these groups' rationales for using violence in time and space, and the
growing  preponderance  of  local  dynamics  of  violence.  Moreover,  these  studies  do  not  investigate
internal revaluations of the costs of violence, and are relatively mechanical in their treatment of these
groups' ideological constructions and organisational evolution in response to repressive state policies.
Finally,  they consider state repression wholly indiscriminate and reactive,  therefore discounting the
temporal and geographical reconsideration of state repression by the authorities from the end of the
1980s to the end of the 1990s.
A recent  investigation  of  the  micro  sociology  of  violence  in  Egypt  has  explored  the  evolving
interactions between militant groups and their local constituencies (Malthaner, 2011). This research
considers the structure of this relationship and its influence on these groups' radicalisation and restraint,
positing that militant groups cannot be considered outside of the milieu in which they are embedded.
This analysis is particularly convincing in its reintegration of these groups into their social and local
settings, and in its dynamic study of local dynamics of violence. Furthermore, this research adequately
investigates the evolution of state repression at a local level and its impact on the support relationship
between the population and militant groups. As with previous cases, however, this analysis is weaker in
its consideration of organisational dynamics (including organisational control over the use of violence)
and internal reconsiderations of violence.
Finally, a few quantitative analyses have attempted to explain the evolution of the use of violence in
Egypt. Using quantitative methodologies, they have scrutinised the correlation between several socio-
economic variables and violent incidents, investigating for instance their geographic location (Fahrer,
2001). This focus on the socio-economic characteristics of Egyptian society informs the elaboration of
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generalisable  assertions,  such  as  the  claim  that  “high  rates  of  poverty,  child  mortality,  cultural
conservatism in terms of low contraceptive prevalence, and greater urban density are more likely to
support  insurgency”  (Jenkins  et  al.,  2014).  In  addition,  quantitative  studies  examine  the  dynamic
dimension of armed violence, arguing that “parliamentary exclusion, security sweeps, and executions
affect the count of attacks along with spatial diffusion from neighbouring governorates” (Jenkins et al.,
2014)  and  that  the  “combination  of  political  repression  and  military  counter-insurgency  measures
employed by the  Egyptian government  has  the potential  to  exacerbate  rather  than reduce  political
violence” (Fielding & Shortland, 2010). Quantitative studies, regardless of their strength in analysing
societies affected by violence, are much weaker in explaining mechanisms of armed contention and the
organisational reinterpretation and mediation of violence over time, which form the central objectives
of this chapter.
This literature has considerably enriched the study of violence in Egypt, even though some key themes
have been left unexplored. While this scholarship has adequately demonstrated that violence in Egypt is
better studied as a multilevel dynamic process, it has hitherto failed to explore the intricacies of militant
groups'  organisational  dynamics.  It  is  therefore  crucial  to  investigate  these  groups'  organisational
evolution  and  uncover  their  decision  making  processes  and  internal  dialogues  overtime.  This
perspective can facilitate the study of the modalities, timing, location and discriminating nature of
violence.  It  can  also  explain  why  most  violent  incidents  occurred  when  these  groups  were
paradoxically reconsidering the rationale behind their use of violence.
The following analysis triangulates complementary quantitative statistics on violence in Egypt. The
first source is a Ph.D thesis, entitled “The Spatial Patterns of Egypt's Islamist Insurgency” (Fahrer,
2011), which contains an extensive listing of all violent incidents committed between 1986 and 1999
(Fahrer, 2001: 202-226). This source is complemented by the exhaustive chronologies of The Middle
East Journal during the same period, and by two online database: the Global Terrorism Database of the
University of Maryland172 and the RAND Database of Worldwide Terrorism Incidents of the Rand
Corporation.173 Considering that the first source is more exhaustive and comprehensive than the Middle
East Journal  chronologies and the two databases, this chapter is primarily based on this thesis' data,
possibly amended by these additional sources.
172 www.start.umd.edu/gtd/  
173 http://smapp.rand.org/rwtid/search_form.php  
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5.2. A MESO-CENTRED AND MULTI LEVEL STUDY OF THE DYNAMICS OF ARMED 
VIOLENCE
The  academic  study  of  violence  encompasses  pluralistic  approaches  characterised  by  different
analytical focuses. They cover successive phases of violence174 and range from large-N comparative
studies based on quantitative methodologies to rich qualitative case study and ethnographic analyses.
The following reviews the main perspectives adopted in the literature and advocates for a multi-level
disaggregation of the use of violence centred on the IG and the JG's meso-level dynamics.
Early analyses of  violence were rooted in  psychological  studies.  Psycho-pathological  contributions
profiled violent militants to uncover abnormalities, such as mental illness, paranoia and authoritarian
personalities.175 These studies have since been repeatedly dismissed with regards to political violence
(Corrado,  1981;  Turco,  1987;  Post,  1990;  Ruby,  2002)  and  Islamic  armed  activism (Hafez,  2003;
Sageman,  2004,  2008).  Scholars  generally  agree  that  “the  outstanding  common  characteristic  of
terrorists is their normality” (Crenshaw, 1981: 390).176 A recent attempt to resuscitate psychological
analysis and demonstrate that suicide bombers underwent psychological crises (Lankford, 2013) has
been easily dismissed for its failure to tackle the recent literature and for its methodical shortcomings
(Moskalenko, 2013; Qamar, 2013).
A prominent approach to the study of violence has investigated several macro factors explaining the
development of violent groups. These societies' political, economic and social characteristics have been
related to multiple grievances and strains which trigger the mobilisation of aggrieved individuals in
violent contention. Political factors include the (il)legitimacy of the state, its relative weakness and the
nature of political regimes (Lia & Skjolberg, 2004; Bjorgo, 2005). Relative deprivation theorists (Gurr,
1970) also study economic factors and consider, for instance, modernisation (Bendle, 2003), economic
inequalities (Gurr, 2008), rapid economic growth and the presence of scarce (Lia & Skjolberg, 2004) or
specific types of resources (Ross, 2003, 2004a, 2004b). The inclusion of societal variables underscore
the role of threatened values (Juergensmeyer, 2003) and rapid demographic changes (Crenshaw, 1981;
Huntington,  1998;  Hudson  & Den  Boer,  2002),  while  international  factors  cover  the  influence  of
globalisation, armed conflict, foreign occupation, state sponsorship, interstate conflicts, resource wars
174 For general reviews, see also: Lia & Skjolberg, 2004; Bjorgo, 2005; Richardson, 2006.
175 These analyses are listed by Lia & Skjolberg (2004) and Sageman (2004).
176 See also: McCauley, C.R. & Segal, E., 1987; Sageman, 2004; Horgan, 2014.
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and economic inequalities between states (Lia, 2004; Bjørgo, 2005). Macro approaches contend that
violent  conflicts  can  be  explained  by  any  combination  of  domestic  and  international  factors.  A
compelling argument notably suggests that the combination of horizontal inequality between groups
aligned along ethno-linguistic differences can explain the inception of armed conflicts (Cederman et al.,
2011, 2013; Buhaug et al., 2014). 
This corpus nonetheless fails to demonstrate the existence of micro-level mobilising mechanisms and
to explain the modalities of violence over time. Hafez (2003) and Wiktorowicz (Hafez & Wiktorowicz,
2005)  argue,  for  instance,  that  societal  cross-comparison  does  not  explain  varying  levels  of
mobilisation. They further assert that, in agreement with resource mobilisation theory, the existence of
grievances does not necessarily lead to militancy. The social movement approach adopted by these two
scholars rather posits that violence is adopted by militant groups believing that they have “no other way
out” (Goodwin, 2001).
The main alternative to macro-centred studies focuses on the organisations resorting to armed violence.
It notably includes the greed school, whose proponents deny that the existence of grievances explain
the development of violent contention, arguing that grievances should be considered a product rather
than a cause of violence (Collier, 2004). The greed school uses quantitative methodologies to compare
the  societies  affected  by  violence  and  to  demonstrate  a  stronger  correlation  between  greed  and
rebellion, than between grievances and rebellion. These scholars describe rebel forces as greedy groups
driven by the material rewards to be made in civil wars (Collier, 2000, 2008), which allegedly occur
when a rebellion is financially and military possible (Collier et al., 2008). This perspective has been
reiterated by additional scholars who oppose, for instance, the assertion that ethnically diverse societies
would be more prone to civil war (Fearon & Laitin, 2003; Fearon 2006). The greed paradigm has,
however, been contested for its shaky foundations, debatable variables and internal contradictions that
lead to the adoption of politically convenient explanations (Keen, 2012; Buhaug et  al.,  2013). The
greed school is also inadequate in explaining the practicalities and timing of violence. It further tends to
overlook evolving interactions between rebel groups and their local settings, and between rebel groups
and state authorities. Finally, an important contribution to the debate between greed and grievances has
focused on militant groups' initial endowments. In contrast with the greed perspective, this study argues
that  only  armed  organisations  with  poor  access  to  external  resources  can  be  studied  under  this
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paradigm,  which  additionally  explains  their  recruitment  strategies  and  use  of  violence  against  the
civilian population (Weinstein, 2007).
The  second  organisational  approach  to  the  study  of  militant  groups  focuses  on  their  external
environments,  and  specifically  investigates  their  interactions  with  other  groups.  This  perspective
contends that the competitive environment in which militant groups evolve has a decisive influence on
their  practices.  They  demonstrate,  for  instance,  that  the  fragmentation  of  the  political  opposition
combined with internal competition worsens the militarisation of civil conflicts by raising incentives
for violence (Zirakzadeh, 2002; Pearlman, 2011; Prince & Warner, 2013). Considering that militant and
rebel  groups are  vying for  popular  support,  they  argue  that  group competition  can  inform certain
patterns of violence and repertoires, such as the resort to suicide bombing to outbid other groups and
networks (Bloom, 2004,  2007;  Pedahzur  & Perliger,  2006).  Competition between armed groups is
generally associated with higher level of violence between co-ethnic factions, and against civilians
sharing their ethnicity (Cunningham et al., 2012). The evolving distribution of power between militant
groups can explain intra-ethnic infighting (Nygard & Weintraub, 2011), as well as group formation and
alliances (Christia, 2012) and civil war outcomes (Akcinaroglu, 2012). In addition, the use of violence
by militant factions can arguably be explained by the timing and extent of government concessions (de
Mesquita,  2005;  Stedman,  1997; Goerzig,  2010;  Cunningham, 2011).  This  perspective on violence
demonstrates the strength of contextualised relational studies in explaining the timing and modalities of
violence.
Recent militant groups' organisational studies have also uncovered their organisational make-up. Rebel
groups' organisational features, for instance their level of centralisation, have notably been related to
their use of violence and to its efficiency (Asal & Rethemeyer, 2008; Eilstrup-Sangiovanni & Jones,
2008; Enders & Jindapon, 2009; Piazza, 2009; Heger et al., 2012). Armed groups are arguably more
lethal when they follow a pyramidal structure with clear command and control,  accountability and
organisational specialisation (Heger et al., 2012). Conversely, chaotic decision-making processes and
operational divisions can facilitate the transformation of militant factions into criminal gangs (Eccarius-
Kelly, 2012) and produce extensive variations in repertoires of violence when a group's leadership is
unable to impose its preference for controlled violence (Green, 2011). It is therefore crucial to study the
combination of internal and external factors regulating militant groups' fragmentation. External factors
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include changing economic and political policies (de Mesquita, 2008), while internal factors include
the factional nature of rebel groups led by a competing leadership (Asal et al., 2012). 
This  organisational  focus  has  catalysed  the  examination  of  organisational  dilemmas  and trade-offs
affecting militant groups. Shapiro argues that militant group leaders need to supervise the finances of
their  groups and the execution of military actions (Shapiro,  2013). He contends that this  quandary
represents a dilemma, considering that financial supervision negatively affects these groups' operational
vulnerabilities, and a trade-off between operational security and financial efficiency (Shapiro, 2013).
Militant  groups'  clandestine nature and need for  secrecy  generates  an additional  trade-off  between
operational security and tactical control, which inexorably affects the management of effective violence
(Enders & Su, 2007; Enders & Jindapon, 2009; Shapiro, 2013). Decentralisation helps to secure the
durability  of  their  networks,  and  simultaneously  affects  the  optimality  of  their  decisions  and  the
commitment  of  their  followers  (Cunningham,  2013).  These  two  trade-offs  arise  from  diverging
preferences for violence between these groups' leaders and followers, notably explained by different
commitments  to  the  cause,  diverging  informational  access  and  by  the  cognitive  dynamics  of
underground organisations (Shapiro, 2013). These divergences are further informed by these groups'
evolving membership, reflected for instance in the joining of new individuals prone to armed violence
and by the possible survival of risk-averse leaders (Shapiro, 2013). These organisational perspectives
demonstrate that militant groups face extreme difficulties balancing organisational security, operational
efficiency and control. 
Finally, organisational dynamics and macro parameters being considered, recent developments in the
study of violence in civil wars have stressed the necessity to explore micro-dynamics of violence. This
research  agenda was significantly  influenced by Stathis  Kalyvas'  seminal  modelling  of  the  micro-
foundations  of  violence  in  civil  wars  (Kalyvas,  2006).  Kalyvas  has  developed  a  sophisticated
theoretical  model  to  relate  the  changing  nature  of  incumbents  and  insurgents'  sovereignty  over
territories  to  their  use  of  selective  and  indiscriminate  violence  against  civilians.  He  specifically
analyses  the fragmentation  and segmentation  of  these actors'  sovereignty,  and its  influence  on the
collaboration and defection of civilians. Kalyvas' model explains why most violence is paradoxically
not committed on the front lines, but in territories marked by the overlapping control of insurgents and
incumbents.  This  emphasis  on  the  micro-foundations  of  violence  is  particularly  adequate  to
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demonstrate the importance of changing patterns of control over the populace, and to investigate the
evolution  of  micro-level  dynamics  of  violence.  Kalyvas  posits  that  many  instances  of  allegedly
indiscriminate violence cannot be considered truly indiscriminate. He demonstrates, for instance, that
in Algeria many massacres were not as indiscriminate as sometimes assumed and followed a strategy
designed to punish collaborators and deter civilians from defecting to the incumbent (Kalyvas, 1999). 
This academic corpus demonstrates the necessity to study the use of violence by non-state armed actors
as the outcome of multi-level dynamic processes. As emphasised by Kalyvas, recent theoretical and
empirical contributions to the study of violence suggest that several dimensions of violence should be
disaggregated: spatial (including subnational disaggregation), temporal, level of analysis (micro, meso
and macro), the actors themselves and the recognition of the broad strategic options available (Kalyvas,
2010). This research therefore strives to uncover organisational processes in a multi-level environment
in order to investigate the evolving use of violence by the IG and the JG, in Egypt and abroad.
 
5.3.  ESCALATING  POLICING  OF  PROTESTS  AND  THEIR  ORGANISATIONAL
MEDIATION
The previous chapter demonstrated that IG and JG prisoners who were loosely associated with the
assassination of Anwar Sadat were gradually released by the authorities by the end of their three year
trial in 1984. It also established that the IG's ideological construction occurred mostly in prison under
the direction of its newly constituted “historical leadership”, while the JG only partially clarified some
of  its  ideological  tenets  due  to  organisational  obstacles.  This  chapter  stressed  that  newly  released
prisoners still  believed in the same strategic vision, the creation of an Islamic state in Egypt, even
though their tactical approach varied substantially after their failure to unite under a central leadership.
The IG believed in mass mobilisation and in the socialisation of a new generation, whereas JG leaders
loosely associated with the network responsible for Sadat's assassination decided to revive their older
tactical choice, and subsequently left Egypt for the Afghan war front to reorganise their group and
undertake military training. 
This  section  argues  that  the  cycle  of  contention  that  started  in  1986-1987  was  paradoxically  not
triggered  by  these  groups'  commitment  to  overthrow  the  regime.  The  following  analysis  rather
demonstrates that this  cycle of violence was sparked by new practices in the Egyptian policing of
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protest, and by the decision of the Minister of Interior Zaki Badr to face Islamist militants in the streets
of the country.  This section additionally establishes that changing macro policies do not suffice in
explaining evolving patterns of violence, and argues that it is crucial to comprehend both their evolving
organisational  mediation  and interpretation  by  these  groups'  members  and  leaders,  and  the  latter's
changing preferences for the use of violence against the state.
 
Despite these groups'  hostile  position on Hosni Mubarak's  regime,  interviews with their  respective
leaders reveal that they were not preparing for a short-term military deflagration by the end of the
1980s (Hafez, 2013; Taha, 2013; Naʿim, 2014). Their organisational developments confirm that these
groups were not actively training their members or planning any armed attack in the short-term, claims
further substantiated by the absence of any violent incident between 1984 and 1986. The following
analysis  of  the  post-1986  cycle  of  contention  demonstrates  that  these  groups'  leaderships  merely
reacted  to  the  unfolding  events,  and  gradually  adapted  their  positions  based  on  their  changing
perceptions of new state policies.
Before the beginning of the cycle of contention, the IG and the JG pursued different endeavours. The
IG  focused  on  its  organisational  expansion,  which  started  in  1984  when  its  historical  leadership
delegated newly liberated members to reconstitute the group in the South of Egypt. IG leaders intended
to reconstitute their group and to rebuild its foundations, which were shattered by post-1981 waves of
arrests. The IG managed to quickly recover from post-1981 losses, and to expand its organisational
presence in most of the South of Egypt.  This rapid expansion was facilitated by the new political
environment and by Mubarak's conciliating position, which initially favoured a non-confrontational
posture.177 An IG member who was not jailed in 1981, argues that: 
We were very weak after  the  arrests  in  1981.  Those who were not  caught  shaved their  beards and
disappeared.  It  only became easier  when our  leaders were progressively freed from detention [after
1984]. We were not planning to confront the state, even though we believed that our final objective was
the creation of an Islamic state. Personally, I wanted to free Jerusalem and thought that only a strong
Islamic state would lead to this outcome. We did not have any presence in Cairo but we intended to
expand there at some point.
This organisational expansion was not reiterated by the JG, which did not mobilise publicly through
177 Chapter 6 expands on this theme. See also Hafez (2003).
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low-risk activism mobilising patterns. The JG stayed faithful to its secret and elitist endeavour, while
internal divisions at the leadership level prevented the creation of sustainable social networks in Egypt.
JG  disorganised  and  loosely  connected  cells  could  not  directly  benefit  from the  relatively  liberal
political environment, and newly freed members and leaders preferred to leave the country instead.
Many departed to the Afghan front, following pre-1981 suggestions that they should undertake military
training to prepare for the future. The main cell, associated with Ayman al-Zawahiri, was temporarily
coordinated by Nabil Naʿim (2014) who testifies that:
The Afghan plan was just our project [this JG faction]. By 1985, Ayman was outside of prison and we all
agreed that we should all go to Afghanistan. We thought that we needed to acquire military training so,
when I was freed from prison, I only stayed a few months in Egypt. Then, I went to Afghanistan and
prepared the travel of many Egyptian fighters there. I can recount that I helped at least 300 Egyptians get
to the Afghan front.
The informal truce between these groups and the state was broken by the arrival of a new Minister of
Interior,  Zaki  Badr,  who reached this  position in  1986 after  unprecedented riots  shook the regime
(involving more than 25,000 disgruntled members of the low-paid security forces) (Sirrs, 2010: 162-
163). The regime thenceforth enacted a two-track policy, consisting in the adoption of Islamic symbols
while  simultaneously  repressing  Islamist  militants.178 Badr  harboured  a  strong  animosity  towards
Islamist militants due to his background; he came from Upper Egypt and had already cracked down on
the IG several years before, when IG leaders tried to take over the Southern city of Asyut after Sadat's
assassination. Badr disagreed with his predecessors' accommodating policies and was determined to
confront the Islamist opposition with a heavy hand (Abdalla, 1991). A diplomat commenting on Badr's
policies asserted that “the instinctive response of the security people is not to do any investigative or
police work, but just to pull the book out and round up the first 500 names and start roughing them up”
(Kifner,  1987).  Badr,  speaking about  the  Islamist  opposition (including the MB),  was also widely
quoted as saying that: “'I want to kill only one percent of the population”.179
Badr was adamant in his  opposition to the IG's expansion and in his intention to face the group's
members and sympathisers in the streets of the country. According to multiple reports authored by
Human  Rights  centres,  newspaper  articles  and  the  previously  mentioned  data,  this  new  policy
178 New York Times, 4 April 1997.
179 New York Times, 4 April 1997; Murphy, 2007: 78.
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precipitated multiple clashes throughout Egypt, located primarily around IG affiliated mosques which
were increasingly besieged by the security forces. Between 1986 and 1989, eighteen IG members died
in these confrontations, in addition to three JG members killed in separate incidents. On the other hand,
only two members of the security forces were killed by independent JG cells. The fifty-two violent
occurrences were geographically located primarily in the South of Egypt and in Cairo and its Giza
suburb, according to the following statistics:
5.2 Geographic location of all recorded incidents between 1986 and 1989180
This new policing of protests focused initially on IG affiliated mosques, and targeted their members
and  sympathisers.  These  security  measures  should  not,  however,  be  solely  analysed  through  their
timing and intensity, as previously posited by Hafez (2003). Social movement theorists contend that
political  opportunities  and policing of protests  are  not  independent  factors studied outside of their
subjective  construction  and  interpretation  by  social  movement  actors  (e.g.  Kurzman,  1996,  2004;
Alimi, 2007). A closing of political opportunities combined with state repression is a dynamic process
interpreted by militant groups' leaders, and mediated by these groups' internal organisational dynamics.
The  analysis  of  their  impact  should  therefore  simultaneously  investigate  IG  leaders'  perceptions,
contextualised with their degree of command and control over their followers. IG leaders' changing
positions on the ground are presented by Rifaʿi Taha (2013), the IG leader outside of prison:
We became progressively threatening for the state. We had strong words in the mosques against the
regime and many people followed us for this reason. The regime started to block our mosques and to set
up police barricades around them. The security forces did not penetrate the mosques, however. They
would just arrest a few brothers for short periods of time. Sometimes, some of our members would be
killed by the regime, but these actions were unplanned. For example, a policeman killed Shaʿban Rashid
while he was preaching. The interior minister did not plan it and a communiqué from the presidency
denounced it and apologised. The policeman was judged and sentenced to seven years in jail. We wanted
him to be executed but, still, we did not retaliate. Then we thought that because we did not retaliate, the
state believed that we were scared and that the security forces could kill more IG members. Six months
180 Data drawn from Fahrer (2001: 120).
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later,  they  killed  another  preacher,  Sayyid  Taqi  al-Din  and  they  did  not  apologise.  It  became  a
normalised, acceptable policy for the regime. So the brothers wanted to do something. Then Muhammad
Qutb was killed. Some of us said that we had to be patient and argued that we were not ready. The state
increasingly assaulted us and our mosques. We had to deal with this new reality and do something. We
did not want to face the state, but the regime was looking for a confrontation.
Taha illustrates the changing perceptions of the ground leadership, which enforced its opposition to the
immediate  use  of  violence  against  the  state.  Taha's  assertion  reveals  that  the  continuation  of  a
leadership on the ground muted internal calls  for revenge, even though some IG militants  already
wanted to face the security forces. Conceivable differences of opinion over the most appropriate use of
violence, which are common between militant group leaders and followers (Shapiro, 2013), did not
initially  alter  the  group's  general  restraint,  in  contrast  with  subsequent  developments.  IG  leaders
understood that  premature use of  violence would  give  the  state  free rein and threaten  the group's
achievements, as had been the case in 1981 after Sadat's assassination. IG leaders initially managed to
enforce their early opposition to armed violence.
The IG leadership appreciated the need to protect the group's long-term objectives, and discerned the
possibility to exploit an environment favourable to its expansion despite the growing pressure exerted
by  the  security  services.  The  initial  repression  indeed  occurred  in  a  favourable  socio-economic
environment  since,  by  the  end  of  the  1980s,  the  Egyptian  government  was  pressured  by  the
International  Monetary  Fund  (IMF)  to  undertake  structural  economic  reforms  and  adopt  macro-
economic adjustments. These measures weakened the foundations of the welfare state established for
the past  three decades (Gunning & Baron,  2012: 92),  and worsened the economic situation of the
population  which  relied  most  on  the  socio-economic  assistance  of  the  state.  This  gloomy  socio-
economic deterioration was particularly resented in the ʿashwa'i neighbourhoods of Cairo (Gunning &
Baron, 2012: 142), defined as the informal suburban communities such as Imbaba and ʿAin al-Shams
where the IG established its organisational foundations to escape the security services in the South of
the country.
The IG benefited from these new macro-economic policies and from the spatial, socio-economic and
cultural characteristics of these informal neighbourhoods (Ismail, 2000) to embed itself in Cairo and to
mobilise new supporters. The IG's expansion was notably facilitated by the congruence and resonance
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of  the  group's  practices  with  older  social  modes  of  organisation  (Ismail,  2006b),  exemplified  for
instance in the reminiscent model of the futuwwa181 (Haenni, 2005), and by a milieu generally receptive
to the group's Islamic message (Malthaner, 2011: 199).182 The IG became a dominant social force which
gradually provided the population with direct assistance that the state was unable to provide due to
macro-economic reforms. In addition, the IG exploited these neighbourhoods' spacial structures, which
were not easily accessible to the security forces (Ismail, 2006b: 92), to replace “traditional layers of
control and mediation” and mediate local conflicts (Ismail, 2006b: 100). Its members gathered popular
support by opposing local gangs that proliferated by the end of the 1980s (Haenni, 2005: 23). The IG
took advantage of its antagonistic position against the regime (Ismail, 2006b; Malthaner, 2011: 121)
and from the relative discrediting of the Muslim Brotherhood,  which participated in parliamentary
elections  that  the  IG denounced as  a  façade  and a  legitimising tool  for  the  regime.  The rapid IG
expansion was facilitated by a combination of a deteriorating socio-economic macro environment, local
environmental conditions and organisational abilities and resources. The IG was able to create vertical
ties to the population (Staniland, 2014), and to appear as a credible alternative to the regime.
In  these  conditions,  state  policies  were  relatively  counter-productive  during  the  first  few years  of
contention.  The embeddedness of the IG in the  ʿashwa'iyyat  and its  provision of various forms of
assistance nourished the sympathy of the population, which considered that the IG was a victim of state
oppression  and therefore  sided  with  the  group when  riots  first  erupted  in  ʿAin  al-Shams in  1989
(Malthaner, 2011: 145-146). Moreover, detaining IG members similarly failed to achieve its intended
objectives.  As  mentioned earlier  by  Taha,  detention  was  not  dissuasive  and rarely  exceeded three
months in the first few years of the conflict. Prison was often used to reinforce the ties between the
detainees  and  their  leadership  (Haenni,  2005:  95-96).  A former  IG  member  and  current  political
analyst, Maher Farghali (2014), confirms that:
The IG benefited a lot from the pressure of the state initially. The population expressed their solidarity
with them and their members when the security forces targeted them. IG sympathisers and members
would also be jailed for only two or three months while the conditions in prison were still relatively
good.  IG  members  therefore  benefited  quite  substantively  from  their  incarceration  and  from  this
collaboration with their leaders in jail.
181 In Egypt, the futuwwa were local leaders which often mobilised popular forces against Egypt's central administration
and regulations.
182 See also Mubarak (1995) and Wickham (2002).
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This episode demonstrates that, at the beginning of the cycle of contention with the state, the IG's
organisational  make-up and  the  group's  relative  centralisation  around  local  leaders  helped  to  take
advantage of the deteriorating environment and of the closing of political opportunities in Egypt. The
presence of relatively strong leaders on the ground prevented a reiteration of hasty actions against the
state, which sharply contrasted with rebellious JG cells.
In contrast with the IG, the focus of the main JG cell on jihad in Afghanistan combined with acute
internal divisions prevented this group from exploiting the new Egyptian setting in a similar way. In the
JG, the cycle of contention rather stimulated the micro-level mobilisation of many individuals loosely
affiliated with the group. These individuals had often been caught in the conflict between the IG and
the  state,  and  suffered  from indiscriminate  arrests  of  Islamist  militants.  These  networks  were  not
centralised around a central leadership and hierarchical structure, as in the IG, and mostly converged
upon geographic areas. Their members revolved around the belief that the they had to retaliate against
the state and the security services. Mahmud (2012), a member of a cell which subsequently became
affiliated with the JG, mentions that he mobilised through local connections and asserts that:
There were many small groups in different parts of Egypt at that time. We were mostly united by two
issues, al khuruj ʿala al-hukam [toppling the leaders of Muslim countries who do not apply Islamic law
comprehensively] and the defence of Muslim lands.
Another jihadi, Amr (2012), who was caught in the talaiʿ al-fath networks,183 testifies that:
I became convinced by the legitimacy of jihad in 1986 and I had no relations with other groups. By the
end of  the  1980s,  there  were many different  small  jihadi organisations,  sometimes with just  a  few
members. At that time my activities were not military, however. I was mostly preaching.
The  adoption  of  a  confrontational  position  vis-à-vis  the  state  occurred  at  an  individual  level  and
through personal connections (Amr, 2012; Mahmud, 2012;  Sadiq,  2012).  These groups were often
isolated from one another, and motivated by their personal experiences in the on-going contentious
conflict with the state. The absence of socialisation with a formalised and organised group, as in the IG,
explains their tactical preferences for immediate actions, as opposed to the development of a long-term
approach.  It  also  contextualises  their  fragmentation  and  ambiguous  organisational  belonging,  with
many JG members being frustrated at the failure of its leadership to act against the state. In turn, many
183 Cf pages 176-179.
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of these isolated cells decided to strike back and to selectively attack those they deemed responsible for
their arrests and for gruesome acts of torture committed against them.
Some of these underground organisations distinguished themselves with sporadic and localised acts of
violence, which the IG initially managed to prevent. Two groups, later referred to as al-shawqiyyun and
najimun min al-nar (the returnees from hell-fire) by the media,184 were specifically involved. These two
armed networks were organised around limited geographical networks and were acting in isolation. The
first group was led by Shawqi al-Sheikh, a man formerly affiliated with the JG who radicalised his
religious  views  and  took  distance  from  the  latter,  according  to  JG  leaders.  Shawqi  opposed  the
government and increasingly excommunicated outsiders as well (Munib, 2009: 95-99). The two main
operations of the  shawqiyyun targeted two Lieutenant Colonel Ahmad ʿAla and Muhammad ʿAwda,
who were both deemed responsible for targeting Islamist opponents and for acts of torture committed
against detainees. Similarly, the group later denounced under the name najimun min al-nar, hailed from
a limited geographic area and was led by a former JG associate, Majdi Safti, who similarly took his
distance from the latter (Munib, 2009: 92). In 1987, Safti's group organised a few targeted operations
against two former Ministers of Interior, Hassan Abu Basha and Al-Nabawi Ismaʿil, and a journalist
considered close to the government, Mukarram Muhammad Ahmad. Other targeted attacks were also
orchestrated  by  some  individuals  who  suffered  from  the  security  services,  such  as  the  killing  of
Lieutenant Colonel ʿIssam Shams by Muhammad Ahmad, after being tortured by the latter in prison,
according to Ayman al-Zawahiri in his memories (al-Zawahiri, 2010: 90-91).
These attacks were marked by their selectivity, the desire for immediate action of their perpetrators and
the absence of a broader strategic vision. These militants did not attack unaffiliated civilians, Coptic
Christians or foreign tourists, who were only caught in the armed contention subsequently. Rather, they
selectively targeted those they considered responsible for their direct suffering. These cells' religious
ostracism, stressed by JG leaders themselves, did not prompt them to condone indiscriminate actions.
These cells' preferences for armed violence were not dissimilar to early calls for retaliation among IG
members. The main difference between these armed networks and the IG was the early maintenance of
a stronger organisational structure in the latter, which initially prevented IG members from following a
similar route.
184 Even though these groups never referred to themselves with these names.
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Eventually, while the IG prison leadership did not condone the use of violence against the state until
1989,185 its members decided to imitate these armed cells and to orchestrate the targeted assassination
of the Minister of Interior Zaki Badr. This decision was informed by three developments. IG followers
on the ground increasingly expected their group to retaliate against unanswered state provocations and
not to give carte blanche to the security forces to kill IG members in impunity. In addition, imprisoned
IG leaders resented the competition of small jihadi cells, which were retaliating against the state and its
agents while the IG was idle. This competition is usually referred to as the outbidding thesis, which
suggests that militant groups vying for recruitment, mobilisation and prestige might resort to similar
repertoires to outbid one another (Bloom, 2004, 2007; Pedahzur & Perliger,  2006). Finally, the IG
realised that they needed to establish some deterrence against the state. The first planned armed attack
was decided in prison by the historical leadership of the group and not, contrary to what has sometimes
been alleged, by its external leadership in the Afghan Pakistan border area, which in fact opposed it.
According to the IG leader abroad, Rifaʿi Taha (2013):
After some time, the leaders in prison demanded the killing of the interior minister Zaki Badr from our
members outside of prison. This operation was not consensual among us. Mustafa Hamza was outside of
prison and opposed it for instance. The majliss al-shura, qiyadat al-tarikhiya (the historical leadership)
of the group ordered this operation, which failed. It was against our views outside, including me, ʿAbd
al-Akhr and Muhammad Shawqi [al-Islambuli].
Another IG leader adds that:
The leadership in prison accepted some limited operations but not all of them. From their point of view,
they thought that they could launch one operation against one individual. They killed us so we kill one of
them. Then we can establish some deterrence, which would then pave the way to bilateral negotiations
and to the acknowledgement of our right to preach in public. You know, we always need something to
negotiate. We need to change the balance of power.
Farghali (2014), who was in Egypt, similarly argues that:
A decision of this importance could only be taken at that time by the historical leadership in jail in
coordination with the leadership outside of prison, notably Talʿat Yassin Hamam. The leadership thought
that they would benefit from this operation. They ordered a car bomb assassination but the operation
failed.
185 See also al-ʿAwwa (2006: 113).
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This first staged armed retaliation against the state was therefore ordered by the prison leadership,
which delegated its undertaking to second tier IG commanders. This decision marked “the activation of
militant networks” (della Porta,  2013: 113-145) by the IG in specific macro and meso contexts. 186
Organisationally, it is important to note that local commanders still enjoyed strong ties to their prison
leaders. They joined the IG many years before the contentious conflict and had long been socialised
with  this  group's  leadership.  Mamduh  ʿAli  Yusuf,  who  was  a  prominent  member  of  these  armed
networks, reflects on the group's early military vision (al-ʿAwwa, 2006: 125):
Our idea was not to kill for the sake of it, or to kill somebody merely because of his support for the
regime.  My idea was that  we could only kill  the  one who is  responsible  for  the  killings.  We only
intended to kill Badr, and no one else. We were not targeting the Minister of Information or the Prime
Minister. We only set out to kill the one who leads the battle against us.
Selective violence was not the only repertoire of contention used by members of the IG at the time. The
deterioration of the socio-spatial environment of the  ʿashwa'iyyat (the informal neighbourhoods) and
the gradual fragmentation of the IG leadership, precipitated by the exile and imprisonment of many
leaders,  damaged  the  relationship  between  the  IG  and  the  local  population  (Malthaner,  2011).
Increasingly, less disciplined IG members and sympathisers applied the group's religious doctrine, al-
hisba  (translated  usually  in  the  application  of  the  good  and  the  prevention  of  vices),  in  their
neighbourhoods. These acts of violence appeared at the beginning of the contentious conflict, as early
as 1986 in the South,  and later spread to Cairo.  They consisted of local attacks against  mixed-sex
celebration, storming of video clubs and attacks against alcohol selling (Haenni, 2005). These incidents
proliferated as the group became increasingly fragmented, which reinforced the importance of marginal
IG figures such as the much-publicised sheikh Jaber of Imbaba.187 Unaffiliated youth inspired by this
confrontational environment also contributed to these security infringements, and felt empowered to
follow their lead. For instance, a declassified report of the American embassy in Cairo mentions an
informal discussion between an American representative and a local IG leader, who recalls that he met
a few teenagers in jail who bombed a video shop, arguing that they “wanted to do something for Islam”
186 Considering that this network only perpetrated one attack before the imprisonment of exile of most of its members, it
would be exaggerated to  assert  that  this decision marked the foundation of  the IG's  so-called “military wing”,  as
sometimes argued (e.g. ʿAwwa, 2006: 119)
187 Jaber is often mentioned in the literature as an IG leader, or as the IG amir or even military leader. According to field
research,  he  never  actually  reached  prominence  in  IG  ranks.  The  IG  second-in-command,  Osama  Hafez  (2013),
describes him as a simple electrician who was never part of the group's leadership.
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(Berger, 2007: 183). The IG prison leadership was informed of these violations early on and opposed it
from the beginning. They released a tape to clarify the contradictions between the hisba doctrine and
these violations, but the difficult coordination and maintenance of a tight control over their followers
prevented them from ceasing these violations (al-ʿAwwa, 2006: 116). According to several interviews,
local followers had a different appreciation of the IG ideological corpus and wanted to impose their
own religious understanding in their neighbourhoods. According to Farghali (2014):
The local leadership saw religion as comprehensive, including teaching, preaching, the application of
good and jihad. This is what differentiated our group from the MB. We could not separate religion and
our practice at a local level.
The IG second-in-command in prison, Najih Ibrahim (2012), adds that:
The contention over  hisba started when it spread outside the universities. Inside the universities in the
late 1970s, we were all students and there was still some adab (manners). No families and no weapons
were involved, so that hisba could be controlled. When it spread outside, however, it faced multiple types
of opposition, from the security forces and local families. Moreover, other people joined our forces. They
were not always  mukhlisin  (sincere), and some of them were hypocrites. This setting generated small
killings, controversies and clashes and the practice generally produced mafasid (corruption).
Between 1989 and 1990, many incidents driven by local dynamics of violence similarly proliferated
throughout the country, located primarily in Cairo and in the South of the country. Congruent reports
mention the multiplication of local clashes between families and Islamist supporters for an array of
reasons, ranging from local tensions based on sectarian rumours between Muslim and Coptic families
to  personal  acts  of  revenge.188 Whereas  twenty-eight  people  were  killed  between  1986  and  1989,
(including  twenty-five  Islamists),  thirty-four  individuals  died  in  1990  alone  (including  twenty-six
Islamists). Half of these deaths occurred in April and May in al-Fayyum, when local rumours triggered
local clashes and the subsequent intervention of the security forces. These deaths were caused by a
tense sectarian environment and were not directly informed by specific decisions of the IG local or
prison leadership. They were precisely rendered possible by the latter's loss of control over certain
geographic areas.
188 Multiple newspaper reports a few rumours spreading between the Coptic and Muslim communities, such as rape, sexual
harassment or simply friendly acquaintances between opposite sexes from different communities (e.g. Stokes, 1990;
Jehl, 1997), Coptic Christians allegedly spreading a special product on Muslim girls' clothing to display a Christian
cross (Sammakia, 1991) and the poisoning of vegetables by the other community (Hemady, Z., 1993).
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Independently of the cycle of contention, internal and external frictions around the ministry of interior
incidentally changed the course of the conflict with the Islamist opposition. The outspoken Minister of
Interior  Badr  domestically  antagonised  all  political  forces  (including  government  supporters)  with
politically  hostile  positions  and  his  failure  to  end  the  conflict.  His  sharp  criticisms  against  pro-
government newspapers specifically marginalised him and justified his replacement by ʿAbd al-Halim
Musa in January 1990. Musa appeared to be more reasonable with the political opposition and was
praised for reversing his predecessors' policies (Podeh, 1996). He notably claimed that he would review
political prisoners cases, and open dialogue with the Islamists. Despite these favourable signs, however,
the turning point in the cycle of contention between the state and Islamist militants occurred only a few
months later when, on October 12, the security services allegedly killed the IG spokesman, ʿAla Muhi
al-Din.  To  this  day,  the  security  services  and  the  political  authorities  have  not  accepted  their
responsibility  for  this  assassination.  Even  though  one  could  speculate  that  Musa  organised  this
operation  while  maintaining  a  degree  of  plausible  deniability,  his  political  choices  and  the  lull
preceding this  operation indicate otherwise.189 It  is more likely that Musa's  policies and the forced
resignation of Badr did not satisfy hard-liners in the Ministry of Interior or in the security forces, who
staged the targeted assassination of Muhi al-Din in response. The true responsibilities are analytically
irrelevant in this case, considering that IG members held Musa responsible for Muhi al-Din's death.
According  to  most  IG  leaders  and  members,  this  killing  represented  a  turning  point  in  their
understanding of the conflict. An IG commander argues that:
We wanted  to  retaliate  before  the  assassination  of  Muhi  al-Din,  but  we  were  still  patient.  We felt
oppressed but we did not react. The killing of Muhi al Din changed the game, however. By targeting our
leaders, we thought that the state wanted to destroy us.
IG members viewed this assassination as a precipitating event, which Crenshaw defines as “specific
events and external circumstances that provoke emotions of despair, rage, or vengeance” (Crenshaw,
2007: 19). The peculiarity of this assassination was reinforced by Muhi al-Din's moderation in the IG
(ʿAwwa, 2006: 121), and by his opposition to the military direction taken by the conflict (al-ʿAwwa,
2006: 132). The significance of his assassination was not lost on IG followers, who did not accept to
remain passive. Moreover, the IG organisational setting contrasted with the relative control previously
189 According to previously mentioned statistics, there were nearly no armed clashes during this time frame, apart from the
sectarian skirmishes in April and May 1990.
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enjoyed by the prison leadership. When Muhi al-Din was killed, in October 1990, many IG leaders
were exiled or behind bars, and restrictions on prison visits impeded the containment of the military
escalation.  Moderating  voices  were  silenced  by  the  assassination  of  a  moderate  leader,  and  the
secondary leadership took the lead. Remaining group members believed that their end was coming,190
and an IG network planned the assassination of the Minister of Interior to retaliate against the killing of
the group's spokesman. According to Farghali (2014):
The secondary leadership was leading at that time. They thought that the killing of Muhi al-Din meant
that the state wanted to get rid of them. They decided to put an end to this and to retaliate by killing the
Minister of Interior. Their objective was to reach a position where they would be able to negotiate with
the security forces.
A network composed of second-tier IG members decided to assassinate the Minister of Interior ʿAbd
al-Halim Musa, even though this assassination attempt failed to achieve its intended objective. Musa
was absent  from the convoy in which  he was supposed to  travel,  which  unexpectedly  carried  the
parliamentarian spokesman, Rifaʿat al-Mahjub, who was killed the 13th of October 1990. While the
targeted  operation  against  the  previous  Minister  of  Interior  Zaki  Badr  was  ordered  by the  prison
leadership, the second tier leaders who executed al-Mahjub recognise that this new assassination was
the product of their own understanding of the conflict, when they thought that the state had decided to
eliminate them (al-ʿAwwa, 2006: 132-134). This assassination attempt marks the second stage of the
contentious  conflict  with  the  state,  towards  increased  militarisation  accompanied  by  the
decentralisation of the IG decision making process.
5.4.  ORGANISATIONAL  DISINTEGRATION  AND  THE  MILITARISATION  OF  THE
CONFLICT
Four years after the beginning of the contentious conflict, the IG organisational structure disintegrated
outside of prison. The decision of the second tier IG leadership to start a tit-for-tat escalation with the
security services prompted the imprisonment of this network's leaders, including Mamduh ʿAli Ismaʿil
and  Sawfat  ʿAbd al-Ghani,  and  the  exile  of  others,  such  as  Mustafa  Hamza.  These  leaders  were
subsequently replaced by third and fourth generations IG members who had not been socialised with
190 If the previous assertion on Muhi al-Din's assassination is true, it would mean that state authorities had not necessarily
decided to eliminate the IG in October 1990. This would further justify this thesis' argument that political opportunities
and state repression cannot be understood solely by their objective content, but need to be understood through their
subjective interpretation by social movement actors.
169 / 314
the group's leadership, had a different understanding of the group's ideological tenets (al-ʿAwwa, 2006:
133),  and did  not  maintain  the  same level  of  organisational  coordination.  The strong vertical  ties
uniting the IG leadership to its followers were severed, and the group became increasingly divided on
the ground.
This  generational  change  had  a  tremendous  influence  on  the  militarisation  of  the  conflict.  The
activation of militant networks and the legitimisation of selective violence by the central IG leadership
paved the way for an expansion of the range of acceptable targets after the successive departures of
prominent and second-tier IG leaders. Statistics on violence and IG's claims of responsibilities indicate
that the use of violence and its targets significantly increased between 1991 and 1993. While violence
initially targeted successive heads of the Ministry of Interior, denounced for their responsibilities in the
conflict, the range of acceptable targets expanded subsequently. Lower-ranking individuals affiliated
with the IG issued communiqués against tourism in Egypt in 1992, and attacked tourist convoys shortly
thereafter  even  though  initial  attacks  rarely  resulted  in  fatal  casualties.  These  actions  were
geographically centred in the South of Egypt and in Cairo, according to the following statistics:
5.3 Fatal casualties between 1991 and 1992191
5.4 Geographic location of all fatal casualties between 1991 and 1992192
The expanding range of acceptable targets and the discrepancies between the preferences of a militant
group's leadership and its followers have been explained in the literature by divergent understandings
of the political impact of their actions, the joining of a new generation more prone to resort to violence
and by the cognitive dynamics of underground organisations (Shapiro, 2013: 45-47).193 In this case,
these discrepancies are mostly explained by diverging political understandings of the benefits of and
rationale  for violence,  and by waning internal  coordination and organisational control.  The role of
cognitive dynamics in the underground only appeared subsequently. The first armed attacks ordered by
191 Data drawn from Fahrer (2001: 108).
192 Data drawn from Fahrer (2001: 120).
193 Similar dynamics have also been studied in ETA and the Shining Path, cf. Zirakzadeh (2002).
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the prison leadership were mostly motivated by their desire to dissuade the state from repressing their
group and to alter the balance of power. Then, the second IG generation retaliated for the assassination
of their spokesman, and attempted to dissuade the state from eliminating them, fearing that a final
decision to eradicate the IG had already been taken by the authorities. In both cases, the selective
nature  of  these  attacks  signalled  that  IG leaders  were not  necessarily  looking for  an  uncontrolled
military escalation. The next generations had, however, a different understanding of reality. Subsequent
assassinations encompassed broader targets considered enemies of the group and supporters of the
regime,  often accompanied with a  stronger religious  framing.  While  only a  dozen Egyptians  were
considered Islamically lawful targets by the IG leadership, this new thinking justified the broadening
range of legitimate targets by the new generations. This tactical change contextualises IG members'
rationale for attacking two leading Egyptian intellectuals, Faraj Fawda in 1992, and Naguib Mahfouz in
1994. According to another IG commander (2013):
Faraj  Fawda was killed because he incited violence against  us,  so we wanted to eliminate him. The
decision was taken in prison. I asked a second generation leader who was involved in this decision why
we killed Fawda.  He said that  it  was better to kill  him back then than to wait for  him to become a
minister. As for Naguib Mahfuz, the initial plan was to kill someone from the political police (amn al-
dawla). But some of the youths revived an older plan and the network responsible for the killing of Fawda
attacked Mahfuz later on. They were by themselves, though, and this operation was not decided by the
central  leadership.  They thought that  they could specialise in  these killings.  Personally I  opposed it.
Mahfuz was a voice of reason, unlike Fawda.
A senior IG leader, Osama Hafez (2013), nonetheless asserts that Fawda's assassination was carried out
without  direct  orders  from  prison.  Hafez's  version  is  substantiated  by  a  member  of  Fawda's
assassination network, Abu al-ʿAla ʿAbd Rabbo, who additionally insists on his religious rationale for
carrying out this assassination (ʿAbd Rabbo, 2012). ʿAbd Rabbo argues that there is a consensus among
the ʿulama' that apostates can be killed in Islam, pointing out to the blasphemies allegedly committed
by Fawda.194 Whether the assassination was ordered by senior IG members in prison or without direct
instructions, the discrepancies between the arguments presented by the IG commander and ʿAbd Rabbo
validate  this  section's  argument.  These  differences  specifically  demonstrate  that  IG  members  had
diverging rationales for using violence. Senior members had a strategic and political understanding
while, for lower members, religious justifications were more preponderant.195
194 The lawfulness of the assassination of an apostate in Islam was a central theme in its perpetrators' trial.
195 While it could be argued that senior IG members are currently using a political rationale to legitimise this assassination,
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Declining internal organisational control after the incarceration and exile of second tier leaders further
exacerbated internal debates on violence and its legitimacy at a local level. Local IG members and
leaders assert that they had diverging preferences over the most suited approach to the conflict, and add
that  organisational  impediments  prevented internal  discussions  and the elaboration of a  consensual
tactical and strategic vision. According to a local IG figure in Aysut, Saleh Muhammad Ahmad (2012):
We all had our own thinking on the ground. Some of us wanted to use violence, while others did not and
strongly opposed the military direction taken by the conflict. We were not coordinated, however, because
of the security situation and the difficulty to communicate.
Social movement scholars additionally argue that state repression can discourage moderate members
from further involvement in contentious conflicts, or radicalise their views (della Porta, 2013: 67). In
Egypt, these two phenomenon were reinforced by the resignation of local IG members and leaders who
were  not  solely  shocked by state  repression,  but  also  disapproved of  the  evolution  of  the  violent
practices of fellow IG members.  The deterioration of the security environment and the absence of
internal discussions inexorably reinforced the proponents of violence, and marginalised IG members
opposed to the militarisation of the conflict. Several testimonies recount that many people opposed to
the military direction taken by the conflict left the group (Haenni, 2005; al-ʿAwwa, 2006: 133-134),
disturbed by the discrepancies between their group's ideological tenets and its practices on the ground.
Others  simply took their  distance  without  formally  severing their  ties  to  the  IG.  These  departures
excluded IG members who could have exercised internal control and convinced proponents of violence
to revise their views. A former IG member who split from the group for this reason, mentioned in
another interview (al-ʿAwwa, 2006: 134) that:
I took my distance from them [the IG] when the ideas they preached differed from their local practices.
Their literature needed religious scholars and educated individuals with a high level of understanding and
awareness to apply it on the ground. But these individuals were not any more those we saw around us. At
the beginning they were realistic [IG members] and under the control of their leaders. Then they became
their own leaders and they decided who was a Muslim and who could be killed after the arrest of their
true leaders and the exile of others 
The militarisation of the conflict combined with the absence of internal organisational control and with
another commander’s version relates to an argument that was internally discussed by the IG in prison.
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the departure of moderating figures exacerbated the use of violence at a local level as well.  Many
clashes were reported between local gangs and IG members, as well as inside the IG for the direction of
the local  leadership (Haenni,  2005: 39).  Local  dynamics of violence and the violent  opposition of
families,  clans  and gangs intensified local  armed contention,  altered the social  environment196 and
exacerbated the use of weapons at a local level, especially in the South, even though “firearms and
ammunition  certainly  flooded the  Saʿid [Upper  Egypt]”  before  the  conflict  (Toth 2003:  562).  The
absence  of  organisational  control  over  IG  militants  facilitated  an  escalation  unrelated  to  the
accomplishment of any tactical or strategic objectives. 
In  one  specific  instance,  a  local  confrontation between two families  was aggravated  by this  tense
societal milieu. In spring 1992, a local quarrel over land between a Muslim and a Coptic family in the
region of Dairut (South of Egypt) was exacerbated by the affiliation of one member of the Muslim
family  to  the  IG.  The local  vendetta  between these  two families,  which  was  reminiscent  of  “this
region’s “tribal” practice of seeking revenge for the dishonour of family members […] as old tribal
vendettas, long [antidated] the rise of Islamic militancy” (Toth 2003: 562; see also Malthener, 2011),
degenerated into a violent confrontation. Dozens were killed, including an array of Coptic Christians
killed by friends of the Muslim family, fellow IG members. In contrast with traditional clashes, the
joining  of  local  IG  members  violated  the  “traditional  rules  of  vendetta”,  and  ushered  previously
unknown levels of violence (Malthener, 2011: 152-153). This incident illustrates the growing confusion
between local identities and the master cleavage, already stressed in this chapter's introduction (see also
Kalyvas, 2006). While many Muslim perpetrators were IG members, they did not target the Coptic
Christians on behalf of their group, but as friends of the Muslim family. Interviews with IG members
and leaders (e.g.  Hafez,  2013) confirm that they were caught unprepared by the unfolding events,
which  resonated  strongly  in  the  Egyptian  Coptic  Christian  population.  These  local  skirmishes  had
henceforth been interpreted as evidence that the IG was targeting them. It reinforced their fears, even
though Christian casualties hitherto resulted only from local unpredictable confrontations rather than
from organised and premeditated targeting.
The collapse of security at the local level eroded the popular support previously enjoyed by the IG,
especially  in  the  ʿashwa'i  neighbourhoods  of  Cairo  (Malthaner,  2011),  and,  at  a  macro  level,  this
196 On this issue, see also Wood (2008).
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environmental  evolution  affected  state  policies  towards  the  IG  and  bolstered  the  proponents  of  a
decisive obliteration of the group.
The deterioration of the security situation was particularly grave in the informal neighbourhood of
Imbaba in Cairo. By 1992, a combination of several factors deteriorated the relationship between the
IG and  the  population  mentioned  previously.  At  a  leadership  level,  most  senior  leaders  had  been
imprisoned or exiled, and were subsequently replaced by a new generation. Former offenders arguably
increasingly joined the group to alleviate the pressure on them and to benefit from a support group
(Haenni, 2005: 36). These two factors aggravated the use of violence and intensified local extortions
against the population. IG members became increasingly perceived as a source of violence, a feeling
which was further fuelled by their repeated attempts to impose their norms and moral order in their
neighbourhoods (Malthaner, 2011: 145-148). While the population initially sided with the IG when its
members were perceived as victims of indiscriminate state repression (Malthaner, 2011: 145-146), the
collapsing security environment raised the cost of supporting IG members in their fight against the
state, and locally de-legitimised their group.
At the international level, the outset of the Algerian civil war likely raised the fears of the security
leadership of a similar scenario in Egypt, and reinforced the views of the hard-liners.197 Eventually,
when a local IG leader declared that Imbaba was comparable to an Islamic republic, the authorities
invaded  the  neighbourhood  with  16,000  members  of  the  security  forces  and  arrested  a  thousand
suspects on the 8th of December 1992 (Buccianti & Francis, 1992).
The IG prison leadership realised that they had lost control over their members, and that this new
setting was threatening the group's survival. While they legitimised the use of violence against the
Minister  of  Interior  to  restore  the  balance  of  power  and  dissuade  the  state  from  attacking  their
members, they subsequently appreciated that violence was becoming increasingly indiscriminate and
counterproductive to the group's objectives. Their isolation in prison prevented them from contacting
their members and, according to several prison leaders, the leadership took advantage of the liberation
of a leading member, Osama Hafez, to convince their followers to refrain from violence.198
197 In the beginning of the 1990s, the Egyptian security services were collaborating with their Algerian counterparts, with a 
notable focus on the presence of Algerian and Egyptian Islamists in Afghanistan and Pakistan (Sirrs, 2010: 166).
198 See also this chapter's next section.
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The exacerbation of the tensions throughout the country nonetheless obstructed Hafez's mission. After
1992, the state radicalised its approach to Islamist militancy and resorted to military tribunals to chase
and judge Islamist  sympathisers.  Human Rights  reports  document that  the new hard-line approach
included far-reaching preventive arrests and death sentences passed on detainees. They additionally
report that the security services kidnapped many family members of alleged IG militants, including
eight-year-old children  (Human Rights  Watch,  1994,  1995).  Wives  of  IG militants  were beaten  in
prison, sexually molested and threatened with rape in front of their husbands and other prisoners. This
evolution is analysed more fully in the next section. Suffice it to say here that this security setting and
the isolation of the militants underline the difficulties faced by Hafez in  meeting and engaging in
dialogue with IG militants.
This deteriorating environment and the evolution of the cycle of contention eventually affected other
militants who were caught in the conflict between the state and the IG. The JG was particularly affected
by these developments, which incidentally coincided, in 1992, with the dawn of the Afghan civil war.
This setting contextualises the return of many JG militants from the Afghan front. Egyptian fighters had
to escape the Afghan-Pakistan border region since they refused to participate in the Afghan civil war,
and were additionally pursued by the Pakistani authorities on the other side of the border.199
Many separate  networks affiliated with the JG leadership in the Afghan Pakistani border therefore
appeared in Egypt. Ayman al-Zawahiri recognised this diversity in an interview, and asserted that the
networks later referred to in the media as talaiʿal-fath (the vanguards of conquest) were affiliated with
his leadership (al-Zawahiri, 1993).200 Hani al-Sibaʿi mentions that the first network was based in Cairo
and its suburbs, whereas the second main network was based in Alexandria under the leadership of
Ahmad ʿAshush, and was called al-taliʿ al-salafiya (the salafi vanguard) (al-Sibaʿi, 2002: 22-24). Most
of  their  members  were  isolated  from  one  another  for  security  reasons,  and  only  had  a  loose
understanding of the broader plan of the JG leadership (al-Sibaʿi, 2002: 22). A prominent leader of
these networks in Egypt asserts that:
We might have appeared as distinct organisations for security reasons and because all our members did
not know the full extent of the network. We were nevertheless united behind our leadership abroad. One
199 The last section of this chapter expands on this theme.
200 In the same interview, al-Zawahiri denies that other factions, including a so-called  hizballah  (no connection to the
Lebanese group), were affiliated with the JG.
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thousand one hundred people were affiliated with  al-taliʿ. We can nevertheless say that only 50 or 60
possibly went to Afghanistan to fight.
While most acts of violence committed by the IG were the product of the gradual isolation of its central
leadership and of its replacement by third and fourth generation leaders, the use of violence by the JG
answered a different logic. These actions were initiated by the arrest of up to a thousand members of JG
affiliated networks in successive waves of arrests organised by the security services in 1993. Prominent
group members, including Majdi Salem, were arrested and accused of plotting against the state and
coordinating  with  their  leadership  in  Afghanistan  to  engage in  violent  contention  in  Egypt.  These
arrests occurred in the context of a broader conflict between the state and the IG, which explains the
rationale of the security services to engage in preventive arrests. They were additionally facilitated by
the  retrieval  of  a  JG  member's  computer,  which  contained  an  extensive  listing  of  the  group's
infrastructure in Egypt.201 The JG was caught off guard. Most of its members were arrested and its
networks were dismantled before the JG perpetrated any act of violence.
This unprecedented setback galvanised young group members, and explains their desire to retaliate
against the state. This issue divided the group outside of Egypt, and reinforced emerging divisions
caused by the radicalisation of Sayyid Imam's theology.202 According to al-Sibaʿi,  a  faction led by
Ahmad ʿAgizah in  the  Sudan and composed of  the  new JG generation  opposed older  cadres  and
denounced their reluctance to engage in violence in Egypt (al-Sibaʿi, 2002: 28). These youths were
disturbed  by  the  JG's  absence  of  reaction  and  the  group's  failure  to  resolve  this  disagreement
consensually triggered their departure.
This episode contributes to the previous discussion on internal divergences over the appropriate use of
violence. JG leaders and their younger followers had a different understanding of the rationale for
violence  and  of  the  consequences  of  hasty  and  unprepared  attacks.  Older  members  and  leaders
appreciated that an impulsive reaction contradicted the group's strategy and its long-term objectives to
infiltrate the army and topple the regime from within. They learnt from the repercussions of Sadat's
assassination in 1981, and were reluctant to repeat the same strategic mistake. Conversely, younger
201 The security services did not focus specifically on this group beforehand, considering the weakness of its networks in
Egypt and its focus on Afghanistan.
202 Cf. chapter 4 page 142.
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members were infuriated and wanted to take revenge and express their solidarity for the prisoners.
These  contradictions  substantiate  that  internal  dynamics  and  different  rationales  for  violence
unresolved in  a  cohesive organisational  structure  prevailed,  in  this  case,  over  the  consideration  of
intergroup competition, which posits that militant groups competing to achieve similar objectives often
attempt to  outbid one another  by resorting to  specific  repertoires  of violence (Bloom 2004,  2007;
Pedahzur & Perliger, 2006). The JG did not resort to violence for fear of losing popular support in
favour of the IG, but for distinctive internal and external reasons.
Al-Zawahiri, the de facto JG leader in light of the leadership fragility of de jure leader Sayyid Imam,
was faced with two main challenges. He was pressured by his followers to launch armed operations in
Egypt (al-Sibaʿi, 2002: 31), and realised that his failure to do so could threaten their commitment to the
group, his sway over the leadership and the JG's unity. According to a member of the  taliʿ al-fath
networks, Amr (2012):
People from our group pressured doctor Ayman [al-Zawahiri] to do something for the prisoners. You
know, thousands of us had been caught before we fired a single bullet. Ayman was under heavy pressure
and that's when we began to use our weapons against targets that supported the state. It was contrary to
our doctrine and to the strategy of the military coup which defined us from the beginning, however.
Moreover, al-Zawahiri was also externally pressured by Osama bin Laden and needed to restore the
JG's credibility. The arrests were indeed partially caused by the detention of a prominent JG member,
Majdi Salem, and by the killing of the driver of a car stolen by JG members. Witnesses argue that bin
Laden was perplexed about al-Zawahiri's abilities, and expressed his doubts about the JG's potential as
a militant group. According to an associate of al-Zawahiri and a JG leader in Egypt, Naʿim (2014):
We had more than one million Egyptian pounds so why would you steal a car? All of the organisation was
uncovered  and  caught  because  of  this  failure.  Dr  Ayman  wanted  to  improve  the  image  of  the
organisational externally and internally. Osama bin Laden told Ayman, so you created an organisation to
steal a car? Ayman decided to retaliate with a big operation, the assassination of the Minister of Interior,
but the operation failed.
This time frame was critical to al-Zawahiri and to the JG. The group's leadership was divided and
challenged internally and externally by these waves of arrests. It needed to respond, even though a
response could be detrimental  to  the group's  long term objectives.  Al-Zawahiri  orchestrated a few
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limited operations and activated a militant network to assassinate the Egyptian Minister of Interior
Hassan al-Alfi in August 1993 and the prime minister ʿAtef Sidqi in November 1993. Both operations
failed, and the two ministers survived the assassination attempts. Al-Zawahiri later strived to legitimise
their  validity  and to  demonstrate  that  these  operations  were  congruent  with the  group's  long term
objectives, even though his justifications were relatively feeble (al-Zawahiri, 2010: 89-112). According
to another JG leader:
The  JG  organised  two  armed  operations  against  [ʿAtef]  Sidqi  and  [Hassan]  al-Alfi  and  Dr  Ayman
announced his responsibility very clearly. We wondered in jail who was responsible, and initially doubted
our group's responsibility. Yet, when Ayman announced his responsibility, we accepted it. It was a logical
reaction. We were oppressed and many were sentenced to death. It was a reaction to the situation.
These two operations did not accomplish their intended objectives. They marginalised the JG as a result
of the killing of one teenager during one of the assassination attempts, and sparked a considerable
backlash against the group in the public opinion. This embarrassment additionally triggered internal
organisational turmoil. The de jure JG leader, Sayyid Imam, blamed al-Zawahiri and branded the group
he hitherto led a deviant group (bin ʿAbd al-ʿAziz, 1994). Imam later claimed that al-Zawahiri was
operating  on  behalf  of  the  Sudanese  intelligence  (bin  ʿAbd  al-ʿAziz,  2008). Other  prominent  JG
members, such as Nabil Naʿim (2014), initiated internal revisions of their views and support for armed
violence  in  Egypt  in  consideration  of  these  aborted  assassination  attempts.  Differences  in  tactical
preferences over the use of violence worsened previous organisational fragmentation.
5.5. ORGANISATIONAL ENCAPSULATION AND THE LOGIC OF SURVIVAL
The last time frame covers the armed confrontation between remnant IG networks and the Egyptian
security services between 1993 and 1997. This phase was primarily located in the South of Egypt and
featured most potent acts of violence according to the statistics previously mentioned. It resulted in the
death of nearly 1300 individuals (90% of the total number of victims), and in the arrest of tens of
thousands of IG militants and sympathisers. Despite the high number of casualties, these violent actions
should not be conflated and different patterns of armed violence should be differentiated, based on their
selectivity, location and timing, and in contextualisation with the IG's organisational configuration. The
following graphs introduce the timing of these fatal casualties and the location of all violent incidents:
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5.5 Fatal casualties between 1993 and 1999203
5.6 Geographic location of all recorded violent incidents between 1993 and 1999
The  main  argument  developed  in  this  section  is  that  the  disintegration  of  the  IG's  organisational
infrastructure  after  1992  eliminated  remaining  internal  organisational  control  (with  one  localised
exception)  and  reinforced  local  dynamics  of  armed  violence.  Third  and  fourth  IG  generations
increasingly perceived the conflict as an existential fight for survival, explained in political violence
studies  by  the  concept  of  encapsulation,  which  posits  that  “organisations  become  increasingly
compartmentalised and closed to the outside” and can “escalate their forms of violence, moving toward
the use of lethal and sometimes indiscriminate violence” (della Porta, 2013: 150). These organisational
dynamics  were  sustained  by  the  rural  characteristics  of  the  Southern  regions,  where  the  IG  had
historically built stronger social networks and ties with the population. This section suggests that the
micro foundations of violence lays in the deterioration of the support relationship between these cells
and the  local  population  (Malthaner,  2011),  and in  these militants'  fight  for  survival  against  local
collaboration with the security services in the absence of centralised organisational IG control.
This section demonstrates the existence of two main patterns congruent with Kalyvas's study of the
micro foundations of violence (Kalyvas, 2006). In the two successive epicentres of violence, in the
203 Data drawn from Fahrer (2001: 108).
179 / 314
districts of Asyut and al-Minya,204 the IG began with strong local grounding and support. IG members'
initial embeddedness in these communities facilitated the selective targeting of the security forces and
of their local collaborators. Then, the selective use of violence against these limited targets triggered
uncontrolled cycles of familial vendetta which, combined with tighter state control and more selective
patterns of repression, changed the tides against IG cells. These developments gradually isolated IG
members from the population, who were increasingly considered the main reason for the growing use
of violence at a local level and could no longer maintain order and security. The cost to be paid for
supporting  the  IG increased  and the  population  switched side  against  the  group,  which  ultimately
hindered the collection of accurate information on collaborators and on the security forces. This critical
change subsequently accounts for the expanding use of indiscriminate violence against mostly Coptic
Christians  and the tourism industry,  designed to  punish the  state  by targeting  the  former for  their
alleged association with the regime and the latter for its prominent role in the Egyptian economy. This
analysis illustrates the peculiar geographic setting of violence, and explains why most acts of violence
occurred when the IG prison leadership was negotiating with the state and reconsidering the utility of
violence. This explanation additionally dismisses possible alternatives, including the role of splitting
factions and spoilers, as sometimes suggested in the literature on political violence (Stedman, 1997;
Greenhill & Major, 2007).
IG militants used violence in the South of Egypt as early as 1986, even though its  intensity only
worsened after 1992. The shift from Cairo to the South of the country can be traced back, according to
field interviews and primary data on violence,205 to the previously mentioned clashes between local
Muslim families  and Coptic  Christians  in  the district  of  Dayrut  in  1992.  These skirmishes,  which
started as a local quarrel between two families, rapidly triggered a logic of vendetta. Thousands of
soldiers were deployed in May 1992 to prevent an aggravation of the security breakdown and to impose
local curfews. The presence of the security forces was resisted by IG members, and the local quarrel
escalated into armed clashes between IG members and the security services throughout the South of
Egypt,  while  the  sectarian  nature  of  local  confrontations  between  Muslims  and  Coptic  Christians
aggravated further. The proliferation of armed confrontations in the South was incidentally reinforced
by the storming of the IG stronghold of Imbaba in 1992, which ended the group's significant local
grounding in the country's capital and reinforced the transfer of its remaining forces to the South of the
204 Between 60 to 80% of all recorded incidents occurred in these two regions between 1993 and 1999, cf. graph 5.6.
205 Hafez, 2013; Farghali, 2014. See also Fahrer (2001: 133).
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country.
The relocation of violent contention to the South of Egypt was accompanied, by the end of 1992, by the
decision  of  the Egyptian authorities  to  replace  civilian tribunals  with  military  trials.  This  decision
epitomised the state's new Iron fist policy, which had been repeatedly denounced by international and
Egyptian Human Right organisations and foreign governmental reports in the beginning of the 1990s
(e.g.  Human  Rights  Watch,  1993a,  1993b,  1994,  1995b,  1995c).  These  organisations  increasingly
blamed  the  Egyptian  government  for  resorting  to  military  courts  and  endorsing  the  death  penalty
against Islamist militants.206 They vilified ubiquitous cases of torture in Egyptian prisons and castigated
the security services for threatening family relatives of detainees with rape, including a seventy-year-
old woman (Human Rights Watch, 1995). In one case, a boy as young as eight year old was kidnapped,
according  to  Human  Rights  Watch,  which  argued  that  these  practices  were  “undoubtedly  [...]
sanctioned, if not ordered, at a high level within Egypt's security apparatus” (Human Rights Watch,
1995).
The  geographical  transfer  to  the  South  of  Egypt  combined  with  reactive  and  indiscriminate  state
repression has to be organisationally contextualised as well. The previous section demonstrated that the
IG prison leadership realised by 1991-1992 that violence was counterproductive, and that they were
losing  control  over  their  followers.  The  latter  were  initially  composed  of  second  generation  IG
members and, after their incarceration, of third and fourth generations IG members. While the IG's
early focus was limited to state figures associated with repression, the range of acceptable targets later
included the tourism industry as well. After 1992, this organisational fragmentation was aggravated by
the geographical relocation to the South, and was further catalysed by the regime's Iron fist policy. The
member of an armed IG network, Saʿid (2012), affirms that:
We were our own leaders because the security setting isolated us from our leadership. We were pressured
by the state  and did not  want  to  be incarcerated.  The state  was carrying out  mass  arrests  and was
pressuring and torturing our families to get to us. We needed to act in secret and had two objectives.
First, we wanted to survive and needed resources. Second, we wanted to weaken the state. This explains
why some of us attacked the tourism industry and the banks. It was the only way. As for the Christians, I
don't think we had any connections with that. Those were mostly local family conflicts.
206 Human Rights Watch (1993) mentions that at least 10 people were legally executed between 1992 and 1993.
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The IG prison leadership attempted to regain the initiative and reassert its control over their followers
after  1992. The previous section mentioned that  they benefited from the liberation of a  prominent
leader of the group, Osama Hafez,  to disrupt the cycle of violence and convince IG members and
sympathisers to refrain from undertaking further military actions. According to Hafez (2013):
In 1991, we attempted to contact people outside but the conditions in prison hindered our collective
efforts. The main opportunity materialised when I was liberated shortly after. My mission was to visit
local districts where violence was spreading and to stop it. I managed to reach a few places but the
prevailing setting in other areas combined with the pressure of the security services prevented me from
achieving the same outcome.
Statistics on violence confirm that Hafez managed to curb violence in areas under his control, and to
stop the cycle of violence and vendetta. His organisational control was specifically noticeable in the
region where he hails from, in al-Minya, where violence virtually ceased in 1993. This temporary lull is
interestingly  unexplained  in  a  doctoral  study  of  the  geographical  diffusion  of  violence  in  Egypt,
unaware of these organisational dynamics, which asserts that it is “is remarkable […] that al-Minya
experienced so little violence” (Fahrer, 2001: 125) at the time. Hafez's organisational control lasted
from 1992 to 1994, when he was re-imprisoned by the authorities.
This episode upholds the assertion that the IG prison leadership was eager to contain armed violence
while negotiating with the state.207 For the civil war literature, this episode additionally suggests that
the micro foundations of armed violence should reconsider the inclusion of organisational dynamics as
scope conditions. While Kalyvas's model of local dynamics of violence in civil wars (Kalyvas, 2006)
elucidates  the  subsequent  evolution  of  violence  in  the  South  of  Egypt,  the  following  analysis
demonstrates that the temporary lull in al-Minya suggests that this model only applies, in this case, due
to the inability of the IG leadership to reassert its organisational control over the group's members. It
could therefore be suggested that  this  model would have been less relevant  had the IG leadership
managed to maintain a tight command and control on the ground. This episode further corroborates
previous inferences that the IG leadership and its local members had diverging preferences over the
appropriate use of violence, hailing from different understandings of the conflict.
According to Hafez, the security setting around Asyut prevented him from reaching IG members and
207 The previous chapter indeed mentioned that the IG was negotiating secretly with the authorities in 1993.
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from imposing the same organisational control on the use of violence in this region. This area therefore
witnessed most acts of violence in Egypt between 1992 and 1993, according to diverse statistics on
violence. Human Rights Watch report that 164 people were killed between March 1992 and June 1993,
including 65 IG militants and 39 policemen (Human Rights Watch, 1993). More than two-thirds of the
victims hailed from the IG and from the security services.
In the region of Asyut, the IG initially enjoyed strong popular support. Asyut had long been an IG
stronghold from the 1970s onwards, and its leaders historically managed to build strong vertical ties
with the population over the years. As in Cairo's informal neighbourhoods, the IG provided significant
local assistance to the population which was receptive to the group's opposition to the government. The
development  of  the South  had indeed long been neglected  by state  policies  (Fandy,  1994),  which
inexorably  reinforced  the  resonance  of  the  IG's  antagonistic  message.  The  group's  popularity  and
organisational strength were substantiated by its control over a large number of mosques, and by its
substantial  presence  in  some neighbourhoods.208 The  IG  demonstrated  its  strength  during  massive
annual collective prayers traditionally organised in public for the two ʿaid festivals (the two ʿaid being
the two official Islamic celebrations).
Asyut was locally affected by the diffusion of violence after the Dayrut clashes between Muslim and
Coptic families, that Hafez was not able to contain as he previously mentioned. The IG was thenceforth
not  locally  centralised.  Its  members  were acting on their  own,  and were both  isolated from other
regions and detached from their  central  leadership. According to a local IG leader in Asyut, Saleh
Muhammad Ahmad (2012):
We had no relations with the historical leadership at that time. They were just people we saw sometimes
on TV, but nothing more than that. They may have heard of me because of my health conditions, but
nothing more.209 People were acting at a very local level. We did not have a military wing. Sometimes this
expression was used by some of us to appear as more threatening than they were, or by the media to
attack us and gather public support against us. This nonetheless did not reflect reality. Some of our youths
had weapons, but there never was the level of coordination and sophistication that we often read in the
media. Most armed attacks were actions of vendetta and vengeances. 
208 According to interviews and primary and secondary sources. e.g. Bari, 2003; Hafez, 2003; Malthaner, 2011: 150-151.
209 Saleh was released in 1998 for his deteriorating health conditions. He remained on a wheeling chair thereafter. Saleh
passed away in 2013.
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The first phase of policing of protest and state repression in Asyut, during the first half of 1993, was
violent and indiscriminate.  The security services reiterated the approach they formerly endorsed in
Cairo, which similarly reinforced the popularity of the IG on the ground (Malthener, 2011: 155). At the
beginning of the cycle of contention, IG members were widely perceived as victims of state repression
and alleged persecution of the security services. Their popularity and this general setting is confirmed
by  numerous  testimonies  from security  officials  who  lamented  the  absence  of  collaboration,  and
claimed that strength of the IG at a local level prevented them from undertaking selective arrests.
Malthener mentions numerous testimonies of police officers deploring the passivity of the population,
and the reluctance of the locals to denounce IG members despite large sums of money promised to
potential collaborators (Malthener, 2011: 155).
The use of violence by the IG began with selective actions committed against local security forces and
their collaborators, in addition to ongoing vendetta opposing IG members and Coptic families. These
developments substantiate that violence was mostly selective in this region. Selective violence was
designed to punish collaborators and deter the civilian population from collaborating with the security
services. This pattern is congruent with Kalyvas's theoretical model of collaboration and control in civil
war settings, which posits that a substantial control exerted by militant groups in a certain geographical
area is associated with lower levels of violence and with the use of selective use of violence against
local collaborators (Kalyvas, 2006). In this case, the targeting of collaborators was facilitated by local
support and by the provision of information on collaborators by the population.  In addition to this
selective and limited violence, local vendetta between IG followers and Coptic Christians and multiple
attacks against foreign tourists followed a comparatively indiscriminate logic.
This setting was altered in the following months by two main developments. Selective acts of violence
perpetrated  by IG members  reinforced local  dynamics  of  vendetta,  whereby families  of  suspected
collaborators killed by IG members would retaliate against their alleged perpetrators. The IG's local
grounding was additionally affected by the development of sectarian clashes between Muslims and
Coptic Christians, which were locally blamed on the IG. The combination of these two patterns of
violence increased the cost of support for the IG. As in Cairo's neighbourhoods, while the IG was
initially praised for its provision of local support to the population and for the security provided by its
members against local gangs, the development of uncontrolled spirals of violence between the group
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and local families changed the status quo that prevailed hitherto. The IG was no longer considered a
source of stability and social support against an unjust state; the group gradually appeared as the main
cause of the deteriorating security environment for its implication in local clashes and family vendettas.
The cost of support for the group therefore increased, and the population started to side against the
group when, incidentally, the state changed its approach to Islamist militancy.
This substantial evolution occurred in parallel with changing policing of protest, which became more
selective and less  indiscriminate.  According to  an  array of  observers  and testimonies,  the security
forces changed their approach to armed militancy, and decided to target IG members more selectively
in the second part of 1993 (Malthaner, 2011: 156-157). This new selective repression was facilitated by
the declining local support for the IG, which eased the collection of accurate information about its
members and facilitated individual arrests. This local evolution is, again, congruent with the predictions
of Kalyvas' model on the micro foundations of violence. According to recorded statistics on the use of
violence  as  well  as  multiple  qualitative  evidences,  violence  became  more  indiscriminate  and
increasingly targeted public places, despite its cost and counterproductive nature. Kalyvas explains this
development by armed groups' failure to get accurate information, and by their endeavour to deter and
punish the population for collaborating with the authorities (Kalyvas, 2006).
By mid-1994, a combination of state repression and switching population alliance contributed to the
cessation of violence in the region of Asyut. The epicentre of violence was later transferred, for the next
few years, to other regions in the North and South of Asyut, especially around al-Minya which became
the main refuge of escaping IG members. The relocation of violence in al-Minya was organisationally
rendered  possible  by  the  arrest  of  Osama  Hafez,  who  maintained  a  strong  organisational  control
hitherto. His departure eroded internal organisational control and unleashed local dynamics of violence
previously witnessed in Asyut. For the next three years, this cycle of violence became increasingly
brutal, with an estimated number of 881 people killed, especially in Abu Qirqas and Mallawi. This
significant figure should not conceal, however, the existence of diverging patterns of violence.
Violence was triggered, according to most reports and testimonies, by the killing of a local preacher
affiliated with the IG, Rajeb ʿAbdul-Hakim, in June 1994. This assassination unleashed a cycle of
violence between IG followers and the security services which followed two successive patterns. The
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first types of killings followed a rational strategy of punishing collaborators and the security services
while  deterring  civilian  defection,  as  Kalyvas  noted  in  Algeria  (Kalyvas,  1999).  This  pattern  is
substantiated by a high number of casualties among suspected collaborators and the security forces.
Curfews imposed on this geographic area combined with the dismantlement of IG networks and the
cycle  of  vendetta  sparked  by  selective  assassinations  precipitated  the  retrenchment  of  surviving
networks, and in increasingly indiscriminate attacks against Coptic Christians and tourist convoys.
During the first  phase of conflict,  an expanding number of collaborators  and security  forces  were
locally  killed.  These  assassinations  were  committed  by  IG  members  who  benefited  from  local
collaboration with the population, which initially sympathised with them (Malthener, 2011: 160-161).
A policeman recalls the initial reluctance of the population to provide information about IG members,
lamenting that “people here are very negative […] we wish they would tell us about the hideouts of the
militants” (Malthener, 2011: 161). These assassinations were widely covered by press reports which
confirm  these  killings'  selective  nature.  Policemen  assert  that  they  retrieved  lists  of  alleged
collaborators to be killed by IG militants, and many press reports mention that victims of assassinations
were accused of collaborating with the police and killed for that reason (Agence France Presse, 1994).
Local witnesses confirm the selective nature of the killings, affirming, for instance, that “the IG can
assassinate or liquidate anyone who helps the police - the IG have liquidated no fewer than 40 people in
Mallawi in the past four months” (Fisk, 1995b). IG's communiqués congruently emphasise the selective
nature  of  their  attacks  against  the  security  forces  and their  local  collaborators.  For  instance,  they
claimed that “at the start of 1995 and with the backing of our people in Mallawi, our  mujahedeen
fighters carried out  the 'law of talion'  against  15 criminals of the security  forces” (Agence France
Presse, 1995).
The  fight  for  organisational  survival  explains  this  selectivity.  Targeted  assassinations  of  alleged
collaborators and security forces by IG members are not unique to al-Minya, and are consistent with
the micro foundations of violence in civil wars model presented throughout this section. They notably
support Kalyvas's study of violence in Algeria,  which establishes that targeted assassinations are a
rational answer to a specific setting consisting of a fragmented rule, civilian defection towards the state
and  a  local  escalation  of  violence  (Kalyvas,  1999).  Harsh  state  repression  and  systematic  torture
undoubtedly explains the fears of the militants to be arrested and their choices to frustrate repeated
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attempts of the security services to capture them with the help of local collaborators, by deterring the
latter. 
In the second phase of conflict, the state successfully isolated these geographical enclaves and imposed
a tighter security control. According to many reports, a combination of curfews and replacement of
local paramilitary forces by thousands of soldiers enforced the local dominance of the security forces
and  confined  remaining  IG  networks.  The  security  forces  benefited  from the  deterioration  of  the
relationship between the IG and the population, substantially exacerbated, as in other areas in the past,
by the logic of vendetta spurred by selective assassinations of alleged local collaborators (Malthener,
2011: 161-164). In congruence with previously analysed patterns in Cairo's neighbourhoods and in
Asyut, IG members became embroiled in violent feuds with local families whose members were killed
for  collaborating  with  the  state,  and  resorted  to  unprecedented  levels  of  violence  (including
decapitations)  to  dissuade  further  defection  to  the  state  (Maltherner,  2011:  162-163).  These
developments isolated the group and turned the population against its members, who were deemed
responsible for local conflicts. By switching sides, the population started to provide more accurate
information on IG members who, in turn, exacerbated their resort to armed violence against the locals,
which  ultimately  reinforced  their  collaboration  with  the  security  services.  Surviving  IG  militants
subsequently had no choice but to escape and hide in remote and inaccessible areas, notably in the cane
plantations which existed around these villages. Many newspaper articles report systematic campaigns
to eradicate these plantations to uncover militant hideouts, which caused dozens of deaths among IG
members (e.g. Fisk, 1995a; Abdel Lattif, 1997b).
This time-frame marked the expansion of indiscriminate attacks against Coptic Christian civilians and
the tourism industry. While Coptic Christians were previously targeted in local and family vendettas, or
during  targeted  killings  of  collaborators,  subsequent  patterns  of  violence  became  increasingly
indiscriminate.  The isolation  of  surviving  IG networks  and  their  inability  to  selectively  target  the
security  forces  and  local  collaborators  sparked  a  short-lived  campaign  of  punishment  against  this
population and against foreign tourists, for their indirect association with the regime. For instance, IG
members reportedly attacked a Church and killed nine Coptic Christians on the 12 th of February 1997
(Abdel  Lattif,  1997a).  One  month  later,  on  the  13th of  March  1997,  they  ambushed  other  Coptic
civilians and killed nine of them, in addition to four Muslims (Jehl, 1997). A researcher asserted that
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“the militants have been hit hard by the Government […] but they have compensated by hiding out and
then staging heavy strikes, either a high-profile ambush or now by targeting the Copts” (Jehl, 1997). By
the end of 1997, these attacks reached an unprecedented level of indiscriminate violence.
The  most  infamous  armed  attack  orchestrated  by  IG  militants  occurred  in  this  context,  and
subsequently marked the group's history in public opinion although it occurred in a very specific setting
which  does  not  epitomise  this  group's  use  of  violence.  On  November  17  1997,  six  IG  affiliated
militants organised an armed assault against Hatshepsut’s Temple in Luxor. More than sixty individuals
were assassinated in the next few hours, including fifty-eight foreigners, in addition to the perpetrators
who died subsequently. This attack followed a ceasefire declaration by the IG prison leadership, in the
summer of 1997. The discrepancy between an unprecedented armed assault against foreigners and the
declaration of a unilateral ceasefire raised many speculations that this assault would have been ordered
by the IG external leadership to disrupt the ceasefire initiative and thwart potential negotiations with
the security services. This unsubstantiated allegation notably claims that the responsibility lies in al-
Zawahiri,  from the JG, who would have allied with Rifaʿi  Taha and Mustafa Hamza from the IG
against the will of their prison leadership (Wright, 2006: 256-258). While the role of (internal and
external) spoilers has been evidenced in many conflicts (Stedman, 1997; Greenhill & Major, 2007), an
isolated focus on the political rationale of militant groups' leaders which neglects the broader dynamics
of  armed contention  previously  analysed  obscures,  in  this  case,  an  accurate  understanding  of  this
onslaught.  This  armed  attack  was  actually  consistent  with  the  increasingly  indiscriminate  attacks
targeting  foreigners  before  the  ceasefire  initiative,  which  corroborates  the  repeated  denials  of
responsibility by the external IG leadership and dismisses the external spoiler's theory.210 The rationale
of  the  perpetrators  conforms  with  Kalyvas's  explanation  of  indiscriminate  attacks,  and  can  be
interpreted  as  their  desire  to  punish  the  state  and  those  considered  its  supportive  forces  in  an
environmental context where these cells were isolated, chased and lacking local support.
210 The IG's external leadership denounced this attack shortly after. The spoiler theory has been arguably substantiated by
Rifaʿi Taha's initial public support for the attackers. Taha, and other leaders who discussed this issue with him at the
time nonetheless all consensually agree that this support merely reflected Taha's solidarity for IG members, and never
implied that Taha orchestrated this operation. Taha's public support critically divided the external IG's leadership in the
late 1990s.
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5.6. TRANSFERRING JIHAD ABROAD?
The previous chapter mentioned that IG and JG members and leaders settled in the Afghan-Pakistani
border area after 1985. While these groups have been subsequently associated with a few external
conflicts  and armed attacks  against  Egyptian  targets  in  the  next  decade,  this  exile  has  often  been
exaggerated by their opponents. The IG and JG's external leaderships have been notably denounced for
their responsibilities in the use of violence in Egypt, allegations mostly invalidated by this chapter's
argument that armed contention was primordially driven by local dynamics.211 In Egypt, at least nine
external leaders were sentenced to death in absentia for conspiring against the state in the judicial cases
referred to as “the returnees from Afghanistan” and “the returnees from Albania”.212 Two individuals,
Talaʿat Fu'ad Qassem from the IG and Ahmad al-Najjar from the JG, were additionally subjected to
pre-9/11 CIA rendition programmes in the 1990s, before their gruesome torture and execution without
fair trial in Egypt (Human Rights Watch, 2005).213
This section investigates the evolving use of violence by these groups' members abroad. The following
argument contends that the IG's centralised decision making process and the strong ties uniting its
external leaders facilitated the preservation of the group's organisational cohesion, and explains the
ability of IG leaders to impose their preferences over a limited use of violence outside of Egypt. The
latter can be narrowed down to a few assassination attempts against former president Hosni Mubarak,
and to various contributions to foreign conflicts. In addition, the preservation of the IG's organisational
cohesion explains why none of its member joined al-Qaeda in Afghanistan,214 despite close personal
ties with their leaders and, sometimes, ideological affinity. The complementary side of this argument is
that leadership divisions in the JG combined with the group's inability to legitimise internal norms of
decision making explains the expansion of the range of acceptable targets in the 1990s. Moreover, these
two factors additionally elucidate the opportunistic defection of many JG members to AQ, premise to
the group's eventual absorption in 2001.
211 The two main exceptions being JG's armed attacks against Hassan al-Alfi and ʿAtef Sidqi in 1993.
212 These cases were initiated in 1992 and only terminated with the revision of some prominent cases after  the 2011
uprising, included the cases of Mustafa Hamza, Muhammad al-Islambuli, Rifaʿi Taha and Muhammad al-Zawahiri.
They were all eventually acquitted by the Egyptian judiciary.
213 See also: Grey, 2007; Mayer, 2009.
214 With only one known exception in 2006. Cf. Page 194.
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The  previous  chapter  suggested  that  the  IG's  emigration  to  Afghanistan  and  Pakistan  took  place
gradually, from the mid-1980s onwards. The first departures resulted from the willingness to fight the
Soviet forces, while subsequent departures additionally included the necessity to escape the Egyptian
security services and find a refuge.215 Jihad in Afghanistan was widely perceived as legitimate in the
Muslim and non-Muslim world, and enjoyed a strong support from Western and Arab nations alike.216
The  IG's  highest  religious  authority,  sheikh  ʿOmar  ʿAbd  al-Rahman,  travelled  several  times  to
Afghanistan and Pakistan to meet the fighters and incite them to armed jihad. According to his eldest
son Muhammad (2012):
The Afghan jihad was a legitimate cause at the time. I travelled to Afghanistan when I was 16 years old
with my brother Ahmad, who was 15. My father visited Afghanistan several times between 1987 and
1989 for short periods of one to two months at a time. He travelled to the training camps and to the
fronts. He delivered lectures and incited to jihad. Sheikh ʿOmar did not want the Arabs to benefit from
the Afghans without contributing. Then he sent me and my brother as well.217
Prominent IG leaders similarly travelled to the Afghan Pakistan border, including its current mufti ʿAbd
al-Akhr Hamad, Muhammad al-Islambuli, Mustafa Hamza, Talaʿat Fu'ad Qassem, Osama Rushdi and
Rifaʿi  Taha.  They formed the group's  external  majlis  al-shura throughout  the 1990s.  According to
another IG leader abroad:
Our work in Peshawar was to organise the group's  media campain and to publish its  magazine,  al-
murabitun [those who are on the front]. Some of our youths also undertook military training for the
Afghan jihad. We were not planning to come back to fight in Egypt, however, and only a few did so.
IG members contributed militarily to the last phase of the Afghan jihad. This choice should not be
understood as a departure from the group's core ideological tenets but should rather be understood in
consideration of  the  wide  legitimacy enjoyed by armed jihad against  foreign occupation in  Islam.
Muhammad ʿOmar (2012) asserts that his father sheikh ʿOmar did not want the Egyptians to benefit
from the hospitality of the locals without participating in the war effort. An IG member who entertained
good relations with most Afghan leaders, ʿAdli Yusuf, therefore created a training camp to train IG
fellows with the assistance of an Afghan war leader, ʿAbdul Rasul Sayyaf.218 In the following years,
215 Cf. chapter 4 page 126.
216 One can refer to the literature in Arabic and English, e.g. Salah, 2001; Anas, 2002; al-Misri, 2002; Coll, 2004; ʿAbd al-
Ghani, 2010; Hegghammer, 2010.
217 This interview has also been published online by the author (Drevon, 2014a).
218 According to many interviews, including Muhammad ʿOmar (2012).  See also:  ʿAbdullah, 2012;  Shamit,  2012; al-
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many IG members died in important battles, including Yusuf. The IG generally enjoyed good relations
with Afghan factions and Arab leaders. For instance, sheikh ʿOmar was very close to sheikh ʿAbdullah
Azzam, the so-called godfather of jihadi fighters (Muhammad ʿOmar, 2012).
In the following years, the IG's emerging military infrastructure has been magnified by its opponents,
as well as by IG members themselves.219 It has often been referred to as the group's military wing, even
though this perception is paradoxically not shared by its own leaders. Rifaʿi Taha (2013), the IG leader
outside of Egypt before his replacement by Mustafa Hamza, argues that:
Some of our youths undertook military training but this was not a military wing in our view. Mustafa
[Hamza] maybe saw it that way, you can ask him [pointing out at him, in the same room], but I didn't.
Between 1992 and 1995, there was no clear mission and responsibilities;  this appeared only later.  I
opposed the claim that I was leading a military wing in Afghanistan because it was not suited at the time,
since we only had modest possibilities. We were in Afghanistan for jihad, not for anything else. While
some of us thought that we could set up a military wing, I did not want it. We did not come for this. After
some time, Mustafa led a military committee but this was not a military wing in our views. It was very
small and we were not more than a dozen individuals. Those who acted in Egypt had no connection to
us. The actions [in Egypt] were led from prison and from the ground, not from abroad.
Similarly, the Afghan jihad was also used by the JG to reorganise its ranks. As asserted in the previous
chapter,  JG  members  and  leaders  arrived  in  Afghanistan  gradually  from the  mid-1980s  onwards.
Muhammad ʿAtef (aka Abu Hafs al-Misri) and ʿAli Amin al-Rashidi (aka Abu ʿObaida al-Banshiri)
were the first prominent JG members in Afghanistan, preceding the arrival of Ayman al-Zawahiri and
Sayyid Imam (Naʿim, 2014). According to most testimonies, interviews and primary sources, Abu Hafs
al-Misri  and  Abu  ʿObaida  al-Banshiri  were  actively  participating  in  the  Afghan  jihad.220 The
participation of remaining JG members is, however, more controversial.  Many witnesses, including
Egyptians militants unaffiliated with the JG and written primary sources,221 assert that the JG was very
secretive and isolated from the battlefield. They argue that JG training camps were unknown to most
people, and add that the group refused to participate in armed operations alongside Afghan factions for
Ghamari, n.d.
219 The next chapter expands on this theme. Many members of the IG and of the JG who did not go to Afghanistan still
refers to this time as a glorious period for their groups and as the climax of their groups' histories.
220 Naʿim, 2014.
221 e.g. al-Sibaʿi, 2002; ʿAbd al-Ghani, 2010; ʿAbdullah, 2012.
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theological reasons.222 In the group's five training camps, JG leaders strived to recruit and train fellow
Egyptians,  who  often  arrived  in  Afghanistan  without  organisational  affiliation.223 Strong  security
measures  prevailed,  and JG members  were isolated from one another  and usually unaware of  one
another's real identity.224 The Afghan jihad was generally used by the JG to pursue its organisational
and ideological development, rather than to support the Afghan war effort.
The early years of the IG and of the JG outside of Egypt were rather modest in scope. These two
groups reorganised their organisational infrastructures in the border region separating Afghanistan and
Pakistan, even though they were equipped with limited operational capabilities and training by the end
of the Afghan war to sustain an hypothetical war against the Egyptian regime. The IG and the JG
developed a capacity of nuisance but failed to materialise as an existential threat to Mubarak's regime.
While some of their members undertook relatively advanced training in guerilla warfare,225 the Afghan
years did not substantially contribute to the development of an adequate strategic military doctrine
accompanied with consistent military abilities to achieve success in Egypt. By the end of the war, the
IG still believed in the mobilisation of the masses, while the JG remained convinced by the necessity to
stage  a  military  coup.  Both  groups  were  nonetheless  not  closer  to  the  accomplishment  of  these
objectives than they were in the early 1980s.
The Afghan journey ended unexpectedly with the dawn of the Afghan civil war in 1992. When the war
started  between  the  two  main  Afghan  factions,  led  by  Ahmad  Shah  Massoud  and  Gulbuddin
Hekmatyar,226 most Arab fighting groups refused to be involved and had to leave the country.227 The
regional and international environment had deteriorated and had become more hostile to former Arab
mujahideen.  The  Pakistani  security  services  were  chasing  Arab networks  in  Peshawar,  and  North
African Arab states (Gulf state adopted different policies) became reluctant to reintegrate their Islamist
opponents. Former Arab mujahideen lost their freedom fighters status and became a security threat to
222 The previous chapter elaborated on the contention between ʿAbbullah ʿAzzam and Ayman al-Zawahiri on the position
to adopt on jihad alongside Afghan factions.  This chapter  notably mentioned that  al-Zawahiri  denounced Afghans'
religious practices and refused to fight under their organisational umbrella, in sharp contradiction with ʿAzzam's views.
223 See for instance ʿAbd al-Ghani (2010).
224 e.g. al-Sibaʿi, 2002; ʿAbd al-Ghani, 2010.
225 Many sources mention the presence of military officers offering advanced training, such as a former officer from the
Egyptian special forces, Muhammad Ibrahim Makkawi, and a former U.S. soldier, ʿAli Muhammad. e.g. Wright, 2006;
Bergen, 2011; Soufan, 2011.
226 One can refer to: Salah, 2001; Anas, 2002.
227 Only a few joined Hekmatyar's forces according to Muhammad ʿOmar (2012) and a few other sources (e.g. al-Misri,
2006).
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their  home countries,  notably Egypt,  where the cycle of violence worsened in 1992. According to
Muhammad ʿOmar (2012):228
Most Arabs, especially Talʿat Fu'ad Qassem from our group [the IG], did not want to be involved in the
Afghan civil war. We sat in Peshawar with other Islamic groups to find an alternative. It was impossible
to go back to our countries. They had turned against us, and we were now considered terrorists after
initially being praised as mujahideen. We only had three possibilities. The first was to go to the Sudan
where Omar al-Bashir had already welcomed many Islamist movements. The second was Yemen with its
convenient tribal system. The last option was to go to Europe and claim political asylum. We could not
go back to Egypt and face imprisonment.229
The departure from Afghanistan further divided these groups at  an organisational level.  IG and JG
members and leaders chose different destinations according to their personal preferences and to the
possibilities offered to them. Only a few returned to Egypt, where they were trailed as early as 1992 in
the judicial case of the “returnees from Afghanistan”, hence dissuading others from coming back as
well. It is therefore necessary to understand the organisational repercussions of this new development.
The previous chapter demonstrated that the horizontal ties developed over time between the IG leaders
facilitated  the  maintenance  of  the  leaderships'  cohesion  throughout  the  1990s,  despite  occasional
differences of views. At the same time, this analysis asserted that the JG's organisational construction
resulted  in  the  formation  of  a  divided leadership which repeatedly  split  over  similar  strategic  and
tactical divergences. These comparative developments signify that these groups' early organisational
constructions  and  these  diverging  norms  of  decision  making  mediated  the  impact  of  this  new
geographic division. In the 1990s, these parameters additionally explain the evolution of these groups'
use of violence outside of Egypt.
In the early 1990s, the main alternative to Afghanistan and the Balkans was the Sudan, where Omar al-
Bashir promoted a friendly pan-Islamist policy towards Islamist groups (e.g. Burr & Collins, 2003).
Senior IG and JG figures partially reconstituted their groups' infrastructures in this country, where they
remained until  their expulsion in 1996. The IG and JG's temporary exile to the Sudan marked the
beginning  of  a  new  covert  war  against  the  Egyptian  security  services,  especially  against  Omar
Suleiman and the Directory of General Intelligence (DGI) he had led since 1993 (Sirrs, 2010: 169-178).
228 See also: Shamit, 2012, al-Ghamari, n.d.
229 This interview has also been published online by the author (Drevon, 2014a).
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The Egyptian intelligence repeatedly strived to thwart these groups'  armed operations, disrupt their
networks and, at times, kidnap or kill their leaders. The IG and the JG did not remain idle, even though
their responses reveal diverging preferences for the acceptable level of violence.
The armed operations orchestrated by IG leaders and members dwelling outside of Egypt demonstrate
that their only lawful target was Egyptian president Hosni Mubarak. Despite increased geographical
divisions and obstacles to these members' coordination, IG leaders and members had internalised the
group's collective decision making norms and felt constrained by the necessity to respect the group's
consensus.230 While new IG generations in Egypt increasingly resorted to indiscriminate attacks against
civilians  and  the  tourism  industry,  the  presence  of  prominent  group  leaders  abroad  prevented  a
repetition of the same strategic mistake. Even though IG members entertained friendly relations with
AQ leaders  after  returning  to  Afghanistan  in  1996,  they  did  not  participate  in  this  group's  armed
operations in the following years, in sharp contrast with the JG. Only a minor IG figure joined AQ in
2006, Muhammad al-Hakayma,231 when most IG leaders had already left Afghanistan.232 Moreover, al-
Zawahiri's claims that prominent IG leaders, including Muhammad al-Islambuli, would have joined AQ
were  repeatedly  denied  (e.g.  al-Ghamari,  n.d.).  The  IG's  limited  military  infrastructure  focused
exclusively on Mubarak, whose assassination was planned more than dozens of time, the most notable
attempt being orchestrated in the Ethiopian capital Addis Ababa in 1995 (Shamit, 2012). Despite the
American hostility to the IG in the 1990s, epitomised in the life sentence passed on IG's religious
leader  sheikh ʿOmar ʿAbd al-Rahman in 1995233 and in the kidnapping of an IG cadre in Croatia
subsequently summarily executed in Egypt, Talʿat Fu'ad Qassem,234 the IG did not participate in any
hostile anti-American operation in the 1990s, despite numerous opportunities.
In addition, IG and JG members participated in a few external conflicts in the 1990s. These groups'
230 This consensual decision making does not preclude personal disagreements over time. The main contention occurred
after the 1997 Luxor attack. Rifaʿi Taha, the head of the IG external majliss al-shura, initially acknowledged the group's
responsibility while other members opposed his claim. Mustafa Hamza, for instance, said that  he had no previous
knowledge of  these  attacks and denied his  involvement.  The IG leadership believed  that  this  operation would be
additionally detrimental to the group and to its members abroad, notably in European countries where some of them
resided.
231 See his online interview in al-Hakayma (2006).
232 Many IG leaders resided in Iran while others had been subject to extra-judiciary rendition and jailed by the Egyptian
state, including Taha and Muhammad ʿOmar.
233 Sheikh ʿOmar has been accused of conspiracy in the 1993 World Trade Center bombing. He has repeatedly denied
playing a role in this attack.
234 See also page 189.
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participation was relatively limited and based on the limited geographic opportunities available after
their forced departure from Afghanistan after the civil war. These groups' main foreign terrain was the
Balkans during the early 1990s' Bosnian wars. Rather than a predetermined plan or a new strategic
development, these groups' joining of a new battlefield merely represented an opportune alternative to
Egypt.  According  to  court  reports  from a  captured  JG  member,  Ahmad  Najjar,  the  Balkans  also
presented an opportunity to raise money through shadow companies in times of financial hardships.235
In the  next  few years,  al-Zawahiri  and some of  his  companions,  notably  Ahmad Salama Mabruk,
additionally attempted to find ventures in other countries, notably in the Caucasus, which did not prove
more successful.236
While the IG limited its armed operations to Mubarak, the JG's own war with the Egyptian military
intelligence exacerbated its  use of violence and widened the range of acceptable targets.  The most
noticeable turning point occurred in 1995, when the group attacked the Egyptian embassy in Pakistan.
The JG was isolated and substantially  weakened by the waves  of  arrests  ordered by the Egyptian
security services in 1993. The group was trying to re-establish its internal and external credibility when
the Egyptian intelligence attempted to assassinate the JG leadership dwelling in the Sudan. According
to various testimonies, the two sons of a prominent JG leader, Abu Faraj al-Misri, were kidnapped by
Egyptian  agents  and  sexually  abused.  The  Egyptian  mukhabarat taped  the  sexual  abuses  and
blackmailed the two teenagers to pressure them to trigger an explosive device during the meeting of the
JG leadership.237 The JG eventually uncovered the plot and killed the two teenagers after a short trial. It
was a new cataclysm for the group. The JG was expelled from the Sudan and many members opposed
to this execution left the group, including the father of the two teenagers.
 
A weakened JG organised an unprecedented operation against Egyptian interests in Pakistan. On the
19th of November 1995, a car bomb exploded next to the Egyptian embassy in Pakistan and killed
seventeen individuals. The JG claimed responsibility in a publication released six months later (jamaʿa
al-jihad,  1996).  Considering  that  the JG had hitherto only  targeted  individuals  associated with the
Egyptian leadership, this publication was necessary to legitimise the use of a suicide bomber against a
235 e.g. al-qadiyya al-jana'iyya li-ahmad al-najjar, 1997.
236 Al-Zawahiri presents his analysis of the Caucasus, and elaborates on his personal experience in his memories (2010:
117-172).
237 See also: al-Shafiʿi, 2002; al-Sibaʿi, 2002; Wright, 2006: 215-216.
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larger target; this book further suggests the group's adoption of a new military doctrine,  no longer
defined by the infiltration of the army to stage a military coup. In a TV interview, a member of the JG's
majliss  al-shura  at  the  time,  Murjan  Salem,  claimed  that  this  attack  was  a  retaliation  for  the
mukhabarat's (Egyptian intelligence) operation in the Sudan (Salem, 2013b). After 9/11, Ayman al-
Zawahiri attempted to alter this narrative, claiming that the JG was primarily looking for a Western
(preferably American) embassy, before choosing the Egyptian embassy in absence of a better choice
(al-Zawahiri, 2010: 114-117).. This new justification is nonetheless not congruent with the initial claim
of responsibility and with the operation's timing.
This  peculiar  operation  is  important  to  understand  the  JG's  military  evolution  abroad.  It  notably
suggests that the JG modified its military doctrine after being substantially weakened in Egypt and
abroad. At the same time, the comparison with the IG and the previous chapter's study of the group's
evolving decision making process additionally indicate that the JG's strategic deadlock is not sufficient
to understand the adoption of a new military approach. The latter was additionally facilitated by the
divisions of the group's leadership, by the departure of many of its members, and by the absence of
organisational constraints on al-Zawahiri, who did not need to abide by the IG's internally constraining
organisational norms. In addition, this operation against an Egyptian embassy demonstrates that short-
term calls  for  revenge prevailed,  in  this  case,  over  the  group's  long term strategic  objectives.  By
targeting an embassy, the JG changed the rules of the game and alienated its natural constituency in
Egypt as well as potentially friendly countries. The JG's new strategic choice was short lived, however,
and the JG declared a unilateral ceasefire shortly after this operation. This new modus operandi against
external embassies was later adopted by AQ, when two American embassies were attacked in Tanzania
and Kenya in 1998.
The JG's gradual organisational dislocation combined with its repeated operational failures additionally
encouraged the departure of many of its members to AQ. Multiple testimonies from AQ members and
witnesses  suggest  an  individual  bandwagon  effect,  whereby  JG  members  decided  to  join  AQ's
operations  in a few African countries in the 1990s.238 The existence of stronger opportunities  with
Osama bin Laden, due to his stronger (ideational and material) resources and networks, sparked the
association of many prominent JG members with AQ, including Abu ʿObaida al-Banshiri and Abu Hafs
238 See for instance the testimonies of Fadil Harun (ʿAbdullah 2012) and of a bodyguard of bin Laden (al-Misri, 2012), in
addition to the English literature on al-Qaeda.
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al-Misri,  who were AQ's successive military leaders. The absence of constraining norms in the JG
eased the joining of a stronger group, especially during the Sudanese exile. According to Muhammad
ʿOmar (2012), bin Laden ultimately instructed JG members to choose between their membership in the
JG or in AQ.239 In 2011, al-Zawahiri eventually joined AQ, as the previous chapter demonstrated. The
JG  virtually  disappeared  abroad,  and  became  indistinguishable  from  AQ.  In  2011,  al-Zawahiri
succeeded bin Laden as the leader of AQ.
After 9/11, IG members in Afghanistan had to leave the country in haste. Most of them went to Iran,
with the assistance of Mustafa Hamza. Some were subsequently arrested and deported to Egypt, while
others came back individually after the 2011 uprising. The sons of sheikh ʿOmar followed another
journey. His eldest son Muhammad was arrested in Pakistan in 2003 and subsequently subjected to the
American rendition programme. He was jailed for six months in an American military base in Bagram
in Afghanistan, and then detained in secrecy in Egypt (see also Drevon, 2014a). His younger brother
Ahmad, who accompanied him in Afghanistan at the end of the 1980s, remained in the tribal areas of
Pakistan until his assassination in November 2011 by an American drone. According to Muhammad
(2012): 
Ahmad stayed for three years with [Abdul Rasul] Sayyaf. Then he had the opportunity to leave so he
went to Waziristan. He opened a few schools and helped the brothers and sisters from the IG return to
Egypt. He personally did not want to come back. Eventually, he was killed by an American drone in
November 2011. He was always by himself. He was a free spirit. He was fighting in Pakistan with the
Taliban, not with al-Qaeda. You must remember that the people of jihad are the Afghan people, not the
Arabs. The Arabs were the salt, while the Afghans were the meat. They were the majority. We were just a
few thousand in comparison. Ahmad did not coordinate with al-Qaeda and refused their administrative
system. Others were closer to al Qaeda than he was. He was even independent from the Islamic Group.
He was the word of truth. He stayed in Pakistan to fight oppression.240
5.7. CONCLUSION
This chapter is a meso-centred study of the use of violence by the IG and the JG in Egypt and abroad.
In congruence with the general argument presented in this research and with the recent scholarship on
political  violence,  this  chapter  has  demonstrated  that  the  study  of  violence  in  Egypt  has  to  be
239 Fadil Harun, the secretary of AQ, similarly recalls in his memories that many members and leaders of the JG first act as 
trainers for AQ members, before formerly adhering to the group.
240 This interview has also been published online by the author (Drevon, 2014a).
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disaggregated, and investigated as a dynamic process contextualised in a multi-level environment. This
research  has  specifically  explored  the  evolving  use  of  violence  by  the  IG  and  the  JG  from  an
organisational perspective, and analysed the organisational mediation of changing macro and micro-
level dynamics of violence. 
This chapter has argued that violence should not be solely considered a rational choice adopted in
reaction to  external  stimuli.  While  recognising militant  groups'  rationality,  this  research posits  that
violence is primarily the outcome of internal and external relational processes. The investigation of the
evolving use of violence by the IG and the JG warns  against  exaggerated political  and rationalist
interpretations  through  rational  choice  paradigms.  Exclusively  rationalist  considerations  obscure,
considerably more than they clarify, these groups' changing approaches to armed violence over time.
Ontological definitions of violence as “terrorism” assume a political and strategic nature to violent
incidents,  disregard  militant  groups'  internal  dynamics  and,  sometimes,  over-intellectualise  their
decision  making  processes.  This  research  has  notably  revealed  that  an  inclusive  definition  of
“terrorism”,  defined as  an  armed operation  directed  indiscriminately  against  civilians  to  achieve  a
political objective, is wrong at an ontological level. It would, in this case, fail to explain the rationale of
the armed attack which is theoretically most congruent with this definition, when foreign tourists were
killed in Luxor in 1997. By assuming a strategic or political rationale, the ontological premise attached
to  “terrorism”  overlooks  internal  processes  which  sparked  this  indiscriminate  attack,  which  was
primarily a desperate act of vengeance carried out by militants fighting for survival.
Armed violence is the outcome of external and internal relational processes. This chapter has notably
confirmed various claims from the academic corpus on political violence concerning militant groups'
interactions  with  external  actors,  including  the  state  and  various  violent  and  non-violent  groups.
Evolving policing of protests and external collaboration and competition with other groups have a
crucial influence on militant groups' decision making processes. Exacerbated repression at a macro-
level often contextualises militant groups' decision to use violence against the state, whose timing and
modalities  cannot  be  solely  comprehended  through  the  study  of  their  ideational  commitments.  In
addition, external competition with other groups can, at times, inform a group's decision to use violence
in order to maintain its organisational cohesion and to demonstrate its internal and external credibility.
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This chapter has additionally argued that external dynamics cannot be properly understood without
simultaneously  investigating  these  groups'  internal  make-up.  This  analysis  contends  that  militant
groups cannot be considered a strategic black box, and has stressed the necessity to study internal
norms of decision making. This perspective suggests that, even though all militant groups’ members
might consensually agree over their long term objectives, internal tactical preferences often differ in
time and place. A thorough study of these group's evolving decision making processes contextualised
with their leaders' command and control over their followers notably explains why the former can order
or consent to armed operations contradicting these groups' long-term objectives. Internal dynamics are
crucial in explaining militant group's leaders and members' evolving construction of external political
opportunities.
The construction of these groups' internal norms pertains to the general argument developed throughout
this thesis. The two previous chapters specifically demonstrated that these groups'  early mobilising
patterns and the timing of their adoption of violence shaped their internal norms of decision making,
and legitimised a structured hierarchy only within the IG. This chapter has additionally demonstrated
the subsequent impact of these early organisational dynamics on these groups' use of violence.
The evolution of the IG and the JG in Egypt does not merely refer to their use of violence, however.
The following chapter will explore the evolution of their non-violent practices as well, especially after
the 2011 uprising.
199 / 314
CHAPTER 6
MILITANT GROUPS' NON-VIOLENT TRANSFORMATION
We did not renounce armed jihad but rationalised it. The weapon of jihad has changed. Jihad in Egypt
cannot any more be undertaken with the rifle. The new weapon of jihad is the political party. 
A senior member of the Jihad Group and a member of the Islamic Party
I  said  and reiterated  that  democracy  is  against  Islam.  My position  has  not  changed.  In  the  1990s,
democracy [in Egypt] meant that no political party could be created on a religious platform. This has
changed,  while  we  have  not.  We  fought  democracy  because  democracy  was  without  God.  The
constitution now recognises it. It is based on shariʿa and all the political parties agree with this feature.
Democracy I denounced is consequently different from the current form of democracy.
A religious leader of the Islamic Group
6.1. INTRODUCTION
This  research  has  challenged frequent  assumptions  that  militant  groups are  intrinsically  violent  by
contextualising the adoption of armed jihad by the IG and the JG. This ontological position suggests
that  the  study  of  militant  groups'  evolution  should  also  explore  their  examination  of  non-violent
alternatives to armed violence overtime. This position additionally posits that non-violent alternatives
should not be merely investigated as complementary means to sustain armed contention, as maintained
in some studies,241 without considering their transforming potential as well. As Sara Roy argued on
Hamas, it  is  indeed important  to note that  militant  groups can “reinterpret  [themselves]  over  time
through  processes  of  radicalisation,  deradicalisation,  de-militarisation  and  re-radicalisation”  (Roy,
2007: 165).
Armed violence and its alternatives are inherent with the study of the impact of political exclusion on
241 For instance,  Hamas'  non-violent  activities  have been analysed complementarily to the group's  military operations
(Levitt,  2007; Berman,  2009),  rather than as  possible substitutes  as  well.  Levitt  has notably simplified Hamas,  an
“increasingly complex and sophisticated organisation to an insular, one-dimensional entity dedicated solely to violence”
(Roy, 2007: 165).
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Islamist movements. The main hypothesis, adopted and elaborated by Mohamed Hafez (2003),242 is that
the combination of indiscriminatory repression and political exclusion accounts for the resort to armed
violence by Islamist groups. In the words of Jeff Goodwin, Islamist movements excluded from political
institutions  have  “no  other  way  out”  than  violence  (Goodwin,  2001).  This  persuasive  claim  has
nonetheless been recently re-examined. Katarina Dalacoura (2011) has questioned this assumption and
pointed out that Islamist militant groups often reject democratic political participation as unislamic,
which means that political exclusion cannot explain these groups' decision to use violence in the first
place.243 Dalacoura asserts that, in Egypt, the IG rejected political participation when relatively free
elections were organised in 1984, a few years before the contentious conflict with the state (Dalacoura,
2011:  117).  Shadi  Hamid adds  that  mainstream Islamist  movements  in  Egypt,  Jordan and Tunisia
endorsed pragmatic positions and did not resort to violence when the state excluded them from the
political  process (Hamid,  2014).  These contradictory findings indicate  that  the correlation between
political participation and violence is more contentious than usually assumed. 
The study of Islamist groups' reactions to changing environmental conditions calls attention to these
groups'  transformation  and  organisational  learning  beyond  short-term tactical  postures.  These  two
processes are arguably informed by a combination of (a) changing macro environments, (b) internal
learning processes, (c) others groups' cognitive processes, and (d) these groups' achievements. Militant
groups' transformation and organisational learning are additionally (e) mediated by their organisational
dynamics,  and  are  contingent  on  the  (f)  ability  of  their  leaders  to  legitimise  these  new  norms
organisationally.244 Most research on militant groups' organisational learning has hitherto focused on
tactical and operational learning, as illustrated by two studies of the RAND corporation (Jackson et al.,
2005a,  2005b).  This  chapter  expands  their  scope  by  exploring  militant  groups'  transformation
overtime.245
This chapter investigates the consideration of non-violent alternatives to violence by the IG and the JG
242 Similar positions have been defended before Hafez, e.g. Burgat. 2002 (first published in 1995).
243 See also a debate between Hafez and Dalacoura in: Dalacoura, 2013; Hafez, 2013.
244 These factors are drawn from a broad literature mentioned throughout this chapter and discussed pages 203-210.
245 This approach is relatively rare in the literature. Only a few recent studies have attempted to relate individual and
organisational learning processes in changing macro circumstances (e.g. Wickham (2013) on the MB). This chapter
broadens this scope by theorising the construction of militant groups' identities.
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from their emergence to the post-2011 Egyptian uprising. This analysis locates these two groups inside
the  Egyptian  Islamist  social  movement  family,  and  argues  that  the  development  of  non-violent
approaches to political action has to be contextualised with these groups' interactions with their Islamist
competitors, and in light of the latter's achievements. Internal interactions and political achievements
notably determine the development of organisational and ideational resources which can motivate a
reconsideration of militant groups' strategic choice to forgo non-violent alternatives to armed jihad.
This chapter demonstrates that the structural context defining the Egyptian regime between 1981 and
2011 obstructed internal interactions between Islamist sub-trends, and prevented the materialisation of
political participation as a credible alternative to achieve substantial political change. This analysis also
investigates the development of the IG and JG's collective group identities from their early days, and
argues  that  their  identities'  diverging  theoretical  positions  on  violence  has  shaped  these  groups'
mobilising patterns and organisational developments. Finally, this research builds on the analysis of the
construction of these groups' collective identities to analyse the impact of the 2011 uprising on their
decisions  to  participate  in  the  political  process.  This  chapter  demonstrates  that  the  IG  and  JG's
diverging responses to the post-2011 uprising was primarily contingent on the ability of their leaders to
maintain their groups' organisational cohesion while drawing on their primordial identities to internally
legitimise these new choices.
6.2. THE TRANSFORMATION OF ISLAMIST MOVEMENTS AND MILITANT GROUPS
The transformation of Islamist movements and militants groups has been explored in the academic
literature  from complementary  perspectives.  This  scholarship  includes  the investigation of  Islamist
movements'  ideological  and  behavioural  moderation,  Islamist  militant  groups'  participation  in  the
political  process,  and  Islamist  armed  groups'  ideological  and  behavioural  deradicalisation.  These
studies have often been undertaken in isolation, however, despite congruent contributions to the study
of militant groups' transformation. The following discussion therefore explores this corpus in order to
identify key analytical features beneficial to the study of the IG and of the JG from their emergence to
the  post-2011  uprising.  This  section  concludes  with  an  emphasis  on  two  remaining  gaps  in  the
literature, namely its elite bias and the neglected consideration of the role potentially played by Islamist
groups' interactions with other actors situated in their social movement families. 
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The  scholarship  on  Islamist  movements'  political  participation  has  mostly  focused  on  mainstream
Islamist groups whose roots are associated with the Muslim Brotherhood. This corpus draws inspiration
from democratic  transition and modernisation theories  to  analyse  the  impact  of  the joining  of  the
political  process  on Islamist  groups,  with frequent  analogies  to the political  inclusion of Christian
political  parties  in  European  countries  and  to  the  institutionalisation  of  left-wing  revolutionary
movements  in  Western  contexts.246 These  studies  are  designed to  analyse  the  rationale  of  Islamist
groups' participation in political processes organised by discredited authoritarian regimes, as well as the
potential  repercussions  of  political  participation  on  these  groups'  ideological  and  behavioural
developments.247
The  literature  concerned  with  the  rationalisation  of  political  participation  examines  an  intriguing
paradox.  Why  would  mainstream  Islamist  groups  participate  in  political  processes  organised  by
authoritarian regimes, considering that their participation legitimises the very regimes they theoretically
oppose? The most common cases are Egypt, Jordan and Yemen, where MB-affiliated movements have
long participated in legislative elections. In these three cases, the literature is quite consensual vis-à-vis
these  groups'  rationale.  Most  studies  argue  that  these  groups  utilised  a  phase  of  relative  political
liberalisation to bolster their fundamentally proselytising (daʿwa) mission (Wickham, 2013: 47; Hamid,
2014). They assert that joining the political process has helped to protect these groups' preaching and to
sustain  their  Islamising  mission  by  providing  legal  cover.  A few  scholars  add  that  MB-affiliated
movements have strived to present themselves as major non-threatening alternatives to current regimes
in the short term, in order to replace them in the long term, when time is appropriate (e.g. Blaydes,
2010: 148).
The ideational and behavioural significance of political participation have also been widely debated. A
prevailing  viewpoint  is  the  inclusion-moderation  hypothesis,  which  questions  whether  Islamist
movements'  ideologies  and  praxis  moderate  when  they  participate  in  political  processes.  This
hypothesis notably examines if joining the political process entails the adoption of democratic values,
or if participation is merely a tool designed to preserve these groups' organisational interests (Robinson,
246 e.g Przeworski & Sprague, 1986; Kalyvas, 1996. For a more thorough comparison, see also Brown (2012: 32-58).
247 An extensive review of this literature was undertaken in Schwedler (2011)
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1997). Carry Wickham argues that, in Egypt, the limited political opening has produced incentives and
cognitive opportunities which have facilitated the transformation of the core values and belief system
of prominent MB members (Wickham, 2004). In a subsequent study, she nonetheless adds that this
process has not necessarily moderated the MB's ideological outlook, and stresses the importance of
generational differences and internal factionalism on the understanding of this group's behavioural and
ideological evolution (Wickham, 2013). Wickham does not directly examine group competition, which
has been mentioned as a source of moderation in other studies (Marshall, 2005). Cross group dialogue
and cooperation combined with political participation have been further considered in Jordan, where
Janine Clark argues that they account for the moderation of a few ideological positions formerly held
by Islamist movements, although limited to those with no bearing on  shariʿa (Clark, 2006). Finally,
Jilian Schwedler asserts that most mechanisms concerned with Islamist movements'  moderation are
still poorly detailed. Schwedler argues that the opening of a political system has to be associated with a
consensual  organisational  structure  and decision  making processes,  and accompanied  with internal
ideological justifications to stimulate a group's ideological moderation (Schwedler, 2006). Schwedler
adds that the inclusion-moderation thesis is less likely to play a role in the post-Arab Spring, since the
emergence of a competitive environment where new conservative Islamist groups prosper challenges
the  ideological  moderation  of  MB-affiliated  movements  (Schwedler,  2013).  Finally,  a  recent
contribution to the study of Islamist groups' political participation has explored the organisational and
ideological ramifications of political  participation in semi-authoritarian regimes on Islamist  groups'
long term evolution (Brown, 2012). Nathan Brown has argued that these movements have invested,
over  time,  more  resources  to  political  participation  and  have  adapted  their  ideological  and
organisational  frameworks  accordingly.  Brown  stresses  the  primordial  influence  of  the  macro
environment  in  which  these  groups'  evolve,  and  substantiates  its  structuring  role  on  these  groups'
developments.
The  inclusion-moderation  hypothesis  has  been  increasingly  disputed.  New  studies  argue  that  the
behavioural  moderation  and  ideological  pragmatism  of  MB-affiliated  movements  have  not  been
precipitated by political liberalisation, but by political exclusion and repression. These studies contend
that these movements have moderated their positions after a closing of political opportunities, rather
than  during  phases  of  political  liberalisation.  In  Tunisia  for  instance,  repression  and  political
marginalisation  have  been  presented  as  the  main  source  of  al-Nahda's  moderation  (Cavatorta  &
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Merone, 2013). In a more extensive study, Shadi Hamid argues that the Egyptian MB has adopted
political pragmatism and the language of democracy and human rights despite political repression and
exclusion. Hamid notably explains this shift by the MB's need to seek legal protection, increase the cost
of repression for the regime and find allies among non-Islamist political parties (Hamid, 2014).
The academic literature has also covered the political participation of Islamist armed groups. Rachel
Rudolph and Anisseh Van Engeland contend that the decision to participate in the political process
entails a previous commitment to governance, and needs to be compatible with these groups' political
ideologies and programmes (Van Engeland & Rudolph, 2008). Leonard Weinberd, Ami Pedahzur and
Arie Perliger  add that,  at  a meso and macro-levels,  a  combination of  four  factors is  required:  the
democratisation of a political system, an amnesty to these groups' members, some level of repression
and an internal desire to reinforce these groups' social anchorage and compete with other movements
(Weinberg et al., 2008). The most common cases refer to Hizbullah, since its first political participation
in 1992, and Hamas after two electoral experiments in 1996 and 2006. In both cases, these groups' two
main rationales were the competition over resources and their distribution (Malka, 2005; Brathwaite,
2013) and the need to legitimise these groups' existence domestically and internationally (Malka, 2005;
Wiegand,  2009).  Regarding  Hamas,  the  decision  to  field  candidates  in  2006 also  resulted  from a
combination of changing political opportunities, new political incentives and internal organisational
changes (Gunning, 2004; Bhasin & Hallward 2013)
The study of the ideological ramifications of militant groups' political participation has pointed out to a
moderating  effect  congruent  with  the  inclusion-moderation  hypothesis.  Joseph  Alagha  argues  that
Hizbullah's  decision to  participate  in  the 1992 parliamentary elections  epitomised a  shift  from the
primacy of its religious and political ideologies, to the primacy of its political programme (Alagha,
2006). In Palestine, Jeroen Gunning argues that Hamas' political participation had a similar moderating
effect. Political participation combined with Hamas' consensual decision making process has notably
encouraged pragmatism and the support of a utilitarian logic (Gunning, 2004). These perspectives are
not  unanimously  shared,  however.  Benedetta  Berti  challenges  the  existence  of  a  linear  transition
between armed violence and political participation, whereby a militant group relinquishes violence to
become more moderate, considering that political participation and armed violence are not mutually
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exclusive (Berti, 2011).
 
Finally, the renunciation of violence has been studied under the concept of deradicalisation, defined as
the ideological renunciations of violence combined with the dismantlement of militant groups' armed
infrastructures. This theme has not been as extensively covered in the literature, and most of the current
scholarship has hitherto relied on secondary sources and textual analyses (e.g. Blaydes & Rubin, 2008;
Rashwan, 2008; Gunaratna & Ali, 2009; Rubin, 2011). Regarding Egypt, this corpus is characterised by
a specific insistence on the state's non-kinetic approach, and by relatively flimsy analyses of the IG and
JG's  internal  dynamics.  Most  studies  stress  the  importance  of  internal  group  dialogue,  but  fail  to
uncover internal organisational processes and analyse divergences of opinions between these groups’
leaders. This corpus does not investigate the acceptance of the revisions by these groups' members, and
are  generally  quite  unsuspecting  in  their  contention  that  these  groups'  nature  has  fundamentally
changed, despite the limited textual scope of the revisions. 
The most  comprehensive studies  were authored by Omar Ashour on the deradicalisation  of  jihadi
movements in  three North African countries,  including Egypt  (Ashour,  2009,  2010,  2011).  Ashour
argues that these processes have been rendered possible by a combination of credible leadership, state
repression, internal and external social interactions and selective inducements. The presence of these
four factors is necessary to the renunciation of violence, according to Ashour. State repression sparks a
re-evaluation of the costs of violence by these groups' leaderships. Interacting with non-Islamist groups
influences militant groups' belief system and, eventually, internal dialogue led by a credible leadership
and  sustained  by  selective  inducements  of  the  state  facilitates  the  internal  promotion  of
deradicalisation. 
Ashour's study of internal group dynamics is nonetheless less convincing. Ashour argues that internal
dialogue led by a charismatic and credible leadership is sufficient to convince these groups' followers
to renounce their ideas, without explaining if and why these groups' members have accepted the new
strategic direction promoted by their leaders. This gap leaves a few questions unexplored. Have all
these groups' members accepted the theological renunciations of violence? Were internal dialogue and
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these leaders' credibility sufficient to internally legitimise these new ideas? These questions suggest
that lower-ranking members may have only tacitly accepted this process and, in this case, the role
played by additional factors (including some type of rational choice, group identity and group survival)
could  be  examined.  Finally,  Ashour's  study  is  relatively  mechanistic  and  unidirectional.  Ashour's
analysis contends that the combination of the four previously mentioned factors is sufficient to explain
why  and  how  militant  groups  deradicalise,  following  a  top  down  approach.  This  unilateralism  is
debatable, however, and the extent to which these groups’ leaders were also constrained by ideational
and  organisational  factors,  including  by  the  reception  of  their  ideas  at  a  meso-level,  has  to  be
investigated.
The corpus on the moderation, political participation and deradicalisation of non-violent and violent
Islamist groups presents a general consensus on a few factors deemed important in the study of militant
groups' transformation. These studies recognise that the decisions to participate in the political process
and  to  renounce  violence  result  from  internal  and  external  relational  processes  informed  by  a
combination of changing macro and meso-level factors, including new political opportunities, internal
cognitive processes and organisational dialogue. This corpus nonetheless remains relatively ambivalent
vis-à-vis the role of macro-level change. While these analyses generally recognise that Islamist groups'
interpretations of their external environments affect their decision making processes, political inclusion
and repression are alternatively given predominance in these groups' decisions to renounce some of
their ideological commitments and participate in their domestic political systems.
The academic literature on Islamist groups' moderation and deradicalisation is also incomplete on two
accounts. The first deficiency is its elitist bias. Most analyses accurately investigate Islamist groups'
decision making processes and cover the evolving positions adopted by their leaders overtime. These
studies do not, however, meticulously explore internal interactions between these groups’ leaders and
members,  and tend to assume that lower-ranking members unquestionably accept the new strategic
choices  of  their  leaders.  In  some cases,  as  in  Ashour's  study,  a  credible  and legitimate  leadership
combined with internal dialogue are deemed sufficient to internally legitimise new directions, without
expanding  on  their  organisational  internalisation.  One  could  nonetheless  infer  that  Islamist  group
leaders  are  simultaneously  constrained  by  the  acceptance  of  their  new  strategic  choices  by  their
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followers, and cannot simply impose their will on demand.
This  corpus  additionally  disregards  the  influence  of  other  groups  and  social  movements  on  the
evolution of violent and non-violent Islamist groups.248 A few case studies explore the interactions with
“the  other”  (i.e.  non-Islamist  groups  and  individuals),249 without  further  consideration  for  militant
groups' dialogues and interactions with Islamist movements and actors who potentially share common
organisational and ideational  resources.  Although regular interactions with non-Islamist  figures  can
influence Islamist groups' cognitive processes, one could speculate that militant groups' leaders and
members are more likely to be influenced by external actors who share a common religious creed and
worldview, albeit with a different political understanding. In this study of the transformation of Islamist
militant groups, it can notably be posited that non-violent Islamist groups and scholars can provide
cultural and organisational resources which could help to legitimise and rationalise militant groups'
non-violent strategic choices.
This research investigates the emergence and construction of militant groups' collective identities to
mitigate  the  elite  bias  of  the  literature.  The  notion  of  collective  identity  is  a  meso-level  concept
(Klandermans  &  de  Weerd,  2000)  which  contrasts  with  the  societal  conceptualisation  of  identity
utilised by new social movement scholars. This concept facilitates the study of the interactions between
these groups' leaders and members, with the postulate that organisational belonging is associated with
meaning-making  processes  of  their  members'  engagement  (Melucci,  1995),  notably  through  the
framing of their actions (Hunt et al., 1994). The consideration of a group's collective identity promotes
the understanding of its transformation in continuity (Melucci, 1995), in light of the opportunities and
constraints  inherent  with  past  developments  (Taylor  &  Whittier,  1992).  This  concept  additionally
stimulates the study of the relationship between these groups' ideologies and organisational structures
(e.g. Reger, 2002; Whittier, 2002). A reference to militant groups' collective group identities means
that, rather than focusing on several concepts such as charisma and social capital which are difficult to
248 There are a few exceptions, such as the previously mentioned study of framing competition between Islamist non-
violent groups (Marshall, 2005) See also Malthaner's (2014) on the Islamist radical milieu.
249 For instance Ashour mentions the interactions between Human Rights activists and Islamist militants in prison (Ashour,
2009). In non-violent cases, Wickham emphasises the cooperation between MB members and non Islamist forces in
professional  organisations  and  syndicates  (Wickham,  2013),  while  Schwedler  and  Clark  uncover  the  interactions
between MB-affiliated movements and leftist forces (Schwedler & Clark, 2006).
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systematically  compare  across  cases,  this  study  focuses  on  militant  groups'  leaders  organisational
positions and reinterpretations of their groups' collective group identities to internally legitimise new
strategic or ideological choices.
Finally, this research utilises the concept of social movement family to study the influence of non-
violent Islamist movements on militant groups. This concept is defined by Donatella della Porta and
Dieter Rucht “as a nationally based, historical configuration of movements that—though they have
different  specific  goals,  immediate  fields  of  struggle,  and  strategic  preferences—share  a  common
worldview, have organisational overlaps, and occasionally ally for joint campaigns.” (della Porta &
Rucht,  1995:  233).  This  study  uses  this  conceptualisation  to  investigate  the  ideational  and
organisational  developments  of  the  sub-components  of  the  Islamist  social  movement  family  in
changing  environmental  conditions.  This  research  posits  that  the  ideational  and  organisational
resources of the Islamist social movement family can inform militant groups' evolving choices and
contribute to their legitimisation of new strategic directions.
6.3. WAS THERE ANOTHER WAY OUT? POLITICAL INCLUSION AND EXCLUSION OF
THE EGYPTIAN ISLAMIST SOCIAL MOVEMENT FAMILY UNDER MUBARAK
This section explores the development of the organisational and cultural resources of the Islamist social
movement family in the structural context characterising the Egyptian regime between 1981 and the
2011 uprising. This structural context, defined by della Porta and Rucht's analytical model (1995: 115)
as  “the  setting  for  both  the  social  movement  family  and  the  alliance  and  conflict  systems”,  was
relatively stable. The regime of former president Hosni Mubarak was authoritarian and provided stable
(and limited) political opportunities to its Islamist opponents, illustrated in various degrees of political
inclusion and exclusion over time (Statcher, 2012). The regime allowed some level of non-violent and
non-threatening opposition,  as  well  as diverse opportunities  to  participate  through political  parties,
syndicates and grass-root movements; it was neither fully inclusive nor fully exclusive vis-à-vis the
political  opposition (Wickham, 2002:  63-66).  This relative stability does not necessarily mean that
noticeable internal variations overtime cannot be discerned. Brown argues that changing patterns of
political  inclusion and exclusion is symptomatic of semi-authoritarian regimes,  which continuously
strive to mold their interactions with the opposition through unstable and re-negotiated institutional
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regulations (Brown, 2012: 15-31). The Polity IV Project of the Center for Systemic Peace substantiates
this relative stability (until 2005), and defines Mubarak's regime as autocratic, based on several key
characteristics including the nature of electoral competition and the existence of constraints on the
executive.250 
6.1. Evolution of the level of authoritarianism of the Egyptian regime251
This section analyses the development of the ideational and organisational resources of the Islamist
social movement family according to the following definitions. Organisational resources are defined as
“the “material” basis for communication and action, networks, infrastructure, and organisations” (della
Porta  &  Rucht,  1995:  115),  while  cultural  resources  refer  to  their  “worldviews,  values,  frames,
symbols, skills, experiences, and motivations” (della Porta & Rucht, 1995: 115). The Islamist social
movement  family  includes,  in  addition  to  the  IG  and  the  JG,  the  salafi  trend  and  MB-related
organisations and institutions. The salafi trend is composed of all the groups and movements using the
salafi etiquette,  notably  salafi  networks  in  Cairo  and  Alexandria  and  the  two  mainstream  salafi
institutions,  ansar al-sunna al-muhammadiyya and al-jamʿiyya al-sharʿiyya.252 They are characterised
250 The User's Manual describing these characteristics and their coding is available on the following address: 
http://www.systemicpeace.org/inscr/p4manualv2013.pdf 
251 This  graph  is  based  on  the  Polity  IV  Egypt  country  report,  available  at  the  following  address:
http://www.systemicpeace.org/polity/Egypt2010.pdf 
252 Even though al-jamʿiyya al-sharʿiyya is not striclty salafi, as explained in chapter 3.
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by  multiple  informal  and  formal  networks  and  institutions  centred  around  groups,  sheikhs  and
neighbourhoods (Gauvain, 2010; al-Anani & Malik, 2013; Utvik, 2014). MB-affiliated groups includes
the  groups  and  movements  which  spring  from  the  Muslim  Brotherhood,  including  its  charitable
networks and the political party which successively split from this organisation, notably hizb al-wasat,
the Centre Party, created in 1996. The following analysis is congruent with Brown's (2012) assertion
that the semi-authoritarian environments in which Islamist movements evolve shape the mobilisation of
their organisational and ideological resources.
This section specifically argues that the relatively stable structural context defining the Egyptian regime
between 1981 and 2011 shaped the development of the Islamist social movement family, and explains
the isolated routes taken by its three main subcomponents (the proponents of violence, mainstream
salafis, and the MB). The post-1981 structural context obstructed internal interactions, dialogue and
cooperation between these three sub-Islamist  trends,  and regulated  their  separate  evolution  despite
organisational and ideational proximity in the 1970s.253 This structural context additionally prevented
the materialisation of Islamist participation as a credible alternative to the achievement of substantial
political change. The combination of these two characteristics suggests that IG and JG leaders and
members were unaffected by virtually inexistent interactions with other Islamist forces, and remained
uninfluenced by their (negligible) political achievements. These two assertions indicate that these three
trends did not share noticeable organisational resources during this period, and did not develop credible
cultural resources in favour of political participation.
The succession  of  Anwar  Sadat  by  Hosni  Mubarak  in  1981 had far-reaching ramifications  on  the
Islamist social movement family. While Anwar Sadat ended his reign with massive arrests among his
political opponents, Islamists and non-Islamists alike, his succession by Hosni Mubarak was followed
by a phase of controlled political liberalisation (Wickham, 2002: 66) which informed the opportunities
and constraints available to opposition movements thereafter. The new political context and the lessons
of Sadat's assassination informed the strategic decision of the MB and mainstream  salafi  groups to
devote  their  organisational  and  ideational  resources  into  two  isolated  routes,  which  shaped  their
253 On the interactions between Alexandria-based salafis and the MB in the 1970s, and more specifically on the eventual
refusal of the salafis to pledge allegiance to the MB, see also Hassan (2012: 167-170).
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subsequent evolution until the 2011 uprising. The MB maintained its rejection of armed violence in
Egypt and recognised the necessity to engage in political and social activities. The internally diverse
salafi trend broadly silenced previous discussions on the use of violence in Islamic countries and on the
Islamic legitimacy of current Muslim leaders, replaced by a practical focus on non-violent preaching.
These two trends voluntarily distanced themselves from the proponents of violence to assure their
organisational survival in a new political environment.
The initial phase of political liberalisation was utilised by the MB to entrench its reformist nature and
develop new organisational and ideational resources to sustain this objective. This process followed the
MB's internal retrospection and ideological moderation initiated in the 1970s, when the second general
guide of the Brotherhood Hassan al-Hudaybi published the opus duat la qudat (Preachers not Judges)
to  refute  the  ideas  developed  by  Sayyid  Qutb  in  prison  (Zollner,  2008).  The  engagement  with
Mubarak's regime after 1981 and the concomitant participation in the political process were initially
justified by the opportunity to protect the group's preaching activities and pursue the Islamisation of
society  through parliament  (Wickham,  2013:  46;  Hamid,  2014:  67).  The  MB's  long-term strategy
crystallised henceforth as the materialisation of the group as the main non-threatening opposition to the
regime, with an implicit endeavour to potentially replace Mubarak's National Democratic Party in the
long run (Blaydes, 2010).
The MB engaged with this new structural context in complementary arenas, including the parliament,
professional syndicates and the informal Islamic sector. Immediately after 1981, the state's obstruction
to the recognition of the MB as a political party and the list-based voting system required an alliance
with an established political party. The MB therefore joined the new Wafd party as a junior partner in
1984,  and  collectively  obtained 13 per  cent  of  the  seats  in  parliament  in  the  legislative  elections
organised the same year. Four years later, in 1988, the MB changed partner and became the dominant
actor of an alliance with the socialist Labour party, and gained 22 per cent of the seats in parliament
(Hafez,  2003:  48).  The  MB additionally  mobilised  its  organisational  resources  to  join  subsidiary
domains.  The  group  notably  became a  dominant  actor  in  university  associations  and  professional
syndicates,  thanks  to  the  organisational  absorption  of  skilled  student  leaders  of  the  late  1970s
(Wickham, 2013; Al-Arian, 2014). The MB finally took advantage of the expansion of the “parallel
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Islamic sector” (Wickham, 2002: 94), which appeared in the 1980s as a “broad network of Islamic
institutions [which] begun to coalesce in the interstices of Egypt's authoritarian state” (Wickham, 2002:
95). This sector included an array of entities, including mosques, associations, clinics and schools,
developed by MB members to sustain the expansion of their  group and the accomplishment of its
objectives.
The  MB's  reformist  endeavour  and  the  group's  engagement  with  the  regime  and  non-Islamist
opposition forces influenced internal debates on democracy and Islamic law (Wickham, 2013: 55-58),
and strengthened the MB's commitments to political reform. The Brotherhood's collaboration with new
political forces impacted the world-views and cognitive processes of new MB members, especially the
generation who joined the group in the late 1970s from the universities students' unions (Wickham,
2013; Kandil, 2014). These interactions sustained new cooperative interactions with external actors and
reinforced the internal role played by MB reformists (Wickham, 2013: 58-70). The structural context
defining the Egyptian regime from 1981 onwards internally sustained the MB's strategic choice to
engage with it.
The evolution of Egyptian salafism contrasts significantly with the MB on organisational and ideational
grounds. Mainstream salafism developed distinctively from the IG and the JG, and adopted a separate
trajectory. Organisationally, the epicentre of the salafi social movement family emerged in Alexandria,
where mostly medicine university students politicised in the 1970s founded the al-madrasa al-salafiyya
(the Salafi school), and then al-daʿwa al-salafiyya, the Salafi Call, in the early 1980s (Hassan, 2012a:
167-170; Faid, 2014: 55). These students were members of the Islamic groups which proliferated in
Egyptian universities in the 1970s, and who eventually refused to join the MB as their Cairo-based
counterpart  (Hassan, 2012a: 167).  Young  salafi  leaders additionally refused to join the mainstream
ansar al-sunna, whose institutional make-up was considered constraining on their activities (al-ʿAl,
2012: 30-31). They rather created a network of mosques and social services in the Nile Delta, which
later spread throughout the country (Gauvain, 2010; Hassan, 2012a, 2012b; Lacroix, 2012; al-Anani &
Malik, 2013; Utvik, 2014). In Cairo, local mosques and associations similarly developed independent
salafi networks, often operating underground and characterised by lower levels of institutionalisation.
These loose networks did not enjoy the relative unity of the Salafi Call and were marked by sharper
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local divisions (Gauvain, 2010). At the national level, there were no salafi organisations or institutions
which enjoyed a monopoly on the salafi trend akin to the MB's.
The ideational development of the  salafi  social movement family was profoundly influenced by the
assassination of Sadat and its repercussions. The main ramification of the use of violence by  salafi
actors was the conscious decision of mainstream salafis to silence public discussions on jihad and on
the  legitimacy of  current  Muslim leaders.  In  Alexandria,  the  leaders  of  the  most  organised  salafi
movement deliberately chose to eschew political activities to protect their social activities and preclude
political repression (Lacroix, 2012: 4). They preferred to focus on teaching, notably through the furqan
institute created in the early 1980s (Hassan, 2012a: 169-170).  In Cairo,  diverse networks of  salafi
sympathisers and preachers were, in their theologico-political outlooks, divided on the legitimacy of
the  regime  and  its  president  Hosni  Mubarak.  Local  divisions  ranged  from  the  supporters  of  the
uncompromising positions  of  Sayyid  Qutb  to  their  opponents,  mostly  represented  by the so-called
madkhali,254 who  justified  the  Islamic  legitimacy  of  Hosni  Mubarak  (Gauvain,  2010,  2011:175;
Lacroix, 2012). These divisions were very common in Egyptian salafism and similarly thrived inside
ansar al-sunna (Gauvain, 2010, 2012). Only some Cairo-based preachers such as sheikh Muhammad
ʿAbdul  Maqsud  and  Fawzi  Saʿid,  often  referred  to  as  the  haraki (activist)  salafis,  adopted  an
antagonistic  position  towards  the  regime  and  Muslim  leaders  who  do  not  apply  Islamic  law
comprehensively (Faid, 2014: 59-60). Their position represented a middle ground between mainstream
and jihadi salafis: excommunication of the Muslim leader without resorting to violence. At the same
time,  Egyptian  salafis  acknowledged that  this  issue  had  no place  in  the  public  sphere,  and  salafi
preachers generally respected the boundaries imposed by the regime (Brown, 2012). 
These developments critically framed the subsequent mobilising patterns and ideological developments
of  Egyptian  salafi  networks.  The  nature  of  the  political  opportunities  available  to  opposition
movements  in  Egypt  and  the  impossibility  to  challenge  the  regime  from  within  sustained  the
development  of an apolitical  ideological construction.  Most  salafi  groups and networks channelled
254 This denomination refers to Rabiʿ al-Madkhali, a prominent contemporary Saudi salafi scholar who has been used since
the 1990s by the Saudi government to oppose the politicisation of the salafi opposition in the country, represented by
the  sahwa (revival) movement,  and the influence of Sayyid Qutb on Islamist movements more generally. See also
Lacroix (2011: 212-213).
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their  organisational  resources  into  preaching  and  teaching  in  order  to  avert  the  repetition  of  pre-
Mubarak's campaigns of arrests, and to stay under the radars of the regime. Al-daʿwa al-salafiyya was
specifically careful not to be associated with  jihadi  groups and suffer their fate.  Ansar al-sunna was
similarly unwilling to  reiterate the active stance adopted between the 1960s and the 1970s,  which
sparked, back then, its dissolution into the mainstream al-jamʿiyya al-sharʿiyya and the confiscation of
its resources (Gauvain, 2010: 815). Mainstream salafis chose to exploit the favourable political context
to  expand  their  networks,  even  though they  occasionally  suffered  from limited  setbacks  (Lacroix,
2012). Mainstream public positions drew upon the cultural resources developed by the Saudi religious
establishment,  which  specifically  warns  against  political  participation  and  its  associated  evils  on
Muslim societies, notably fitna (discord) and fawda (chaos) (Gauvain, 2010: 815).
The phase of relative political opening ceased by the end of the 1980s, when the contentious conflict
with the IG and the JG inaugurated a wave of political de-liberalisation which extended throughout the
1990s. The conflict with militant Islamist groups and the perceived empowerment of the MB through
political participation were resented by the regime, which decided to revoke the conciliatory position
formerly endorsed towards the opposition (Hamid, 2014: 88). The legislative elections organised in
1990 were logically boycotted by an array of opposition movements, while the subsequent legislative
elections held in 1995 were preceded by sweeping arrests among political opponents, and accompanied
by the increasing use of military trials against the opposition (Rutherford, 2013: 88). The evolution of
the Egyptian political context marked the beginning of a period of relative political exclusion.
Political  de-liberalisation  did  not  impede and reverse  the  MB's  moderation,  nor  did  it  disrupt  the
group's  reformist  agenda.  Political  exclusion  reinforced  the  group's  commitment  to  internal  and
domestic democratisation (Wickham, 2013: 71-73; Hamid, 2014: 91-97) and reinvigorated the group's
promotion of democracy and political reform in Egypt. Wickham argues that this evolution reflects the
growing influence of the reformists inside the Brotherhood. She asserts that the reformist faction is
formed by MB members who joined the Brotherhood in the late 1970s, and who have been influenced
from the 1980s onwards by increased collaboration with non-Islamist political forces, especially in the
syndicates  and  in  the  professional  associations.  She  adds  that,  in  contrast  with  the  previous  MB
generation, the reformists were not socialised in prison and did not consequently have the same narrow
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mindset  (Wickham,  2013:  58-70).  Hamid  adopts  a  more  cynical  view,  and  asserts  that  this  new
pragmatism is better explained by the need of the MB to seek legal protection and allies against state
repression (Hamid, 2014: 91-97). Despite diverging analyses, what matters for this section is that, when
political exclusion worsened, the MB was all the more willing to carry on investing its cultural and
organisational resources into the promotion of political reformism in Egypt.
The phase of political de-liberalisation witnessed throughout the 1990s similarly affected the Egyptian
salafi  trend.  The  post-1981  decision  to  avoid  political  activities  and  take  distance  from  Islamist
militants facilitated the survival of  salafi networks and the continuation of their grass-root activities.
State repression and the contentious conflict with militant salafi groups (the IG and the JG) confirmed
the necessity to dissociate themselves from controversial public statements and from taking part to the
opposition to Mubarak's regime. The salafi  trend maintained the same organisational and networking
structures  and strategic  vision,  centred  on teaching and preaching.  They only suffered  from some
setbacks, such as the closure of the Alexandria-based furqan institute and of the group's publication in
1994 (al-ʿAl, 2012: 32). The evolution of the Egyptian structural context entrenched the route hitherto
endorsed by salafi groups and networks.
Egyptian salafis had not been specifically affected by political  and societal  developments until  the
2000s, when the religious field witnessed new developments. During the decade preceding the 2011
uprising, the proliferation of satellite TV channels and the growing access to the internet in Egyptian
households  combined  with  the  marketisation  of  religion  contributed  to  the  promotion  of  a  new
individualistic approach to Islam in Egyptian society (Haenni, 2005; Roy, 2012).255 The diversification
of the religious field was reinforced by the growing inability of the religious establishment to fulfil
individual religious expectations (Roy, 2012). The individualisation of religion has been corroborated
by the marginalisation of traditional and institutionalised forms of religiosity, gradually replaced by an
individually-driven selection among an array of religious sources (Roy, 2012).256
This setting was fertile ground for the diffusion of new forms of salafism. Salafi preachers increasingly
255 See also Hirschkind (2006) and Mahmood (2011).
256 For a broader study, see also Roy (2010).
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relied on new religious TV channels and on the internet, rather than on salafi  associations, to diffuse
the salafi approach to Islam (Field & Hamam, 2009; Gauvain, 2010: 816; Lacroix, 2012: 2). This new
mode of socialisation with salafism shaped its new organisational and ideological making and rendered
it more individualistic. Whereas  salafi Muslims in Egypt used to be socialised in  salafi  institutions
around  specific  religious  scholars,  this  new  socialisation  through  the  internet  and  satellite  TV
individualised the religious approach of the new generation and shaped their eclectic choice among
diversified sources, which has been conducive to the creation of their own understanding of salafism
(Drevon, 2015, forthcoming). This period saw the proliferation of new salafi figures and movements,
such  as  mainstream  satellite-TV preachers  Muhammad  Hassan,  Muhammad  Hussein  Yaʿqub  and
Hazem Abu Ismaʿil, and new movements such as the al-haraka al-salafiyya min ajl al-islah (the salafi
movement for reform) (Faid, 2014: 57). Salafism became more influential in Egyptian society while,
paradoxically, traditional salafi networks and institutions lost their sway over its development.
These societal  changes reinforced the competition between the MB and the  salafi  trend inside the
Islamist social movement family. The first arena of contention was charity, where the expansion of
charitable  salafi  networks  increased  rivalry  with  MB-affiliated  networks.  This  antagonism  was
nonetheless abated by different focuses with, for instance, a middle class and urban constituency for the
MB (Clark, 2004; Masoud, 2014).257 Competition was more strident in the religious field, where the
salafis were better positioned to capitalise on the evolution of the religious practices in Egypt.  Salafi
networks had devoted their organisational and cultural resources to education and preaching for the
past three decades, and possessed a rich and coherent religious corpus to diffuse through new means of
communication. The political focus of the MB and its neglected religious construction (Kandil, 2014)
mean that, aside from a few exceptions,258 the MB did not have the religious scholars and literature akin
to the salafis', which became influential even among MB members.259 The MB has indeed long been
marked  by  a  richer  internal  religious  diversity  between  the  sufis,  the  Qutbis,  the  salafis  and  the
proponents of religious traditionalism (El-Houdaiby, 2012; Wickham 2013: 133-137), and defined by
257 On the Islamic charity sector in Egypt, see also Atia (2013).
258 One of the most renown MB-affiliated scholar is Yusuf al-Qaradawi. He is the chairman of the International Union of
Muslim Scholars,  and  is  widely  considered  influential  among MB members.  Al-Qaradawi  was  offered  an  official
position in the group on two occasions (see also:  Graf & Skovgaard-Petersen, 2009).  Another influential Egyptian
scholar for MB members is Sawfat Hegazi.
259 The salafi influence among MB members is substantiated by an array of qualitative evidences. The most comprehensive
historical analysis by Husam Tamam (2012) traces its origins back to the exile of MB members to Saudi Arabia in the
1960s (see  also:  Lacroix,  2011).  Recent  academic studies  additionally  highlight  the changing  demography of  MB
members in the 2000s (Kandil, 2014).
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its  neglected  endeavour  to  diffuse  a  unified  religious  approach  in  society  (Kandil,  2014).  These
developments indicate that Egyptian societal evolution reinforced internal competition in the Islamist
social  movement  family,  even though internal  interactions  remained underdeveloped.  Islamist  sub-
groups  remained  faithful  to  their  previous  routes,  daʿwa for  the  salafis  and  political  reform  and
participation for the MB.
The last political developments before the 2011 uprising occurred in the context of the two legislative
elections organised in 2005 and 2010. The main noticeable change was the provisional and limited
liberalisation of the political system in the aftermath of 9/11, when Mubarak's regime was pressured by
the United States to undertake steps towards political liberalisation. George W. Bush notably insisted
that the absence of democratic regimes in the Middle East partially contributed to the 9/11 attacks, and
promoted a so-called “freedom agenda” to liberalise the region (Hassan, 2008; Dunne, 2009). The 2005
Egyptian elections were therefore the most competitive elections ever organised during Mubarak's three
decades in power. These elections witnessed unprecedented gains for the MB, which loomed as the
largest opposition group in the parliament with 20 per cent of the seats (Gunning & Baron, 2013;
Osman,  2013).  This  perceptible  political  opening  should  not  conceal,  however,  that  the  MB still
suffered from repeated waves of arrest which substantiate that the regime had not fully liberalise and
remained semi-authoritarian.  The regime similarly  continued to  repress  growing waves  of  popular
protests which proliferated in the 2000s (Gunning & Baron, 2013). The next parliamentary elections,
organised in 2010, marked a clear set-back. They were widely denounced as fraudulent, and rebuked by
the opposition which broadly boycotted them, even though the MB participated and obtained a single
seat (Gunning & Baron, 2013; Osman, 2013).
This relatively stable structural political context contextualises why the salafi  trend did not revise its
theological  position  on  political  participation  in  the  2000s,  despite  the  significant  political  gains
achieved by the MB in 2005.  Salafi groups maintained their former positions, which stretched from
silence to the denunciation of democracy as a form of kufr (disbelief) (al-ʿAl, 2012: 37-38, 44; Zahran
et al., 2012a: 29-31). These apolitical or antagonistic positions to democracy raised the speculation
among many observers, including U.S diplomats (Wikileaks, 2011) that salafis were used by the state
as a religious alibi against the MB. After the uprising, the most organised component of pre-2011 salafi
networks retrospectively argued that their refusal to participate was essentially political, and informed
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by the absence of a competitive political system that would allow for substantive changes to occur
through the ballot box (Lacroix, 2012). The pre-2011 setting also signifies that Egyptian salafis did not
develop any organisational or ideational resources towards the shaping of a political vision for Egypt
before the 2011 uprising, and carried on their post-1981 route during this decade.
The investigation of the evolution of the structural context under Mubarak confirms its relative stability
for the three decades preceding the resignation of the Egyptian president. A stable structural context
shaped  the  evolution  of  the  Islamist  social  movement  family,  and informed its  organisational  and
ideational  development  from 1981  to  2011.  The  MB channelled  its  organisational  and  ideational
resources towards the sustainability of its reformist endeavour, despite numerous obstacles. The group's
long-term  approach  to  political  change  in  Egypt  relied  on  the  mobilisation  of  a  middle  class
constituency and on the development  of  internal  norms of  organisational  survival.  Conversely,  the
salafi  trend remained divided until 2011, although its sub-components consensually agreed that they
had  to  eschew  political  activities  and  focus  on  preaching  and  teaching  to  survive  in  this  semi-
authoritarian setting.
This analysis is critical to the understanding of the evolution of the IG and of the JG before 2011. This
section notably reveals  that  these groups'  non-violent  competitors  in  the Islamist  social  movement
family  did  not  develop  a  credible  alternative  to  political  violence  to  change  the  fundamentals  of
Mubarak's  regime.  The  MB's  non-threatening  opposition  to  Mubarak  and  the  salafi's apolitical
preaching, both aiming in their own ways at the very long term, did not generate appealing cultural
resources  which  could  have  challenged  IG  and  JG  members  and  leaders,  and  triggered  a
reconsideration of their positions on democracy. Moreover, the organisational isolation of the three sub-
components  of  the  Islamist  social  movement  family  obstructed  internal  interactions,  dialogue  and
cooperation which could have stimulated a similar outcome. Dalacoura's claim that militant groups
rejected  democracy  in  the  1980s  (Dalacoura,  2011:  117)  is  therefore  inadequate  considering  that,
despite  occasional  improvements  (notably  in  1987  and  2005),  Mubarak's  regime  was  never  fully
inclusive nor electorally competitive. At the same time, IG leaders' claims in personal interviews (e.g.
Hafez,  2013)  that  they  rejected  democracy  in  the  1980s  and  in  the  1990s  solely  because  they
considered democracy a legitimising tool for the regime, and the related argument that the IG's former
theology did not aim at democratic participation per se, cannot be substantiated in this case. While the
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IG  and  some  JG  factions  legitimised  political  participation  after  2011,  the  following  analysis
demonstrates that this structural change was not the only factor informing the evolution of these groups'
political outlooks.
6.4. COLLECTIVE GROUP IDENTITY AND THE CONSTRUCTION OF AN APPROACH TO
POLITICAL ACTION
This section investigates the development of the collective group identity and approach to political
action of the IG and of the JG from their emergence to the 2011 uprising. In contrast with the fourth
chapter of this thesis, this section does not explore the construction of these groups' theologico-political
frameworks through the study of their leaderships, but rather endeavours to study the organisational
elaboration of these groups' ideational commitments. The main argument developed thenceforth is that
militant  groups'  organisational  and  ideational  early  developments  are  interdependent  with  the
construction  of  their  collective  identities  and approach to  political  action.  These  processes  further
account for the endurance of these groups' internal cohesion overtime and have assured, in the IG, the
successful  diffusion  of  new ideational  frames  when  IG leaders'  collectively  renounced  the  use  of
violence in Egypt.
Collective group identity is an analytical concept designed to investigate meaning making at a meso-
level. This concept is based on the premise that militant groups, like any other organised entity engaged
in  contentious  politics,  actively  construct  the  sense  of  their  actions  through the  development  of  a
collective  group identity  (Melucci,  1995).  New social  movement  theorists  assert  that  this  process
unfolds in the course of social movement activities through internal dialogues, cognitive processes and
negotiations,  and  in  interaction  with  external  actors  (Taylor  &  Whittier,  1992).  Collective  group
identity is thus described as “the shared definition of a group that derives from members' common
interests, experiences and solidarity” (Taylor & Whittier, 1992: 105). This definition nonetheless does
not include the contextual field in which identity construction occurs, and which is incorporated in
Melucci's conceptualisation of collective identity as “an interactive and shared definition produced by
several individuals (or groups at a more complex level) and concerned with the orientations of action
and the field of opportunities and constraints in which the action takes place”. Collective identity is
therefore partially shaped by these groups'  external context, as asserted by Melucci,  who adds that
“actors “produce” the collective action because they are able to define themselves and their relationship
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with the environment” (1995: 43).
The following analysis  contends that  the IG and the JG produced,  in  their  early days,  an explicit
primordial identity which has shaped the foundations of their collective “we”. This collective “we”,
whose definition is “a fundamental accomplishment of activist groups” (Blee, 2012: 53), includes, in
line  with  Melucci's  framework,  these  groups'  ends,  means  and  possibilities  (Melucci,  1995).  This
section argues that these groups internalised their collective “we” through diverging mobilising patterns
consistent with their collective identities' fundamental nature and with the structural context in which
these  groups  initially  operated.  This  section  establishes  that  the  theoretical  positions  on  violence
embedded in the IG and in the JG's collective group identities enabled diverging mobilising patterns
which have subsequently impacted their organisational internalisation. The IG's initially non-violent
endeavour  promoted  low-risk  activism  mobilising  patterns  which  have  facilitated  a  thorough
assimilation of the IG's collective group identity, strengthened its internal hierarchy and discipline, and
legitimised its leaders' figures of authority. Even though the IG engaged, in the late 1970s, in clashes
with its local competitors, widespread armed violence did not materialise in the group's early days and
was not constitutive of the group's initial endeavour. Conversely, the violent endeavour pursued by the
JG  from its  inception  enforced  high-risk  activism  mobilising  patterns  which  have  obstructed  the
replication of similar processes.
In the 1970s, the emergence of the IG as a group of friends who gathered to preach Islam in society has
shaped  the  group's  daʿwi  (proselytising)  primordial  identity.  Multiple  interviews  and  written
testimonies  of  its  early  founders260 suggest  that  IG leaders  and members  collectively  framed their
actions and the meanings of their engagement with the necessity to spread Islam in Egyptian society
through  daʿwa.  This engagement was harmonious with the post-Nasserist environment of the 1970s,
when  a  religious  zeal  transpired  across  social  classes  and  backgrounds,  regardless  of  previous
intellectual  affiliations.  Early  IG  members  hailed  from different  socio-economic  backgrounds  and
levels of religiosity. They mostly converged around a unifying Islamic revivalist endeavour. This point
relates to Roel Meijeir's contention that the IG has historically been guided by hisba (which is usually
translated as the promotion of virtue and repression of vice in Islam) as a “principle of social action”
260 Chapter 3 pages 82-85.
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(Meijer, 2009b), even though, according to field research and interviews,  daʿwa is ubiquitous while
hisba is rarely ever mentioned.
The IG's ideational focus on daʿwa shaped the means and possibilities available to the group before the
contentious conflict with the state, as well as the conditions of their internalisation through low-risk
activism  mobilising  patterns.  As  argued  by  Blee  on  grass-root  activism,  “activist  groups  quickly
develop routing ways of operating that shape what they will do and will consider doing far into the
future” (Blee, 2012: 29) and “to define who fits into the group by assessing questions of belonging,
membership and recruiting” (Blee, 2012: 79). The liberalised environment of the 1970s was notably
favourable to the use of the public space for religious mobilisation. This supportive environment was
manifest  on many levels,  and can be generally corroborated by the increasing number of mosques
through the country, by the growing influence of Islamist activism on university campuses and by the
expansion of the Islamic parallel sector (e.g. Abdo, 2002; Wickham, 2002; Al-Arian, 2014). The IG
benefited from this new setting to engage in various low-risk activities, including public preaching and
the provision of diverse forms of social support which facilitated the recruitment of new members,
strengthened the ties between IG members and leaders, and promoted the internal assimilation of the
daʿwi collective group identity.  The IG's internal discipline was organisationally normalised by the
adoption of the MB minhaj (method)261 and by the endorsement of the Islamic concept of al-samaʿ wal-
taʿa (listen and obey), which characterised Islamist student groups in the 1970s (Al-Arian, 2014: 120).
This concept can be traced back to early Islamic history, and refers to the necessity for Muslims to obey
God, his Prophet Muhammad and those in charge of authority. This concept facilitated the maintenance
of an organisational discipline inside the IG and reinforced the group's patriarchal nature. The structural
contextual of the 1970s combined with the daʿwi (proselytising) nature of the IG's primordial identity
therefore  bolstered  low-risk  activism  mobilising  patterns  which  played  a  critical  role  in  the
socialisation of new members and in the creation of consensual organisational norms.
The inception  of  the  first  JG affiliated  cells  contrasts  substantively  with  these  developments.  The
violent nature of these cells' primordial identity, a jihadi avant-garde, prevented the institution of low-
261 Cf. chapter 3 page 88. This similarity between the MB minhaj  and the IG is often mentioned by IG members, who
define themselves as the salafi equivalent of the MB.
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risk  activism  mobilising  patterns.  The  translation  of  this primordial  identity  into  organisational
mobilisation was indeed associated, as in analogous cases, with several trade-offs between security,
efficiency and control (e.g. Shapiro, 2013). The ideational nature of these cells' primary endeavour to
use violence against the state prevented them from exploiting a relatively liberal environment on the IG
model.  JG  members  could  not  organise  low-risk  activism  activities  to  mobilise  and  recruit  new
followers, and had to maintain a certain level of secrecy to avoid external infiltration by the political
police (e.g. Muhammad, 2013). These obstacles to low-risk activism mobilisation internally hindered
the development of shared organisational norms: JG cells were plagued with divisions and internal
competition,  and had to  rely primarily  on relational micro-mobilisation among trusted networks of
acquaintances, family and friends (e.g. Muhammad, 2013). A member of one of the most prominent JG
cell led by Saleh Sirriyya, argues that:
Saleh believed in a very specific mode of organisation. He believed that we should design a strategic
plan and delegate its application to individual groups. We needed to compartmentalise our actions and to
create different units throughout the country and inside the army. Our security needs made it impossible
to  create  a  centralised  organisation  which  could  have  been  destroyed  at  any  time.  Our  three  core
principles  were:  secrecy,  deception  and  decentralisation.  We  did  not  have  a  plan  at  the  beginning,
however, and were isolated from one another because we feared that insiders could collaborate with the
state and betray the group.
Commenting on the emergence of early JG cells, a JG leader adds that:
The main difference between us and the IG concerned the level of secrecy needed by our group. We did
not engage in mainstream daʿwa in public places. Our daʿwa always remained secret. Secrecy was the
only means suited to the reality we lived in. We were like the Prophet during the first three years of
preaching, when he preached in secret to his close friends and associates. You know, when you live in an
oppressive environment, you look for a way out. The reality imposed itself on us, and Islam showed us
the way.
JG members' early acceptance of jihad and these cells' relative isolation from one another nourished
their fundamental self-perception as a jihadi avant-garde fighting for an idealist cause, in line with the
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pro-active endeavour analysed previously.262 Considering that JG cells could not, as the IG, create a
comprehensive  (shumuli in  Arabic)  movement  which  would  form the  basis  of  a  new society,  JG
members had to be the avant-garde elite suggested by Sayyid Qutb's  taliyaʿ  (literally avant-garde in
Arabic),263 since, according to Blee, “how groups define a problem [...] shapes how they act and how
they see themselves and the social world” (Blee, 2012: 82). Amr (2012) from the JG, expresses a self-
perception shared by many JG members, who describes this jihadi elite:
We were all connected to the idea of jihad. Personally, what convinced me was the need to fight for the
oppressed (al-mathlumin). I did not want to fight for them only because they were Muslims, but because
they were oppressed. Had they been from other nationalities or religion, I would have fought for them as
well. In the JG, we are like chameleons. We prepare ourselves and we are ready to act when an occasion
arises. When new needs materialise, and when Egypt is not suited for jihad, we are ready to take action
elsewhere.  In  the  1990s,  the  alternatives  were  Bosnia  and  Chechnya.  Today  it  is  Syria.  Jihad  is
contingent on the circumstances.
The political context in which JG early cells emerged shaped their approach to political action as well,
in  accordance  with  Melucci's  inclusion  of  the  relational  field  in  which  collective  identities  are
constructed (Melucci, 1995). While several strategies were initially debated among JG cells, with a
preference for the military coup and guerrilla warfare, the death of Salih Hisham, a proponent of the
latter, effectively paved the way for the general adoption of the military coup as a strategic objective to
replace the Egyptian regime with an Islamic government. This strategic vision has subsequently shaped
the conceptualisation of the military component of jihad by JG members, according to field research
and interviews, even though the absence of organisational control meant that no individual or cell could
claim a monopoly over the formation and evolution of the JG's collective group identity. A prominent
JG leader  in  the 1990s and  member the Islamic Party,  contextualises the adoption of the strategic
military coup:
In the 1970s we thought that change was only possible with the organisation of a military coup against
this oppressive regime. We were not the only ones to think this way, however, and this vision was not
peculiar to the Islamist trend. In Syria, Asia and South America, most political change occurred through
military coup at the time. It was the prevailing idea. You had to change the regime through the army, and
not through elections or public preaching. The jihad groups were not the only one to support this position.
262 Cf. chapter 3 page 76.
263 Even though Qutb did not explicitly embrace the use of violence, cf. chapter 3.
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Even  [former  president  Anwar]  Sadat,  in  the  past,  participated  in  military  coups  and  political
assassinations. He was proud of it!
Diverging levels of internal control and organisational discipline informed by low versus high-risk
activism mobilising patterns exacerbated these differences in the next few years. In the IG, the post-
1984 liberation of prisoners combined with the phase of relative political liberalisation during the first
few years of Mubarak's presidency facilitated the reconstruction of the group's infrastructure in the
South of the country, and reinvigorated the socialisation of its members with the group's collective
identity. Local IG leaders reconstructed their networks under the nominal control of the IG's historical
leadership in prison, and utilised favourable opportunities to preach in public and to spread the group's
daʿwa. While the IG's core literature was minimal before the 1981-1982 wave of arrests, the collective
endeavour  of  the  group's  leadership  to  clarify  core  ideological  tenets  in  prison contributed  to  the
dissemination of these new texts among the group's (old and new) members. This process refined the
framing of the group's  collective identity,  reinforced shared organisational  norms and enriched the
meanings associated with their members' involvement with the IG. An IG member argues that:
Our leaders authored the group's literature in prison. They clarified many core issues that we collectively
learnt  afterwards.  For  instance,  they  developed  the  theological  concept  of  al-ʿudhr  bil-jahl to
differentiate us from the JG on the indiscriminate use of takfir, which we opposed and denounced. This
concept became a central theological tenet for us, while it was not important for them. Our leaders also
clarified our relationship with the MB in the text entitled “We and the MB”. We were together on the
ground and easily bounded in this relatively free environment. We could learn directly from our leaders,
contrary to what occurred later, in the 1990s. These interactions reinforced our collective solidarity. The
JG, on the other hand, were all their own sheikhs with their independent thinking.
The books published by the IG prison leadership were paradoxically not initially authored to form the
group's core literature according to their authors. Najih Ibrahim notably insists that mithaq al-ʿamal al-
islami (The Charter for Islamic Action) was conceived as their defence in the trials which followed
Sadat's assassination, when they thought that they would be executed by the regime.264 Field research
with many IG members nonetheless reveals that they generally consider these books the IG's core
literature  and  the  epitomisation  of  its  theologico-political  tenets,  frequently  unaware  of  the  initial
264 Cf. chapter 4 page 122.
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intentions of their leaders.
The imprisonment of the early IG leadership after the assassination of Sadat was additionally used to
legitimise its  vertical  authority  over  the group.  Stories  of  steadfastness in  prison and resistance to
gruesome acts of torture bolstered the prison leadership's aura, religious credibility, and social capital.
By staying faithful to their objectives and religious commitments in prison, IG leaders reinforced their
portrayal as spokesmen for the truth (kalima al-haq). The IG leadership managed to portray itself as the
rightful heirs of prominent religious scholars who were similarly jailed for their religious viewpoints,
including Ahmad Ibn Hanbal and Ibn Taymiyya who faced a similar mihna (inquisition) in the classic
period. IG leaders' opposition to a revision of their ideational commitments despite the use of torture
demonstrated the virtue of their endeavour, and their willingness to sacrifice themselves in the path of
God (fi sabil illah). Being in the front line against the regime, prison substantiated that IG leaders were
not merely using fellow members for personal objectives, but were the first to pay a heavy price. The
credibility and social capital of the prison leadership were nourished by their authorship of the group's
newly published literature in detention, which were collectively assimilated outside of prison by IG
members. The vertical authority of the IG prison leadership was reinforced symbolically, by virtue of
imprisonment,  and  practically,  with  the  collective  assimilation  of  its  written  productions  and
recognition of its practical guidance. The development of the group's collective identity was therefore
sustained by prison experience, which increased IG members' solidarity with their rightful leaders.
The IG's  primordial  daʿwa  identity  retained its  centrality  in  the next  few years.  This  concept  was
pivotal in attracting and mobilising new followers before the beginning of the contentious conflict with
the state. The relatively liberal environment that prevailed until 1986-1987 meant that joining the IG
was, as in the 1970s, akin to engaging in low-risk activities for the group's newcomers. The framing of
the group's  primordial  identity  as  daʿwa resonated strongly among Egyptian  youths  who felt  they
needed to do something “for Islam”. As argued by Wickham on the development of the Islamic sector
in Egypt (2004), joining the Islamic movement gave them a “sense of purpose” (Wickham, 2004: 237)
and an endeavour to  change the prevailing order  and create  a  just  society (Wickham, 2004:  238).
Joining an Islamist group was also aligned with their material interests, considering that the IG, as in
the non-militant Islamist networks studied by Wickham, gave access to a new community with its own
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communal support and resources (Wickham, 2002: 150-151). The IG was analogous to a new family
which assisted its members,265 as in other cases of socially embedded radical movements.266 In addition,
many IG members argue that they were attracted by the white Islamic garbs worn by IG members,
which reminded them of Prophet Muhammad and his companions. This garment contrasted with the
Western outfits  common among MB members  and leaders,  and further diverged with the  jellabiya
traditionally worn in Upper Egypt.267 Wearing this new type of dress reinforced the sense of shared
identity among IG members. Joining the IG was a new daʿwi way of life.
The  ideational  nature  of  the  IG's  primordial  identity  helped  the  group  to  take  advantage  of  the
favourable political environment and of the growing influence of the Islamist social movement family
in society. This atmosphere was a fertile cement to the legitimisation of the public role of Islam (Abdo,
2002;  Hamid,  2014),  which  eased  the  IG's  mobilising  process.  Salafi networks  and  institutions
legitimised the salafi  religious approach promoted by the IG, while the support for the application of
Islamic law by the Islamist social movement family strengthened popular demands for the application
of sharʿia, which became ubiquitous even among non-religious political parties.
The strong public support for the application of Islamic law in Egypt and the growing influence of the
Islamist social movement family determined the conditions under which IG's mobilisation could be
successful. The group's expansion notably became contingent on its ability to differentiate its religious
and  political  approach  from mainstream salafis  and from the  MB.  On  the  religious  front,  the  IG
exploited what were often perceived as internal salafi contradictions. Many IG members argue that they
felt uncomfortable with the political ambiguities of the salafis on Mubarak's legitimacy, which they
considered  internally  inconsistent  with  their  religious  approach.  They  believed  that  chastising  the
Egyptian president as an infidel was the only position congruent with the salafi approach to Islam, and
mention multiple fatwas of mainstream salafi scholars to validate their claim.268 The relative silence of
mainstream salafi institutions on Mubarak, contextualised in the previous section, often motivated their
quest for an alternative. In addition, the IG's opposition to party politics and the failure of the MB to
265 One can refer to the testimonies of former IG members (Bari, 2002; Farghali, 2012). See also Malthaner (2011).
266 For a comparative study of the provision of social services by militant groups, one can refer to Berman (2009).
267 The white dress worn by IG members is similar to the Gulf  thawb.  It contrast with the traditional  jellabiya  worn in
Upper Egypt, which is a robe which is usually looser and more colourful.
268 Cf. chapter 4 pages 111-112.
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achieve substantial results through parliament similarly strengthened the group's political credibility.
The structural context under Mubarak was therefore instrumental to the IG's success on the ground. IG
members stress that they believed that their group had more credibility and consistence both politically
and  religiously.  An  IG  member,  Ahmad  (2012),  clarifies  his  feelings,  widely  shared  among  IG
interviewees, concerning his decision to join the IG:
I joined the IG when I was fourteen. I was already religious at the time and so was my family. I was
attracted by the IG because of their activities. They were assisting and helping people and I wanted to be
part of that. You know,  daʿwa is fundamental in Islam and the IG was actively promoting it. When I
joined university, there were different groups following different modus operandi. You could just choose
and join who you preferred. The JG was secret and divided. We barely heard about them. They were
their own sheikhs and leaders with their specific set of ideas. They did not enjoy the centralisation of the
IG.  Al-daʿwa al-salafiyya was mostly based in Alexandria. There were no real contacts with the IG,
which was localised mostly in the South and a bit in Cairo. In my opinion, I thought that al-daʿwa al-
salafiyya was acting like cowards. They shared our ideas but did not want to oppose the regime. The IG,
even before the phase of confrontation, was stronger and more attractive to me. They were preaching
kalima al-haq (the word of truth) and were not ashamed of doing so. I admired their strength and wanted
to be part of it.
The relatively liberal structural context prevailing in the 1980s did not affect the JG equivalently. The
primary focus on Afghanistan defended by its main faction269 and the violent endeavour theoretically
pursued by its various cells obstructed the group's use of a relatively free environment. As in the 1970s,
membership in  a  secret  group which endeavoured to infiltrate  the army and stage a  military coup
prevented the organisation of public low-risk activities to attract and mobilise new members on the IG
model. This group's nature, on organisational and ideational levels, was an important obstacle to public
mobilisation. JG cells were still broadly characterised by the features developed in the 1970s. Their
mobilising  patterns  were  circumscribed  to  networks  of  acquaintances  and  friends,  although  JG
members  sometimes attempted  to  mobilise  inside mainstream  salafi  institutions  as  well  (Mahmud,
2012; Sadiq, 2012).
The  secrecy  required  by  JG  cells  combined  with  internal  organisational  divisions  affected  the
269 Which benefited most from the liberation of prisoners which occurred in 1984-1985. Cf. chapter 4 page 126.
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continuation of a collective group identity widely shared among its members.270 In contrast with the IG,
the absence of low-risk activities impeded the strengthening of their members' collective bounds and
emotional attachment at a meso-level, which have been critical to militant groups' survival in other
contexts  (e.g.  della  Porta,  1995:  177).  The  strength  of  JG  members'  attachment  to  their  group's
collective identity was contingent on the networks in which they were embedded, and on the positions
of  their  leaders  within  the  group.  In  social  network  analysis,  the  JG's  overall  topography  can  be
analysed as a constellation of several cores constituted around its main leaders. The strength of JG
members' identification with the group's collective identity was diluted in the cells situated farer from
its core. This phenomenon is exemplified in the departure of some JG members, who took independent
initiatives by the end of the 1980s, and retaliated against the security services without any specific
identification with the JG. This is particularly true for the groups referred to as the  shawqiyun  and
najimun min  al-nar, studied  in  the  previous  chapter.  Conversely,  JG cells  that  were  more  closely
associated with the group's core leaders still strongly identified with the JG and its collective identity,
which influenced a similar identification by their new associates.
Eventually, the participation of IG and JG members in the Afghan jihad reinforced these dynamics and
confirmed the importance of diverging organisational norms in the construction and continuation of
these groups' collective group identities. IG members in Afghanistan and Pakistan remained under the
supervision and organisational control of their  leaders, which facilitated the survival of the group's
organisational cohesion. The engagement in a foreign land did not contradict the importance of Egypt,
as  the  previous  chapter  asserted,  and  the  Afghan  jihad  merely  enriched  the  self-perception  of  its
members'  and  leaders.  Multiple  interviews  reveal  that  IG  members,  including  those  who  did  not
directly contribute to the war effort, pride themselves for their group's engagement in what they deem a
legitimate  jihad  to  protect  oppressed  Muslims.  They  identify  with  this  war  and  consider  it
complementary to their duties in Egypt. Ahmad (2012) for instance argues that:
I did not have the chance to go to Afghanistan and I remained in Egypt. I nonetheless know that we were
very strong in Afghanistan, and that our youths contributed to the jihad effort against the Soviet invasion.
We had many camps and our group played an important role during the war. The IG influenced many
other groups in other Muslim countries,  who decided to follow our lead.  For instance  al-jamaʿa al-
270 The following suggestions were established on the basis of comparative interviews with members and leaders of these 
cells.
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islamiyya [the Islamic group] in Indonesia was inspired by us. Our mission is to serve Islam, and serving
Islam is both daʿwa here in Egypt, and jihad in occupied Muslim lands.
Conversely,  three  organisational  factors  negatively  affected  the  maintenance  of  a  strong collective
group identity and group loyalty among JG members in the Afghan-Pakistani training camps: (1) the
group's  historical  division  between  its  prison  leadership  and  its  exiled  leaders,  (2)  the  failure  to
cultivate a strong organisational culture before the Afghan conflict  and, as illustrated in the fourth
chapter of this thesis, and (3) the joining of new factions in a common fight against the Soviet Union. 271
Many new JG members were merely attracted by the concept of jihad in Egypt and by the liberation of
occupied  Muslim  lands.  They  had  a  looser  organisational  loyalty  to  the  JG,  and  a  stronger  self-
identification  with  the  concept  of  a  jihadi  avant-garde.  Organisationally,  JG  members  did  not
necessarily know who were their real leader (often confusing the leadership of al-Zawahiri and Sayyid
Imam)272 and  had  a  tendency  to  take  their  own  decisions.  Sayyid  Imam's  first  book  on  the
responsibilities and duties of jihadi groups' leaders and members was a notable attempt to correct this
situation and bolster internal discipline.273 These factors collectively prevented the maintenance of an
organisational discipline akin to the IG's. While IG members remained loyal to their group and to its
cohesive leadership, JG members more easily switched organisational membership, especially in the
following years when many JG members and leaders joined Osama bin Laden and AQ, considering that
this alternative was more appealing. A JG member, Sadiq (2012), confirms the group's characteristics
abroad and asserts that:
The JG in Afghanistan was characterised by secrecy and paranoia. In the training camps, people did not
usually know one another and had to adopt aliases [kunia in Arabic] when interacting with one another.
The least amount of personal information we knew about one another the better. If we were arrested in
Egypt, we would be less likely to divulge threatening information about other members. We were kept in
limbo and were training without understanding what our strategy was. We perceived ourselves as an
elitist jihadi avant-garde and did not socialise collectively on the IG model.
In parallel  to these developments, the cycle of violence initiated at  the end of the 1980s in Egypt
impacted IG pre-conflict low-risk activism mobilising patterns for two main reasons. As mentioned
271 Chapter 4 page 128.
272 Cf. chapter 4. See also: al-Sibaʿi, 2002; al-Zayyat, 2007.
273 Chapter 4 page 139.
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previously, the IG's organisational structure gradually disintegrated on the ground and local leaders lost
remaining organisational control through exile and imprisonment. Local dynamics of violence drove
many youths towards the IG during the contentious conflicts for an array of reasons, stretching from
group solidarity, the desire to confront the security forces and the necessity to get the protection of a
protective  group,  as  often  pointed  out  in  other  cases  (e.g.  Bosi  &  della  Porta,  2012).  This  new
mobilising pattern  contrasts  significantly with earlier  low-risk activism forms of  mobilisation,  and
signifies that, by the end of the 1980s and throughout the 1990s, new IG members joined this group
wittingly,  aware  of  the  personal  risks  endured.  These  two  factors  contextualise  their  weakest
socialisation with the group's collective identity and literature, and account for their loosest ties to the
IG and its leadership. The fifth chapter has notably demonstrated that these developments explain the
heterogeneous understanding of the group's ideological tenets and established repertoires of the new
generation.274
While  these  developments  could  have  sparked  organisational  divisions  and  splits,  the  ultimate
imprisonment of virtually all IG members in Egypt had positive ramifications on the socialisation of
the  new  generation.  Prison  presented  an  opportune  time  to  familiarise  themselves  with  the  IG''s
collective group identity and to become acquainted with its organisational norms. This socialisation
incidentally  coincided  with  the  IG  historical  leadership's  acknowledgement  that  violence  led  to  a
strategic impasse, which helped to convince the state to allow senior IG leaders to tour the prisons to
dialogue with their members. The IG's leadership evoked these tours in a collective memory, nahr al-
dhikrayyat  (The  River  of  Memories)  (Zuhdi  et  al.,  2003),  where  they  argue  that  these  collective
discussions  were  an  unprecedented  opportunity  to  promote  internal  dialogue,  including  with  the
generation which was not fully acclimatised with the group's identity before the contentious conflict
with the state. According to an IG member:
There were contentious issues of understanding for the lower ranks, especially those who joined the IG
in later phases. Most of them did not fully understand what we stood for. It was therefore extremely
important for the leaders to take the time to sit and discuss with all of us, in order to clarify their new
positions on the use of violence. As individuals we only accept God's words and the practices of the
Prophet's tradition (al-sunna). At the beginning, it was very difficult. We thought that the political police
was manipulating our leaders and felt saddened for that reason. Personally, I also thought that the state
274 Cf. chapter 5 pages 170-172. See also: al-Ghamari, n.d.
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eventually freed some prisoners and not others in order to encourage  fitna (division) in our ranks. I
believed,  unfortunately,  that  this  process  would  mark  the  end  of  the  IG  as  a  group.  Eventually  I
nonetheless saw that our leaders were good people, as I knew, and eventually the liberation of most of us
clearly helped to facilitate this process and preserve the survival of our group.
In their collective discussions with their followers, IG leaders used the credibility and social capital
acquired over time in prison to demonstrate that they were not presenting unacceptable concessions to
the  regime,  but  were  merely  pursuing  a  legitimate  rethinking  of  the  cost  of  violence.  Stories  of
resistance of prominent IG leaders' against prison authorities were used to prove that they did not shirk
from their  ideological commitments, even, as earlier,  when torture was widely used.  Having faced
similar  predicaments,  the  IG  leadership  argued  that,  if  they  supported  a  ceasefire  now,  other  IG
members who also suffered at the hands of the security services should also support this initiative.
Religious  retrospection  was  more  important  than  revenge.  The  vertical  authority  of  the  group's
leadership  and  the  presentation  of  the  ceasefire  initiative  as  a  unilateral  decision  of  the  group
articulated by credible leaders who did not retreat from their commitments in the past were crucial to
convince IG members that this initiative did not imply that the group had been defeated. 
The eventual acceptance of the rejection of armed violence by IG members, more than the theological
revisions  per  se,  was  arguably  contingent  on  two  main  factors.  While  these  groups'  members
consistently argue that what mattered as Muslims was the congruence of any new ideological positions
with the Qur'an and the Sunna (the Prophetic tradition), it can still be inferred that the interpretation of
religious texts can be diverse within certain boundaries and frames of reference.275 The first important
parameter  therefore  pertained  to  the  interpreting  agents,  these  groups’  leaders,  and  to  their
organisational positions within the  formal and informal organisational arrangements presiding these
groups' decision making processes. While the social capital and charisma of IG leaders mattered, these
factors  cannot  be  studied  in  isolation  from the  organisational  positions  and  norms  in  which  they
operate.276 The  successful  acceptance  of  this  process  required  a  legitimate  leadership  whose
prerogatives were organisationally internalised and accepted, as had long been the case in the IG. An
adequate  contextualisation  of  militant  groups'  leaderships  and  organisational  positions  within
275 As demonstrated in chapter 4.
276 This  is  recurrent  shortcoming  affecting  academic  studies  using  Bourdieusian  concepts  in  isolation.  Bourdieu's
conceptualisation of diverse types of capital is not isolated, in his theoretical conceptualisation, from the fields and
habitus regulating their use. See also: Emirbayer & Johnson, 2008
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legitimised meso-level norms prevails over the sole consideration of a combination of leaders' charisma
and internal dialogue, as previously argued by Ashour (2011).
Moreover, the acceptance of the necessity to cease violence was contingent on the ability of IG leaders
to  draw on the  group's  primordial  group identity  to  legitimise  a  new strategic  direction.  In-group
discussions and interviews with IG members reveal that, more than the theological intricacies of the
revisions, what mattered was the reconsideration of violence as a reality which was imposed on them
and that the IG did not want. Group members consensually reiterate the primacy of their group's daʿwa
mission  and  argue  that  the  IG was  pushed  into  armed  confrontation:  they  typically  maintain  that
violence was only used in  self-defence  to  protect  daʿwa.  This  interpreting process  is  described in
framing studies  as frame amplification (Snow et  al.,  1986:  469),  which “involves the idealisation,
embellishment, clarification, or invigoration of existing values or beliefs” (Benford & Snow, 2000:
624). In this case, IG leaders simultaneously amplified the group's primordial daʿwa collective identity
and curtailed the ideational importance of armed violence in the group's theoretical commitments. A
local IG figure who rejected the theological renunciations of the group's old literature while supporting
the end of violence, Saleh Muhammad Ahmad (2012), illustrates this view and argues that:
I don't believe in the legitimacy of the revisions and I still support our old literature, notably mithaq al-
ʿamal al-islami (The Charter for Islamic Action). There is nothing wrong with it. This book is consistent
with Islam and does not contradict any Islamic precept. I was nonetheless a supporter of the end of
violence in Egypt. We did not launch armed struggle against the state in the first place, so if the security
forces stop attacking us, then we can stop as well. We were just reacting against the state when it became
necessary to do so. They killed our spokesman so we killed the head of their parliament. They killed our
youths so we killed their policemen. We created dissuasion. End of the story. The foundation of our work
is daʿwa, not jihad.
This process could not be reiterated with imprisoned JG members and leaders. The absence of strong
organisational control and the geographical divisions between several prisons notably isolated them
from one another. The JG did not enjoy any substantial degree of centralisation, and had no legitimate
leadership to initiate discussions with others members. The discussions widely reported in the media in
2007, when Sayyid Imam published the first renunciation to violence in Islamic countries were not,
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according to most testimonies, as inclusive as allegedly asserted.277 Many prominent JG members and
leaders argue that they were never included in these discussions, even though some of them contend
that they independently revised their position on jihad before Sayyid Imam's renunciations, as early as
1981, while others followed suit in 1994-1995 after the failure of the JG's armed operations in Egypt.278
They add that they opposed the radicalism of the younger generation which joined the group in the
1990s, whose ideological excesses are epitomised by their excommunication of the Egyptian army.
They nonetheless deny the existence of consensual discussions to renounce violence and boast that they
never read Sayyid Imam's new writings (e.g. Qassem, 2012). They assert that these revisions were
imposed by the security services and have no legitimacy.279 One of the main JG leaders in the 1990s
argues that:
There was no dialogue on the so-called revisions. This text resulted from the collaboration between the
security services and Sayyid Imam. We refused it for objective reasons. We were under attack and were
prisoners. We could not make concessions in these circumstances. Only a few accepted it, and many
retreated afterwards. Others who allegedly accepted were not in the JG to begin with. Now, however,
[speaking after 2011], may God be praised, we are out of prison. The political system is different after the
uprising and we are not looking for revenge. We only want stability.
Finally, a parallel development directly related to the post 9-11 environment and to the evolution of the
Egyptian religious field analysed in the previous section unfolded outside of prison in the 2000s: the
so-called  salafi  jihadi trend  appeared  in  Egypt  in  the  fringe  of  some  JG-affiliated  factions.  The
emergence  of  this  new  trend  is  analytically  important  considering  that  its  dominant  mode  of
socialisation,  non-relational  diffusion,  contrasts  significantly with the low and high-risk mobilising
patterns characterising IG and JG networks. Non-relational diffusion of  salafi jihadi  frames directly
affected pre-2011 processes of identity construction of the new Islamist supporters of violence, and had
notable repercussions on the post-2011 evolution of the Islamist social movement family analysed in
the last section of this chapter.
According to a field ethnography with salafi jihadis undertaken after 2011 (Drevon, forthcoming), the
277 Sayyid Imam recognised this publicly, before the 2013 military coup (bin ʿAbd al-ʿAziz, 2013c).
278 Cf. chapter 5 page 179.
279 IG leaders who undertook their own theological revisions similarly point out to the role of the security services in the
publication Sayyid Imam's new opus.
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expansion of salafi jihadism in Egypt was mostly triggered by the wars launched by the United States
on Afghanistan and on Iraq in 2001 and 2003, even though these wars do not suffice to explain the
micro-level  adoption  of  salafi  jihadism.  Field  research  with  salafi  jihadi youths  reveals  that  the
majority identified as salafi  Muslims before accepting the religious justifications for violence framed
by jihadi ideologues and theologians. This research adds that these wars nourished a personal quest and
a  desire  to  find  indigenous answers  to  these  external  threats  against  the  Muslim world,  as  in  the
cognitive opening analysed by Wiktorowicz on British  salafi jihadi  groups (Wiktorowicz, 2005). In
contrast with Wiktorowicz's study, however, while militant networks managed to socialise these youths
in London, the adoption of salafi jihadi positions in Egypt was precisely facilitated by the absence of
militant groups and networks on the ground which could have mobilised and socialised them. The
adoption of these new ideational frames was additionally fuelled by (1) the inability of mainstream
salafi preachers to adequately oppose these attacks to the Muslim world, (2) the presence of a growing
jihadi corpus on the internet280 and (3) the shared salafi creed between jihadi with non-jihadi salafism.
In a comparative perspective, it is interesting to note that, while international solidarity played a role in
older  and  newer  mobilising  patterns  for  a  substantial  number  of  IG  and  JG  members  (from the
liberation of Palestine in the 1970s to the fight for Afghanistan, Bosnia and Chechnya in the 1990s),
salafi jihadi mobilisation was not directly mediated by existing organisational structures in Egypt. New
salafi  jihadis socialised individually and without intermediaries, which sustained the creation of an
individualised understanding of salafi jihadism at a micro level. This peculiar socialisation with salafi
jihadism  means  that  the  distinction  between  different  trends  of  salafism  based  on  their  political
approaches  is  more  blurred  than  expected.  While  new  salafi  jihadi  supporters  acknowledged  the
illegitimacy of current Muslim rulers and the necessity to oppose foreign occupation of Muslim lands
before 2011, they disagreed on wide subsidiary issues. For instance, they quarrelled on the legitimacy
of mainstream Egyptian preachers such as Muhammad Hassan, Muhammad Hussein Yaqub and on
priminent scholars affiliated with Saudi Arabia (e.g. Ibn Baz and al-Albani). These extensive divisions,
which reflect wider divisions in  salafi  jihadism between realists and purists (Moghadam & Fishman,
2011) were relatively concealed before 2011. This new mode of socialisation therefore eroded militant
groups' control over the ideational foundations of this new trend, and over the creation of a collective
280 Particularly on the website of prominent  salafif jihadi ideologue Abu Muhammad al-Maqdissi  minbar tawheed wal-
jihad. www.tahwed.ws. See also: Wagemakers, 2011.
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group identity.
Some of the young salafi  jihadis were incarcerated for their political positions. Prison was a notable
opportunity to become acquainted with a few JG-related networks,  notably around Muhammad al-
Zawahiri and Ahmad ʿAshush. These youths' independent socialisation and the renewed importance of
AQ after 9/11 nonetheless meant that they did not identity with the JG any more, but rather associated
themselves with al-Qaeda without being formally part of this organisation. One of these youths, Abu
ʿAbdullah (2012), recounts that:
I became familiar with salafi jihadi idea after the 2003 Iraqi war and later spent 18 months in jail for my
religious  beliefs.  In  prison,  we  were  incarcerated  together,  and  become close  to  some JG-affiliated
leaders like Ahmad ʿAshush. I knew that they were in the JG in the past, although it did not really matter
any more back then. Personally I thought of myself as an AQ member. I was attracted by their strength
and power. The JG was irrelevant. AQ was the new central player.
6.5. MEDIATING THE IMPACT OF THE JANUARY 2011 EGYPTIAN UPRISING
In 2011, massive non-violent protests against the Egyptian regime united millions of Egyptians in the
streets of the country.281 On February 11, Egyptian president Hosni Mubarak resigned and the Supreme
Council  of  the  Armed Forces  (SCAF) assumed responsibility  to  temporarily  lead  the  country  and
facilitate the political transition. In the next few months, the SCAF suspended the constitution and
dissolved  the  two  houses  of  parliament.  A constitutional  referendum  was  organised,  and  a  new
temporary constitution was approved with 77.27 per cent of the vote. The (short-lived) opening of
political opportunity witnessed after the resignation of former president Hosni Mubarak challenged the
existing  status  quo  and  presented  a  reality  that  was  previously  unknown.  The  Egyptian  military
authorities  initially  liberalised  political  participation  in  the  political  process,  and  an  array  of  new
political parties appeared shortly after the uprising. Existing constraints on public activities were lifted,
at least informally. Moreover, thousands of Egyptians affiliated to former militant groups, including IG
and JG members and leaders, were gradually released by the new authorities. This opening of political
opportunities presented many challenges and opportunities to  the Islamist social  movement family,
reflected primarily in their ideational and organisational ramifications. 
281 For recent analyses of these social protests, see Korany & el-Mahdi, 2012; Gunning & Baron, 2013.
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This  concluding  section  explores  the  repercussions  of  the  2011  uprising  on  the  Islamist  social
movement family and on the Islamic and Jihad Groups. The following analysis specifically addresses
the  evolution  of  the  IG and JG's  political  approaches  in  light  of  increased  interactions  inside  the
Islamist social movement family and of the broad legitimisation of political participation by its sub-
components.  This  section  argues  that  post-2011 networking and organisational  overlaps  with other
Islamist actors combined with the development of new cultural resources in favour of party politics
figure prominently in the IG and JG's evolving choices, even though they are not sufficient to explain
these groups' differentiated responses to the 2011 uprising. This section contends that the successful
creation of a political party by the IG was primarily contingent on the ability of its leaders to undertake
internal reforms and to draw upon the group's primordial identity to substantiate its continuity with this
new strategic direction. This analysis additionally demonstrates that pre-2011 JG divisions hindered the
repetition of the same consensual process.
The 2011 popular uprising was unanticipated by most political forces, including by the IG and the JG
which both initially failed to articulate a clear position (Drevon, 2014a).282 The IG was divided between
its exiled, detained and newly liberated leaders and members. The most critical division opposed a
relatively accommodating position on Mubarak's regime and a hostile viewpoint. The two IG historical
leaders,  Karam Zuhdi and Najih Ibrahim, were initially reluctant to support the uprising, fearing a
backslash had the uprising failed (Ibrahim, 2012). IG members nonetheless joined the demonstrations
individually and, from prison, ʿAbud and Tareq al-Zumur embraced the popular uprising. The JG was
further divided at geographical, ideological and organisational levels. Its detained and newly liberated
leaders were unable to articulate a united stance on the 2011 uprising. Some JG members and leaders
participated individually, while others endorsed a passive stance.
The evolution of the Egyptian structural context critically affected the Islamist social movement family
after the uprising. The first notable ideational challenge to the salafi trend pertained to the legitimacy of
violence in Muslim countries. Before 2011, Egyptian salafis consistently agreed that Islamic law should
be  applied  comprehensively,  and  primarily  differed  on  the  legitimacy  of  violence  to  reach  this
objective. The IG historically legitimised its use against nominally Muslim leaders, before renouncing
its applicability in the theological revisions. Some JG members followed suit subsequently, while their
282 On salafi internal divisions on the 2011 uprising, see also Zahran et al. (2012a: 14-20).
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fellows who opposed any concession on this issue did not articulate new positions on the legitimacy of
violence before 2011. The emerging salafi jihadi  trend, conversely, became essentially defined by its
support  of violence against Muslim leaders who do not comprehensively apply Islamic law in the
Muslim world, even though their self-proclaimed spokesmen in Egypt283 decided to focus primarily on
public preaching after 2011.284 A new shared understanding of the inapplicability of violence in Egypt
consolidated in the aftermath of the 2011 uprising, and blurred a central ideational division between
different salafi groups and trends.
The de-legitimisation of violence as a means to implement Islamic law in a Muslim country did not
comprehensively dissipate its legitimacy in the salafi public discourse, however. The aggravation of the
Syrian civil war and the militarisation of a mostly non-violent uprising of the Syrian population unified
a significant sector of Egyptian salafism behind the legitimisation of armed resistance to the regime of
Bashar  al-Asad.  This  support  is  illustrated  in  the  favourable  public  stance  adopted  by  non-jihadi
preachers and politicians,285 as well as in the growing public demonstrations organised in the streets of
the country in 2012.286 Paradoxically, while the renunciation of the use of violence in Egypt suggests
that  militant  salafis  became  closer  to  mainstream  salafis,  the  Syrian  war  signalled  that  this
rapprochement was not unidirectional,  and fuelled its  legitimisation by mainstream salafis  in other
settings.
The second main ideological challenge posed by the post-2011 uprising concerned democracy and the
legitimacy of political participation in the electoral process. The  salafi trend was internally divided
until 2011 vis-à-vis democracy. Internal divergences of opinion ranged from the outright rejection of
democracy as a system of governance based on the sovereignty of the people to more circumstantially
accommodating positions.287 The absence of a clear consensus in Egypt was sustained by the absence of
283 Notably represented by Ahmad ʿAshush, Murjan Salem and Muhammad al-Zawahiri.
284 Salafi jihadi youths independently confirmed to this researcher that the spokesmen of the salafi jihadi trend told them in
private that time was only suited to preaching at the time (between 2011 and 2012).
285 For instance, the conference of the Muslim scholars organised in Cairo in June 2013 called for armed jihad in Syria.
Later  the  same  month,  thousands  of  Egyptians  congregated  around  prominent  Islamist  preachers  and  politicians
(including Egyptian president Mohamed Morsi) in a stadium in Cairo to express a similar support. On the legitimisation
of violence in Syria by mainstream scholars, see also Hegghammer & Zelin (2013).
286 According to this researcher's field research in 2011 and 2012, public demonstrations in support of the Syrian jihad
were initially organised by Syrian expatriates.  Egyptian salafis initially contributed to these demonstrations, before
taking a leading role.
287 e.g. al-Anani, 2012; Lacroix, 2012; McCants, 2012; al-Anani & Malik, 2013; Utvik, 2014. Mainstream salafi preachers
have, at times, endorsed electoral competition in specific contexts such as Algeria in 1991, when the Front Islamique du
Salut (FIS) was competing for victory before the military coup.
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free and fair elections, and by the official ban on religious political parties. After 2011, the political
transition  following  the  removal  of  Hosni  Mubarak  encouraged  many  sectors  of  the  salafi  social
movement family to re-evaluate their former positions. Mainstream preachers announced their public
support to the political process and, through the  majliss al-shura  (consultative council) of  ansar al-
sunna,  asserted that there was no barrier to political  participation in Islamic Law, considering that
electoral competition was an acceptable means to spread their  daʿwa in society (ʿAli, 2011). Similar
positions were endorsed by a range of  salafi  groups and preachers from diverse pre-2011 leanings.
Despite internal political divergences, most salafis eventually legitimised participation in the political
process.
The new Egyptian structural context after the uprising therefore affected the Islamist social movement
family  at  an  organisational  level  as  well.  The  following  two  years  witnessed  unprecedented
demonstrations in the streets of the country successively organised by virtually all Egyptian political
groups, including by the Islamists. This new environment was an opportunity for Islamist groups and,
unprecedentedly,  for  the  salafis,  to  defend  their  positions  publicly.288 The  post-2011  era  was
characterised by intensive exchanges inside the Islamist social movement family, development which
fostered internal interactions and discussions among Islamist supporters.289 These exchanges fuelled the
emergence of an array of new movements, from the middle-class salafiyyu kosta (the salafis of Costa
Coffee) to the more activist  al-jabha al-salafiyya (the  Salafi  Front),  ansar al-shariʿa  (supporters of
Islamic Law), al-haraka al-islamiyya li-tatbiq sharʿ Allah (the Islamic movement for the application of
God's Law), and the nebula around sheikh Hazem Abu Ismaʿil.290 The latter epitomise the blending
boundaries characterising the Islamist social movement family after the uprising. Abu Ismaʿil's father
was a MB member of parliament291 and, while a  salafi  preacher himself, Hazem participated in the
2005 legislative elections on a MB-affiliated list. After 2011, his outspoken support for the “revolution”
combined with his Islamic project rendered him very popular in the Islamist social movement family,
288 The first public demonstrations of the salafi trend were organised the 29th of July 2011 and the 18th of November 2011.
They were pejoratively dubbed “Kandahar's Fridays” by Islamist opponents, in reference to the Afghan city.
289 According to this researcher's field participation in these demonstrations between 2011 and 2012.
290 Sheikh Hazem is a public preacher who prospered in the 2000s thanks to the diffusion of salafism on satellite TV
channels.  He  attempted  to  contest  the  2012  presidential  elections,  but  was  dismissed  because  of  the  American
nationality held by his mother (the Egyptian constitution does not allow for the candidature of somebody whose parents
hold foreign passports). On the plurality of loosely defined groups which emerged around sheikh Hazem after 2012, see
Zahran (2012) and Faid (2014)
291 The fourth chapter of this thesis, pages 109-110, mentioned his testimony in the trial of the IG and JG after Sadat's
assassination.
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regardless of pre-2011 affiliations.292 
Salafis from diverse leanings (including those formerly considered haraki – militant - salafis or ʿilmi -
pietist  –  salafis)  additionally  created cross  pre-2011 boundaries  institutions  to  foster  their  political
influence. The most prominent institution was created by  ansar al-sunna in alliance with the most
prominent  Egyptian  salafi preachers,  who  collectively  formed  majliss  al-shura  al-ʿulama (the
consultative council of the scholars)293 to influence the political process and support the candidates and
projects  considered  most  closely  aligned  with  Islam.294 In  addition,  at  an  institutional  level,  the
Alexandria-based  Salafi  Call founded  hizb al-nur (the Light Party) and decided to contest the 2011
legislative elections. In Cairo, salafi preachers representing a middle ground between mainstream and
jihadi salafism created  hizb al-ʿasala  (the Authenticity party) and hizb al-fadila  (the Virtue Party).295
Influenced by the Kuwaiti  precedent and by the emergence of numerous Egyptian Islamist parties,
many salafi political parties mushroomed. 
While the legitimisation of political participation in the new political process was facilitated among
non-jihadi salafis  by  the  existence  of  pre-2011 cultural  resources,296 salafi  jihadi scholars  did  not
develop similar resources in the past. Internal disagreements over the legitimacy of the political process
were therefore particularly strident for their followers in Egypt before the 2013 military coup.297 The
study of their ramifications at a micro-level necessitates to consider pre-2011 modes of socialisation
with  salafi  jihadism. The previous section argued that, before 2011, Egyptian salafis adopted  jihadi
positions individually, considering the absence of mobilising structures on the ground. This internal
292 This popularity is reflected at a national level  by a poll of the al-Ahram Centre for Political  and Strategic Studies
conducted in April 2012, before Abu Ismaʿil's disqualification, which gave him 28.8 per cent of the votes (only 2 per
cent behind Amr Moussa).
293 This council is formed by ʿAbdallah Shakir, Abu Ishaq al-Huwayni, Saʿd 'Abd al-ʿAtheem, Jamal al-Murakabi, Abu
Bakr al-Hanbali, Muhammad Hassan, Muhammad Hussein Yaʿqub, Mustafa al-ʿAdwi, Wahid Bali and Jamal ʿAbd al-
Rahman.
294 For instance, the majliss al-shura al-ʿulama opposed any modification of the constitution which would reduce the role
of  Islam,  initially  supported  the  salafi  candidate  Hazem  Abu  Ismaʿil  in  the  presidential  elections  (until  his
disqualification), and later endorsed Morsi's candidature (see also Faid, 2014: 66-67).
295 See also Faid (2014).
296 Regardless of their theoretical positions on democracy and on the sovereignty of the people, political participation had
already  been  circumstantially  legitimised  by  prominent  salafi  scholars  (including  Ibn  Baz,  al-Albani  and  al-
ʿUthaymeen), in notable support for the 1991 Algerian elections. It should additionally be noted that the Alexandria-
based salafi movement did not consider, as the salafi jihadis, that political participation was a matter of belief (iman)
before  2011.  In interviews conducted  before 2011,  prominent  Alexandria-based  salafis  rather  posited that  political
participation was an issue of jurisprudence and interpretation (Ghazi, 2012: 77).  Haraki salafis differed with them on
this point and refused political participation on the same ground as jihadi salafis.
297 For additional salafi jihadi debates on the post-2011 Arab Spring, see also Lahoud (2013).
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diversity meant that, after 2011, young Egyptians who identified with salafi jihadism continued to draw
on eclectic  sources despite  new interactions with  salafi  jihadi  preachers  facilitated in  a  liberalised
political setting. Salafi jihadi public spokesmen barely managed to disseminate their opposition to the
political process among their potential supporters and to overcome its wide legitimisation in the salafi
populace.  According to field research,  Hazem Abu Ismaʿil  was particularly successful in gathering
strong support from salafi jihadi youths and to mobilise them in the presidential elections campaign.298
In  addition,  democratic  participation  further  divided  the  salafi  jihadi  trend  after  the  election  of
Mohamed Morsi. One faction announced that Morsi was an apostate, and added that anyone who failed
to excommunicate him was similarly leaving the fold of Islam. Most salafi jihadis nonetheless adopted
a different  position and refused to excommunicate  Morsi,  following Ayman al-Zawahiri's  arguably
more balanced views.299
These challenges were differently mediated by the IG and JG's organisational dynamics and resulted in
two different outcomes. The IG created hizb al-binaʾ wal-tanmiya (Building and Development Party,
BDP thereafter)  as  its  official  political  party  in  June  2011.  The  religious  outlook  of  its  political
programme  initially  hindered  its  official  recognition  but,  after  defending  its  case  based  on  the
interpretation  of  the  second  article  of  the  constitution,  the  BDP  was  eventually  granted  legal
recognition.300 In the meantime, discussions among JG members sparked the creation of hizb al-salama
wal-tanmiya  (Safety  and  Development  Party),  later  renamed  hizb  al-islami  (the  Islamic  Party,  IP
thereafter). This party did not satisfy the new promulgated conditions for state recognition, however,
and had not been recognized by the authorities before the 2013 July military coup (Faraj, 2012). In
contrast  with the BDP, the IP cannot be considered the official  party of the JG considering broad
differences of opinions over the legitimacy of the political process among JG members. This difference
is reflected in the subordination of the BDP to the IG's  majliss al-shura (the consultative leadership)
and the independence of the IP from any external structure.
298 In-group meetings with the two parties later formed by the Islamic and Jihad groups reveal that their leaders realised the
strength of  Abu  Ismaʿil's  constituency and attempted to find new avenues to gather similar support.  Abu Ismaʿil's
popularity among salafi jihadis is also revealed by the fatwas demanded on the online library of salafi jihadism, Minbar
Tawheed  wal-Jihad,  on  the  legitimacy  of  electoral  participation  in  his  support:  e.g.
https://www.tawhed.ws/FAQ/display_question?qid=4873. 
299 The existence of these two positions was widely communicated to this author by young salafi jihadis from both sides. It
is worth noting that this division was later reflected in young salafi jihadis' diverging positions on the Syrian conflict
between  jabha  al-nusra (the  Front  of  Support)  and  the  Islamic  State  (Drevon,  2014c):  the  salafi  jihadis  who
excommunicated Morsi widely supported the Islamic State against al-nusra.
300 More information on these discussions are available in a document published by this party which was given to this
researcher (hizb al-bina' wal-tanmiyya, 2012).
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The rationale for the political participation of the IG and of the JG after 2011 is widely shared with
mainstream and armed Islamist movements. The decision to participate in the political process was
essentially based on these groups' interpretations of the new political opportunities available to them.
This choice was not preceded by an ideological acceptance of the political process or by an expressed
willingness to participate in the governance of Egypt. The ideological revisions detailed previously did
not articulate a clear political  vision for Egypt,  and were virtually silent on these groups'  potential
political participation in the future (see also: Stein, 2011; Ashour, 2012). This issue was only briefly
mentioned in 2005 when an IG leader, ʿAbud al-Zumur, alluded to his potential candidature in the
presidential elections (El-Nahhas, 2011) and in an opus he co-authored with his cousin Tareq al-Zumur
on the promotion of political reforms in Islamic countries (2005). Before the 2011 uprising, however,
there was no concerted effort to articulate a political programme beyond a support for the application of
Islamic law in the country.
The IG and the JG were therefore, in 2011, in an ideational position analogous to the Egyptian MB
before 1984. The joining of the political process in 1984 by the MB was also preceded by a process of
ideological clarifications of its position on violence in Islamic countries and by the publication of a
book,  duat la qudat  (Preachers not Judges), which promoted, as in these groups' revisions, a non-
violent approach in Muslim countries and an Islamic mode of governance. Despite the differences in
terms  of  content  between  the  MB's  ideological  clarifications  and  these  groups'  renunciations  to
violence, they similarly endorse non-violence and the application of Islamic law without articulating a
clear political programme.
The  main  difference  between  the  rationale  for  participation  of  the  Islamic  and  Jihad  Groups  and
mainstream and armed Islamist groups previously reviewed pertains to organisational protection and
legitimacy. The political participation of the MB in Egypt did not solely result from its interpretation of
the new political opportunities available to the group. While the MB was motivated by the possibility
to expand its preaching through parliament, the group was also interested in the legal protection to its
activities conferred by political participation. As for Islamist armed groups, political participation has
been considered a complementary mean to achieve internal legitimacy and to protect the sanctity of
their weapons, as the first section argued. In 2011, the IG and the JG were not affected by the same
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requisites.  These  groups  were  in  an  organisational  limbo,  had  no substantial  constituency  and  no
military wing to legitimise. Their members were scattered and isolated, and these groups' networks had
virtually  been  decimated  on the  ground.  Their  decision  to  participate  in  the  political  process  was
therefore primordially informed by their  interpretations of the new opportunities available to them,
rather than by the need to protect or legitimise nonexistent networks and institutions.
This decision leads to the second argument of this analysis: its internal legitimisation among group
members and supporters. Before 2011, the IG and the JG had long opposed the MB on theological
grounds  for  its  political  participation  in  the  elections,  and had generally  denied  the  legitimacy of
democracy in Islam. The theological nature of their former opposition to democracy was, according to
a literal reading of their texts, not merely a political rebuttal of political participation under autocratic
regimes but an absolute theological hostility. How did the IG and the JG justify to their members and
followers the adoption of a position apparently inconsistent with their long-held religious positions on
democracy? 
The main argument is that IG and JG leaders reinterpreted their past commitments in light of post-2011
political opportunities in order to demonstrate the continuity between their groups' primordial identities
and the  willingness  to  form a  political  party.  In  framing studies,  this  process  is  defined as  frame
transformation, whereby a movement reinterprets its own self-understanding to generate new meanings
(Snow et al.  1986; Benford & Snow, 2000). This process was necessary to convince these groups'
members and followers that joining the political  process did not contradict these groups'  collective
identities, but was rather a legitimate reinterpretation of what it means to be the IG or the JG.
Interviews of IG leaders and lower-ranking members reveal a clear emphasis on the primordial group
da'wi identity to legitimise political participation.  Two IG leaders,  including its second in command
Osama Hafez, affirm that their hostility to party politics in the 1980s and 1990s was informed by the
absence of free and fair elections and by the need to de-legitimise the regime (Hafez, 2013). They argue
that they opposed and blamed the Muslim Brotherhood for their participation since it made the regime
more  credible  internationally.  Their  reinterpretation  of  the  ramifications  of  the  group's  collective
identity is an extension of the ideological revisions started a few years earlier, when they emphasised
da'wa while simultaneously minimising the group's legitimisation of violence.  An IG religious figure
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maintains that:
I  said  and reiterated  that  democracy  is  against  Islam.  My position  has  not  changed.  In  the  1990s,
democracy [in Egypt] meant that no political party could be created on a religious platform. This has
changed,  while  we  have  not.  We  fought  democracy  because  democracy  was  without  God.  The
constitution now recognises it. It is based on shariʿa and all the political parties agree with this feature.
Democracy I denounced is consequently different from the current form of democracy
While  it  is  true  that  the  IG was  a  preaching movement  before  its  adoption  of  violence,  this  was
undoubtedly not the case for the JG which adopted armed jihad in its early days. This fundamental
difference could have obstructed a similar frame transformation of this group's primordial identity. In
spite of this, prominent leaders of the Jihad Group similarly recognise that the 2011 uprising triggered
their decision to join the political process and nourished the idea to create a political party (Qassem,
2012). In contrast  with the IG, however,  they do not claim that they adopted armed jihad in self-
defence but rather contextualise its use. They assert that, while jihad is undertaken under an autocratic
regime with weapons,  the latter  become irrelevant  and illegitimate after  a political  opening.  A JG
commander affirms for instance that:
We did not renounce armed jihad but rationalised it. The weapon of jihad has changed. Jihad in Egypt
cannot any more be undertaken with the rifle. The new weapon of jihad is the political party. 
Other senior members of the JG and of its political party, including Osama Qassem, that the opening of
political opportunities was crucial in their decision to create a political party in Egypt. They support
Amir al-Jaysh's position, and explain that different state policies require different answers. They add
that the 2011 uprising was a game changer which imposed the revision of their positions. They reject
the legitimacy of violence, and consider electoral competition the new game in town. The JG therefore
undertook a similar frame transformation from violence to political participation, by reinterpreting its
past history in  light of macro-level change to justify the continuity between the group's  collective
identity and this new choice.
The remaining question of this comparative analysis concerns internal group debates on the joining of
the political process. As with any strategic decision of this importance, the decision to create a political
party was not initially unanimously accepted in the IG and the JG. Interviews and discussions with IG
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leaders and members reveal a plurality of position on this issue. Some prominent IG leaders, including
Osama Hafez and ʿAsim ʿAbd al-Majid, preferred to focus on the group's reconstruction. Hafez (2013)
notably stresses that many members and leaders had just left prison, and adds that the IG lacked a
strong internal infrastructure and cadres. He asserts that he opposed the group's participation in the
elections by fear of its potentially negative repercussions (Hafez, 2013). Contrastingly, other leaders
advocated an isolation from the political  game and a sole  focus  on preaching (daʿwa)  (e.g.  Najih
Ibrahim).
Internal JG divisions were more strident. According to field research and interviews, JG members and
leaders broke up along three lines. The first faction accepted the legitimacy of the political process and
created the IP. Its members are cross-generational and include militants active in the mid-1970s as well
as new comers from the mid-1990s. The second faction, led by Ahmad ʿAshush, Murjan Salem and
Muhammad al-Zawahiri established the so-called salafi jihadi trend after their liberation from prison,
and thoroughly opposed the political process (e.g. ʿAshush, 2012; al-Zawahiri, 2012). They gathered
around them many previously unaffiliated supporters of salafi jihadism socialised on-line, according to
field research.301 The remaining faction is not cohesive, and includes JG members and leaders who
oppose  the  political  process  and  who  do  not  consider  themselves  salafi  jihadis.  Their  post-2011
activities stretched from non-violent preaching to the mobilisation in support of the Syrian jihad (Amr,
2012).
Considering the wide range of opinions hold by IG and JG members and leaders on the joining of the
political process, why has the IG been successful in creating a political party based on a collective
agreement while the JG simultaneously failed to reach a similar outcome? The previous comparative
analysis  of  frame transformation can certainly dispel  a  solely ideational  reason informed by these
groups' essentially different nature. Being primordially a  jihadi  group is not sufficient to explain this
failure, since prominent opponents of the theological revisions (e.g. Majdi Salem and Osama Qassem)
legitimised the joining of the political process after 2011 based on their new understanding of the post-
2011 structural context.
 
This comparative discrepancy is rather explained by these groups' organisational dynamics, and inheres
301 See also Drevon (forthcoming).
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with their internal decision making processes. The consensual nature of the IG decision making process
notably facilitated the democratisation of its internal structures after the 2011 uprising. This research
previously  noted  that  this  group  was  divided  along  several  lines  in  2011,  including  between  an
accommodating and a hostile stance on the former regime. A IG religious figure argues that:302
Before the revolution, we could not do anything because of the difficulty to communicate. Then, internal
disagreements between some of our leaders imposed a reconfiguration of the group's make-up. 303 We
started from our followers, and organised internal elections at all levels. We managed to reconstitute our
internal structures through elections. Then, we created al-jamʿiyya al-ʿumumiyya (the General Assembly)
as a  legislative  institution and the  majliss  al-shura as the executive.  The  jamʿiyya represents  all  the
governorates  of  Egypt.  Regarding  the  elections,  we  organised  a  general  discussion  on  current
developments in order to present a unified position on the legislative and presidential elections. More
than two-thirds of our members agreed to create a political party, and the new majliss al-shura took the
responsibility to apply this decision.
In contrast with the democratisation of the MB under state repression in the 1990s, the IG managed to
reorganise and democratise its internal decision making process after the post-2011 opening of political
opportunity.  In  both  cases,  internal  pressure  played  a  significant  role  in  convincing  these  groups'
leaders of the necessity to undertake internal reforms to assure their  group's  survival and preclude
internal ruptures and break ups. 
The IG's internal democratisation did not materialise in the JG. JG leaders assert that, while some of
them tried to reach out to one another (e.g. Qassem, 2012), they repeatedly failed to unite on a common
programme. Instead of unifying their ranks, JG leaders debated one another and disputed the group's
legitimate heir. In personal discussions and interviews, some IP leaders debated the sanity of Sayyid
Imam (Qassem, 2012) and argued that they never read his theological revisions (Qassem, 2012). Others
blamed the salafi jihadi trend for being from the JG young generation with no legitimacy to speak in its
name. In turn, the latter argued that IP leaders were not in the JG in the first place, and were hijacking
its legitimate heir (Badawi, 2013). The salafi jihadi trend merely recognised the former organisational
belonging of a former JG leader Nabil Naʿim, while denouncing him as a state collaborator (Badawi,
302 See also: ʿAbd al-Ghani, n.d.; al-Ghamari, n.d.
303 IG members were particularly unhappy with the public positions adopted by Karam Zuhdi and Najih Ibrahim, which,
they thought,  did not represent  the IG's  consensus on the revisions considering their  accommodating positions on
Mubarak and their claims against the excommunication of Muslim leaders.
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2013). The JG remained plagued by its historical development as a fragmented group.
The IG and the JG were not particularly successful in mobilising outside of their natural constituency.
According to field research, most of their political supporters are drawn from their former members and
families, in addition to the IG's traditional strongholds (where the BDP obtained decent results in the
legislative elections). They particularly failed to reach out to the salafi jihadi trend, as they genuinely
admit. According to an IG religious figure:
I spoke to the followers of the salafi jihadi trend and I tried to convince them to accept this new political
setting. Some agreed, but many refused to listen to my arguments. I have realised that it is very difficult
to reach out to them. You know, when I was asked by German intelligence if I was the sheikh of the
young generation, we said, with my lawyer, that their real sheikh was sheikh Google!
Osama Qassem (2012) from the JG confirms that:
Salafi jihadi spokespersons and leaders have new means and channels to reach out to the new generation
that we were not acquainted with. They use the media, the internet and new means of communication,
while we failed to do so. We have been isolated for a long time and remain an old organisation.
The political participation of the BDP and of the IP in the post-2011 political process was abruptly
discontinued in July 2013, when the Egyptian military staged a coup d'état against elected President
Mohamed  Morsi.  These  parties'  short-lived  political  experience  is  therefore  insufficient  to  draw
meaningful lessons on its possible ideological or behavioural repercussions.304 The main assertion is
that both political parties showed some signs of political pragmatism. For instance, the BDP supported
the  candidature  of  Islamic-leaning  moderate  candidate  Abdel  Moneim  Aboul  Fotouh  in  the  2012
presidential  elections,  and refused to  lend support  to  the  salafi  candidate  Hazem Abu Ismail  who
claimed that he would apply Islamic law in Egypt. IG leaders argue that they favoured Aboul Fotouh's
more  consensual  approach  (Hafez,  2013).  After  the  July  2013 military  coup,  both  parties  tried  to
mediate between the MB and the military, and publicly opposed the use of violence in Egypt by any
side of the conflict. The post-coup setting is nonetheless more difficult to assess. Many members and
304 In the meantime, one can refer to their temporary political programmes in hizb al-bina' wal-tanmiyya (2012) and al-hizb
al-islami (2013).
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leaders of these groups were arrested or left Egypt. The BDP and the IP joined an alliance of political
parties  supporting  the  reinstatement  of  Morsi's  presidency.  Dissonant  views  appeared  in  the  IG
leadership  on  the  appropriate  position  to  adopt,  but  the  group  generally  maintained  its  internal
cohesion. The IP articulated a vague support for Morsi and, according to field research, its members
and leaders preferred to stay under the radar for fear of arrest. 
6.6. CONCLUSION
This  chapter  has  argued  that  an  investigation  of  militant  groups'  evolution  has  to  include  their
consideration of non-violent alternatives to armed jihad. Islamist militant groups indeed cannot merely
be studied through their evolving use of violence without investigating their evolving positions on its
alternatives  in  changing  circumstances.  This  study  is  not  limited  to  militant  groups'  potential
renunciations  of  violence  and of  its  legitimacy  in  Muslim countries,  as  investigated  in  the  fourth
chapter of this thesis. This consideration additionally includes the study of the internal and external
factors which facilitate the emergence of credible alternatives, including the joining of the political
process.
The first main argument presented in this chapter is that, at a societal level, militant groups' refusal to
engage  in  party  politics  cannot  be  studied  solely  at  a  theological  or  ideological  level  without
considering the macro-level environment in which these groups'  operate. This research has notably
insisted on the crucial contextualisation of militant groups' positions on democracy with the positions
adopted by other groups and movements located in their  social  movement families.  In Egypt,  this
research  has  demonstrated  that  the  structural  context  defining  Mubarak's  regime  during  his  three
decades reign was semi-authoritarian and prevented the development of credible electoral alternatives
to violence. This analysis has additionally contended that the structural context between 1981 and 2011
has shaped the evolution of the IG and JG's two main Islamist competitors, namely the MB and the
salafi  trend. This setting specifically accounts for the choice of the MB and mainstream salafis  to
distance themselves from the supporters of violence after 1981, and to mobilise their ideational and
organisational  resources  into  political  participation  for  the  MB,  and  non-violent  and  apolitical
preaching for the salafis. This environment contextualises the absence of interactions inside the Islamist
social movement family and the lack of credibility of political participation before 2011. This context
additionally accounts for the IG and JG's unwillingness to legitimise party politics before the uprising.
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This chapter has explored the construction of the IG and JG's collective group identities since their
emergence. In line with the argument presented throughout this thesis, this chapter has argued that
these groups' collective identities are informed by their early mobilising patterns. This analysis has
demonstrated that these two groups produced an explicit primordial identity in their early days which
has  formed  their  collective  identities  and  shaped  the  meanings  associated  with  their  members'
collective  belongings.  The  IG's  non-violent  theoretical  endeavour  promoted  low-risk  activism
mobilising  patterns  which  have  subsequently  facilitated  the  development  of  shared  organisational
norms, including the assimilation of the group's collective identity and the legitimisation of its internal
hierarchy. In the JG, the violent endeavour pursued since the group's emergence has prevented the
development of low-risk mobilising patterns and has obstructed the replication of similar processes.
This chapter has finally demonstrated that the construction of these groups' collective identities has
informed their positions on the political process after 2011. While increased interactions with other
Islamist trends and the latter's broad legitimisation of party politics after the uprising contextualises the
IG and JG's evolving positions on political participation, only an analysis of their meso-level dynamics
can explain the consensual creation of a political party by the IG and the JG failure to reach a similar
outcome. In this case, the IG's successful organisational reconstruction and subsequent joining of the
political process were facilitated by the existence of shared organisational norms and by the ability of
its leaders to internally reform their group and to draw on its primordial identity to demonstrate the
continuity with this new strategic direction. A few JG leaders similarly utilised their group's primordial
identity  to  legitimise  the  same  choice,  although  pre-2011  organisational  divisions  hindered  a
consensual legitimisation of party politics.
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CHAPTER 7
CONCLUSION
7.1.  THIS  THESIS'  GENERAL ARGUMENT  APPLIED  TO  THE  ISLAMIC  AND  JIHAD
GROUPS
This thesis has theorised and systematically compared the evolution of the Egyptian Islamic and Jihad
groups  from  their  emergence  to  the  post-2011  uprising.  The  comparative  study  of  these  groups'
ideological construction, use of violence and non-violent transformation has demonstrated the existence
of a path-dependent model accounting for their diverging ideational and organisational evolutions in
similar environmental conditions.
The  IG's  emergence  as  a  group  of  friends  who  socialised  collectively  before  the  endorsement  of
violence against the Egyptian regime substantially affected its subsequent evolution. The time-frame
preceding the legitimisation of armed jihad against the Egyptian regime promoted low-risk activism
mobilising patterns which helped to create strong ties between the group's early leaders and to shape
the foundations of its collective identity as a proselytising (daʿwa) movement.  The combination of
these complementary factors facilitated the internalisation and legitimisation of shared organisational
norms, including collective decision making processes and deference to the group's internal hierarchy.
The IG's early organisational norms combined with the embrace of the salafi discursive tradition have
informed the development  of the group's  theologico-political  framework.  The IG's adoption of the
salafi discursive tradition has shaped its engagement with its competitors and galvanised the defence of
the group's orthodoxy in diverse framing contests with its Islamic contenders. The  salafi discursive
tradition circumscribed the IG's reinterpretation of formerly held political prescriptions with regards,
specifically, to the status of the Muslim leader who does not apply Islamic law comprehensively. Early
organisational norms also facilitated the group's rearticulation of its theologico-political framework as a
result of external stimuli and internal learning processes. These norms helped to preserve the continuity
of the group's consensual decision making processes, and facilitated the sustainability of its ideological
cohesion despite occasional differences of views between IG leaders.
The transformation of the IG's organisational structure throughout the 1990s had a profound impact on
the  group's  interpretation  of  changing state  policies  and subsequent  use  of  violence.  The cycle  of
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contention triggered by the new Minister of Interior in the late 1980s diminished the IG's command and
control over its followers, and altered the group's evolving preferences for the use of violence. While
the IG's organisational cohesion initially muted internal calls for revenge and armed retaliation, IG
leaders later orchestrated a few limited armed operations, which resulted in the imprisonment or exile
of the group's ground leadership.  Heavy handed policing of protests then disrupted remaining IG's
internal organisational control and aggravated the use of violence by IG members at  a local level,
especially in the South of the country. Surviving IG members initially targeted the security services and
their  collaborators,  while  the  IG's  popular  support  helped  to  provide  accurate  information  on  IG
opponents. Eventually, their societal isolation triggered a spiral of encapsulation which was fuelled by
local and ideational grievances against Coptic Christians and foreign tourists, and accounts for their
indiscriminate targeting to avenge themselves against perceived state allies.
The shared organisational norms established in the IG's early days facilitated the group's theological
renunciations of violence as well as its non-violent transformation after the 2011 Egyptian uprising.
While the IG did not explicitly endorse party politics before 2011, the transformation into a political
party was facilitated by the broad legitimacy enjoyed by political participation in the Islamist social
movement family after  2011, and by increased interactions with other  Islamist  groups.  IG leaders'
consensual  decision  to  join  the  political  process  was  internally  legitimised  by  reference  to  their
followers'  self-understanding of the IG as  a  proselytising (daʿwa)  movement.  The IG has thus  re-
framed the interpretation of the group's  collective group identity in a new macro setting,  with the
contention that political participation is the most suitable means to promote religion and that violence
was historically merely used in legitimate self-defence against the state.
The  emergence  of  JG  cells  in  the  1970s  substantially  contrasts  with  the  IG,  and  reveals  the
development of a distinctive path dependent model. In this case, the early legitimisation of armed jihad
against the Egyptian regime hindered the development of shared organisational norms. Early JG cells
were characterised from their inception by multiple security dilemmas sparked by the high-risk nature
of their endeavour, which essentially hindered low-risk activism mobilising patterns. The absence of
shared organisational norms and strong ties between JG members and leaders exacerbated internal
suspicion, and reinforced internal competition over (ideational and material) resources. These groups
repeatedly split over tactical, strategic and personal issues, and failed to exploit an initially favourable
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macro environment to establish a cohesive entity.
The JG's early days affected its subsequent ideational evolution.  The emergence of JG cells in the
fringe  of  the  broader  salafi  movement  provided  a  salafi theological  legacy  which,  as  in  the  IG,
constrained the range of possible reinterpretations of the group's theologico-political framework. In
contrast  with  the  IG,  however,  the  absence  of  shared  organisational  norms  uniting  JG  members
obstructed the development of a consensual ideological development. The JG failed to solve internal
ideological disagreements consensually, and was frequently faced with organisational splits as a result.
In addition, JG cells were more extensively influenced by external developments, especially by the
emergence of a competitive salafi jihadi social movement industry in the Afghan-Pakistani border area
in the early 1990s. A JG faction eventually joined AQ outside of Egypt, a decision facilitated by the
absence of constraining norms of decision making on its leader at the time. Conversely, JG imprisoned
members who, as in the IG, realised that armed violence yielded more damage than benefits did not
manage to consensually renounce its theological legitimacy, due to the absence of internally legitimised
organisational norms which could have set out the foundations of internal dialogue.
Early organisational impediments to the JG's internal cohesion were never surmounted, and affected the
group's resort to armed violence by the end of the 1980s. In spite of the collective imprisonment of
many jihad groups' leaders and members after 1981, pre-prison security dilemmas triggered by the lack
of trust between them persisted, and attempts to unite and to create a cohesive entity quickly faded. The
use of violence by JG-affiliated individuals during the post-1986 cycle of contention was affected by
the absence of shared organisational norms. While the IG's initial organisational control muted internal
calls  for  revenge  against  the  security  services,  the  absence  of  analogous  norms  inside  JG  cells
stimulated, at a very early stage, the proliferation of local armed actions against security personnel. In
addition, JG leaders dwelling outside of Egypt subsequently ordered a few armed attacks contradicting
the  group's  long-term objectives  to  reassert  the  JG's  internal  and  external  credibility,  which  were
deemed vital to the group's organisational survival. The absence of internalised organisational norms
consequently rendered the JG more susceptible to internal and external challenges. 
Internal discord obstructed the transformation of the JG into a political party after the 2011 uprising.
While many JG members and leaders, including opponents of the theological renunciation of violence
252 / 314
before 2011, have been influenced by the nearly consensual legitimisation of party politics among
Egyptian  salafi  movements,  the  absence  of  consensual  norms  of  decision  making  thwarted  initial
attempts to join the political process as a group. Diverging organisational dynamics and the absence of
a controlled collective group identity mediated macro-level change differently from the IG. Individuals
affiliated with the JG created a political party, whereas others decided to focus on other endeavours
such  as  peaceful  proselytisation  and  the  mobilisation  for  the  Syrian  jihad.  Those  who  joined  the
political  process  internally  legitimised  this  decision  by  re-framing  the  group's  jihadi avant-garde
collective group identity, arguing that the use of weapons in jihad is only legitimate against autocratic
regimes.
7.2. GENERALISING THIS RESEARCH'S FINDINGS
This research has endeavoured to theorise militant groups' evolution across cases with a small-n case-
study research design. The analysis of the Islamic and Jihad groups contextualised them in their multi-
level environments and in consideration of the positions of external actors, including the state and these
groups' opponents and contenders. This thesis has argued that these groups' ideological and behavioural
evolutions stem from internal processes and dialogues informed by changing environmental conditions.
This  research's  investigation  of  rich  empirical  data  with  a  process  tracing  methodology  and  its
reference  to  the  literature  on  political  violence  and  social  movements  have  bolstered  the  internal
validity of this comparative case study,
The generalisability of this research is nonetheless faced with two possible caveats. The first issue is
inherent within the development of a path dependent case study research design. It would be erroneous
to assume that this conceptualisation implies that these groups' evolution was entirely predetermined
and could not have materialised differently. A structuralist and determinist path is not endorsed in this
thesis, which, by a meticulous focus on points of rupture, posits that these groups' paths could have
been substantially altered in specific instances. This research recognises these groups' agencies, and
only infers that the IG and the JG's early days shaped certain mobilising patterns, which informed these
groups' subsequent developments.
An associated warning concerns this research's external validity, and the professed endeavour to be
generally relevant to the study of militant groups evolving in semi-authoritarian regimes. Considering
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this research's contextualised focus on Egypt, to what extent can this analysis of the Islamic and Jihad
groups contribute to the study of Islamist and non-Islamist groups evolving in different settings? The
following discussion focuses on four important themes in the study of political violence, which benefit
substantially from this thesis' analytical insights: (1) the debate on the correlation between political
violence and democracy, (2) militant groups' organisational legacies, (3) the study of militant groups'
beliefs and (4) the investigation of the construction of their tactical and strategic approaches.
7.2.1. Debating Violence and Democracy
This  research's  first  contribution  to  the  academic  literature  concerns  the  debate  on  the  impact  of
political exclusion and repression on opposition movements. Political violence and social movements
studies  have  hitherto  broadly  defended two antagonistic  positions.  The  first  contention  posits  that
political exclusion combined with some patterns of repression explains opposition groups'  resort to
violence  when  non-violent  alternatives  to  political  change  disappear.  Violence  is  accordingly
understood as a rational choice calculus to achieve political objectives. The contending position asserts
that militant groups do not necessarily believe in political participation, which they often denounce.
This perspective argues that violence is caused by an array of material or ideational factors, stretching
from socio-economic environmental change and individual alienation to radical ideologies.
This thesis has addressed these apparently contradictory findings and proposed that political inclusion
and repression should be disaggregated. While exclusion and repression are often combined in semi-
authoritarian regimes, their impact on opposition movements (both violent and non-violent) should be
differentiated.
Semi-authoritarian  regimes'  political  configuration  informs  opposition  groups'  ideological  and
behavioural developments.  Opposition groups evolve in  a specific macro-level environment,  which
delineates available opportunities to achieve their objectives. While these groups believe in a set of
principles, which defines their core commitments as this concluding chapter later argues, the endeavour
to  pursue  their  objectives  combined  with  the  necessity  to  survive  in  a  precarious  environment
additionally contextualise the construction of their political choices. The macro-level environment in
which opposition groups' evolve specifically informs their ideational and organisational developments,
through  the  mobilisation  of  internal  (cultural  and  organisational)  resources.  A closing  of  political
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opportunity  can,  for  instance,  trigger  a  public  retreat  on some controversial  positions  to  protect  a
movement's survival. In other cases, refusing to participate in a discredited political system can be a
very political decision, whereas an unprecedented opportunity to achieve a group's objectives through
political  participation  can  motivate  a  reinterpretation  of  previous  opposition  to  party  politics.  The
organisational sustainability of these paradigmatic cases relies primarily on these groups' meso-level
dynamics.  For  this  research,  what  matters is  that  political  inclusion and exclusion are not  directly
correlated to opposition group's  decision to resort  to violence,  even though political  exclusion can
exacerbate armed contention.
This research has demonstrated that the use of violence is primarily correlated with evolving policing
of  protests  mediated  by  militant  groups'  organisational  dynamics.  Although  violent  ideologies
occasionally precede political repression, the modalities of violence (including its timing, selectivity
and intensity) have to be understood in relational patterns located at the meso-level, in militant groups'
interpretation and construction of a changing policing of protest. Opposition groups might pursue a
violent endeavour irrespectively of repression; however, an ideational emphasis is not always sufficient
to explain when and how violence is used. Only in some limited cases the importance of ideational
commitments prevails over these groups' contentious conflict with the state in accounting for the use of
violence. Violence is primarily the outcome of internal and external relational processes. The decision
to use violence has to be contextualised with these groups' internal dynamics, including their evolving
decision making processes and command and control over their followers, and in interactions with
external actors, including the state and these groups' opponents and contenders.
Political exclusion and the absence of non-violent alternatives to political change can exacerbate the
use of violence, even though they do not directly trigger violent contention. The exclusion of non-
violent  opposition  movements  can  discredit  semi-authoritarian  regimes'  legitimacy,  bolster  militant
groups' credibility and frame salience, and stimulate public support on the ground. Although this macro
setting does not necessarily mean that militant  groups will  be able to exploit  this  opportunity,  the
populace  is  generally  more  likely  to  side  with  them when non-violent  alternatives  are  exhausted.
Popular support potentially gathered locally by armed militants can generate the provision of crucial
sources of information on the security forces and their collaborators, which are necessary to accurately
target them and threaten the regime's control. In turn, this development can reinforce the fears of a
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semi-authoritarian regime and aggravate the cycle of contention by strengthening internal support for
these  groups'  eradication.  Political  exclusion  can  additionally  influence  militant  groups'  internal
dynamics  and reinforce the perception that  violence is  the only way forward,  hence marginalising
dissenting positions.
This thesis has finally revealed the existence of an additional instance whereby militant groups use
violence irrespectively of political inclusion and exclusion. In this case, the use of violence cannot be
merely explained by state repression against an opposition group, which later adopts an antagonistic
position  and  legitimises  armed  violence.  This  case  is  relatively  rare,  and  can  occur  in  relatively
inclusive  political  regimes,  which  do  not  actively  repress  their  opponents.  In  such  instances,  the
consideration of a proactive agency to pursue radical political change prevails over the study of these
regimes' macro-level configuration. Militants can be affected by a combination of emotions, revenge,
empathic solidarity for others and a desire to pursue a grand endeavour,  which sparks radicalising
processes and motivates their legitimisation of violence even in relatively liberal regimes. This pattern
is relatively rare and, as with other forms of violence, has to be similarly contextualised at a meso-level
to comprehend its peculiar modalities.
7.2.2. Militant Groups' Organisational Legacies
The previous  section  has  thoroughly  emphasised  the  importance  of  militant  groups'  organisational
dynamics. According to the argument developed throughout this thesis, their investigation should start
from the premise that militant groups do not emerge in a vacuum, but originate in a specific context,
which accounts for their early mobilising patterns. This perspective contends that diverging mobilising
patterns can trigger specific path dependent models, which inform these groups' early developments,
although initial impediments can be potentially surmounted.
The first insight of social movement studies is that militant groups often stem from a broader social
movement family (SMF). Their SMF is defined by a specific world-view, modes of organisation and
position in society. These factors contextualise whether these groups' SMF promotes societal status quo
or  more  confrontational  approaches.  They  equally  account  for  militant  groups  and  their  SMF's
engagement  with  society,  as  well  as  for  the  opportunities  and  impediments  to  their  respective
expansion. Militant groups and their SMF can, for instance, benefit from discursive opportunities if
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they promote long term objectives aligned with societal developments, but merely differ on the means
to achieve them. These discursive opportunities can constrain militant groups' ideational construction
and curb their ability to cross certain red-lines, within society and within their SMF. 
Militant groups' SMF give them a certain ideational (possibly theological for  salafi  groups) legacy,
which informs their early mobilising patterns and framing processes. The contextualisation of militant
groups'  emergence  within  a  broader  SMF specifically  determines  the  articulation  of  their  internal
legitimisation for violence. In many cases, these groups emerge in times of crisis when they are more
susceptible  to  convincing new sympathisers that,  while they still  believe in  their  SMF's long term
objectives, the latter's tactical approach has proven unsuccessful and should be dramatically changed.
The  consideration  of  militant  groups'  broader  SMF  can  reinforce  these  groups'  legitimisation  of
violence,  or  impede  their  expansion,  depending  on  their  SMF's  perceived  effectiveness.  Militant
groups' emergence in a broader SMF therefore determines their initial developments. 
This research’s central argument has demonstrated that the timing of these groups' legitimisation of
violence is crucial to explain their initial modes of organisation. When a group does not immediately
legitimise  the  use  of  violence,  the  time  period  preceding  the  latter  facilitates  low-risk  activism
mobilising patterns, which help to strengthen the ties between its leaders and members, and contributes
to the creation of shared organisational norms. Conversely, an immediate legitimisation of violence
triggers multiple security dilemmas, which prevent similar developments and reinforce mistrust and
internal competition. In such instances, micro-mobilisation is more likely to be circumscribed to trusted
networks  of  acquaintances  and  friends.  Militant  groups'  organisational  structures  are  therefore
inherently related to their early developments.
The  type  of  organisation  initially  created  by  militant  groups  eventually  informs  their  subsequent
evolution. Although these groups' future cannot be mechanically determined from their early days, the
conditions in which they emerge present a set of impediments and opportunities affecting their future
prospects. The legitimisation of consensual norms of decision making processes and the acceptance of
a  group's  internal  hierarchy  are  particularly  important  in  accounting  for  the  survival  of  a  group's
internal  cohesion  in  changing  external  conditions.  The  absence  of  shared  organisational  norms
combined with internal suspicion and competition between a group's members, on the other hand, often
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sparks  internal  splits  in  similar  environments.  Even  though  a  militant  group  can  overcome  these
obstacles, their importance should not be underestimated.
Finally,  militant  groups'  organisational  legacies  influence  their  behavioural  and  ideational
developments.  As posited  in  the previous  section,  organisational  dynamics  and norms mediate  the
impact of changing state policies towards militant groups and determine their interpretation of macro-
level change. Organisational norms indicate the level of command and control exerted by a group's
leadership, and helps to establish the latter's role in the use of violence. Moreover, the study of these
groups'  organisational  dynamics  illustrate  whether  they  can  (and  have)  assimilated  past  learning
processes in response to a combination of internal retrospections and external stimuli, and adapted their
views accordingly. The resilience of these norms can also mean that, while some individuals might
object  to  some  of  their  group's  (past  or  current)  policies,  they  still  abide  by  collective  decisions
regardless of their personal positions.
7.2.3. Revisiting the Role of Ideas
This research has defended an ideational perspective situated between the two paradigmatic positions
widely defended in the literature.  The first academic position has traditionally emphasised militant
groups'  rationality  and  their  endeavour  to  survive  in  precarious  environments,  postulating  that
ideational developments are epiphenomena broadly susceptible to material changes. These rationalist
considerations tend to analyse ideas as a mere tool kit, and to overlook their potentially constraining
impacts  on  their  holders.  The  second  academic  perspective  has  leaned  towards  essentialist
considerations of militant group's ideational frameworks, including through the study of the influence
of  religious  cults  and  radical  ideologies.  In  sharp  contrast  with  rationalist  considerations,  this
perspective usually disregards militant groups' discursive work.
This thesis has endorsed a relational consideration of militant groups' ideational developments situated
between rationalist and essentialist perspectives. This approach to the study of ideas is more closely
aligned with recent developments in social movement studies and social network analysis, which posits
that  militant  groups'  ideational  construction  has  to  be  studied  relationally.  This  thesis  adds  that
ideational considerations are broader than the usual study of militant groups' ideologies, and include
internal and external relational dimensions as well.
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The internal-relational dimension of militant groups' ideational developments refers to the meanings
attached to one's belonging to a group. These meanings include these members' emotional ties to one
another  and  to  their  leaders,  their  self-identification  with  the  group's  collective  identity  and  their
acceptance of the groups'  organisational norms (including decision making processes and a group's
internal hierarchy).  These norms often stem from these groups'  emergence,  as the previous section
argued, even though they can be infused subsequently. Their strength varies across cases and differently
regulate the impact of external stimuli on militant groups overtime. These norms are constraining on
these groups' followers as well as on their leaders, whose legitimacy often relies on their appropriate
handling of these norms to legitimise new directions.
The second relational dimension is external. Militant groups interact with other actors (including allies,
contenders, opponents, and the state) in relational patterns circumscribed by the macro environment in
which  they  operate.  This  research  has  notably  expounded  on  the  role  played  by  militant  groups'
interactions with their  broader social  movement family,  and contended that they can generate very
distinctive  outcomes.  When  militant  groups  are  pursued  and  repressed  at  national  and  (possibly)
international levels (for instance in the early 1990s in Afghanistan and Pakistan), their interactions with
a competitive social movement industry can radicalise them. The so-called radical fringe effect refers to
a process of ideological radicalisation caused by the necessity felt by militant groups to differentiate
themselves to survive in a precarious environment. Conversely, a liberalised political environment (for
instance post-2011 Egypt) has proven more conducive to cooperation and ideological acclimatisation,
through  a  legitimisation  of  party  politics  rendered  possible  by  a  combination  of  new  political
opportunities, interactions with other groups and the development of ideational resources legitimising
this choice. These two cases are context-specific and are highly contingent on these groups' internal
dynamics. They nonetheless clearly establish that militant groups cannot be isolated from their external
interactions with other actors.
At a micro level, militant groups' members can additionally be affected by direct or indirect interactions
with external actors. These interactions concern, for instance, their emotional identification with the
suffering of others, such as Muslims under foreign occupation in Islamic cases. These precedents are
particularly salient for Islamist groups, considering the broad legitimacy enjoyed by armed jihad for
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Muslims living under foreign occupation. Emotional ties can trigger micro mobilisation in external
terrain,  regardless  of  militant  groups'  raison  d'être.  This  external  relational  consideration  revives
individual  agency  beyond  rational  calculus,  considering  that  fighting  for  external  actors  is  less
intelligible for strictly rationalist analyses.
Finally, militant groups' ideational study includes the investigation of their ideological commitments.
This thesis has contended that militant groups' ideologies are better studied as a set of core principles
embedded in a  certain ideational  framework (for  salafi  groups,  the  salafi  discursive tradition)  and
mediated by these groups' organisational dynamics. These core principles form a group's primordial
identity and the meanings attached to the membership of its followers. They shape the foundations of a
group's ideological commitments and constrain a group's reinterpretation of the past and general ability
to adapt to changing circumstances. These core commitments are usually enriched in later stages by
various framing contests opposing these groups to their opponents and contenders. These processes
result  in  the  creation  of  a  broad  and  coherent  world  view reflecting  debates  and  themes  deemed
important in these groups' social movement families and societies.
In line with the debate on militant groups' deradicalisation and disengagement from armed violence,
this research has posited that these groups' primordial identity does not substantially change over time,
although their tactical  and strategic objectives (also studied as these groups'  political prescriptions)
might  be  substantially  altered.  Militant  organisations  that  have  defined  their raison  d'être  as
proselytisation or jihad do not easily renounce the ideational commitments they theoretically embraced
for decades. In changing macro circumstances and in subordination to these groups' ability to utilise
internal  regulations  to  legitimise  new  choices,  militant  groups  might  recant  the  relevance  and
applicability of their  former commitments without disavowing their  initial  objectives. Even though
individuals  might  fully  revise  these  objectives  as  well,  internal  group regulations  often hinder  the
diffusion of these ideas at an organisational level.
7.2.4. Studying the Construction of Militant Groups' Tactical and Strategic Objectives
This thesis has contended that the construction of militant groups' tactical and strategic approaches to
political action and violence has to be contextualised in the multi-level environments in which they
operate, and in consideration of internal and external relational patterns. Militant groups' rationalist
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understandings are notably inadequate if  they simultaneously overlook these groups'  organisational
dynamics  and the constraints  and opportunities associated with them. Militant  groups'  evolution is
better studied in continuity and change, with a focus on specific points of rupture in their ideational and
behavioural developments. 
This  research has argued that  militant  groups'  early days  are  critical  to  the understanding of their
subsequent  evolution.  The  conditions  in  which  these  groups  emerge  inform  the  development  of
multiple norms, which regulate their short-term tactical choices and the construction of their long-term
objectives.  Militant  groups'  early  days  notably  define  their  primordial  collective  identities,  and
determine their abilities to establish shared organisational norms, including the legitimisation of an
internal hierarchy and of consensual decision making processes. 
 
The study of militant groups' tactical and strategic choices consequently necessitates to move beyond
the strategic black box which often characterise them in the literature. A legitimate rejection of flawed
considerations  of  militant  groups  as  irrational  lunatics  should  not  be  substituted  by  exclusively
rationalist perspectives. While acknowledging these groups' rationality, this research has demonstrated
that rationalist paradigms have to be contextualised with these groups' organisational and ideational
dynamics  and in  consideration of  external  interactions  with  other  actors.  The construction of  new
tactical  and  strategic  objectives  is  notably  contingent  on  these  groups'  ideational  commitments
contextualised  with  their  decision  making  processes,  organisational  cohesion  and level  of  internal
command and control. In this case-study, an Islamist group which has long emphasised its solidarity
with fellow Muslims under occupation or its endeavour to implement a constitutional order based on
Islamic Law is likely to be constrained ideationally by these commitments. In addition, the analysis of
militant groups' organisational dynamics include the study of internal framing processes designed to
legitimise new objectives in the eye of these groups' members. It should indeed not be assumed that
lower-ranking  members  blindly  follow  their  leaders,  even  in  militant  groups  characterised  by
hierarchical structures and internal discipline.
Militant groups'  transformation is not a unidirectional process. In this thesis, the two groups under
study have gradually (and to varying degrees) rejected the legitimacy of violence in Islamic countries
under semi-authoritarian regimes and joined the political process. They internalised the lessons of their
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failure  to  accomplish  their  objectives  in  Egypt  and  recognised  that  violence  was  tactically  and
strategically wrong. This analysis does not mean, however, that these processes cannot be revised and
reversed. Changing macro conditions, such as an unprecedented wave of repression combined with
militant groups' organisational weakening could trigger a re-legitimisation of violence if these groups
leaderships' were not able to maintain internal control over their followers. A heavy-handed policing of
protest could additionally alter previous learning processes and influence their tactical choices in the
short term.
7.3. FUTURE RESEARCH
This research's study of the evolution of two Egyptian militant groups has opened multiple academic
avenues for future research. New academic studies can build upon this thesis in complementary ways,
stretching from its methodological and philosophical premises to more detailed studies of its internal
mechanisms in various settings.
Future research can apply this thesis' central findings to other militant groups evolving in Islamist and
non-Islamist  environments.  This  research's  path-dependency  model  has  not  been  designed  to  be
applicable to Egypt only, and has strived to be relevant to other cases of armed militancy in semi-
authoritarian regimes. The guidelines presented in this concluding chapter can therefore be potentially
applied  to  idiosyncratic  cases,  or  serve as  a  foundation  to  larger  comparative  case  study research
designs. New studies can notably enhance the generalisability of this research by refining its theoretical
framework, or discover irregular cases which might apparently contradict some of its findings.
The generalisability of this research's argument can be improved in mixed-method case study research
designs. Future research can notably utilise new mixed-method methodologies, including qualitative
comparative analysis (QCA), to compare numerous groups (typically between 5 to 15 groups) evolving
in  different  environmental  conditions  in  order  to  test  the  sufficiency  and  necessity  of  the  factors
introduced in this thesis. A larger comparative case-study could additionally help to refine this thesis'
argument  by elaborating comparatively on some elements  which can be deemed peculiar  to  salafi
groups (such as the salafi discursive tradition which has constrained their ideational development).
New case studies  can reveal  the existence of “deviant” militant  groups,  whose evolution does not
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follow the two routes defined in  this  thesis.  Two main types of groups can be differentiated.  One
possibility would be the study of a group which emerged, as in the IG, as a mass movement, endorsed
the use of violence against a semi-authoritarian regime subsequently, and eventually divided in the JG
model. The other type of group would include an array of cells which legitimised armed violence at a
very early stage and then managed to unite despite the numerous obstacles to unification presented in
this thesis.305 The existence of these deviant cases would not contradict this thesis' central argument, but
would rather contribute to the improvement of its scope conditions and to the discovery of intermediate
steps in militant groups' path-dependent evolution which can fundamentally affect their development.
Two interesting  cases  are  Hizbullah  and the  Islamic  State  Organisation.  Hizbullah's  organisational
origins can be traced back to a plurality of groups which did not interact before the group's gradual
aggregation between 1982 and 1985. Despite these initial organisational divisions, Hizbullah managed,
over time, to reinforce its internal structure, create shared organisational norms and establish a strong
collective group identity. In this case, the group's evolution in a sectarian civil-war environment, the
external support provided by Iran and the related provision of a strong unifying ideology have arguably
helped to overcome organisational barriers to unification. This case would demonstrate that a group
characterised by early organisational divisions can eventually develop shared norms necessary to its
survival.
Another important case is the Islamic State Organisation. A priori,  this group developed on the JG
model  and eventually  managed  to  expand  and develop  a  cohesive  organisational  structure  despite
similar obstacles. In this case, a thorough investigation would focus on Camp Bucca detention facility,
where most current ISO leaders met and developed interpersonal ties and shared organisational norms,
which proved crucial a few years later, after their liberation.306 Their detention in the same prison and
their  fight  against  the  same external  enemy  in  a  civil  war  environment  arguably  helped  to  unify
organisational (provided by Baathist pre-2003 networks) and ideational resources (based on a  salafi
jihadi approach to Islam) between differentiated networks.
Finally, considering the fundamental role played by evolving social networks in this comparative case
305 Staniland  (2014:  35-58)  has  already  highlighted  some  important  factors  which  can  crucially  affect  these  groups'
evolution.
306 The most comprehensive study of this group, which presents thoroughly this line of argument, has been undertaken by
Weiss & Hassan (2015)
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study, a new research agenda could investigate the arguments presented in this thesis with a social
network  analysis  theoretical  framework.  Social  network  analysis  has  exponentially  focused on the
study of social networks' evolution and on meaning makings, which are central to this thesis' argument.
New research could synthesise the evolution of militant groups'  networking typologies in changing
external conditions, and theorise the interactions between their leaderships and their followers with a
social  network  theoretical  approach.  This  theoretical  conceptualisation  would  notably  enhance  the
replicability and generalisability of this thesis.
This research on political violence has demonstrated that academic research on armed militancy can be
empirically  rich,  theoretically  and methodologically  rigorous,  and  be  faithful  to  these  actors'  self-
understandings. This philosophical approach ought to be replicated in new studies of armed violence,
which should be reflective about the shortcomings which have affected this field of inquiry for many
decades.
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